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The nexus between the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in 
Africa is underpinned by the recognition that the Security Council is the supreme organ 
of the UN; and its reform saga is a conundrum to Africa’s peacebuilding and security 
praxis. In assortment of ways, this study observes that the Council is created in 
atmospheres of major realpolitik and has unrepentantly deprived the African continent for 
70 seventy years, of meaningful contribution. As the harbinger for global peace and 
security, the Council lacks geographic representativity and is bias towards Africa’s real 
peace which has fanned insecurity paradigm in the continent. The study recognises that 
African inclusion into the permanent chambers of the Council will entrench Africa’s role 
for global security and armistice. The African exclusion matrix is a clearly-thought-out 
strategy of the imperial forces in the Permanent Five (P5) which has processed economic 
deprivation - making the continent perpetually dependent on imperial powers, and 
politically marginalised - keeping the same at the periphery of the pot of global politics 
since 1945. In the current global community, peace in Africa is a call of worldwide 
significance due largely to the observation that, conflicts in Africa accounts for over 
calculated 70% of world conflicts. Conflicts destroy the pillars for peace and terminate 
Africa’s interest to succeed in containing insecurity regime in the region and elsewhere. 
Conversely, lack of Council’s restructuring has reinforced insecurity regime, and 
exacerbated the dependency syndrome in the thinking-faculty of African leaders. 
Actually, some African nations are with necessary capabilities to become permanent 
members of the Security Council, but US and allies are against African inclusion on the 
altar of maintaining the status quo and retaining the exclusive core for a realist outlook 
that, the League of Nations and United Nations are children of World Wars I and II 
respectively. However, the study among other things learnt that dependency on external 
actors and marginalisation of Africa may continue until Africa speaks one word with one 
voice. That is, to demand permanent seat with veto or simultaneously withdraws 
membership from the UN through the AU’s common front. The study, essentially, 
extended the frontiers of existing knowledge and expanded the horizons of facts on the 




Background and Outline of Research Problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Given its enduring crusade for democratisation across the globe, the United Nations (UN) 
was expected to fully return the Council to democracy before its entire constituent 
member nations became democracies, and yet it remains the most undemocratic global 
institution in the world. Pertinent to test is, is it because democratisation is unrelated in 
the current international system or because the assumption on which this prediction was 
based is false? Caron, (1993: 552) opines that, sometimes it is about situating the 
determinant actor. His words, it is not “what principle (democracy or dictatorship) is 
acknowledged, but who is accepted as the authoritative interpreter of the principle, or, to 
put it in institutional terms, how does the process of legitimisation works.” Essentially, 
the UN was created on 24 October 1945 with six main organs, namely: General 
Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council1 
(inactive since 1994), International Court of Justice (ICJ), and Secretariat (United 
Nations Charter, 1945: 4).  
Informed by the roles of the UN various organs, the Security Council is the most 
powerful organ of the UN. It is charged with the maintenance of global peace and order 
and seats fifteen members (Cox, 2009). Five of which: China, France, Russian 
Federation, the United States (US), and the United Kingdom (UK), are the P5 empowered 
with a veto. The remaining members are elected from the UN regions — Africa, 
Americas, Asia pacific, and Europe —  as follows: three from Africa, two from Asia, two 
from Latin America and the Caribbean, two from Western Europe and others, and one 
from Eastern Europe. The non-permanent members hold their seats for two years and 
cannot be immediately re-elected (Ronzitti, 2010: 5). Since the UN inception at the end 
                                                          
1In 1945, when the United Nations was established, there were eleven territories (mostly in Africa and in the Pacific Ocean) that were 
placed under international supervision. The major goals of the Trusteeship System were to promote the advancement of the inhabitants 
of Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government or independence. The Trusteeship Council is 
composed of the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the 
United States). Each member has one vote, and decisions are made by a simple majority. Since the last Trust Territory — Palau, 
formerly administered by the United States — achieved self-government in 1994, the Council has formally suspended operations after 
nearly half a century. It will meet only as the need arises. 
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of World War II there had been persistent call by its regions. Egypt, Nigeria, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, have primarily called for the Council reform with a view to 
including Africa in the Council’s veto-holding permanent category. The advocates of this 
position argue that the inclusion of Africa in this category will enable Africa influence 
the overall Council’s decisions, policies and agenda. 
After seven decades of calls for reformation of the Council, no meaningful reform has 
taken place. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), at the 68thUnited Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) plenary session in November 2013, in consonance with 
(1992, 2004, 2009,) previous reform calls, resurrected the reform debates. The African 
Union (AU) unanimously made a key demand, voting for overhauling and rehabilitation 
of the Security Council to include streamlined working methods and a broader, more 
representative membership that reflected geopolitical realities and regional 
representations in the permanent seat of the Council (African Union, 2005: 7). Africa’s 
calls is predicated on the notion that the current configuration of the UNSC is chiefly 
discriminatory, entirely not democratic, truly lacks balance, endangers global peace and 
security prospects, and actually stoke and breeds conflict in non-permanent regions of the 
UN, of which Africa is one (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 17).2 Therefore, Africa calls for 
reform not only to entrench balance so as to be able to survive within a balanced and 
ordered structure, but actually, as action prerequisite to secure its house from total 
decimation. Across Africa, adage plays important role in understanding situations around 
humanity. May be inspired by one of the Igbo adages, African countries such as Egypt, 
Nigeria, and South Africa, to mention a few, has stepped forward to represent Africa at 
the permanent chamber of the Council at different times. But none of these attempts 
drafted Africa unto the permanent seat of the Council (Akpotor and Egbebaku, 2010: 52), 
hence, the questions: what are the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion 
from the United Nations Security Council permanent seat? How has the exclusion 
impacted on Africa’s peacebuilding architecture and what lessons are there for Africa? 
                                                          
2 For Africa the push for permanent seat on the Security Council is weaved into an Igbo adage that says: 
Onye oku n’ agba ulo ya adighi achu nta oke. Translated in English, means “he or she whose house is 
under fire does not hunt for rat”. 
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In grappling with these questions, it became evident that the P5 have contending views 
and reservations regarding empowering any other country from the represented region, or 
excluded region with permanent seat and veto power. The P5 are of the view that the 
United Nations Security Council, notably, works for international peace and security, the 
security of African region, being one of them (Caron, 1993: 552). In this light, absorbing 
Africa into the Council will tilt the political landscape of the Council to disadvantage the 
P5. For example, the United States (US) clearly, believes that the Council will function 
better without Africa on the Council’s permanent seat map. To this end, US espoused a 
reform strategy that empowers only four continents, a proposal that is popularly known as 
the “Four Policeman”, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Russia, and China 
(Cox, 2009: 95). The US claims that Africa lacks the clout — military and economic 
might — that is, super power credentials, required to occupy a permanent seat. This is, 
despite France, and to some extent, Britain leaving in the shells of their post war glory.  
But accounts available on global economic calendar compiled by the 
Africanholocaust.net holds that Africa is the largest and fastest growing economy in the 
world. Specifically, the accounts narrates that “In terms of natural resources, Africa is the 
world’s richest continent. It has 50% of the world’s gold, most of the world’s diamonds 
and chromium, 90% of the cobalt, 40% of the world’s potential hydroelectric power, 65% 
of the manganese, millions of acres of untilled farmland, as well as other natural 
resources” (Africanholocaust, 2012: 1). Correspondingly, with US’s seeming exclusivist 
arrangement, Britain actually called for a three regional councils, one each of the tiered 
system is for Europe, Asia, and the Americas, charged with enforcing regional security 
and collective responsibility as a Supreme United Nations Council (Cox, 2009: 
95).Russia’s reform position is not African inclusive. The Russian Federation favored a 
straight military alliance with the United States and Britain rather than a United Nations 
that would assume the right to decide the fate of all other peoples, Russia sees both 
British and US proposals as an institutionalisation of war-time alliance cloaked in 
democratic trappings. France is a lone voice, faintly, calling for African inclusion while 
China continues to make references to the amendment of the Charter as the basic basis 
for African inclusion.   
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This thesis splits the United Nations history into halves, the moment the United Nations 
Charter was signed and the Security Council created, and the time Africa and disgruntled 
members started calling for a balanced and representative Security Council. Prior to 
1945, the world was closely rated an arena of total sovereigns, each wielding a legitimate 
right to solve conflict with aggressive warfare; after 1945, those sovereigns, by a mutual 
agreement, began surrendering that right for principled reasons of law and humanity and 
practical security reasons (Cox, 2009). Without a doubt, World War II painfully 
demonstrated civilisation’s power for self-destruction through the unrestrained use of 
force. So in 1945, a restraint was created in the form of the Security Council. Current 
studies on the P5 resistance, and the consequent agitations for reform by the UN member 
states, suggest that the Council has actually become a source of conflict and insecurity 
within the global political arena, lending itself to bias interventions and adoption of 
skewed resolutions (Hawkins, 2003:67). This thesis collects empirical accounts, matched 
with literature evidence and examines the variegated reform proposals strewn in recent 
years. The assessment is undergirded, to better understanding of the best reform practice 
and how it will impact on peacebuilding architecture in Africa. In this pursuit, the thesis 
is divided into seven chapters. The layout is provided under the structure of thesis below.  
1.2. A brief search for Africa on the global security map 
A central issue for global security organisation since its cradle in 1815 has been, not only 
the character of the central decision making body, but also, their membership and voting 
rules and regulations (Zacher, 2004). For example, the 1815 Congress of Vienna 
established the Concert of Europe and confined membership to great powers who must 
make unanimous decisions and votes. Equally, Zacher, (2004) notes that the Hague Peace 
Conference of 1899 and 1907 introduced large numbers of non-super powers into global 
security deliberations, and the 1907 conference adopted the practice of passing 
recommendations by simple majority (Zacher, 2004: 211). At the 1919 Versailles 
conference in which the Covenant of the League of Nations was formulated, the 
dominant consensus was that security of the Nations, is the business of great powers, it 
was also agreed that resolution from the council would require the unanimous consent of 
all member states, with exception to the accused aggressor, if it were a Council member.  
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A distinctive feature of the deliberations to formulate the character of the League of 
Nations and the United Nations was that they occur during two major wars. One 
important impact of the war was that the major powers such as the United States, Britain, 
and the Soviet Union that were winning the war had an overriding impact on the 
deliberations (Zacher, 2004: 212).And this is how China and France which were coopted 
into the negotiations and permanent seats. Britain, US and Russia, made other nations 
formerly enter into the deliberations on invitation to attend the San Francisco conference 
in June 1945. At the instance of San Francisco, only 51 states were on the political map 
of the United Nations. Five veto states and six non-permanent members were the central 
actors in 1945. The UN members agreed that seven of the eleven members — that is the 
permanent and non-permanent members — shall approve a resolution before it will be of 
any effect, while veto will be reduced to addressing the needs of use of military force 
(Zacher, 2004). Conversely, the Soviet Union threatened to leave the UN if there were a 
diminution of veto power that tampered with the original scope of its ability to neutralise 
matters of substance. The participant gave in to Soviet’s stand and the veto mechanism 
remained the most valuable instrument in the Security Council to date. At that era, Africa 
was not a visible actor since only three African States, Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia, were 
members in 1945, before Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia in 1956, and Ghana and Guinea in 
1957 and 1958 respectively. The rest of African states started joining the UN from 1960s 
according to the year in which they are released from colonial bondage and apartheid 
(United Nations, 2014a).3 Actually, UN member nations succumbed to Soviet’s pressure 
in 1945; the call to increase the Council to become more representative was resurrected 
with the arrival of Africa on the global stage. According to Zacher (2004: 212), after 20 
years of UN inception, in 1965, the United Nations, reformed its security membership 
outlook, increased the six non-permanent members to ten for a two year term as provided 
in the Charter (United Nations Charter, 1945: 7). Since 1965, the Council’s non-
permanent members have progressively increased to fifteen, for the leadership and 
governance of 193 nations of the United Nations. 
                                                          
3United Nations Member state, Growth in the United Nations membership, 1945-present (2014a). 
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Despite the dramatic increase of UN members from 51 in 1945 to 114 in 1963 and 193 in 
2014 the P5 has reasons and justifications to be stagnant with the permanent seat and veto 
structural arrangements. Let us say that the member states of the United Nations are 
unofficially divided into five geopolitical regional groups — African group, Asia-pacific 
Group, Eastern European Group, the Latin America and the Caribbean group, and the 
Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG) (United Nations, 2014b). In these groupings, 
Africa and South America are the only UN regions not represented at the permanent 
category of the Council. Since early 1960s, Africa’s interest is to belong to the permanent 
category of the Council. But none of Africa’s quests has had any effect since the call in 
about 70 years ago. Ironically, out of the 193 UN member states, Africa represents the 54 
member group — the highest members in the UN after a 55 Asian-Pacific, that is 28% of 
the overall membership, an approximate one-fifth of the UN member states. As stated 
earlier, Africa has a slot for three non-permanent members of the Council. This is a 
number that cannot change any decision that any veto wielding states supports. Veto 
system, makes Africa’s presence on the Council insignificant, relegating the wishes of the 
population of 54 nations to the oblivion, as well as, not making any meaningful 
contribution in addressing substantive policy or reform debates that affects the continent. 
And, this has been the nuisance in Africa’s odyssey in the UN since 1945. Even if it 
wishes to form a common front as some strategic scholars may suggest in order to tilt 
negotiation and voting in the Council debates, it has no veto power — the most important 
political instrument in the Security Council — to back up the will to do so. Thus, all 
efforts may amount to void. 
 
Surely, underlying the characteristics of the UNSC veto mechanism and the call for 
African inclusion into the permanent seat is violation of the established international 
decision making norms. They are “the state autonomy or state sovereignty norm; 
international order; power; and democratic representativeness” (Walker, 1990; Wendt, 
1987: 337; Zacher, 2004: 219). The state autonomy or sovereignty is an important 
political gadget, central to interstate system. Autonomy or sovereignty seeks to uphold 
the virtue of equality of nations before the international law and community. Specifically, 
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in the words of Inis Claude, cited in Zacher (2004: 219), autonomy or sovereignty 
maintains “the rule that every state has an equal voice in international proceedings, and 
that no state can be bound without consent.” Although it has central status in international 
legal order, it does not commensurate with practice in the current international order. 
This partly explains why a 54 African sovereign nations has no contributions whatsoever, 
through the Council’s permanent seat to the world. Further, the international order norm 
directs that states must seek to reduce obstacles to the development of international laws 
and actions by international institutions so as to facilitate the management of their 
interdependencies. The point here is that the P5 of the Council advances positions that 
process disruption which underlies the African political exclusion and several other 
undue incursions into the region outside the rule of unanimity. In this fashion, the tension 
between the imperatives of international political participations and Africa’s quest to 
acquire adequate degrees of power, notably, the permanent seat and veto power will 
continue to inject conflicts in the organ until every power play by the rules, or all rules 
broken and new ones set up or weaker powers crunched. The third norm speaks to power. 
Zacher (2004) notes that centrally, international laws and legal binding treaties should 
require the support of those states whose backing will secure the implementation of an 
accord, and that voting arrangements should reflect the distribution of resources in issue 
area. The net idea is that first and foremost, the UNSC, a global security organisation, 
enjoys the support of UN member nations or at the minimum does not suffer the excluded 
nations such as Africa within the relations. The fourth norm—democratic 
representativeness norm—specifically states that the UN decision and laws should have 
broad support from the international society of states, that is to say, that the backing 
should be representative in structure and character, not only to entrench balance but also 
to avert injustices. Pertinent to the four norms are, how Africa’s exclusion from the 
Council constitute a violation of several rules guiding the conduct of international 
politics. Yet, no tangible effort from the P5 to root democratic representativeness is 
within sight. This study will flesh out this debate, in the Chapter two of this study, under 
literature review and link it through the rest of the chapters.  
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1.3. Research Task 
In the main, the study investigates how the political marginalisation of African region 
from the United Nations Security Council permanent seat impedes peacebuilding 
architecture in Africa and exacerbates state and human security while stoking trajectories 
of conflict. Thesis considers the linkage between permanent seat and veto power relations 
and the notion of development, peace, and security. Although, Africa alone has nearly 
30% of overall UN membership population, it has no permanent seat on the Council. This 
causes inhibition towards Africa’s peacebuilding efforts. This observation is based on the 
accounts that, some P5 nations who have intervened in Africa were without adequate 
knowledge of how to address the affected African people with a view to dealing with 
their insecurity regimes. The relevance of African actors in addressing Africa’s problems 
is out of debate, however, the questions that still need to be asked, are have Africa’s 
numerical strength translated to its relevance in the Council? Answer is no. How 
significant is the region’s position and disposition in addressing the security concerns and 
peacebuilding options for Africa, very significant? Answer is no. Actually, the 70 years 
existence of the Council without a permanent seat for Africa, eviscerate the regional 
leaders. And beyond the selective deprivation or still political marginalisation argument, 
why is the Council reform, securitised and Africa secluded? For example, the 
demographics of the UN recognised regions evidently, show that African Group has 54 
members, Asia-Pacific Group has 55 members, Eastern European Group has 23 member 
states, Latin American and Caribbean has 33 member states; Western Europe and Others 
has 28 member states.   In all of these, resistance to reform, frustrates the democratic 
ordinances and ideals of such global institution, and undermine the supposedly neutral 
arbiter and harbinger of global peace and security primary role of the Council. Tinker 
(1977) notes that the net effect of this outlook is a seeming second form of imperial 
expansion (Tinker, 1977: 17).  For instance, in 2011, the Council, under the guise of 
responsibility to protect, invaded Cote d’Ivoire, and especially Libya with exceptional 
impunity. In a UN-backed North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO’s) bombing 
campaign, the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was dethroned and assassinated, 
against the dictates of the African Union (AU) who had a five point roadmap to secure 
Libya peacefully (Ekwealor, 2013: 64). This was after the three African nations—Gabon, 
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Nigeria, and South Africa—at the non-permanent seat of the Council voted for the 
enabling Resolution 1973 in Libya. Assuredly, the case in point of fact is that even if the 
three voted against the intervention, the Council will still make incursion into Libya using 
the permanent seat and veto instruments as determinant factors. So, understanding 
powerless Africa at the global stage and developing modalities to empower Africa at least 
to be able to save human and natural resources from imperial abuse, are some of the 
critical tasks this study unpacks and provides guidelines to overcome.   
 
The confined nature of exclusion and imbalance, and the attendant human 
underdevelopment in Africa is also reflected in the Security Council’s configuration.  The 
obvious exclusion and selective and bias adoption of resolutions on Africa are also 
replicated in addressing the basic need of peacebuilding and access to security and 
development in the region. The inequitable representation in the Security Council, 
especially in its permanent category, poses root problems in terms of the democratic 
representation of the views of member states, and indeed occupation issues in decision 
making (Sandole, 2010: 107).   Beyond the P5 marginalisation of the African region, 
Africa insight (2012) records that, as the fastest growing economy in the world [after 
Asia] and the richest continent in terms of mineral deposit, Africa has a lot of security 
and interest factors at stake and stands a chance of losing more than any other region in 
the UN circle. As such, the region has to deal with a myriad of constraints artificially 
created and factored into the most representative global organisation (the UN). Many of 
these constraints relate to interest and reinforced by power, played through the permanent 
seat and veto device. And our task in this instance is to study and observe Africa’s 
capabilities and recommend some practical ways that will make the Council inclusive and 




1.4. The Hypothesis 
Peacebuilding architecture and state and human insecurity regime in Africa are 
exacerbated by the exclusion of African states from the permanent seat of the United 
Nations Security Council. The inclusion of African countries in the UNSC with veto 
powers will assist the continent’s quest for sustainable peace and security. 
1.5.      Research problems and objectives; Key questions to be asked 
The Security Council reform and Africa’s peacebuilding occupy a unique stance in the 
homily of global security due to the significant patterns they have set. The reform and the 
Africa’s insecurity have endured for more than seven decades (since 24 October 1945). 
Narrating on the Africa’s state and human insecurities over the years and its experiences 
of unending conflict and marginalisation, Ricigliano (2003) observed that peacebuilding 
in Africa is “in a class by itself among the world’s worst cases” (Ricigliano,2003: 447). 
Using the Security Council’s exclusivist paradigm and some African countries’ 
involvements in varieties of peace and security initiatives in Africa, as well as globally as 
the focal point, the aim of this study is to understand the dynamics of the Council’s 
permanent seat and veto mechanism and to canvass for its reform especially, along the 
lines of geographical representativeness. This will interrogate the African 
exclusion,weighing Africa’s suitability for at least a permanent post on the scale of its 
interest, resources, security and peacebuilding roles in the current international system. In 







1.6. Research Problems and Objectives: Broader issues to be 
investigated 
1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from 
obtaining a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council; 
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa’s 
permanent representation; 
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United 
Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with Africa’s 
peacebuilding and security issues. 
1.7. Research questions 
The following central questions are posed and will therefore be answered: 
1. How has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a 
permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council? 
2. How the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa’s permanent 
representation? 
3. What lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations Security 
Council permanent membership in terms of how to deal with Africa’s 
peacebuilding and security issues? 
 
In grappling with these key questions, this study seeks to underscore the rethinking of 
two paradigms that inform research and practice in the domain of global security, peace 
and conflict. In other words, the paradigms relate to theory and praxis. One is the 
orthodox conflict analysis paradigm, which focuses essentially on armed groups or 
warring parties. The second is the formal governmental peace process paradigm that 
emphasises the role of state actors but largely ignores powerful non-state actors whose 
actions in conflict zones shape the dialectics of conflicts. In addressing these questions, 
this study emphasises the instrumentality of a holistic framework that encapsulates the 
motivations, strategic interests and multifarious roles of key and powerful non-state 
actors in the permanent and non-permanent seats of the Security Council. 
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1.8. Statement of the Problem 
The world faces old and new security challenges that are more complex than our 
multilateral and national institutions are currently capable of managing. International 
cooperation in this regard is ever more necessary in meeting these challenges (Gowan 
and Gordon, 2014: 1). A structurally imbalanced Council tasked with sustaining a global 
peace and security, to enhance international responses to conflict, insecurity, and scarcity 
through adoption of resolution or direct military intervention within the existing 
international political environment, is believed to be inefficient in establishing and 
managing the global order without the combined support of the geopolitical actors and 
their natural resources. Lack of geographical representativeness which affects the regions 
of Africa and Latin America and Caribbean is an enduring source of antagonism within 
the Council since Brazil is resourced sufficiently to represent the Latin American region 
as does Nigeria, Egypt and South Africa for Africa. Therefore, exclusivist Council does 
not have the suitable binocular that monitors the spectrum of conflict, insecurity, and 
scarcity issues in the isolated regions. The shortage of representativeness does not allow 
the Council to see critical security dilemmas in every region, which, highlights the 
absence of coherence often necessary for effective security response globally (Gowan 
and Gordon, 2014: 1). Thus, the thesis invariably, weighs in on verifying the popular 
assertion that unity of the nations is strength, with a view to locating the Council within 
the statement. 
 
The importance of unity in enhancing effective and efficient Council in the world, with a 
very high rate of terrorism, need not be over-emphasised. According to Cox (2013) only 
five countries determine insecurity and decide intervention. This trend is not sustainable. 
In order to function properly, the Council should become holistically representative, 
involving all actors in the fight against insecurities in defence of humanity. Functionality 
and can be achieved by investing in the representativity and creating balance. The P5 in 
this regard are vital to drive reform and innovation in combating global conflict. Security 
Council is a critical organ in global security and peace efforts. The resultant effects of 
these lingering problems since 1945 in the context of this study are: i) poor control over 
terrorism and even development in the world; ii) low participation in peace missions in 
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selected conflicts; iii) inadequate skills and innovations in all regions to promote peace; 
iv) declined Council popularity among disgruntled members and impede global 
development; and v) high dependency on external actors to resolve domestic unrests, 
especially in Africa. 
1.9. Significance of the Study 
 
The impact of a lack of veto power to African state in times of crises in 
Africa and elsewhere has been under-researched and largely ignored 
(Banfield, Haufler and Lilly, 2003: 17).…only a limited number of studies 
have focused on explaining the P5s’ behaviour in general and very few 
have looked specifically at their role in peacebuilding of war torn zones in 
Africa (Rieth and Zimmer, 2004: 10). 
Some of the key purposes for establishing the United Nations are: (i) maintain 
international peace and security, and to that end, take collective measures for the 
prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of 
aggression or other breaches of peace (United Nations Charter, 1945). And to bring 
about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which 
might lead to a breach of the peace; (ii) develop friendly relations among nations based 
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; (iii) achieve international 
cooperation in solving international problems…” (United Nations Charter, 1945: 3). 
Assuredly, the Security Council is the principal organ charged with these missions. As 
such, the Charter delivers express powers to the Council for fulfillment of these duties.  
From a security perspective, agitations for a balanced Council and the attendant refusal to 
reform, currently, seeks to polarise the age long not consolidated UN Security body, into 
more factions. The polarity will adequately hinder every effort towards the principle of 
collective measures as inspired by the Charter. Further, friendly relations among UN 
member nations are under attack in its current existence, without a doubt, it is the P5 
versus the rest of the UN family. Even more, is that the agenda for international 
cooperation, is being suffocated by the exclusivist Council’s outlook.  These are actually 
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the underlying causes of both economic and political instability, which in most cases in 
Africa as elsewhere result in armed conflicts between groups and communities within the 
states. Therefore, emphasis on global security approach to economy, politics and 
peacebuilding is important to avert conflicts and wars, and advance and prosper in 
secured global environments. It was understood that security was the anchor since it 
would be impossible to ensure and sustain investments, growth and development in a 
conflict-ridden environment. Even so, lack of collective action, relationship and/or 
cooperation among the UN peoples beget acrimony and have continued to result in wars 
and anarchy as was the case of Africa’s Cote d’Ivoire and Libya. This thesis is pertinent, 
since Soest (1995) sees war as psychos is caused by an inability to see relationships. The 
neglect of Southern hemisphere by the Northern hemisphere in the permanent seat of the 
Council can actually cause separation in the Council and may be used instrumentally to 
entrench rivals and make enemies. This can be traced in part to the pervasive ideology of 
self-appointed oligarchy of the P5. Ostensibly, the thesis has the awareness that the 
current configuration of the United Nations Security Council, risks the foundations of 
modern era of global peace and even more, of security (Haftendorn, 2013: 4). Hence, the 
significance of the study lay, partly, in the thesis’ commitment to recapture the Council’s 
image as a united body pursuing a collective global security purpose and also to undercut 
the viewpoints on the world impression of the Council as a self-appointed oligarchy or a 
tool for the advancement of Western interests. This research study breaks new ground in 
that it approaches the Security Council reforms from a relatively new perspective – 
peacebuilding in Africa that seems to have continued to play a significant role in shaping 
and sharpening the reform debates. That, the UN is the most representative global 
political institution is undoubtedly true. However, the ill-structured Security Council 
organ of the UN has triggered various clamours not only on the credibility of the organ 
but also on its constituency. The import of this study primarily hinges on the calculated 
effort to achieve global peace by developing pertinent trajectories and modalities for 
conflict transformation, and insecurity regime containment that will guarantee Africa’s 




Thus, the utility of Africa in this study is anchored on the thesis of mitigating conflict, 
peace and security patterns of the global agency of peace in the Southern hemisphere 
through an Africa’s peace and security advocate (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). In this 
fashion, thesis explores some African states’ peace and security efforts in Africa and 
peacekeeping record globally through which new knowledge will be brought to bear not 
only on modalities to balance the Council, but also, and especially to contribute towards 
new knowledge in the domains of conflict, intergovernmental institutions, international 
law, and Africa’s disposition in the world. The thesis is therefore, fundamentally 
significant, as it truly extends the frontiers of existing knowledge and expands the 
horizons of facts in the areas of Africa and global conflict and security, but also chat the 
methods for embracing peace and security in the world.  
The implications of the undemocratic and unrepresentative structural Council is mauled 
nations as  examined, giving deep insight and standing on the shoulders of current studies 
into the security roles of the P5 as it affects developing countries, non-permanent 
continents and Africa exactingly is exposed. Specifically, this work is vitally momentous 
as it indeed, widens the scope and horizons of information available in the field in 
assortments of paradigms, using the current international Security Council system, 
especially towards the resolving conflicts in the world to inculcate democratic culture 
which straddles geographical representativeness in the UN permanent seat and a 
structurally angry-free United Nations regions that will necessitate a peaceful world. 
Further, the study is equally significant in terms of policy imperatives –the thesis serves 
as a basis for re-evaluation, re-focusing and re-strategising the Council activities through 
the provision of clear policy direction and implementation strategies for a robust 
democratic and balanced UN Security Council 
Prudence of Practice –the thesis provides an impetus for the improvement of Council 
(P5) practices, thereby ensuring enabling grounds for effective response to global 
conflict, especially in the African region of the UN. 
Theory nexus –the thesis makes some contributions to the domain body of 
literature/knowledge and providing awareness of the Council strategies and practices as it 
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affects permanent and non-permanent member states respectively. Actually, it introduced 
a new approach to resolving and transforming conflict, through the theory of Native 
Support Approach. 
Improved society- the findings and recommendations of this study benefits the UN and 
AU communities through improved systems and innovations developed through inclusive 
Council, thereby laying the foundations for attaining peace and security and an enhanced 
peacebuilding cultures globally. 
1.10. Research methodology and techniques 
Within this specific study, the researcher obtains information from both primary and 
secondary sources. Both primary and secondary sources of data are packaged together by 
dominantly, secondary sources supporting primary data with a view to validating the 
claim and sometimes vice versa.  
Bearing in mind that both primary and secondary sources of data required validations, 
primary sources of data were validated through a consensus among the interviewees on a 
specific question in the study. In areas from chapter four of the study till chapter six, the 
researcher asked certain question to at least three different respondents and the theme of 
their response is used as those vividly validated the test through consensus. In a similar 
vein, secondary sources of data were tested and validated through a content similarity 
among authors on any said subject. As evident through the thesis, the researcher has 
quoted more than two or three sources on certain contested cases; this is aimed at 
validating the account under canvass. 
Hart (1998:28) defines methodology as a system of methods and rules that facilitate the 
collection and analysis of data. It involves making choices from various approaches to 
know which to use in analysing the topic under study. Additionally, Mouton (1996:107) 
defines research design as a set of guidelines and instructions to be followed in 
addressing the research problem. Bearing these definitions in mind, this study employs 
historical and qualitative approaches. The historical approach was necessary to show the 
link between this research and other pertinent literature in the field. And qualitative 
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approach ensures the understanding of a given research problem or topic from the 
perspective of the local population under focuses (Babbie and Mouton, 2006:70). 
Silverman (1997: 1) describes qualitative research method as that “built on a dialogue 
between Social Science and the community.” He discerns also that “qualitative research 
delivers a profound understanding of social phenomena” (Silverman, 2005: 10).  
According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000: 8), qualitative research stresses “the socially 
constructed nature of reality, the intimate relationship between the researcher and what is 
studied, and the situational constraints that shape inquiry. Further, it generates non-
numerical data, focuses on gathering mainly verbal data from human persons rather than 
measurements. In this instance, qualitative approach is appropriate and invaluable in this 
research, especially, in placing the issues under investigation in their proper social 
context while getting as close as possible to the “actors’ perspectives … prioritising the 
study of perceptions and meanings” from the subject’s perspective through interaction 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2000: 10).This gathered information is then analysed in an 
interpretative and diagnostic manner for authentic outcome. Thus, qualitative research is 
utilised in this study because of its ability in bringing together the researcher and the 
people under study. Qualitative research methods also allowed the researcher the first 
hand information from the community on all areas of contested terrain. In this manner, 
the behaviour of the P5 towards Council’s reform, and Africa’s peacebuilding cum 
suitability and possible balance and efficient Council following its inclusion, will be 
learned from the affected population. As Perecman and Curran (2006: 146), would advise 
the researchers, “let the respondents tell their stories.” 
 
Accordingly, the in pursuant of realising the objectives of the study, the combination of 
these methods is key, since the approaches embodies some flexibility for academic 
sagacity. The qualitative method, combined with the historical research technique best 
marries the literature standpoint and empirical data sourced in accordance with the study 
objectives. This was necessary for two principal reasons. First, the nature of the research 
questions required the use of qualitative data from primary sources. Second, since the 
United Nations Security Council reforms and Africa’s peacebuilding are the subject of 
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the study, it was imperative to study them in their dominant locales and through the 
account partly take Africa’s feelings and experiences of exclusion and marginalisation 
from the Council’s permanent seat with veto, and the peacebuilding processes in the 
region into accurate account as peace and security research underscores. 
 
In this manner, information sourced from desktop literature and interview approaches 
will be utilised to unpack the challenges of political exclusion of Africa in the 
international politics of Council’s permanent seat. More specifically, the approaches help 
interrogate in depth the controlling idea of Council reform, permanent seat, veto 
mechanism and Africa’s peacebuilding architecture. And indeed, in areas where 
interview sources may be insufficient to explain some phenomena, the desktop document 
is used to corroborate the views of the officials. Equally, desktop literature evidence is 
used to initiate debate on germane issues. Primary sources of data are those interview 
accounts, and original texts, and reports. This straddled the linked and reciprocally 
buttressing discussions with the United Nations officials, African Union Representatives, 
and the Representatives of the Federal Government of Nigeria, textbooks, United Nations 
official documents and relevant commissioned reports. Secondary sources of data 
included: peer-reviewed journal articles, and assortments of interpreted online journal 
articles and pertinent internet sources. Imperative to underscore is that, the secondary 
sources are based on the document and not necessarily the mode under which they were 
acquired. 
1.10.1. Research setting 
Africa has a fundamental stake at the deliberations of the Security Council. Hence, the 
call for reform to include an African state with a view to securing Africa’s peacebuilding 
architecture emerged. Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Africa and South Korea are the settings 
employed to carry out this research. However, in the event of struggling to track down 
the UN and AU interviewees, the researcher had travelled to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 
Johannesburg and Pretoria (South Africa), and Seoul (South Korea) to meeting with 
interviewees. Through E-interview the researcher collected data from Abuja, Nigeria. 
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1.10.2. Sample Size and Sampling Technique 
The initial plan was to interview a total of twenty respondents from the AU, UN, Nigeria 
and Researchers. This was aimed at securing the views of five respondents each from 
these identified groupings. However, following from the difficulties involved in 
accessing the AU and UN officials, especially, plus the fact that the knowledge they 
possess is hugely unique to them, the researcher was unable to access the AU and UN 
officials in their numerals. Concisely, two high-ranking UN officials were interviewed, 
one AU official was interviewed, a University professor (researcher) was interviewed, 
and a United Nations University for Peace (UPEACE) official was equally interviewed. 
In this manner, five informed respondents responded to our questions. Their views 
together with the literature documents such as commissioned reports constitute the thesis 
Chapters Four to Six. Out of which, two respondents were drawn from the United 
Nations perspective, one respondent from the African Union, one respondents from 
Nigeria, one respondent from research field.  
 
In areas such as the reasons for African exclusion, Africa’s security roles, and lessons 
for Africa, same sets of questions were given to these respondents bearing in mind that 
they are well informed on these related questions. Their views were analysed through 
content and thematic analyses. The researcher’s sample design for interviewing the 
directly affected actors is purposive sampling technique. According to Wadsworth 
Cengage Learning workshop (2005) and Tongco Dolores (2007: 151) “purposive 
sampling targets a particular group of people and helps find knowledgeable and reliable 
informants from the community.” When the desired population for the study is rare or 
very difficult to locate and recruit for a study, purposive sampling may be the only 
option. In this study, it indeed, is the best option. The research targets (African Union 
official, United Nations official, Nigerian Government official), all particular groups 
which make purposive sampling truly appropriate. The interviews are also semi-
structured and open ended so as to allow divergent views on the topic and for thematic 
collation of data which guarantees the academic standardisation of the data on one hand 
and its scientific rigour on the other. 
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1.10.3. Data Collection 
Primary and secondary sources of data collection were employed. The main sources of 
primary data comprise the personal in-depth interviews with informed actors. This 
technique is invaluable in conducting “systematic social inquiry, generating empirical 
data about [the] social world by asking people to talk about their lives” (Holstein & 
Gubrium 1995: 113). Government and official documents from the United Nations, 
books and certain newspaper reports that speak originally to peace and security in Africa 
and the United Nations Security Council reform also forms part of the primary sources of 
data. Secondary data consists of reviewed and interpretative publications that do have 
alluded position and information on the topic. These sets of data were obtained through 
the reading of books, articles, online secondary materials. Essentially, they were accessed 
through the dominant desk top interrogation of relevant documents. These secondary 
sources provide the extensive bibliographic and contextual information that supports the 
primary sources meaningfully. The primary data are collected through semi-structured, 
open-ended interviews, obtained through interaction with relevant stakeholders of the UN 
and the AU. This cross-examination of data enriches the study and also entrenches 
standardisation in the overall approach and maintains the science in the research task. 
Semi-structured interviews are appropriate due to the patterned elasticity they afford 
researchers to generate valuable facts from respondents.  
1.10.4. Data Analysis 
The research employed two analytical tools: the content and thematic analyses. Content 
analysis is practically employed to analyse the collected data based on their valued 
content. The study dominantly employed content analysis in addressing issues raised in 
chapters four, five, and six. This was necessary since the sense –making of several 
viewpoints the respondent and supporting materials could be possible through the 
collation of data and literature. Patton (2002) defines content analysis as “any qualitative 
data reduction and sense-making effort that takes a volume of qualitative materials and 
attempts to identify core consistencies and meanings” (Patton, 2002: 453). Since the 
interviews were semi-structured, the researcher collated all responses accordingly and 
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reduces responses in accordance with their content. In this sense, the study also employs 
thematic analysis on interpretation and application of data. Thematic analysis as indicated 
was employed in the analyses of the viewpoints of the various respondents from the 
fieldwork. The researcher used thematic analytical tool in paring viewpoints and finding 
common grounds among the respondents. This tool was hugely utilised through chapters 
four, five, and six. Thematic analysis has been branded as one of a range of potential 
methods for research synthesis. It moves beyond counting explicit words or phrases and 
focuses on identifying and describing mutually implicit and explicit themes or the 
controlling ideas within the data. 
1.11. Limitations of study 
Using a purposive sampling technique for data collection requires an operational 
suppleness in order to angle out the best informed participant and accommodate the 
strengths of each respondent to mitigate their weaknesses as well as get around other 
methodological difficulties of the study.  
 
Without a doubt a study of this nature is – expectedly – fraught with limitations. The 
researcher acknowledges the possibility of bias on the part of the study respondents, who 
might be interested actors in the reform. This possibility has an implication for 
objectivity. In order to address this challenge and mitigate its effect as well as to ensure 
impartiality, the researcher undertook a careful analysis and juxtaposition of respondents’ 
views. Moreover, the alacrity at which some of the UN and AU officials and Nigerian 
government representatives targeted for interview were not available to respond to the 
researcher presents a formidable challenge in time-limited research of this nature. Indeed, 
unless in a commissioned research, unlike this scholarly research, tracking down the key 
actors of global institutions such as the AU, and the UN have proven difficult. This thesis 
experienced this fate. In addition, the fluidity and unpredictability of events in the global 
institutions such as the UN often defy common and established logic in conflict analysis. 
Against this backdrop, there is the potential danger that the UN may reform, or have 
certain structural developments within its structure vis-à-vis the study’s 
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arguments/findings may confound future readers, or even negate some of the study’s 
recommendations. 
 
Although the chase for respondents was tedious, it resolves the problem of relying on 
self-reporting as empirical basis for conclusions in social research (Kumar, 1996:114; 
Payne and Payne; 2004:90).The fewer number of respondents secured as opposed to 
higher number was equally mitigated by the follow-up question responses that clarified 
and validated contrivances in the interview. As Bem (2008) puts it, in a social science 
research, one key informant is better than twenty misinformed informant in addressing a 
real situation. He argued that the key is to ensure that the views of the appropriate 
respondent that will ensure the fulfilment of the overall aims of the study are recorded. 
He further maintains that in the social and bahavioral sciences, it is important to always 
provide sufficient information from the key informant. This information is particularly 
important because it is the real issue from the main actor and will help develop pool of 
new knowledge in the area. 
 
1.12. Structure of Thesis 
This study is organised into seven chapters as follows: 
1.12.1. CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction and background 
Chapter One is an introduction to the study. It specifically provides a general background 
and an overview of the study. The chapter includes an outline of the research problem, a 
statement of the research problem, Research task, hypothesis, objectives of the study, and 
research questions. It also explicates the significance of the study, the research 
methodology and methods, research setting, sample size and sample technique, data 
collection, data analysis, its scope as well as its methodological and practical limitations, 
and finally, the structure of the thesis. 
23 
 
1.12.2. CHAPTER TWO 
The United Nations Security Council reform and Africa’s peacebuilding 
praxis 
Chapter Two undertakes a review and comparison of pertinent literature evidence on the 
nexus between Security Council reform and Africa’s peacebuilding praxis and attendant 
conflicts through an interrogation of the various reform proposals and Africa’s 
peacebuilding capabilities. It examines the contending narratives that affirm and falsify 
the reform and peacebuilding thesis. The chapter probes the potential and actual impacts 
of lack of reforms and identifies some gaps which the existing literatures have missed. In 
essence, it engages, critically, with extant literature on the correlation between pro and 
anti-reform crusaders noting in essence, that lack of democratisation of the Council is an 
enduring source of conflict in the world. In doing so, the chapter foregrounds the 
intervening variables in the reform, peace building and securitisation nexus. The analysis 
in Chapter Two underscores a nuanced understanding of the United Nations Security 
Council’s P5 politics of exclusion aimed at dependency of the marginalised. In this way, 
it provides the link and a contextual framework for unpacking the resistance struggle of 
the P5 and lays the ground for observing that African states of Nigeria, Egypt and South 
Africa are equal to the task of permanent seat with veto. It has canvassed for Africa’s 
inclusion based on observed merits. 
1.12.3. CHAPTER THREE:  
Behaviorism, Dependency, Realism, and Society of State: navigating the 
Council reform conundrum 
Chapter Three discusses theoretical and analytical perspectives on Security Council 
reform. Essentially, it examines important theoretical tools such as: Behaviorism, 
Dependency, Realism, and Society of State paradigms on reform and peacebuilding, 
especially their traditional arguments on the roles and impacts of concerned and affected 
actors in the global political environment. The premises and conclusions of these theories 
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provide broad analytical parameters for understanding the issues within the Security 
Council reform saga on one hand and peacebuilding programme in Africa on the other. 
The chapter examines the main trends of P5 as well as African Group behaviour in 
pursuit of permanent seat with veto (for a reformed Council), highlighting implications of 
the behavioural forms and nursing of interest tactics of representative political actors in 
the UN. It notes that the significance of the P5 actions in conflict zones is determined by 
the amount of interests (pecuniary and political) that is at stake.  
1.12.4. CHAPTER FOUR 
The African exclusion from the Council’s veto power: weighing the 
nexus 
Chapter Four answers to Question One (Q1) Objective One (O1) the first question of this 
thesis through combined field work data and literature reports. That is, what are the 
remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the United Nations Security 
Council? It analyses the formation of global institutions such as the League of Nations, 
the sources of Concert of Europe, which encapsulates the dialectics of politics of power 
and interest, and representative and participatory. It shows the nexus between exclusion 
and its weights on Africa underpinning the actions of colonial rule and the trajectories of 
conflicts and prospects for dependency. It deduced that protection of own national 
interest shaped the behaviours of the P5 actors in both pre and post 1945. In line with this 
realisation, the chapter discusses the strategic P5governance African Group as they see 
each other. This study’s theoretical framework such as the dependency theory is aptly 
situated in the discussion. 
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1.12.5. CHAPTER FIVE 
Africa: the construal of regional and global peace and security 
Chapter Five responds to Question Two (Q2) Objective Two (O2) of the thesis through 
combined field work data and literature reports. The chapter provides broad explications 
of violence and death in Africa interrogating the implications of Security Council 
permanent seat in the African continent. As a matter of interrogating the strategic 
importance of Africa’s peacebuilding capabilities in the world, the top five African states, 
were measured with a view to understanding whether the permanent membership of the 
United Nations Security Council inspired Africa’s conflict and inhibited Africa’s active 
peace and security roles in the region and globally. It presents the profile of Africa with 
reference to its regional peacebuilding strategy for global harmony. In addition, the 
chapter analyses the key challenges and prospects for African inclusion in the permanent 
category of the Council discussing the contextual factors that underpinned Africa’s peace 
and security thus explicating the study’s hypothesis. 
1.12.6. CHAPTER SIX 
The United Nations Security Council’s deeds: lessons for Africa 
Chapter Six responds to Question Three (Q3) Objective Three (O3) of the thesis through 
combined field work data and literature reports. It discusses the United Nations Security 
Council’s deeds and lessons for Africa in terms of how to deal with Africa’s 
peacebuilding and security issues. In doing so, the chapter contextualises the activities of 
the Security Council in Africa against the backdrop of the typology of security behaviour 
in conflict zones. It also discusses the issues that emerge from the review of literature, 
theoretical frameworks, paradigmatic perspectives and survey findings. Based on 
research findings, the chapter makes analytical deductions and presents a prognosis on 
Africa’s conflict burden compared to non-African conflicts. 
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1.12.7. CHAPTER SEVEN 
Summary of findings, Conclusion and Recommendations 
Chapter Seven is the concluding chapter. It presents a summary of the study and draws 
logical conclusions from research findings. The conclusions engender specific 
recommendations on peacebuilding in Africa and United Nations Security Council 
reform in addressing global conflicts and insecurity regimes. Beyond the peacebuilding 
outlines for Africa, the recommendations in varieties of ways inform public policy 
choices and practices in transformation of conflicts in countries plagued by or emerging 
from conflict and in those striving to circumvent the slide into the vortex of violence and 
economic or political instability. It also made vivid policy suggestions for the reform of 












The United Nations Security Council reform and Africa’s peacebuilding 
praxis 
2.1 Introduction 
The name United Nations was coined by former United States President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. As a tribute to President Roosevelt, who died a few weeks before the signing 
of the Charter of the UN, all those present at the San Francisco Conference agreed to 
adopt the name ‘United Nations.’ (United Nations, 2008: 4). It was first officially used in 
1942, when representatives of 26 countries signed the Declaration by United Nations 
(United Nations, 2008: 4). With the deposit of the necessary 29 ratifications, including 
those of the five major powers, the Charter of the United Nations came into force 
(Fernbach, 1945: 114). The work of the United Nations is carried out almost all over the 
world and is done by the six main organs alluded to in chapter one.  
 
Despite its works, the United Nations has been styled as a huge and grand arena of 
conflict of interests, of competition of values, and of cooperation in search of solutions to 
common problems (Adebo, 1988; Akindele, 1999:17; Nader and Grande, 2002; ). Given 
the actual anarchical nature of the international society in which the UN operates and the 
sovereign equality of its principal, primary and dominant state actors, the UN is arguably 
the most urbane political equipment mankind ever constructed and developed to maintain 
international peace and security. But member-states of the organisation have variegated 
perceptions of it. While a few powerful states which designed it ab initio have shown a 
determination to preserve the status quo, which historically has been in their favour, the 
galactic majority of member-states, largely concentrated in the southern hemisphere, 
poor, unfledged and at the periphery of high global politics, would prefer the UN to 
mutate into an appliance of change; an instrument for linking the economic and 
technological gap between the rich North and the poor South (Akindele, and 
Akintererinwa, 1995; Adeniji, 2004; Adeniji, 2005; ). At the focus of this perilous 
challenge are three crucial tasks: (a) reform of the international economic order, 
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fashioned at the end of World War II, ostensibly to defend only the concern of the 
overriding powers (particularly the developed, industrialised and market-economy 
countries of the North) at the  expense of the other participants in the international 
community; (b) introduction and enhancement of the values of justice, fair play and 
equity in the management of global order; and (c) to end the perpetuation of economic 
deprivation and political marginalisation and exclusion from the UN Security Council in 
whatever form (UNSC, 1992; UNSC, 2000a; UNSC 2000b; UNSC, 2004; United 
Nations, 2007). 
 
The Security Council is undoubtedly, the most powerful organ of the UN (Boyd, 1971; 
Akinrinade, 1992; Annan, 1997). Following the perception that the Council is becoming 
a “mutual vilification society” and the actual mounting of international pressure for its 
substantial reforms after 70 years of its formation, fueled in part by its abysmal 
performances in conflict-affected member nations, Bosnia, Rwanda, Libya, Iraq, Syria, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the call is unending 
(Maclaurin, 1951: 6). The perceived bias of the P5 cum their alleged usual pecuniary 
interests during mediation in naturally rich and strategically situated countries which runs 
contrary to “advancing human welfare” is in fact among the angers that sparked reform 
chorus in the relevant quarters of the UN (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 3; Steckel, 2008: 
18;Posner, 2008: 1769). Specifically, Andrew Boyd observed that the first time the tool 
— Security Council — is used, there are almost bound to be complaints from one quarter 
or another, that it is bent sinisterly (Boyd, 1971;Babangida, 1991). Since then, pertinent 
questions regarding the Council reassert themselves and change seems both possible and 
overdue.  
 
In this vein therefore, this chapter interrogates such question as what is the purpose of the 
Security Council and why its reform? What are the motivations behind the resistance? 
Why was the reform plans not implemented? If change will happen does African state 
qualify for permanent seat? Does the Council care for countries recovering from conflict 
in fashion of peacebuilding, and are there any correlations between the UNSC reform and 
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Africa’s peacebuilding architecture? We will try to unpack these issues and respond to 
them with specificities of documented literature evidence.  
2.2 Purpose of the Security Council: the scrutiny of United Nations 
Charter Chapter V 
The formal purpose of the United Nations is to “maintain international peace and security 
[using] collective measures for the prevention and removal of the threats to the peace, 
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (Franck, 
1992, 522;Kirgis, Jr.1995, 506; Cox, 1999: 91;). The functions and roles of Security 
Council, found under Chapter 5, article 24 aims to guarantee swift and effective action by 
the United Nations. The members of the United Nations confer on the Security Council 
principal obligation of the preservation of “international peace and security, and agree 
that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their 
behalf” (Charter, 1945: 7).  
 
Chapter 5 of the Charter opens the precise conversation of the Security Council with 
Article 23, and finished with Article 51 (Charter, 1945). Specifically, Article 23 details 
the Council’s composition: “the Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (now Russian Federation), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland, and the United States of America as the permanent members of the Security 
Council” (Charter, 1945: 6). The General Assembly elects non-permanent members of 
the Security Council, due respect being particularly paid, in the first instance to the input 
of Members of the United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the other purposes of the UN, and also to unbiased geographical distribution 
(Charter, 1945). With an aim on prompt, efficient and effective action by the United 
Nations, under Article 24, the Members confer on the Security Council, the primary 
responsibility for the “maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf” 
(Charter, 1945: 6; Martin and Edwards, 1955: 67; Weston, 1991: 519). In discharging 
these duties the Security Council shall act in tandem with the Purposes and Principles of 
the United Nations as outlined in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII (United Nations, 1945). 
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Article 25, draws Members of the United Nations to agree to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the spirit of the Charter, especially 
with a view to maintaining international peace and security through the “regulation of 
armament” as authorised by Article 26.  
 
In keeping with the task of global security, when the Council from time to time disagrees 
on procedures as enshrined in Articles 28, 29, 30, 31, and 32, it would have to revert to 
voting as established in Article 27 to break the deadlock (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 225). 
Article 27 states that each member of the Security Council shall have one vote (Charter, 
1945; Liang, 1950; Gross, 1951; Gross, 1953; Gross, 1968). And that, “decisions of the 
Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven 
[nine in 2015] members … including the concurring votes of the permanent members” 
(Charter, 1945: 7). This provides that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under 
paragraph 3 — the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific 
settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by regional agencies 
either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council. 
In Charter’s Article 33, the Council is empowered to first of all, seek a peaceful solutions, 
and Article 34 is coined to investigate dispute or situation likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security. According to the Charter (1945), 
provisions of Articles 35, 36, 37 saddled the Council with issues of disputes and natures 
and settlements. Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37 on pacific 
settlement of disputes, the Security Council in Article 38 may, if all the parties to any 
dispute so request, “make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific 
settlement of the dispute” (Charter, 1945: 9). 
 
In a similar spirit, Article 39, seeks to determine breach of peace, Article 40 promises to 
prevent aggravation, Articles 41 and 42 decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force including complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, 
sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance 
of diplomatic relations (Charter, 1945; Fox, 1945; Nasu, 2009). Article 43 calls for 
contribution of, and agreements between the Security Council and groups of Members. 
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The types of agreements are further explained in Article 44 which calls upon members to 
provide armed forces in fulfillment of the UN security obligations.  Article 45 introduces 
Military Staff Committee, Article 46 Plans the utility of the Military Staff Committee, 
Article 47 established the roles of Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the 
Security Council. Article 48, Article 49, and Article 50, provide guidelines for carrying 
out enforcement measures, while Article 51, the last Article on Security Council Chapter 
declares in a parting short, that “nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member 
of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security” (Charter, 1945: 10; Franck, and Patel, 1991; 
Gowlland-Debbas, 1994). It is consequently with no small measure of causticness that the 
international community actually ceded quite amount of power to the Council for global 
concord. This explains, in part why the Security Council is the chief organ charged with 
security mission. Priming global peace and security, the Charter delivers express powers 
to the Council for the fulfillment of this duty. The question therefore is, since the Charter 
provided for every conduct of the Council, what is wrong with the status quo? We will 
tease out this question and respond to it in section 2.3 through literature evidence. 
 
2.3. Why challenge the status quo, why reform the Council, why the 
resistance? 
In views of Hovet (1960: 32), Rozintti (2010), and Okhovat (2011) there are a number of 
important reasons for reforming the Council. The UN in 2014 counts 193 members, a 
situation quite different from its foundation and from that existing in 1963 when the 
Council was expanded from 11 to 15 members. The examination of the United Nations 
Security Council and the utility of permanent membership and the actual instrument of 
veto mechanism — the ability of the five permanent members of the Council to quash 
any non-procedural matter with their negative vote, irrespective of its level of 
internationals support (Okhovat, 2011: 3) — and its overall authority over world nations, 
always returns scholars of security to five cardinal points. (a) the working method; (b) 
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legitimacy; (c) faulty structure, (d) veto power and (e) the new threats (Caron, 1993; 
Panel Report, 2004).  
 
Within these matters are associated focal cases of discrimination, dominance, 
participation, size, and tyranny within the ‘club’ (Bailey and Daws, 1995: 16). 
Surrounded within the confines of reform debates, the important question remains how 
the decision-making authority of the Council should be owed so as to maximise the 
effective use of its authority and the perceived legitimacy of that use (Fernbach, 1945; 
Wouters and Ruys, 2005; Cox, 2009). This is vital since the commanding presence of the 
veto, has actually captures the attention of Member Nations in a way that mislays the 
focus of both the academic and the diplomatic worlds (Caron, 1993: 567). Ironically, the 
motivating force behind diplomatic concerns often seems to be more the preservation and 
attainment of status than the efficacy and legitimacy of collective decision. Whether 
status or legitimacy, both concerns are begging attention but the latter landed on the laps 
of the academia. Thus, the cardinal issues which informed the reform proposal and 
continued to challenge the status quo as outlined above will be considered below, in turn. 
2.3.i. The Legitimacy debate 
Legitimacy of the Security Council occupies a middle ground between the composition of 
the Council and its enforcement mechanism (Sens, 2004: 142). And the fact that the 
Council through its decisions can both legislates and validates claims underscores that, it 
issues command and truly expect obedience among the UN Nations (Caron, 1993). The 
Council can validate the actions of other nations because it is purport to authorise those 
actions on behalf of the United Nations (Charter, 1945). Caron (1993: 562) observes that 
the current composition of, and the utility of permanent membership and the veto 
instrument vividly serves legitimacy problems. In his view, although not wholly separate, 
the composition and veto elements probes the correctness of the overall Council’s 
essence and tends to make a caricature of this important organ.  
 
According to Köchler (2007), part of many issues with the Council’s legitimacy is the 
“virtually non-existent separation of powers within the organization, a condition that, in 
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structural terms, almost resembles the decision-making procedures in a dictatorial 
system” (Köchler, 2007: 3). Especially since the end of the Cold War’s bipolar order, the 
Council’s P5 has been annually accused of arrogating more and more competencies, in 
certain cases circumventing relevant provisions of the UN Charter. For scholars, such as 
Maclaurin, (1951), Luck (2004: 362), and Köchler (2007), violation of any verse of the 
Charter is a “systemic arbitrariness of Security Council action … under Chapter VII of 
the Charter which exclusively depends on the constellation of interests among the P5 and 
not on considerations related to international security (Köchler, 2007: 3). Legitimacy 
challenge is therefore, a problem that is further exacerbated by the realpolitik and power 
balance in the present international environment. 
 
When the P5 goes on intervention with an aim on interest, there have been instances of 
policy issue of double standards resulting from the lack of (political) checks and balances 
as well as of legal restraint within the Council (Gowan and Gordon, 2014). These have 
played out several times in the international political gallery, and each appearance 
presented the veto wielding states as dominating proceedings and tilting the scale for 
global peace and security agenda (Hay, 2002; Rothwell, 2013). The perception of 
dominance of the Council by a few states is another major charge against it.  Giving the 
roles of P5 in either adopting resolutions or engaging in direct military intervention, it is 
very believable that the Council is dominated by several of the permanent members. 
Ironically, “though the Council’s voting rules require that at least nine of the fifteen 
members must vote in favour of an action potentially binding all the members of the 
United Nations, it nonetheless suffers from the allegation of dominance by subgroups” 
(Caron, 1993: 562). This was possible because of the roles veto plays in Council’s voting 
and also the organ’s working method, places the P5 beyond touch. 
 
While legitimacy of the Council has been judged and placed in doubt by several scholars 
judiciously noted above, authors such as (Hurd, 2002: 36; Dickinson, 2003: 301; Hurd, 
2007: 83) have contending views. According Hurd (2002) the Council is efficient and an 
important element of its power is largely a function of its legitimacy. An institution that is 
perceived as legitimate by an individual is treated with more respect, is endowed with a 
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corporate existence beyond the units that make it up, and finds compliance with its rules 
more easily secured than in the absence of legitimacy. Lobel and Ratner (1999) believe 
that beyond respect and compliance that legitmises the Council, some possible arguments 
that negates Council’s legitimacy appear to have been an oversight for the security and 
humanitarian roles the Council has been able to command through legitimate routes. 
2.3. ii. Working methods 
Most of the Council’s decisions are in the form of resolutions, which generally consist of 
two parts, a preamble and the operative section (Hadwen and Kaufmann, 1960: 36). 
According to Ekwealor (2013) adoption of resolution and authorisation of direct military 
intervention are the two chief working procedures employed by the Council in 
discharging of its security duties. Ekwealor (2013: 26) accounts that “between 1960 and 
2011, the Council adopted 2,547 resolutions, of which 1,844 [are] related to Asia, North 
America, South America, Australia/Oceania and Europe, while the continent of Africa 
attracted 706.” The points for a broad reform of the Council’s working methods were 
spelt out in the note by the President of the Security Council in 2006 (President of the 
United Nations Security, 2006) S/2006/507 on the “perception of the transparency, 
efficiency and inclusiveness” of the Security Council’s activity (Rozinthi, 2010: 15). The 
2006 Presidential note was an activation of the basic assumption often made in 
discussions regarding the working method and also the allegations of a structurally 
imbalanced Council. In the view of Bailey and Daws (1998: 21) and Rozinthi, (2010) 
such note themed around encouraging enhanced stakeholders’ participation in the 
Council’s public and private meetings, interaction and dialogue between the Council and 
contributors of troops to UN missions, are systemically targeted at cooperation with 
regional and sub-regional Organisations (Rozinthi, 2010: 15).  
 
Therefore, those disputations around bended Council structure make an applied 
difference. Whether this assumption truly connects to a fact, the possible supposition in 
the case of the Security Council is that the prospect of sustained shared deed depends in 
part on the professed balance of the decision maker, the Council itself (Panel Report, 
2004). For Caron (1993), to achieve balance, the final curve of reform proposals shall 
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open up Council proceedings to the General Assembly and thus increase the sense of 
participatory governance and to a great extent creates political accountability for 
members of the Council. The principle motivating these applications is that the decision 
making of the Council increasingly takes place in informal consultations that 
progressively involve only a sub-group of its membership and that accordingly discount 
not only the nonpermanent members but the membership generally (Hovet, 1960: 38; 
Bailey and Daws, 1998: 21).  
 
Agreeing with Caron, Gowan and Gordon (2014) discern that working methods have 
frequently formed part of experts concerns with the overall faulty mechanics of the 
Council, especially, pertaining to “providing order, transparency and inclusiveness in its 
procedures, as well as strengthening the capacity of the UN to implement the decisions of 
the Security Council” (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 11). This partly explains why Professor 
Peter Wallensteen of Uppsala University, cited in Gowan and Gordon, is adamant that 
even if comprehensive reform are unlikely in the short-term, reforms in certain areas such 
as working methods including work habits of the Council not limited to improving 
transparency, reducing veto use to a minimum which can be achieved in a short term 
basis for efficient Council must be implemented (Gowan and Gordon, 2014). 
 
Despite these postulations, Woods (1996) in his ‘Security Council Working Methods and 
Procedure: Recent Developments’ underscored that Council’s working method is the best 
part of its behaviours. Specifically, he wrote that the Council should not commit itself to 
procedures which in practice might prove to be excessively rigid. Johnstone (2008) 
agrees and asserts that this is crucial, since each dispute with which the Council has to 
deal has unique characteristics. In affirmation, Weiss and Young (2005) also, argued that 
the basis of meaningful successes in the Security Council since 1945 lies in pragmatic 
adaptations the Council’s working methods have provided in exploring the panacea of 
reform for many critics. 
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2.3.iii. The veto mechanism and its contested terrains 
The word veto was never mentioned in the United Nations Charter. However, Article 27 
of the Charter provided for its functions (Charter, 1945: 7). According to the rules, 
“Article 27 of the UN Charter allows the permanent members of the Security Council to 
quash any non-procedural draft resolution with their negative votes [veto power], 
irrespective of its level of international support and popularity” (Okhovat, 2011: 11; 
United Nations Charter, 1945). The power to quash non-procedural draft in the Council is 
therefore, referred to as the veto. 
 
The veto essentially, subjected decision-making in the Council to unanimity of the 
permanent members, both with regard to enforcement action and the peaceful settlement 
of disputes (Charter, 1945). Veto, then serves not only as deterrence, but actually an 
ultimate weapon available to the P5 members to ‘shield’ friends from attack and exert 
influence on all matters since de facto, its effects affect both procedural motions and 
substantive decisions of the Council (Bailey and Daws, 1998: 225).  In this approach, 
veto means, however, that certain members of the community potentially are not 
governed. Actually, the P5 who wields the veto power and whatever states any of the five 
is willing to shield, potentially are free from the governance of the Council. In this way, 
the P5 does not only go against the political claims of equality but also undermines the 
sovereign equality clause of the Charter.  
 
Partly in light of the above, the veto rule of Article 27 (3) of the Charter means a de facto 
and de jure negation of the basic democratic principle of the equality of votes (Bailey and 
Daws, 1998: 227). And veto also implies, whatever may be said to the contrary, an 
irreconcilable normative contradiction to the article of “sovereign equality of all 
Members Nations as provides Article 2 (1) of the Charter” (Köchler, 2007: 4; United 
Nations Charter, 1945). Since 70 years ago, the question of the veto remains one of the 
dividing issues that continue to stall the reform process (Rozinthi, 2010: 13). In essence, 
as Wouters and Ruys (2005: 3) put it, “apart from the Council’s faulty composition, one 
of the traditional stumbling blocks has been the existence of the veto power of the 
Council’s permanent members.” In an international community of professed sovereign 
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equality of all nations, regrettably, the veto instrument enables only the P5 to block any 
resolution that is not merely procedural in nature.  
 
The veto is considered fundamentally unjust by a majority of States and is thought to be 
one of the main reasons to reform the Council since a negative vote of one permanent 
member nullifies the decision other members have voted in favour (Bailey and Daws, 
1998: 228). Somewhat, scholars of security and strategy opine that Council’s failure to 
respond adequately to humanitarian crises as witnessed in Bosnia (1992), [as well as 
Rwanda (1994), Darfur (2004), Cote d’Ivoire (2011), Libya (2011), Syria (2012), Central 
African Republic (2013), and Mali (2013)] can be linked to veto mechanism (Cutts, 
1999: 3). Admittedly, assurances of global peace and security is difficult, and the ability 
of the Council to take decisions binding on the community as a whole in the area of peace 
and security is also a strong form of governance. However, veto power in the pockets of 
the P5 always denotes that “certain members of the community destroy the sovereign 
plank upon which the global security tent is built” (Caron, 1993: 565).  
 
In the context of the Council’s actions in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait the 
question for many became: is there a double standard? Will the Council be as assertive — 
adopting Resolution 661 (Chitalker and Malone, 2013) — with Israel as it was with Iraq? 
Giving the seeming bias and selective adoption of resolutions by the Council, especially, 
when a P5 member threatens to veto resolution, it becomes obvious that there are no easy 
answers to questions surrounding the P5’s utility of veto. The veto, even though it 
relegates non-holding states to a state of excited confusion during crisis, it indeed, 
distorts governance among the P5, because it severely limits the basis of possible 
discourse.  
 
To the non-members, the adverse impact of the veto mechanism in the Council is 
enormous, since “it reinforces the perception and reality of dominance of the Council by 
the permanent members” (Caron, 1993: 566). For example, in Iraq and Kuwait conflicts, 
in response, particularly to the Soviet peace efforts, both the United States and the United 
Kingdom reportedly stated that they had “the power to maintain the UN sanctions and to 
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continue the use of force authorised by the Council because any alteration of the 
sanctions or the authorisation to use force would require a new resolution that they, as 
permanent members, could veto” (Caron, 1993: 577). The initial reason for the inclusion 
of this power in the Charter was to prevent the UN from taking direct actions against any 
of its principal founding members but veto has become an enduring source of discord 
within the organ. 
 
Historically, dating from 1945, the first ever veto casted was “in February 1946 by the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)” (Okhovat, 2011: 11). Between 1946 and 
2012, a total of 264 vetoes have been casted (Multilateral Research Group, 2012). Russia 
(Soviet Union) “vetoed 123 draft resolutions; United States 83; United Kingdom 30; 
France 18; and China 10” (Multilateral Research Group, 2012: 3). Further, between the 
years “1946 – 1955, 1 - 77 vetoes were casted; Vetoes 78 - 106 (1956-1965); Vetoes 107 
– 130 (1966-1975); Vetoes 131 - 171 (1976-1985); Vetoes 172 to 197 (1986-1995); 
Vetoes 198 - 219 (1996-2012)” (Multilateral Research Group, 2012: 4-6) every single 
one of these veto says no to general demand. Specifically, Western influence in the first 
decade of the Security Council’s existence is visible in the account that shows how the 
Soviet Union vetoed 75 of the 77 draft resolutions from 1946-1955. The Western ability 
to influence the Security Council without much recourse to the veto is perhaps the most 
noticeable factor during the first two decades of Security Council vetoes. The next two 
and a half decades (up to May 1990) were dominated by Third World attempts, in an 
enlarged Security Council, to get changes from the Western powers on issues of security 
importance (Okhovat, 2011: 12). 
 
Despite the huge powers the veto bestowed on the P5 that has made it possible to 
marginalised the non-permanent members, and the call for even distribution of veto 
power among the actors, a number of authors still believe that either amendment of veto 
or removal of veto is at best nonsensical. For emphasis, McCarty and Poole (1995), 
Akande (1997), Voeten (2001), argued that veto power allows for the functions and 
actions of the Council to be done. While McCarty and Poole (1995) variously suggested 
that the veto is important instrument and its geographic distribution makes no-sense of its 
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purpose, these writers further believe that the decisive nature of the Council is built into 
its veto strength. In the same regard, Shapley and Shubik (1954) copiously concur and 
further stretch the importance of the veto status quo to include simplifying the already 
complicated Security Council. The two hold that more veto votes mean more power, and 
simply more problems to the world body in and in general. For these authors, let the P5 





Figure 2.1: The Five Permanent Members: US, China, Russia, France and Britain – in 
order 
 
Adapted from theMetro-Detroit Model United Nations II 
 
Having recognised the P5 states who (in) advertently preaches the maintenance of status 
quo, below are some of the diagrammatic presentations of their use of veto between 1946 








Figure 2.2: Total number of vetoes per Permanent Member 1946-August 2012 
 
Adapted from the Multilateral Group, Research Analysts Research, 2012  
 
Figure 2.3: Permanent Members’ veto use 1946-August 2012 
 




2.3.iv. The blind spots within the existing arguments on veto 
Figures: 1 and 2 above show that the veto instrument has been used radically, and abused 
stringently, as a constituent of Power and ingredient of decision making and taking. 
While in accordance with Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, both elected and permanent 
members are obliged to abstain from voting in decisions regarding the peaceful 
settlement of disputes whenever they are a party to the dispute under consideration, this 
obligatory abstention is not faithfully honoured since the veto is somewhat used to shield 
states from scrutiny. This study extricates the existing judgments on the relevance of veto 
and in part presses further Wouters and Ruys (2005) argument that the main reason why 
many states abhor the veto power is the fact that permanent members often use the 
privilege to wrongly guard friendly states from condemnation or the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 
 
Further, the veto device as opposed to Voeten’s postulations, has been used for wrong 
political reasons (the collapsing of the AU peace talks in Libya, 2011), making veto 
wielders intimidating members and , the instrument responsible for more misstatements 
than any other feature in the UN, including claims of preventing the UN 
peacekeeping/peacemaking (Maclaurin, 1951: 196). Truly, some permanent members 
have not only exerted their prerogatives to shield friendly states from condemnation or 
economic sanctions, they actually, have also used veto to stall peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement operations. When McCarty and Poole (1995), and Akande (1997), wrote that 
maintenance of the status quo is key to the survival of the Council, it only provides rooms  
for assumption that the authors seemingly promote the culture of colonial alliance (that is 
the politics of old order) when the underlying arguments in their study is somewhat 
maintaining the status quo. The issue with veto alliance is, for example, “China, a veto 
welding state, temporarily impeded the continuation of UN peacekeeping missions in 
order to penalise UN Member states maintaining close relations with Taiwan” (Wouters 
and Ruys, 2005:16).  
The shielding of alliance partners and attacking of ‘enemy’ states through the agency of 
veto has served contradiction against the dictates of both the Charter and the spirit of 
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security. Other controversies regarding the use of the veto are the recourse to the veto by 
a permanent member which intervenes in a third country in contravention of the Charter. 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force. And Article 27(3) further   held the 
veto nations accountable in whichever way the veto power is administered (Shane 
Kelleher, 2005).  Correspondingly, the permanent members have also cast vetoes to block 
nominations for the post of Secretary-General,in abrogation of Article 97 of the Charter. 
Specifically,  “these vetoes were cast during closed sessions of the Council which, for 
example, include vetoes against the re-election of Kurt Waldheim in 1981 and Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali in 1996” (Wouters and Ruys, 2005. 18). While Shapley and Shubik (1954) 
would insist that veto allows for effective functioning of the Council, it, indeed, blocks 
the way as well. 
For most UN Member states, there are gross violations of the voting code as provided in 
the Charter. Essentially, Wouters and Ruys (2005: 24), recognise that “Article 27 of the 
Charter is a codification of the painful reality that some states are more equal than 
others.” This clue is perceptibly at odds with the moralities laid down in the Charter, such 
as Article 1(2), pursuant to which the UN aims at developing friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights of peoples, and even Article 2(1) 
which affirms the principle of sovereign equality as one of the basic pillars of the world 
body (Charter, 1945). 
 
Basically, the veto privilege in favour of the permanent members ‘protected’ by means of 
a kind of self-referential arrangement sincerely defies all rules of democracy and fair 
play. Historian, Paul Kennedy (2006: 51), who studied the functionalities of the UN, 
believes that it is outrageous to any right thinking mind, that a “mere 5 of the [193] 
sovereign states that make up the United Nations have special powers and privileges” 
(Kennedy, 2006: 51). The P5 countries are permanently seated at the core of the UN 
Security Council, which itself is the heart of the current global security system. “Upon 
what they do, or decide not to do, and upon what they agree to, or veto, lies the fate of 




But, in line with Article 108 of the Charter, any amendment to it, including, of course, the 
provisions of Article 27 (the veto), requires the consent of the permanent members. Even 
though, this amounts, in essence, to political circulus vitiosus that has prevented UN 
reform from the outset, the veiled wording of paragraph 3 of Article 27, the principle 
effectively endorses decisions pro domo whenever the interests of a permanent member 
are at stake [whether in regard to Charter reform or “operative” matters to be decided 
under Chapter VII or any other matter whatsoever] (Köchler, 2007: 6). This is why Caron 
(1993: 568) is adamant that practically speaking, it is quite unlikely that the veto can be 
eliminated or even significantly limited, adding that if one’s goal in reforming the veto, is 
to mitigate the possibility of a double standard in governance, any substitute voting 
procedure will in all likelihood allow some sort of double standard to continue because it 
is about the protection of interests of power holders. While agreeing with Caron on the 
vested interest and Shapley and Shubik (1954) that veto is important instrument in 
international leadership, the current status quo preserves only the colonial and 
dependency orders and these are the major problems. 
2.3.v. The New threats 
Traditionally, states posed the greatest threats to international security especially through 
wars that have caused massive death and destruction (Cato Institute, 2013). In the past 
and recent times, commonly referenced threats to the current international peace and 
security include conflicts between nations and civil wars within nations, the impacts of 
rising nations, weapon proliferations, general unrest, cybercrime, transnational organised 
crime, poverty, infectious disease and climate change, and state failures as well and 
technological developments, and requirement to maintain stable global economic system 
(Cato Institute, 2013; Erik Tamarkin, 2015). Also, Ronzitti (2010) and Panel Report 
(2004) who corroborated the account, underlines that cyber security; cyber wars; 
uncertainty of  access to sources of energy; international terrorism; Nuclear, radiological, 
chemical and biological weapons, (Weapon of Mass Destruction [WMD]); state and 
human insecurity; and the role of sanctions are all new threats to global security 




2.3.vi. The structure and composition 
According to Article 23 of the Charter which designed the Council’s structure and 
composition, there shall be permanent and non-permanent members of the Council 
(Charter, 1945). As listed earlier, the five permanent members are from Asia-Pacific, 
Eastern Europe and Western Europe and North America. This structural configuration 
leaves out the African and the Latin American and Caribbean regions from the permanent 
seat of the Council. As we will see in the discussion of reform proposals, one factor 
inherently wrong with the current configuration of the Council is the partial style of its 
structure (Martin and Edward, 1955: 102).  
 
The ‘partial’ composition also continues to resurrect reform debate among scholars of 
security and strategy, who blame the lack of regional (geopolitical/geographical) 
representativeness of the Council on the P5 resistance. Many reform documents favours 
‘one region one permanent seat’ at the minimum, as a means to straightening the crooked 
Council pillars (Panel Report, 2004). African group for example, claims that the Council 
is composed in a bias manner which negatively affects Africa’s overall development and 
especially its planned peacebuilding frameworks (President Robert Mugabe’s UNGA 
Speech, 2008). 
2.4. Africa’s peace and peacebuilding praxis 
As Sandole (2010: 8) and Galtung (1964) put it, peacebuilding seems to break nicely to 
the ‘building of peace.’ Galtung, often seen as the forerunner of peace studies presented a 
binary stage cataloging of the notion of peace: (i) positive peace or preventive initiatives, 
and (ii) negative peace (curative measures) from thence, the knitting of a pieces society 
together becomes peacebuilding. The essential individualities of positive peace according 
to Galtung are structural integration, optimism, prevention, and encouraging peace by 
peaceful means, while negative peace denotes the presence of violence, pessimism and 




Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo, (2011) looked at peace as “the resolution and 
transformation of conflict and also the conversion of extant social systems at national and 
international levels to respond to nation’s developmental needs for the wellbeing of the 
mass of its humanity” (McCandless and Karbo, 2011: 1). The World Health Organisation 
(WHO) (2008) and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 
2008) suggest that peacebuilding compartmentalises and harmonises both positive and 
negative peace while focusing on reducing or ending violent conflict and/or promoting a 
culture of peace (OECD, 2008; Erin McCandless, 2011). This is why the inkling in 
overall and especially Africa’s peacebuilding concerns peace, and is intimately tied to 
development, unlike the initial preoccupation in the northern hemisphere with removing 
the threat of nuclear war. This is why McCandless argues that in Africa, peace usually 
involves concerted reference to harmonious societal relationships among the population” 
(Erin McCandless, 2011: 20). Indeed, African conceptions of peace makes that peace is 
measured by the well-being of the individual and his or her community gauged by 
physical, material, and spiritual considerations. As such, the basic starting point for 
Africa’s peacebuilding is the understanding of the nature and character of conflict and 
recovering and assembling the nation from its pieces (Kuna, 2005: 5). Hansen (2011) 
whose study of peace is rooted in African perspective, fortifies Kuna and asserts “that the 
resolution of conflict is only a minimalist condition for the achievement of peace, adding 
that understanding the nature and character is the key” (Hansen, 2011: 11).  
 
In effort to locate peace and peacebuilding contextually in Africa, Erin McCandless 
opines that the concept of conflict must be understood. She argues that the common 
denominator in the definition of the concept of conflict refers to a struggle (physical or 
verbal, or emotional) clash, disagreement, or negation to harmonious co-existence 
between diametrically opposing forces or a people (Erin McCandless, 2011: 29). In her 
view, there are terms associated with conflict and peace that have to be understood in 





Conflict prevention: aims to prevent outbreaks of violence (minimalist) and to root out 
structural injustices that may cause conflict (maximalist). 
Conflict resolution: aims to address causes of conflict and seeks to build new and lasting 
relationships between hostile groups. 
Conflict transformation: focuses on the relationships and transactions between the parties 
in the midst of or previously engaged in a given conflict; addresses wider social, 
economic, and political sources of a conflict; and seeks to transform negative energy and 
war into positive social change (Erin McCandless, 2011: 30). 
Peacekeeping: provision of monitors or peace-keeping military forces, with consent, to 
stop violence and monitor a cease-fire, generally to provide a buffer between conflicting 
parties. Can prevent looting of humanitarian assistance, help implement peace 
agreements by overseeing or observing demobilisation and disarmament, and employ 
other techniques to monitor compliance with agreements and foster mutual confidence. 
Peacemaking: political, diplomatic, and sometimes military interventions directed at 
bringing warring parties to agreement (Erin McCandless, 2011: 30-31). 
2.4.1. Peacebuilding in perspective 
Paragraph 97 of the Outcome Document of the United Nations recognised “the need for a 
coordinated, coherent and integrated approach to post-conflict appeasement and 
reconciliation (World Summit Outcome, 2005: 24). On this basis, the General Assembly 
decided “to establish a Peacebuilding Commission as an inter-governmental advisory 
body (Outcome Document, 2005). This body, backed by a Peace Support Office and “a 
multi-year standing Peacebuilding Fund marks a new level of strategic commitment to 
enhancing and sustaining ‘peace after conflict’. Peacebuilding viewed through the prism 
is “a strategic process involving a synergetic series of actions targeted at addressing the 
sources of conflict and supporting the structures and capacities for peace aimed at 
institutionalising justice, and building positive peace” (Erin McCandless, 2011: 31).  
 
In the early 1990s, when the concept of peacebuilding entered the lexicon of security and 
conflict studies, it was an attempt to arrest a new pervasive and pernicious internal 
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violence that threatens global security and human welfare (Jackson, 2011).  Civil wars in 
1990s accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts fought in that era (Paris, 2008: 8). 
These, introduced internecine violence and collapsing states that became an unfortunate 
but familiar feature of the post-Cold War political landscape in Africa. For example, 
Paris records that some of the major peacebuilding operation in the 1990s were deployed 
to “Namibia in 1989; followed by missions to Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), 
Cambodia (1991) El Salvador (1991), Mozambique (1992), Liberia (1993), Rwanda 
(1993), Bosnia (1995), Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), East Timor (1999), Kosovo 
(1999), and Sierra Leone (1999)” (Mingst and Margaret, 2000; Rupert, 2000; Ougaard 
and Richard, 2002; Paris, 2004: 1-10, 235-236).  
 
These post-conflict missions after the civil wars aimed at preventing a recurrence of 
violence are essentially peacebuilding operations (Humphreys, 2011: 380). Accordingly, 
former UN Secretary-Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992) and Kofi Annan (2005) 
opine that the controlling idea of peacebuilding is not only to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into 
conflict or take preventive actions to guarantee peace, but also, to create the conditions 
necessary for a sustainable peace in war-torn societies — that is, a peace that would 
endure long after the departure of the peace builders themselves (Erin, McCandless, 
2011).   
2.4.2. The Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa: the 
linkages 
As the Cold War came to an end, a new type of international peace operation emerged, a 
new security activity of the United Nations missions aimed at helping war-torn countries 
make the transition from a fragile ceasefire to a stable peace emerged. This became 
known as “post-conflict peacebuilding” (Fassbender, 1998: 7; Paris and Sisk, 2007:5; 
Hassler, 2013: 9). In this drive, the United Nations considers democratisation of all 
nations as non-negotiable, intertwined with good governance and human development 
and security for peace (Russett, 1993; Erin and Hope, 2011: 276). However, the 
identification and development of mechanisms and processes for co-existence and 
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interaction that support peace rather than conflict represents a critical gap in the UN 
practice as it relates to state-building and peacebuilding, especially in Africa (Deo, 2009).  
 
While scholars have strived to link Africa’s insecurity paradigm with the Security 
Council’s involvement in African security affairs, Francis Deng (2008) points to the need 
for Africans to achieve clarity on political frameworks. In his Introduction to Identity, 
Diversity, and Constitutionalism in Africa, he argues that the legacy of constitutions and 
political frameworks of colonial powers has proven largely ineffective and has 
contributed to a crisis throughout much of the African continent. Deng and other authors 
claim that although existing legal and institutional frameworks [such as the UN Security 
Council] stress unity, they actually suppress diversity, leaving many Africans 
representatives at the Council feeling disempowered and unable to identify with 
governance processes in their own nations (Wilkinson, and Steve, 2002; Sutterlin, 2003; 
Deng, 2008). 
 
Focusing on peacebuilding as an important objective, Africa’s peacekeeping, state-
building, state-making, state-breaking and state failure are matters that are to some degree 
connected to the Council’s decisions and machinations (Kranso, 2004: 225; Malone,  
2004; Bourantonis, 2005). According to Mohammed Ayoob (2007), when the Cold War 
overlay is removed from Third World conflicts, it exposes the fundamental local 
dynamics inspired by international insecurity regime. However, his continued 
explanations also suggest that states are fragile when state structures lack political will 
and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed to guarantee peacebuilding 
initiatives and development (Ayoob, 2007).  
 
The above, is a part of the major security problems with Africa which is currently 
excluded from the veto of global security governance. The OECD (2007), underscores 
that Africa has prioritise prevention of conflict and peacebuilding missions but 
international actors within the Security Council may not be ready for Africa’s inclusion 
as yet. The OECD writes that the UN Security Council’s inclusive action today can 
reduce fragility, lower the risk of future conflict and other types of crises, and contribute 
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to long-term global development and security in Africa. (OECD, 2007: 222). The core of 
the document is that the current configuration of the Council is self-evident of Africa’s 
dependency on the veto-welding nations for basic security survivals. 
 
Walter Hoffmann, (1994) in his United Nations Security Council reform and 
restructuring and Theo Neethling (2005) citing the Commission on Global Governance 
(1995:84–85), related that the primary goals of global security organ such as the Council 
should be to prevent conflict and war and to maintain the integrity of nations and avert 
conditions that generate threats to the security of the people and state. Neethling (2005) 
further claims that such organ should anticipate and manage crises before they escalate 
into armed conflicts through a balanced agency of all Member Nations. The principles 
advocated by the Commission on Global Governance in 1995 clearly “pointed towards 
changing perceptions of what constitutes security and how it can be achieved” 
collectively as a community of nations (Diehl, 2001; Neethling, 2005: 228).  
 
Conversely, where people and state security are affected by political marginalisation and 
other factors that (may) cause or actually process insecurity are lying at the nexus of 
development and security, peacebuilding is imperative to return the nation to sustainable 
peace (Erin McCandless and Hope Mary, 2011). In this regard, without permanent seat to 
Africa and effective government institutions partly sustained through the veto might, and 
healthy state- society relations, African states are unlikely to be free of violence and 
poverty (Köchler, 2007). At the same time peacebuilding processes are internal focal 
trajectories towards a nation’s peace and security while external interventions such as 
those of the UN-backed NATO mission in Libya, during the 2011 crisis, puts strains on 
Africa’s peacebuilding praxis and its security outlook (Erin McCandless and Hope Mary, 
2011; Ekwealor, 2013). Actually, Paris and Sisk (2007: 5) view external involvement in 
the domestic affairs of African countries as obstacle to achieving peace and security in 
the region. The two argues that UN’s programming in peacebuilding process in Africa 
sometimes deviates from the domestic need and resulted in foreign ownership of local 
reforms.  They add that even though civil wars usually have domestic drivers, at bottom, 
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they are also local and international phenomena pulling the triggers for insecurity, and the 
Council is one of those (Paris and Sisk, 2007: 5;Call and Cook, 2003: 135).  
Further, Addison (2003: 4) believes that one of the problems facing peacebuilding and 
post-conflict reconstruction processes in Africa is the proliferation of external actors. 
Addison further notes that these external actors such as the P5 engage with post-conflict 
reconstruction processes for various reasons. While there are those who are genuinely 
interested in improving the welfare of the target populations, “there are others who may 
seek to engage with post-conflict reconstruction processes in order to secure their own 
economic or political interests” (Addison, 2003: 4; Murithi, 2006: 245; Cooper, 2006: 
20). The view of Addison alongside Murithi and Cooper who regularly indict foreign 
actors in African Affairs partially confirms the canvass that African inclusion into the 
permanent category of the Council will ensure a local-breed peacebuilding effort in the 
continent (Cooper, 2006: 21). This is a call that Africa and other Member Nations of the 
United Nations have repeatedly made under the banner of proposals for the Security 
Council reform. This call has not yielded any fruit, and we will engage the reform 
proposals here, in turns. 
2.5. Assessing the United Nations Security Council reform proposals 
since the 1990s 
 
It is interesting to read that the UN says the following “We the peoples of 
the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to 
mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice 
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of 
international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and 




On this creed, is predicated the calls for reforms of the UN Security Council to instill 
equality in the Council organ. The new phase of reform after the 1963 began in 1992 with 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 47/62, which invited members to 
submit written comments on a possible review of the membership of the Security Council 
(Razali Plan, 1997). The invitation generated so many proposals that UNGA Resolution 
48/26 was passed to allow the committee sufficient time for a successful completion of 
their task (Cox, 2009: 103). The tone for the new phase of reform was therefore, set “on 3 
December 1993, through a UNGA Resolution 48/26 inter alia to establish Open-ended 
Working Group” (Razali Plan, 1997: 4) to consider all aspects of the question of increase 
in membership of the Security Council, intended to provide a platform for any nation to 
submit proposals and discuss plans and other matters related to the Security Council” 
(Razali Plan, 1997: 1). 
 
The Open-ended Working Group which started its work in January 1994 extended its task 
through UNGA Resolution 50/489 of 16 September 1996 before the presentation of its 
findings on 18 July 1997 (Razali Plan, 1997). The Open-ended Working Group was the 
first comprehensive reform plan aimed at the reformation of the United Nations Security 
Council (Cox, 2009). The plan proposed an expansion in Council membership and 
transparency in operating methods, noting that the “effectiveness, credibility and 
legitimacy of the work of the Security Council depend on its representative character, on 
its ability to discharge its primary responsibility and duties on behalf of all members” 
(Razali, 1997: 6; Luck, Blokker and Schrijver, 2005; Luck, 2006; Cox, 2009: 102). 
Therefore, the UNGA through its Resolution 48/26 decides: 
 
(a), To increase the membership of the Security Council from fifteen to 
twenty-four by adding five permanent and four non-permanent members; 
(b), that the five new permanent members of the Security Council shall be 
elected according to the following patterns: (i), one from the developing 
state of Africa, (ii), one from the developing state of Asia, (iii), one from 
the developing state of Latin America and the Caribbean, (iv), two from 
the industrialised states; (c), that the four new non-permanent members of 
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the security Council shall be elected according to the following pattern: 
(i), one from African states, (ii), one from Asian states, (iii), one from 
Eastern European states, (iv) one from Latin American and Caribbean. 
The working document, under section 4(a), recognising the veto 
instrument as anachronistic and undemocratic, calls for its elimination 
and decides to discourage the use of veto by urging the original 
permanent members [P5] of the Security Council to limit the exercise of 
their veto power to actions taken under Chapter VII, and that new 
permanent members shall have no veto provision (Razali Plan, 1997: 7). 
 
Moreover, the Razali plan (1997) initiated the often-repeated calls for regularly-
scheduled, open meetings to allow direct expression of opinions by concerned states and 
organisations; regular consultations between the Council, the other organs, and affected 
countries; regular briefings to all member states; open debates to orient the Council 
before taking decisions; clear delineations on what matters are procedural and not subject 
to a veto; greater use of the International Court of Justice for advisory opinions; and more 
consultations with regional actors under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (Razali, 1997: 8-
9). Since 1997, several other reform plans have emerged including (the Informal Group 
of Small and Medium Countries (IGSMC), Movement of Non-Aligned Countries 
(MNAC), the Mongolia, Group of Arab States (GAS), the African Union (AU), High 
Level Panel Report (HLPR), the Group Four (G4) Plan, the Uniting for Consensus 
(UFC), the Small Five States (S5) Plan, Overaching process, Italian Proposal, Panama 
Proposal, Academic Proposal-model C, Model X, and Regional Economic Plan (Razali 
Plan, 1997). We will discuss these proposals in turn, below. 
2.5.1 The Informal Group of Small and Medium Countries (IGSMC) 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia Hungary, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Slovenia constitute the (IGSMC) states (Razali Plan, 1997). While these 
nations agreed with the propositions of the Razali Plan, they accentuated that reform of 
the Security Council should strengthen its effectiveness, and expansion should not be so 
large to impede its efficiency (Razali Plan, 1997). Specifically, the IGSMC under section 
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‘b’ underscores that enlargement of the Security Council must “ensure representativity of 
increased general members; take into account new economic and political powers; 
enhance equitable geographic representation; and will take place in both the categories of 
permanent and non-permanent members” (Razali Plan, 1997: 10-11). In this way, the 
IGSMC holds that the upper numerical limit for the size of the Council should be no 
more than twenty-five, adding that the under-represented groups of Africa, Asia, Latin 
America and Caribbean should become part of the permanent group. 
2.5.2. The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (MNAC) 
The Movement of Non-Aligned Countries submitted a negotiating paper towards the 
Security Council reform. While the MNAC is convinced that set of recommendations by 
the Razali Plan improves transparency and decision-making processes of the Council, 
they are concerned with the consultation process of the Council, especially with regards 
to peacekeeping and troop contributions. MNAC want open public meeting as a rule and 
actually fuller participation of non-members before reaching decision of important 
security issues including sanctions (Razaali Plan, 1997). 
2.5.3. Mongolia reform plan 
Mindful of the substance of Razali proposal, Mongolia working paper, has a more radical 
position, calling for non-members’ full participation in the formal meetings of the 
Council (Razali Plan, 1997: 24). In the view of the Mongolia paper, no degree of 
expansion in the Council will bear a direct representation of the overwhelming interests 






2.5.4. The Group of Arab States 
Even though the concerns of the Group of Arab States seem many, the controlling idea of 
their call is to attain reform. Their reform strategies, although agree with the position of 
the MNAC on the principle of equitable geographical distribution of power within the 
Council, GAS request two non-permanent seats to themselves. They also called for “the 
periodic review of the United Nations Charter with a view to phase out the veto 
instrument (Razali Plan, 1997). 
2.5.5. The African Union – Ezulwini Consensus 
The African Union, praying the collective responsibility of maintaining international 
peace and security in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations, suggest the democratisation of the Council. The AU specifically, stated that “the 
membership of the Security Council should be expanded to twenty-six with a two 
permanent seat for Africa for the benefit of developing nations, Africa, in particular” 
(Razali Plan, 1997: 58; Ezulwini Consensus, 2005: 9). While adopting the relevant 
document of the MNAC regarding efficiency and transparency, the AU actually sought 
two permanent seats and five non-permanent seats for Africa. Its letters under section 
2(a) of the Razali Plan read: “Africa should be allocated no less than two permanent 
seats; 2(b) Africa should be allocated five non-permanent seats in the expanded Security 
Council” (Razali Plan, 1997: 58; Ezulwini Consensus, 2005: 9). According to both 
documents on Africa’s position on reform, the veto instrument is to be abrogated by 
disuse. Further, in 2013 UNGA session, African representative pressed further the call for 
reform and argued that, it was inconceivable that a region like Africa, with the highest 
cases of conflict, 54 member nations, abundant natural resources, and a huge contributor 
to the UN peacekeeping operations does not have a permanent seat on the Council 
(UNGA, 2013). They are adamant that reform must guarantee balance and spirit of global 
democracy and governance. 
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2.5.6. High Level Panel Report 
Mindful of the issue areas identified in the Razali reform Plan, which elicited consensus 
and disagreement in pertinent expanses, in 2003, United Nations Secretary-General Koffi 
Annan renewed the push for reform with an aim on a more secure World (Panel Report, 
2004). His report — High Level Panel Report — attempted to strike a balance between 
two major considerations that should govern the composition of the Council, firstly, the 
“contribution to the Organisation — financial, military, and diplomatic — and secondly, 
the overall representativeness of Member States in the Council” (Panel Report, 2004; 79: 
Cox, 2009: 104). The Panel Report believing that a decision on the enlargement of the 
Council, is now a necessity, introduced two important proposal models, Model A and 
Model B (Panel Report, 2004). Models A and B both involve a distribution of seats as 
between four major regional areas, which were identified respectively as “Africa”, “Asia 
and Pacific”, “Americas”, and “Europe” (Panel Report, 2004: 81). Model A provides for 
six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-
permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows: 
 
Table 1 – Proposed Security Council reform plan – Model A 








Africa 54 0 2 4 6 
Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 1 2 6 
Americas 36 1 1 4 6 
Totals 
Model A 
193 5 6 13 24 






While Model A proposed three new non-permanent seats and six new permanent veto-
less seats, Model B, on the other hand, essentially created a downright new category of 
seats instead of merely adding permanent seats” (Panel Report, 2004: 80; Cox, 2009: 
104). Conversely, Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new 
category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year nonpermanent 
(and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows: 
 
Table 2 – Proposed Security Council Reform Plan – Model B 









Africa 55 0 2 4 6 
Asia and Pacific 56 1 2 3 6 
Europe 47 3 2 1 6 
Americas 36 1 2 3 6 
Totals 
Model A 
193 5 8 11 24 
Source: High Level Panel Report with minor corrections 
 
Model B proposed a four years, instead tenure of two, in which the incumbent state 
would have been immediately available for reelection. In this scheme, two four-year seats 
would have been reserved for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe and the Americas. 
Each plan would have increased the Council to twenty-four members (High Level 
Report, 2004: 81; Cox, 2009: 104-5). According Cox (2009: 105) and High Level Report, 
(2004: 81) “the report proposed an ‘indicative voting’ in which members of the Security 
Council could call for a public indication of positions on a proposed reform whereby 
action would have a first vote with no effect or veto and a second formal vote under the 
usual practice, which it was believed would increase accountability of the veto function. 




2.5.7. The Group Four (G4) Plan 
The Group of Four (G4) consists of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan (Gowan and 
Gordon, 2014: 29). The G4 marries Model A’s focus on enhancing effectiveness, 
credibility and legitimacy of the Security Council by improving its representative 
character with the Razali concern for developing nations. As Cox (2009) notes the G4 
plan also subtly broadens the meaning of ‘security’ under the Charter by claiming that 
“security and development are intertwined and mutually reinforcing and that 
development is an indispensable foundation of collective security” (Cox, 2009: 106). For 
that reason, the G4 plan privileges security issues of existing world veracities and that the 
Security Council needs the enlargement of the members chiefly to enhance 
responsiveness towards the visions and wishes of all Member States, especially the 
excluded nations. The G4 plan sought to increase the Council from fifteen to twenty-five 
members by adding six permanent members and four non-permanent members (Panel 
Report, 2004). Also, the new non-permanent seats would seat one member from each of 
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean without veto until a 
review of the entire plan at a fifteen years mark (Cox, 2009). Indeed, the plan reiterated 
many of the reform strategies as enunciated in the Razali plan on geographic 
representativity. 
 
2.5.8. Uniting for Consensus 
Uniting for Consensus (UFC) consists of countries such as: “Argentina, Canada, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, 
Spain, and Turkey” (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 29). China and Indonesia participate in 
expert level meetings of the UFC. The Uniting for Consensus’ plan is essentially a 
reaction against the alleged efforts of certain G4 proponents to become permanent 
members of the Council (Cox, 2009). Supporters of the Uniting for Consensus plan 
favour a variant Model B proposal which they believe is flexible and more representative. 
The plan describes the Security Council as ‘inequitable and unbalanced’ and asserts that 
any expansion “should make it more democratic, more equitably representative, more 
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transparent, more effective and more accountable” (Okhovat, 2011: 22). It actually 
underscores, that, the strongest means to promote real accountability, is to allow for 
frequent rotation and fair and equitable representation (Cox, 2009). The plan also calls 
for increasing the number of Council members from fifteen to twenty-five, holding 
however, that the five permanent seats would remain unchanged; the twenty non-
permanent seats would be held for two years and would be redistributed along these lines: 
“six from African States; five from Asian States; four from Latin American and 
Caribbean States; three from Western European and other States; [and] two from Eastern 
European States” (Cox (2009: 107). 
2.5.9. The Small Five Group (S5) Plan 
The S5 group comprises: Switzerland, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, and Singapore 
(Emch, 2012). Their plan is a modest attempt at reforming the Council’s working 
methods. The plan suggests a number of improvements to “enhance the accountability, 
transparency and inclusiveness of its work, with a view to strengthening its legitimacy 
and effectiveness and to stop the P5 from using the veto power” (Cox, 2009: 109; Emch, 
2012: 1). They suggest institutionalising regular, open exchanges between the Council 
members and affected member states as reform strategy. According to Cox (2009) 
permanent members are asked to voluntarily abstain from exercising the veto in any 
matter of “genocide, crimes against humanity and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law” (Cox, 2009: 109).  
2.5.10. Overarching Process (OP) 
Essentially, the Overarching Process is an endeavor to halt the standoff that had emerged 
between G4, Uniting for Consensus, and the Ezulwini Consensus plans (Cox, 2009). The 
plan puts in firm terms that common denominator, that is,  only those reform measures 
that are common among the proposals be accepted and leaves all the key dissimilarities 
“open for negotiation” (Caron, 1993: 568). Simply put, the Overarching Process is a 
covenant to agree on the basic points from which further negotiations regarding the 
Security Council will proceed, and to leave the real tough talking and the dealing for the 
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negotiations themselves (Cox, 2009). In this reform arrangement, the Council tentatively 
grows to twenty-two, and another seven new seats created and distributed as follows: two 
seats to Africa; two seats to Asia; one seat to Latin America and Caribbean; one seat to 
Western Europe and others; and one seat to Eastern Europe (UN special report, 2014: 8).   
2.5.11. Italian Proposal 
The Italian proposal is one of minor state-sponsored proposals. It is distinctive in that the 
plan creates rotational regional seats, not seats for individual states assigned by region 
(Cox, 2009: 111; Razali 1997: 63). By implanting strictly regional voices on the Council, 
broader collective interests are caused to triumph over the more narrow interests of single 
powerful states. The Italian proposal gives two added permanent but veto-less seats to 
Africa, Asia, Western Europe and other groups, Latin America and the Caribbean, and 
Eastern Europe (Razali Plan, 1997). Each regional group would have the operational 
management of the seats and outline principles and mechanisms with appropriate checks 
and balances to avert national occupation of the seats and ensure regional representation 
(Razali Plan, 1997: 63). 
2.5.12. Panama Proposal 
Panama proposal is another minor state-sponsored proposal. In 2007, Panama proposed a 
simple plan to increase member representation. Under its plan the Security Council 
would seat an additional six members with five-year renewable terms (Cox, 2009: 111). 
The seats would be spread among the current regions: two for Asia, two for Africa, one 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, and one for Western Europe and other States 
(Razali Plan, 1997; Cox. 2009). In Panama plan, any state chosen for four uninterrupted 
terms would automatically converted to, and for this reason only, a permanent member 
with no veto. These reform plans further inspired academics to wade into the reform 




2.5.13. The Models of Academic Proposals 
2.5.13.i. Model C 
Almost all problems of the United Nations reform revolve around the composition of the 
Security Council (Panel Report, 2004). This in part necessitates the academia’s Model C 
position on the Council’s reform. Model C is chiefly a proposal developed from a 
variation of Models A and B which retains focus on equitable representation through 
increased membership (Cox, 2009). In this Model, membership would be increased and 
distributed in the same manner as Model A or B, but would create a new Pacific Rim 
region (Razali Plan, 1997). The Pacific Rim group would consist of the “U.S., Canada, 
Japan, the Philippines, the states other than China along the East Asian coastline, 
Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Island States, while the Asian Group would 
consist of China plus south and southwest Asia” (Cox, 2009: 129).  
 
Brian Cox (2009) for one notes that model C is calculated to offer greater recognition to 
the large populations of Asian states. The general orientation of model C is to retain the 
original five permanent members but redistribute the ten two-year term seats members: 
three to Africa; two to Asia; one to Europe; two to the Pacific Rim; and two to Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Cox, 2009). The plan then creates one four-year renewable 
seat and one eight-year renewable seat for each region. The eight-year seats would be 
dual-seated, meaning that two nations would occupy the seat on a two-year rotation. The 
dual seat is meant to reduce “political rancor from the large states in each region which 
are not selected” (Cox, 2009: 105). The four-year seats are reward seats. Each region 
selects the constituent nation that has contributed most to peacekeeping and other United 






2.5.13.ii. Model X 
Given that none of the proposals has yet gained wide spread support. Model X is an 
attempt to make Model B more palatable to more member states. The plan sacrifices 
some equitable depiction in favour of a smaller, more efficient Council of no more than 
twenty (Cox, 2009). Model X recognises that the developing world is not sufficiently 
accounted for but not neglected either. The plan favours and rewards major contributors 
to the United Nations programme. It adds five four-year renewable term seats; two four 
year renewable seats for Africa, two for Asia, and one for the Americas and the Pacific 
(Kelleher, 2005). At the heart of the Model X plan, each UN region would itself regulate 
whether a nation will be re-elected. Europe is not allocated a new seat, which somewhat 
redresses their overrepresentation among the permanent members (Köchler, 2007: 9; 
Okhovat, 2011). In the face of these designs, unfortunately, the permanent states are 
adamant that no reform of the Council can take effect, essentially sticking to their 
position since 1945. Collectively and individually, the P5 insists that “no reform can 
occur without the full consent of the P5” (Gowan and Gordon, 2014: 4). Below are the 
positions of the: United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France on reform of the 
Council. 
2.5.14. The American Position on Security Council Reform 
The United States envisioned a Security Council with a “Four Policeman” at the 
inception of the Council (Cox, 2009). The four includes the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, making up a separate body within the United 
Nations that would have “exclusive authority whose sole responsibility is to decide on the 
utility of force” (Cox, 2009: 94). While rhetoric from the US government may have 
tilted, the core of their position is unshaken. In US arrangement, there shall be a separate 
Executive Council composed of the Policemen and six or seven representatives chosen 
from regions to deal with nonmilitary matters. Yes, there is no Four Policemen; there are 
five in the form of permanent members, with the duties of the Policemen. This outlook is 
fortified by the US’ firm belief that peace could be held only by the willingness to use 
overwhelming military power against any population. This belief is the ideology driving 
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the US foreign relations. This view specifically conflicts with the modern, popular 
viewpoint that the United Nations is, in all aspects, “based on sovereign equality and 
must permit the smaller nations a meaningful role” (Charter, 1945: 1). And even more, 
the views of those peace and security authors such as Micheal Doyle and Nicholas 
Sambanis who passionately argued that “peace cannot be enforced on any resistant 
population” (Doyle and Sambanis, 2006: 14) is at wrestle with the US plan. Indeed, while 
the US routinely conveyed in its proposal and any other dais it sees, that small nations 
should not be allowed to complicate the supreme task of keeping the peace, it also 
believed that the P5 should champion the rights of those states. Thus, the US position on 
the use of force and equality are crafted contrarily to the principles of the Charter 
(Charter, 1945; Cox, 2009: 95). 
2.5.15. The British Position 
Britain likewise the US, is unrepentant. The position it held in 1945 is the one it pursues 
and maintains today. According to Brian Cox (2009), the British envoys sought for three 
regional councils, one each for Europe, Asia, and the Americas, charged with enforcing 
regional security and collective responsibility as a Supreme United Nations Council 
(Howard, 1998) is settled with non-African permanent member. In its original plan, 
Britain believes that this tiered system would allow the regional councils to enforce peace 
locally and avoid having every nation poking its finger into every other nation’s business. 
While local ownership of enforcement process seems situated at the heart of British’s 
proposal, it later shifted its goals to balancing European power against the Soviet Union 
and to protecting the British Empire from being dissolved by independence and self-
determination at the end of the war (Cox, 2009: 95). The British ultimately viewed the 
Security Council and the United Nations less as a new system of international relations 
and more as an added tool in traditional diplomacy. Even when it has, in sermons at the 




2.5.16. The Soviet Position 
The Soviet (present day Russian Federation) originally, preferred an orthodox soldierly 
cooperation with the United States and Britain rather than lording themselves over 
weaker nations (Roach, 1952). Undeniably, the Soviet regards the US proposal especially 
as a catalyst for war, holding that it is insufficiently democratic and as a result can re-
invite war among nations. Thus, the Soviets called for a reform that did not endanger the 
security or hegemonic ambition of global powers. In this fashion, Cox (2009) accounts 
that the Soviets maintained an absolute, insoluble position on maintaining an unrestricted 
power of the veto as an instrument to contain the excesses of powerful counterparts. In 
Cox account, the Soviets were willing to compromise on almost all points except the 
unanimity principle (Cox, 2009: 96). 
2.5.17. The position of France 
France in a response to the Council reform supports an expansion of the Council in both 
permanent and non-permanent categories of members. A position that the US and Britain 
claim is informed by the weak status of France in the Council. Specifically, it favours the 
inclusion of “Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan for new permanent seat along with a 
representation from Africa among the permanent Council” (Mission de Permanente de la 
France, 2010: 1). With a view to breaking the deadlock arising from the variegated 
proposals, France proposed the creation of new seats with longer mandate as intermediate 
solution to the seeming unending reform debate.  
2.5.18. The Position of China 
China is one of the P5 members who has vetoed only a very few resolutions, an act some 
scholars linked to its multilateralism and diplomacy. Regarding, the reform of the 
Security Council, while China has not been vehement in its stance in its individual 
capacity, It recalls that for the purpose of “regulating the use of force, for the application 
of the Responsibility to Protect, for making the Security Council more representative” the 
Council can be reformed to meet these outlined requirements (Geeraerts, et al, 2007: 2-
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5). China however, notes that changing the Security Council’s membership or veto power 
or any of its structures, requires amendment of the UN Charter (Article 108) and 
necessitates the approval of two-thirds in the UN General Assembly including the 
mandatory backing of the P5 (Geeraerts, et al, 2007: 6) . Hence, only one such de jure 
amendment has been made to the UN Charter since its formal signing on 26 June 1945. 
2.5.19. Regional Economic Plan (REP) 
Regional Economic Plan (REP) is pertinent because it seeks to reconcile the 
“unrepresentative, illegitimate, and increasingly ineffectiveness of the Council especially 
in matters of dealing with global crises squarely” (Cox, 2009). The REP proposes a new 
Security Council that will consist of ten new regional groups: “Northern America, Latin 
America, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, Northern Eurasia, Southern Asia, 
Eastern Asia, Southeastern Asia and The Pacific” (Cox, 2009: 114). Under this formula, 
participation in a region would be limited to states with a population of at least four 
million or a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and or Public Private Partnership (PPP) of at 
least 40 billion constant US dollars. Thus, the regional groupings will distribute 
representation equally, according to population and wealth of relevant states.  
 
The ten groups would be headed by ‘an anchor country’ or by co-anchor countries. Cox 
(2009) writes that under the arrangement, a vote could only be cast by any region on a 
specific issue when backed by individual states representing 60 percent of its population 
and 60 percent of its GDP (PPP). The plan refers to this as the 60/60 rule, which governs 
all votes save those cast in emergency situations (Cox, 2009). In the case of an 
emergency, the anchors, or co-anchors, can vote their will. The wealthiest regions, those 
with at least 18 percent of the combined GDP (PPP) of all Regions, would receive an 
additional two votes. This plan eliminates the veto because the “gridlock and inaction 




2.6. Analysis of the reform proposals 
Recurring themes and shared concerns that run through a majority of the proposals are 
the need for increased membership in the permanent category; the elimination or 
limitation of the veto; African inclusion; and improved working methods. These are the 
common pleas. According to (Köchler, 2007; Guzzardi and Mullenbach, 2008; Cox, 
2009; Okhovat, 2011; and Gowan and Gordon, 2014), some of these ideas cannot help 
but improve the Security Council but not all of these reforms strategies are popular 
among the reformist. Actually, the majority of the reform propositions conceivably, are 
quite safe and even beneficial to the current members of the UN for collective global 
security. Further, the new formulae centrally create a structure that compartmentalises 
every concern and responds specifically to the balance needs within the organ. Although, 
several of new proposals barely resemble the Council’s originally agreed upon structure 
and tends to threaten the old foundations of the organ, it is important to reform with a 
view to keeping on par with current security changes and challenges. Increased 
membership is called for by every proposal except the S5 plan. This, indeed, shows 
global community’s overwhelming support for the reform. The different plans offer a 
variety of reasons for these suggested increases in the membership of the Security 
Council.  
 
To be sure, the Razali, G4, United for Consensus, REP, and Model C plans, in particular, 
argue that the Council’s effectiveness, credibility, and legitimacy depend on a 
representative character that the current body lacks. The High Level Panel Report, G4, 
and Model C plans also add that a membership increase would create a Council better 
conformed to the actual contribution of world states. The Ezulwini Consensusfor one 
argues for increased membership based on essential fairness and egalitarian values. In 
calling for increased membership, all made valid observations, but faces resistance as 
some of the plans seems to ignore the original purpose of the Council and neglect the 
functional complications. These are the current basis for resistance. 
 
Furthermore, no plan approves of the unrestricted veto utility only the Elzuwini 
Consensus extended the power to new permanent members. The remaining proposals 
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condemn the veto power as anachronistic and undesirable. Arguably, veto carries the 
most blame for the Council’s ineffectiveness. The blame is chiefly rested on the claim 
that the veto is habitually used to protect the interest of P5 and countries with which the 
P5 have close cultural, economic and/or political ties, most notoriously in situations of 
mass genocidal killings. This, in part provided the reason most of the reforms call for 
some form of restraint, if not outright elimination, of the veto (Razali, 1997; Cox, 2009). 
2.6.1. The Working Methods analysis 
Several recommendations and observations under the working method, underscores that 
the Security Council should improve its functioning techniques (Panel Report, 2004). 
Particularly, every proposal agrees on changes to the procedural aspects of the Council. 
Some insists on regular briefings and consultations with affected groups of states with a 
view to guarantee non-permanent members with the opportunity for real participation and 
control in Council decisions without substantial infringement on permanent member 
rights and duties (Cox, 2009; Ekwealor, 2013). Under working method, replacement of 
secretive, informal decision-making sessions with more open hearings is suggested for 
efficiency (Gowan and Gordon, 2014). Also, the reform should take into account 
activities that would prevent the exclusion of the non-permanent members and must 
abhor the selective deprivation tactics in the Council that actually offend the integrity of 
the United Nations.  
 
As enunciated in Italian proposal and the REC plan, the core of concentration of power 
on regional bodies is that the UN will create an organisation that better acts for the world 
as a whole. For example, most of Europe could easily be managed through the European 
Union and Africa through the African Union (Cox, 2009). Increased use of regional 
organisations as espoused in S5 plan assures closer coordination of security activities and 
proven reliance in the management of people and resources of the Council. Cox, (2009) 
notes that under the new regional arrangements, that, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) acts under the United Nations flag, and the African Union acts as a 
stabilising force in Africa which is good for the UN. Although, critics are querying the 
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utility of regional organisation for the UN security programme, labelling same as 
divisive. 
2.7. Colonialism and neo-imperialism in the Security Council: the 
conundrum for Africa 
In view of Lenin cited in Aja (1998:46) imperialism is secured on economic domination, 
subordination and exploitation of weak economies by the developed economies. Aja 
(1998) argues that imperialism’s  most outstanding technical meaning is that it is the 
highest stage in the promotion of capitalism when, among others the business interests of 
monopoly capitalists in Europe became more pronounced among all subordinate nations 
(Ake,1985:20). The attitude of monopolisation of veto power is actually the newest 
colonial stock in trade for the powerful European nations duplicated in the Security 
Council. Closely related to imperialism is the concept of neo-colonialism. The substance 
of neo-colonialism is the continual economic and technological domination of the 
dependent states by foreign states and other interests without direct political control and 
subordination (Yansane, 1980: 24). Implicitly, neo-colonial dominance is the continual 
utility of power from the developed countries to expand and deepen the sphere of 
capitalist accumulation at the expense of the developing regions such as Africa (Onwuka, 
1987: 52).  
The contrivances for neo-colonialism in developing regions, Africa inclusive, are the 
multinational corporations (MNCs), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, 
Security Council, and even the weak and subservient neo-colonial states in the periphery 
(Aja, 1998:51). In security and political sense, neo-colonial strategy is expedited through 
Western maneuvers through the instrumentality of foreign grants, loans, aid, economic 
assistance, military-defence pacts and agreements through which dependent nations get 
more chained into insecurity paradigm in the world dominated by developed capitalist 
states. For example, in Nigeria, foreign oil companies have exercised monopolies in 
exploration and exploitation of resources. Western multinational corporations (such as 
Texaco, Chevron, Total, Elf, Mobil and Shell) have monopolised Nigeria’s rich oil 
reserves with sheer impunity. According to Ake (1985:126), in virtually all the 
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underdeveloped countries in which neo-colonialism has managed to bolster its position, 
there are growing crises of external debt burden, food crisis, high unemployment rate, 
technological backwardness and diversion of scarce resources to arms for the sole benefit 
of colonial commanders, notably the P5 nations. 
The P5 at the centre of global powers perpetuate their presence in the security arena of 
their former colonial outlets, particularly through the extraction of raw materials and 
engagement in securitisation interventions. The P5 are thus involved in interfering in, and 
controlling the governance and security and peace programmes of fragile African nations 
with a view to sustaining the flow of raw materials into the P5 states at prices which 
overly profit the P5. Essentially, neo-colonialism enhanced and eventually replaced 
colonialism. This explains why Africa continues to pay huge amounts of money annually 
in debt service to the some P5-members controlled Bretton Wood institutions. This 
dependence, in turn, gives the IMF and World Bank the undue advantage to reap from 
where they did not actually sow.  
 
The post-independence African leaders in the face of these inauspicious developments 
appeared crippled by their own powerlessness and veto threats of the some of the P5 
nations, especially Britain, France and the US – the P3. The P5 through the veto 
instrument of neo-colonialism dismember African leaders from unity that will earn them 
political power to make economic decisions. According to Cilliers (2004:23) France (a 
veto state) carried out one military intrusion on average in Africa each year from 1960-
1994, and it has been scot-free since there is no laid-down power to challenge its 
audacity. Indeed, the global post-colonial order is nurtured on the lop-sided socio-
economic and political nature it has had. Indeed, Zeleza (2008:1-2) and Kastfelt (2005:2) 
vividly note that several postcolonial wars are deep-rooted in continued obtaining 
advantage of the colonised.  
 
At the centre of the resistance towards Council reform is the appreciation of 
transformation of Europe and world history orchestrated by Africa’s anti-colonial wars, 
which culminated in somewhat political association of Africans and colonial emperors. 
69 
 
Regrettably, gains made at the heels of Africa’s political independence were capsised in 
the sea of permanent seat of the neo political order of the United Nations Security 
Council. The uncertainties and timorousness of postcolonial Africa are founded in the 
governmental and cultural economies of colonialism and the neo-colonial oracle, the UN 
Security Council permanent seat with veto. The veto power is laced on to the neo-
colonial agenda inherited from colonial knowledge. In essence, the veto power is used to 
secure the colonial parlance in the global political arena. 
2.8 Justification for sampling Africa  
The main African contenders that have officially declared themselves able, available, 
willing, and ready to occupy the Council’s permanent seat are: Egypt, Nigeria and South 
Africa (Fafowora, 1997; Ciroma, 1995; Cantori, 2002; Spies, 2008). Although, countries 
such as Kenya, Libya, Senegal, and others have shown interests in ‘permanent seat’ some 
authors such as Hovet, (1960: 93) and Cox, (2009) qualified such calls as sabotage to the 
common African front of the “African Caucusing Group” (ACG). Actually, since the 
1960s when Africa started actively wriggling herself out of colonial odyssey 
characterised by sorrowful asymmetrical encounter with Europe, its constituent states 
have prayed larger freedom in all spheres and strata of international institutions and 
regimes, inclusive of the United Nations (Ekwealor, 2013). In this vein, African members 
of the UN sought inclusion into the permanent seat of the Council with a view to 
achieving security and greater freedom for Africa (Gambari, 1992; Gambari, 1997; 
Garba, 1997; Fawole, 2000; Ezulwini Consensus, 2005). While these ambitions are 





2.8.2.i. The gaps within the existing Security Council reform 
proposals 
Some of the principal challenges with the reform of the Security Council are the actual 
proposals which in turn serve working problems for the UN. Some of the gaps in the 
existing literature are as follows: 
Assessment of Africa’s capabilities in relation to Security Council permanent position: 
the plethora of literature reviewed, have unanimously suggested reform on the basis of 
geographic representativity or in view of democracy and better practices. However, no 
literature has actually assessed or weighed up Africa’s capabilities and strengths in all of 
the recommendations. This lack of assessment of the capabilities in terms of military 
might, economic development and potentials, prudent peacekeeping and building 
capabilities of Africa’s top five nations is a gross oversight. This oversight is a major 
hindrance to securing the various proposed reform strategies. This study, therefore, in 
chapter five (5.3; 5.3.1; 5.3.2; 5.3.3; 5.3.4; 5.4; 5.5; 5.6; and 5.7)  weighs into these grey 
spots in literature and provide lucid basis for the African inclusion narrative.  
The politics of P3 (Britain, France and US) versus P2 (China and Russia): while in areas 
such as adoption of resolutions, the P5 have relatively worked together exception to 
instances such as the Syria crisis, the division between the P3 and the P2 has not been 
adequately accounted for by the various literature proposals. The need to recognise this 
inadequacy is a prime factor since it provides the groundwork for non-agreement and lays 
the foundation for sturdy disunity within the P5. This study, actually to fills this gap by 
providing the specific engagements and positions of the individual P5 nations in relation 
to the business of global security, the reform of Security Council being one of them. 
These discords and gaps relating to reform were discussed in chapter four of this thesis in 
which variegated non-progressive positions of the P5 were highlighted and technical 
rearrangements of the Council, such as African inclusion suggested on the basis of not 




The Razali plan: the plan has been praised as the most comprehensive document on 
reform since 1945. The underlying message of the plan is expansion and inclusion, but it 
makes this proposal outside the dictates of the Charter. The Plan is legally flawed. Article 
108 states: “amendments to the Charter shall come into force for all Members of the 
United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the members of 
the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective constitutional 
processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the 
permanent members of the Security Council” (Charter, 1945, Article 108). Razali Plan 
specifically deviated from Article 108, and not in tandem with the Charter. If it had gone 
through, the Plan would have created precedence and opened the gate for Charter abuse. 
This research has signaled this warning and laid the framework that encouraged both the 
P5 and General Assembly to abide by the principle of democracy upon which the UN is 
supposedly constructed. 
 
High Level Panel Report: the High Level Panel Report intentionally emplaced emphasis 
of reform on ‘contribution to the Organisation — financial, military, and diplomatic’. 
Surely, while contribution serves good purpose, the blind spot with this proposal is that it 
does not know which of the elements is most vital to the organisation. It also, did not 
categorise the elements in any other of importance to allow for whatever claims it has 
made. Financial capacity without military support is useless, military expertise without 
financial vehicle is immobile, and also does diplomatic channels. One thing that makes 
the Panel Report inapplicable is the stack lack of actuality in its recommendation. It lacks 
practical guidelines because developing nations, Nigeria inclusive have been hugely 
responsible for the donation of troop but instead of mentioning Nigeria, the statement is 
blanket, making it difficult to establish strength and determine way forward. This study, 
has highlighted the missing link in the High Level Panel Report, and lucidly accounted 
for Nigeria’s security services to the world. 
 
The removal of the veto power: Essentially a common denominator among other (forms 
of) proposals such as the G4, with exception to the Ezulwini Consensus is the removal of 
the Veto. Fact is that veto power is a major problem within the Council. But it is not 
72 
 
inherently evil. The only issue with the veto is the selective deployment. This study does 
agree that veto is intrinsically mayhem but underscores that a solution to veto and its 
attendant crises is to infest all UN geographic actors with the sauce of veto power. Its 
availability to all geographic regions will dilute the sting of veto and increase regional 
cooperation that has been lacking in the Council through the colonial acrimony that has 
processed “a diplomatic cul-de-sac”in many UN activities (Spies, 2008: 109).The gaps 
on veto were highlighted in this chapter, teased out in chapter three and further engaged 
in chapter six. 
2.9. Conclusion  
In order to achieve greater security and peace in the current international system through 
the United Nations Security Council, the organ must reform itself. Currently, the P5 
struggles to keep up with the purpose of the Council because the status quo is shaken by 
the various tests of current time. Assuredly, the Council will regain its legitimacy, 
harness its working method, respond quickly to new threats and organise its structure 
only when the P5 allows for the expansion of the Council to accommodate geopolitical 
balance and evenly distribute the veto power or eliminate the utility of veto entirely.  
 
Truly, there is a link between insecurity in Africa and the Security Council permanent 
seat. Africa is currently inefficient in addressing its conflict partly due to the exclusion 
and attendant hindrances of veto power. Africa needs to occupy permanent seat with 
assured veto power which will allow them deal with matters without the fear of the 
interests of the current P5 in Africa’s conflict. Point of fact is that, the P5 are on duty first 
to guard their own nations and secondly to guard the world. And as international actors, 
they usually have domestic interest which hinders their international roles as neutral 
arbiter. It is plausible that when Africa becomes a permanent seat holder and the Latin 
America and the Caribbean becomes one too, the regional balance is greatly achieved. In 
this way, Africa will be better placed to address matter of neocolonialism and 
peacebuilding in particular. The degree of insecurity in Africa blamed on lack of 
permanent power offers that at least one of the three African states: Egypt, Nigeria, and 
South Africa that have availed themselves to serve are given positive consideration to 
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represent the region. A permanent seat to Africa is as good as permanent peace to the 
region and to the global community. 
 
In the following chapter (Chapter Three), we will provide the theoretical basis and 
perspectives for which we chose the instruments used in this study and demonstrate how 
the approaches  address the core issues of this research, including: international politics 
of interest and power (Realist Theory); human orientation, behaviour and conduct 
(Bahaviourist Approach); the business of lording it over the other to sulk the weak 
(Dependency Theory); and most importantly the legislation of leading by the rules (the 
Society of State Approach). These theories have been chosen for their specific 














Behaviourism, Dependency, Realism, and Society of State: navigating 
the Security Council reform conundrum 
3.1 Introduction  
“As long as the current Charter of the United Nations remains in force and unamended, 
the existing United Nations Security Council structure is legitimate” (Ashley,1988;Baker, 
2000; McDonald and Patrick, 2010: 7). Despite the notion that the UNSC is structurally 
imbalanced, social, economic and, indeed, political institutions such as the configuration 
of the Council which excludes some nations actually impedes developmental trajectories 
and essentially processes vulnerability on excluded nations (McDonald and Patrick, 
2010: 7). Vulnerability in turn ushers in both state and human insecurity regime among 
the affected populations. From the literature review, we learnt that the view of the UN 
regional blocs, is that the Council’s domination by Western countries and failure to 
include permanent members from Africa and Latin America gives it dwindling authority 
to issue binding international decisions, a perspectives from the global South which 
reinforces perceptions that the Council is a neo-colonial club, determining questions of 
war and peace for the poor without their input (Cox, 2009; McDonald and Patrick, 2010). 
 
In essence, this chapter scrutinises the conduct of the P5 actors who are either explicitly 
or stealthily convoluted in the reform saga in relations to the Africa’s quest for permanent 
position in the Council. The resistant behaviours of the P5 influenced the appeal and 
dynamics of the reform since 1945. The chapter narrates the P5’s motivation anchored on 
the lexicon of protection of their interest against the perceived ‘enemy’ (the Africa 
Group). Thus, this chapter examines in turn, the analytical usefulness of a number of 
theories including, principally the Realist Theory of International Relations, the 
Behaviourism, the Society of State Approach, and the Dependency Approach. 
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3.2 Realist Theory of International Relations:  negotiating the bends 
3.2.1. Brief Introduction of Realism 
Realist theory examines a body of realist philosophies that argue states 
care deeply about the balance of power and compete among themselves 
either to gain power at the expense of others or at least to make sure they 
do not lose power. They do so because the structure of the international 
system leaves them little choice if they want to survive. This competition 
for power makes for a dangerous world where states sometimes fight each 
other. There are, however, important differences between traditional 
realists and structural realists and further distinctions among structural 
realists. In particular, defensive realists – a variant of structural realist-
argue that structural factors limit how much power states can gain, which 
works to ameliorate security competition. Another variant of structural 
realist – offensive realists - on the other hand, maintain that the system’s 
structure encourages states to maximise their share of world power, to 
include pursuing hegemony, which tends to intensify security competition 
(Mearsheimer, 2006). 
Realists believe that power is the currency of international politics. Great powers, the 
main actors in the realists’ account, pay careful attention to how much economic and 
military power they have relative to each other. The presence of power within the arena 
of international politics, does not only make realism pertinently useful in this study, but 
also accentuate the root causes of Africa’s exclusion. It is important not only to have a 
substantial amount of power, but also to make sure that no other state sharply shifts the 
balance of power in its favour.  
For realists, international politics is synonymous with power politics. There are, however, 
substantial differences among realists. The most basic divide is reflected in the answer to 
the simple but important question: why do states want power? For traditional realists like 
Hans Morgenthau (1948), the answer is human nature, adding that whatever the ultimate 
aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim. This account satisfies 
the requirement for the claim of this study, that African exclusion from the Security 
Council is based solely on the human nature and character of those P5 nations who 
already wielded veto power. Since traditional realist argues that virtually, everyone is 
born with a will to power hardwired into them, which effectively means that great powers 
are led by individuals who are bent on having their state dominate its rivals (Adler, 1997; 
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Mearsheimer, 2006), is it still difficult for anyone to see why the US president of African 
descent defends the US instead of Africa? This is still the case with the UN. It is humanly 
natural for one to be better than the other. This may include destroying the qualities one 
has if it aids the interest. However, for structural realist such as Waltz (1979), human 
nature has little to do with why states want power. Instead, it is the structure or 
architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power. So the 
distinction between the traditional and structural realists is that, for traditional realists, 
power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means to an end and the 
ultimate end is survival. 
3.2.2. The Structural Realism 
Structural realism divides into two camps: those who argue that states are security 
maximisers (defensive realism), and those who argue that states are power maximisers 
(offensive realism). Despite the specificities between these structural realists, both agree 
that the US’s refusal of African inclusion is for the sole interest of the US and not of any 
other concerned elements. This also, stresses the importance of this theory in this study. 
Structural realists developed the concept of system’s structure which permits 
understanding of ‘how the structure of the system, and variations in it, affect the 
interacting units and the outcomes they produce’ (Waltz, 2003: 29). With this assertion in 
mind, it is needless recalling that the UN, especially the Security Council is a structure of 
a system that functions with various units and African being one of the parts. Waltz 
defined the structure of the international system in terms of three elements—organising 
principle, differentiation of units, and distribution of capabilities (Waltz, 2003). Waltz 
(1989) identifies two different organising principles: anarchy, which corresponds to the 
decentralised realm of international politics; and hierarchy, which is the basis of domestic 
order. Building on Waltz’s, anarchy and hierarchy are man-made structures to advance 
human natural interests, in the case of Security Council’s P5, to permanently hold on to 
power. He argues that the units of the international system are functionally similar for 
sovereign states; hence the unit-level variations within the Council’s structure such as 
Africa’s or the South American continent exclusions are irrelevant in explaining 
international outcomes. It is the third tier, the distribution of capabilities across units that 
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is of fundamental importance to understanding crucial international outcomes (Dunne and 
Schimdt, 2004).  
According to structural realists, the case of African exclusion from the permanent seat of 
the Security Council, as needled into the relative distribution of power in the international 
system is the key independent variable in understanding important international outcomes 
such as war and peace, alliance politics, and the balance of power. Simply put, the current 
Council’s organisation remained imbalance due to power politics. Structural realists are 
interested in providing reason why African exclusion is not a matter of interest to US, 
Britain or any other P5 state, since the organ is clothed with a rank-ordering of states so 
as to be able to differentiate and count the number of great powers that exist at any 
particular point in time. This determination is important since the number of great 
powers, in turn, determines the structure of the international system. For example, during 
the cold war from 1945 to 1989 there were two great powers—the USA and the Soviet 
Union—that constituted the bipolar international system (Dunne and Schimdt, 2004). 
In the web of power politics in the Security Council, the researcher somewhat concerns 
himself with understanding how the international distribution of power impact the 
behaviour of states, particularly their power-seeking behaviour? In the most general 
sense, Waltz argues that states, especially the great powers, have to be sensitive to the 
capabilities of other states. The possibility that any state may use force to advance its 
interests results in all states being worried about their survival. This, specifically, is the 
case in point with Africa, currently, Africa’s stand in global politics is blurred but it will 
continue to degenerate without a voice in the global security operations, through the 
Council. According to Waltz, power is a means to the end of security. In a significant 
passage, Waltz writes ‘because power is a possibly useful means, sensible statesmen try 
to have an appropriate amount of it’. He adds, ‘in crucial situations, however, the ultimate 
concern of states is not for power but for security’ (Waltz 1989: 40). In other words, 
rather than being power maximisers, states, according to Waltz, are security maximisers. 
Waltz argues that power maximisation often proves to be dysfunctional because it 
triggers a counter-balancing coalition of states. Counter reactions include the current 
Africa’s agitation for inclusion as does, Argentina, Brazil, and India, to mention a few.   
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As indicated earlier, for traditional realists, human nature has bantam to do with why 
states want power, by extension why the US, Britain, and France for instance wanted 
Africa out of the circle of global security leadership. Alternatively, it is the man-made 
structure or architecture of the international system that forces states to pursue power that 
destroys another. Structural realist argues that in a system where there is no higher 
authority that sits above the great powers, and where there is no guarantee that one will 
not attack another, it makes eminently good sense for each state to be powerful enough to 
protect itself in the event it is attacked, this is at the core of African exclusion 
(Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). Russia and US are fearful of each other, but will readily have a 
proxy test of their might through other weaker states. In essence, great powers are 
‘trapped in an iron cage’ where they have little choice but to compete with each other for 
power if they hope to survive even when it is not directly competed. Structural realist 
theories ignore cultural differences among states as well as differences in regime type, 
mainly because the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great 
powers. Whether a state is democratic or autocratic matters relatively diminutively for 
how it acts towards other states (Yanow, 1996). Nor does it matter much who is in charge 
of conducting a state’s foreign policy. Structural realists treat states as if they were black 
boxes: they are assumed to be alike, save for the fact that some states are more or less 
powerful than others (Waltz, 1979). Point of interest here is that the great powers with 
veto, believe that Africa will rattle them should Africa become empowered. 
Bearing this notion in mind, there is a significant divide among structural realists, which 
is reflected in the answer to a second question that concerns realists: how much power is 
enough? Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz (1979) maintain that it is unwise for states 
to try to maximise their share of world power, because the system will punish them if 
they attempt to gain too much power. The pursuit of hegemony, they argue, is especially 
foolhardy. Offensive realists like John Mearsheimer (2006) take the opposite view; they 
maintain that it makes good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible 
and, if the circumstances are right, to pursue hegemony. The argument is not that 
conquest or domination is good in itself, but instead that having overwhelming power is 
the best way to ensure one’s own survival. This is why realism is apt in this discussion, 
without veto power and permanent seat, how does African continent survive? 
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Let us now consider in greater detail the structural realists’ explanation for why states 
pursue power, and then explore why defensive and offensive realists differ about how 
much power states want. The focus then shifts to examining different structural realist 
explanations about the causes of great power war. This great power war can be likened to 
the current debate of African exclusion from the permanent seat of Security Council after 
70 years of functioning. Finally, the study illuminates these theoretical issues with an 
assessment to validate why the Security Council permanent members resisted reform and 
will continue to do so. 
3.2.3. Why do states pursue power, control, and supremacy? 
There is a simple structural realist explanation for why states compete among themselves 
for power. It is based on five straight-forward assumptions about the international system. 
None of these assumptions alone says that states should attempt to gain power at each 
other’s expense. But when they are married together, they depict a world of ceaseless 
security competition. 
The first assumption is that great powers are the main actors in world politics and they 
operate in an anarchic system. This is not to say that the system is characterised by chaos 
or disorder. Anarchy is an ordering principle; it simply means that there is no centralised 
authority or ultimate arbiter that stands above states. The opposite of anarchy in this 
instance is hierarchy, which is the ordering principle of domestic politics (Mearsheimer, 
2006: 75). 
The second assumption is that all states possess some offensive military capability. Each 
state, in other words, has the power to inflict some harm on its neighbor (Keohane, 1986). 
Of course, that capability varies among states and for any state it can change over time. 
The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other 
states. States ultimately want to know whether other states are determined to use force to 
alter the balance of power (revisionist states), or whether they are satisfied enough with it 
that they have no interest in using force to change it (status quo states). The problem, 
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however, is that it is almost impossible to discern another state’s intentions with a high 
degree of certainty. Unlike military capabilities, intentions cannot be empirically verified. 
Intentions are in the minds of decision-makers and they are especially difficult to discern. 
One might respond that policy-makers disclose their intentions in speeches and policy 
documents, which can be assessed. The problem with that argument is policy-makers 
sometimes lie about or conceal their true intentions. But even if one could determine 
another state’s intentions today, there is no way to determine its future intentions. It is 
impossible to know who will be running foreign policy in any state five or ten years from 
now, much less whether they will have aggressive intentions. This is not to say that states 
can be certain that their neighbours have or will have revisionist goals. Instead, the 
argument is that policy-makers can never be certain whether they are dealing with 
visionist or status quo state. 
The fourth assumption is that the main goal of states is survival (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic 
political order. They can pursue other goals like prosperity and protecting human rights, 
but those aims must always take a back seat to survival, because if a state does not 
survive, it cannot pursue those other goals. 
The fifth assumption is that states are rational actors, which is to say they are capable of 
coming up with sound strategies that maximise their prospects for survival (Mearsheimer, 
2006). This is not to deny that they miscalculate from time to time. Because states 
operate with imperfect information in a complicated world, they sometimes make serious 
mistakes 
Yet again, none of these assumptions by themselves says that states will or should 
compete with each other for power. For sure, the third assumption leaves open the 
possibility that there is a revisionist state in the system. By itself, however, it says nothing 
about why all states pursue power. It is only when all the assumptions are combined 
together that circumstances arise where states not only become preoccupied with the 
balance of power, but acquire powerful incentives to gain power at each other’s expense 
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(Mearsheimer, 2006). In the case of the Security Council, the P5 acquire power at the 
expense of Africa and other excluded actors. 
3.2.4. How much power is enough: the structural realists arguments 
There is incongruity among structural realists about how much power states should aim 
to control. Offensive realists argue that states should always be looking for opportunities 
to gain more power and should do so whenever it seems feasible (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
States should maximise power, and their ultimate goal should be hegemony, because that 
is the best way to guarantee survival. While defensive realists recognise that the 
international system creates strong incentives to gain additional increments of power, 
they maintain that it is strategically foolish to pursue hegemony. That would amount to 
overexpansion of the worst kind. States, by their account, should not maximise power, 
but should instead strive for what Waltz (1979: 40) calls an ‘appropriate amount of 
power’. This restraint is largely the result of three factors (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). Why 
is the question how much power important is this study? It is typically necessary since it 
helped reveal that pursuant of hegemony is the obstacle in the reform of the Council as 
opposed to other claims such as capabilities. 
Defensive realists emphasise that if any state becomes too powerful, balancing will occur. 
Specifically, the other great powers will build up their militaries and form a balancing 
coalition that will leave the aspiring hegemon at least less secure, and may be even 
destroy it. This is what happened to Napoleonic France (1792–1815), Imperial Germany 
(1900–18), and Nazi Germany (1933–45) (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75) when they made a run 
at dominating Europe. It becomes apt here to suggest build-up of the excluded actors in 
order to make concrete inroad into the inclusion quest. In Europe, following the build-up, 
each aspiring hegemon was decisively defeated by an alliance that included all, or almost 
all, of the other great powers. Otto von Bismarck’s genius, according to the defensive 
realists, was that he understood that too much power was bad for Germany, because it 
would cause its neighbours to balance against it. So, he wisely put the brakes on German 
expansion after winning stunning victories in the Austro-Prussian (1866) and Franco-
Prussian (1870–1) Wars (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
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Some defensive realists argue that there is an offence–defence balance, which indicates 
how easy or difficult it is to conquer territory or defeat a defender in battle. In other 
words, it tells you whether or not offence pays. Defensive realists maintain that the 
offence–defence balance is usually heavily weighted in the defender’s favour, and thus 
any state that attempts to gain large amounts of additional power is likely to end up 
fighting a series of losing wars. Accordingly, states will recognise the futility of offence 
and concentrate instead on maintaining their position in the balance of power. If they do 
go on the offensive, their aims will be limited. In the view of this study, Africa should 
embark on the offence-defence approach for the account that it has liberated the 
politically oppressed nations in Europe. 
Defensive realists further argue that, even when conquest is feasible, it does not pay: the 
costs outweigh the benefits. Because of nationalism, it is especially difficult, sometimes 
impossible, for the conqueror to subdue the conquered. The ideology of nationalism, 
which is pervasive and potent, is all about self-determination, which virtually guarantees 
that occupied populations will rise up against the occupier. The relevance if the defensive 
realist to the study is the bearing indication that conquest should not be the order or 
relationship and interactions. This is a subtle message for the P5 especially now they are 
governing the Security Council. In sum, not only is conquest difficult but, even in those 
rare instances where great powers conquer another state, they get few benefits and lots of 
trouble (Mearsheimer, 2006).  
According to defensive realism, these basic facts about life in the international system 
should be apparent to all states and should limit their appetite for more power; all the P5 
nations especially the P3 should note the departing argument of the defensive realists. 
Otherwise, they run the risk of threatening their own survival. If all states recognise this 
logic – and they should if they are rational actors – security competition should not be 
particularly intense, and there should be few great power wars and certainly no central 
wars (conflicts involving all or almost all the great powers). 
Offensive realists do not buy these arguments wholly. They understand that threatened 
states usually balance against dangerous foes, but they maintain that balancing is often 
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inefficient, especially when it comes to forming balancing coalitions, and that this 
inefficiency provides opportunities for a clever aggressor to take advantage of its 
adversaries. Furthermore, threatened states sometimes opt for buck-passing rather than 
joining a balancing coalition (Mearsheimer, 2006). In other words, they attempt to get 
other states to assume the burden of checking a powerful opponent while they remain on 
the sidelines. This kind of behaviour, which is commonplace among great powers, also 
creates opportunities for aggression. This aggression is evident in the account of P3 
versus the P2 within the Council. 
Offensive realists also take issue with the claim that the defender has a significant 
advantage over the attacker, and thus offence hardly ever pays. Indeed, the historical 
record shows that the side that initiates war wins more often than not. And while it may 
be difficult to gain hegemony, the USA did accomplish this feat in the Western 
Hemisphere during the nineteenth century. Also, Imperial Germany came close to 
achieving hegemony in Europe during the First World War. African nations should be 
better footed when they position themselves on the offence than defence. 
Both defensive and offensive realists agree, however, that nuclear weapons have little 
utility for offensive purposes, except where only one side in a conflict has them. The 
reason is simple: if both sides have a survivable retaliatory capability, neither gains an 
advantage from striking first. Moreover, both camps agree that conventional war between 
nuclear-armed states is possible but not likely, because of the danger of escalation to the 
nuclear level. Finally, while offensive realists acknowledge that sometimes conquest does 
not pay, they also point out that sometimes it does. Conquerors can exploit a vanquished 
state’s economy for gain, even in the information age. Indeed, Liberman (1996: 126) 
argues that information technologies have an ‘Orwellian’ dimension, which facilitates 
repression in important ways. 
While nationalism surely has the potential to make occupation a nasty undertaking, 
occupied states are sometimes relatively easy to govern, as was the case in Franceunder 
the Nazis (1940–4). In the theoretical sense of the word, Africa is currently occupied by 
some members of the P5 nations in global politics. Moreover, a victorious state need not 
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occupy a defeated state to gain an advantage over it. The victor might annex a slice of the 
defeated state’s territory, break it into two or more smaller states, or simply disarm it and 
prevent it from rearming. For all of these reasons, offensive realists expect great powers 
to be constantly looking for opportunities to gain advantage over each other, with the 
ultimate prize being hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2006: 77).The security competition in this 
world will tend to be intense and there are likely to be great power wars. Africa should be 
on the lookout to gain advantage towards inclusion in order to be relevant in the global 
security scheme. 
Moreover, the grave danger of central war will arise whenever there is a potential 
hegemon on the scene. The past behaviour of the great powers has been more in 
accordance with the predictions of offensive rather than defensive realism. During the 
first half of the twentieth century, there were two world wars in which three great powers 
attempted and failed to gain regional hegemony: Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and 
Nazi Germany. The second half of that century was dominated by the Cold War, in which 
the US and the Soviet Union engaged in an intense security competition that came close 
to blows in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). While the above 
accounts were not on the instance of the Security Council reform, Africa’s agitation can 
bring about similar effects since it is among human population and actors. 
Many defensive realists acknowledge that the great powers often behave in ways that 
contradict their theory. They maintain, however, that those states were not behaving 
rationally, and thus it is not surprising that Imperial Germany, Imperial Japan, and Nazi 
Germany were destroyed in those wars they foolishly started (Mearsheimer, 2006). States 
that maximise power, they argue, do not enhance their prospects for survival; they 
undermine it. This is certainly a legitimate line of argument but, once defensive realists 
acknowledge that states often act in strategically foolish ways, they need to explain when 
states act according to the dictates of their structural realist theory and when they do not.  
Thus, Waltz famously argues that his theory of international politics needs to be 
supplemented by a separate theory of foreign policy that can explain misguided state 
behavior. However, that additional theory, which invariably emphasises domestic 
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political considerations, is not necessarily a structural realist theory. The theories of 
defensive realists such as Barry Posen, Jack Snyder, and Stephen Van Evera conform 
closely to this simple Waltzian template. Each argues that structural logic can explain a 
reasonable amount of state behaviour, but a substantial amount of it cannot be explained 
by structural realism. Therefore, an alternative theory is needed to explain those instances 
where great powers act in non-strategic ways. To that end, Posen (1984) relies on 
organisational theory, Snyder (1991) on domestic regime type, and Van Evera (1999) on 
militarism. Each is proposing a theory of foreign policy, to use Waltz’s language. 
In essence, defensive realists have to go beyond structural realism to explain how states 
act in the international system. They must combine domestic-level and system-level 
theories to explain how the world works. Offensive realists, on the other hand, tend to 
rely exclusively on structural arguments to explain international politics. They do not 
need a distinct theory of foreign policy, mainly because the world looks a lot like the 
offensive realists say it should. This means, however, that they must make the case that it 
made strategic sense for Germany to pursue hegemony in Europe between 1900 and 
1945, and for Japan to do the same in Asia between 1931 and1945. Of course, offensive 
realists recognise that states occasionally act in strategically foolish ways, and that those 
cases contradict their theory. Defensive realists, as emphasised, have a fall-back position 
that is not available to offensive realists: they can explain cases of non-strategic 
behaviour with a separate theory of foreign policy (Mearsheimer, 2001). When one pairs 
Africa against the P5, the ingredients that make offensive and defensive realist as 
opposed are found, with Africa being required to adopt the offensive position. 
3.2.5. What causes great power war: the structural realist perspectives 
Structural realists recognise that states can go to war for any number of reasons, which 
makes it impossible to come up with a simple theory that points to a single factor as the 
main cause of war. There is no question that states sometimes start wars to gain power 
over a rival state and enhance their security. But security is not always the principle 
driving force behind a state’s decision for war. Ideology or economic considerations are 
sometimes paramount. In the case of African inclusion, it is important to account that 
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both ideology and economic considerations are laced into security concerns for Africa. 
For example, nationalism was the main reason Bismarck launched war against Denmark 
(1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870–1) (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
Wars motivated largely by non-security considerations are consistent with structural 
realism as long as the aggressor does not purposely act in ways that would harm its 
position in the balance of power. Actually, victory in war almost always improves a 
state’s relative power position, regardless of the reason for initiating the conflict (Brown, 
Coté Jr, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, 2004) and Copeland, (2000). The German state that 
emerged after 1870 was much more powerful than the Prussian state Bismarck took 
control of in 1862. Although isolating a particular cause of all wars is not a fruitful 
enterprise, structural realists maintain that the likelihood of war is affected by the 
architecture of the international system. Some realists argue that the key variable is the 
number of great powers or poles in the system, while other focus on the distribution of 
power among the major states. Issue here is that major power status is not offered to 
interested candidates, states become by asserting oneself, and this is one thing Africa 
needs to do to validate itself within the Council. 
3.3. The Traditional Realism   
Society in general is governed by objective laws that have their root in 
human nature (Morgenthau, 1958: 4). This is to say that the main signpost 
that helps political realism find its way through the landscape of 
international politics is the concept of interest defined or utilised as power. 
This in turn explains why the ultimate destination of traditional realists is 
power.  
At the outset, it seems prudent to settle upon and contextualise a working definition of 
realism. The traditional realist theory of international relations is centuries old, but 
experienced a rebirth fathered by Hans Morgenthau during the interwar period. The 
definition of traditional realism has been contested, and it has spawned variations of 
realist theory as well as many alternative theories about the human nature and of 
international law. The latter include the New Haven School, rationalist-institutionalism, 
liberalism, constructivism and critical legal studies, as well as theories of international 
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law’s legitimacy. While diverse, what these responses to traditional realism have in 
common is that they regard international law as consequential to varying degrees. 
International law may inter alia explain the process that leads to the human desire for 
power to rule and the outcomes it creates (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004) 
The traditional realist lineage begins with Thucydides’ representation of power politics as 
a law of human behavior and nature (Morgenthau, 1948). The drive for power and the 
will to dominate are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature (Dunne and 
Schmidt, 2004). The behaviour of the state as a self-seeking egoist is understood to be 
merely a reflection of the characteristics of the people that comprise the state. It is human 
nature that explains why international politics is necessarily power politics. This 
reduction of traditional realism to a condition of human nature is one that frequently 
reappears in the leading works of the realist canon, most famously in the work of the high 
priest of post war realism, Hans J. Morgenthau. Traditional realists argue that it is from 
the nature of man that the essential features of international politics, such as competition, 
fear, and war, can be explained. This in part provides the basis for the study’s utility of 
realism and traditional realism in particular. This is because it touched cord with the 
reality of the Security Council existence. Morgenthau notes, ‘politics, like society in 
general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature’ 
(Morgenthau [1948] 1955: 4). The important point for Morgenthau is, first, to recognise 
that these laws exist and, second, to devise the most appropriate policies that are 
consistent with the basic fact that human beings are flawed creatures. For both 
Thucydides and Morgenthau, the essential continuity of the power seeking behaviour of 
states is rooted in the biological drives of human beings. 
Another distinguishing characteristic of traditional realism is its adherents’ belief in the 
primordial character of power and ethics. Even though moralists are not security experts, 
they would argue that the current configuration of the Security Council suffocates the 
principles of the morality of human conduct. Traditional realism is fundamentally about 
the struggle for belonging, a struggle that is often violent (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). In 
this account, Africa is simply struggling to belong to the inner chamber where the 
decision-making that guides global security is announced. The duo asserts that patriotic 
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virtue is required in order for communities to survive in the notable battle between good 
and evil, a virtue that long predates the emergence of sovereignty-based notions of 
community in the mid-seventeenth century. Traditional realists therefore engage with 
moral philosophy and sought to reconstruct an understanding of virtue in light of practice 
and historical circumstance. Two traditional realists who wrestled with the degree to 
which state leaders could be guided by ethical considerations were Thucydides and 
Machiavelli (Carr, 2001). 
Thucydides was the historian of the Peloponnesian War, a conflict between two great 
powers in the ancient Greek world, Athens and Sparta. Thucydides’ work has been 
admired by subsequent generations of realists for the insights he raised about many of the 
perennial issues of international politics. Thucydides’ explanation of the underlying cause 
of the war was ‘the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta’ 
(Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). This is considered to be a classic example of the impact that 
the anarchical structure of international politics has on the behaviour of state actors. On 
this reading, Thucydides makes it clear that Sparta’s national interest, like that of all 
states, was survival, and the changing distribution of power represented a direct threat to 
its existence. Sparta was, therefore, compelled by necessity to go to war in order to 
forestall being vanquished by Athens. Thucydides also makes it clear that Athens felt 
equally compelled to pursue power in order to preserve the empire it had acquired. The 
famous Athenian leader, Pericles, claimed to be acting on the basis of the most 
fundamental of human motivations: ambition, fear, and self-interest (Dunne and Schmidt, 
2004). 
Bearing the above in mind, traditional realists—notably Machiavelli and Morgenthau—
would concur with Thucydides’ suggestion that the logic of power politics has universal 
applicability. Instead of Athens and Melos, we could just as easily substitute the 
vulnerability of Gaddafi’s beloved Libya to the expansionist policies of external great 
powers. In Morgenthau’s era, there were many examples where the innate drive for more 
power and territory seemed to confirm the realist iron law: for example, Nazi Germany 
and Czechoslovakia in 1939, and the Soviet Union and Hungary in 1956 (Dunne and 
Schmidt, 2004). The seemingly endless cycle of war and conflict confirmed in the minds 
89 
 
of twentieth-century traditional realists the essentially aggressive impulses in human 
nature. How is a leader supposed to act in a world animated by such hegemonic 
antagonism? The answer given by Machiavelli is that all obligations and treaties with 
other states must be disregarded if the security of the community is under threat (Zakaria, 
1998). Moreover, imperial expansion is legitimate as it is a means of gaining greater 
security.  
Other traditional realists, however, advocate a more temperate understanding of moral 
conduct. Mid-twentieth-century realists such as Butterfield, Carr, Morgenthau, and 
Wolfers believed that anarchy could be mitigated by wise leadership and the pursuit of 
the national interest in ways that are compatible with international order (Carr, 2001). 
Taking their lead from Thucydides, they recognised that acting purely on the basis of 
power and self-interest without any consideration of moral and ethical principles 
frequently results in self-defeating policies. After all, as Thucydides showed, Athens 
suffered an epic defeat while following the realist tenet of self-interest (Dunne and 
Schmidt, 2004).  
Not surprisingly, this theory gained significant traction during the Cold War. Hans 
Morgenthau attacked the classical view of international law as idealist and utopian. Elihu 
Root and others envisioned international law as possessing the potential to be apolitical, 
neutral and predicated on the discovery of common interests between states, which trump 
the interests of any one state to have a harmonising, codifying function analogous to 
municipal law. By working together to codify the rules and obligations of international 
law, states would elect to observe these rather than risk becoming outcasts in the 
international community (Rose, 1998). Morgenthau countered this view by pointing out 
that reality bore no relation to it and that, in fact, international law owes its existence to 
identical or complementary interests of states, backed by powers as a last resort, or, 
where such identical interests do not exist, to a mere balance of power which prevents a 
state from breaking these rules of international law (Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 
(2009). The reason for characterising international law as irrelevant or merely rhetorical 
was the belief that it is a means for states to pursue and preserve power and that, since 
much of international law is not respected and no sanctions result from its breach, it is not 
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really law at all (Grover, 2011). The United Nations Charter that guides the conduct of 
member nations seems to have been flagrantly removed from the operations of the 
Security Council, especially the article of equality of all nations. 
3.4. The essential elements of structural and traditional Realism 
The previous paragraphs have reasoned that realism is a theoretically broad church, 
embracing a variety of authors and texts. Despite the numerous denominations, it is 
evident that all realists subscribe to the following ‘three Ss’: statism, survival, self-help. 
Each of these elements is considered in more detail in the subsections below. 
3.4.1. Statism 
Statism is the centre piece of realism. This involves two claims. First, for 
the theorist, the state is the preeminent actor and all other actors in world 
politics are of lesser significance. Second, state ‘sovereignty’ signifies the 
existence of an independent political community, one that has juridical 
authority over its territory (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). 
For realists, the state is the main actor and sovereignty is its distinguishing trait. The 
meaning of the sovereign state is inextricably bound up with the use of force. The African 
members of the UN are sovereign and independent states but the barely use any force in 
the UN Security Council’s gallery, states such as the US does. In terms of its internal 
dimension, to illustrate this relationship between violence and the state we need look no 
further than Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as ‘the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Smith, 1986: 23). Within this 
territorial space, sovereignty means that the state has supreme authority to make and 
enforce laws (Williams, 2003). This is the basis of the un-written contract between 
individuals and the state. According to Hobbes, for example, we trade our liberty in 
return for a guarantee of security. Once security has been established, civil society can 
begin. But in the absence of security, there can be no art, no culture, and no society. The 
first move for the realist, then, is to organise power domestically. Only after power has 
been organised can community begin. 
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Realist international theory appears to operate according to the assumption that, 
domestically, the problem of order and security is solved. However, on the ‘outside’, in 
the relations among independent sovereign states, insecurities, dangers, and threats to the 
very existence of the state loom large. Realists largely explain this on the basis that the 
very condition for order and security—namely, the existence of a sovereign—is missing 
from the international realm (Walt, 2002). 
Realists claim that, in anarchy, states compete with other states for power and security 
Dickinson, (1916).The nature of the competition is viewed in zero sum terms; in other 
words, more for one actor means less for another. This competitive logic of power 
politics makes agreement on universal principles difficult, apart from the principle of 
non-intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states. But even this principle, 
designed to facilitate coexistence, is suspended by realists, who argue that in practice 
non-intervention does not apply in relations between great powers and their ‘near 
abroad’. As evidenced by the most recent behaviour of the USA in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
powerful states are able to overturn the non-intervention principle on the grounds of 
national security and international order (Walt, 2002). 
Given that the first move of the state is to organise power domestically, and the second is 
to accumulate power internationally, it is self-evidently important to consider in more 
depth what realists mean by their ubiquitous fusion of politics with power. It is one thing 
to say that international politics is a struggle for power, but this merely begs the question 
of what realists mean by power. Morgenthau offers the following definition of power: 
‘man’s control over the minds and actions of other men’ ([1948] 1955: 26). There are two 
important points that realists make about the elusive concept of power. First, power is a 
relational concept: one does not exercise power in a vacuum, but in relation to another 
entity. Second, power is a relative concept: calculations need to be made not only about 
one’s own power capabilities, but about the power that other state actors possess (Dunne 
and Schmidt, 2004) and (Guzzini, 1998). Yet the task of accurately assessing the power 
of states is infinitely complex, and is often reduced to counting the number of troops, 
tanks, aircraft, and naval ships a country possesses in the belief that this translates into 
the ability to get other actors to do something they would not otherwise do. 
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Structural realists have attempted to bring more conceptual clarity to bear on the meaning 
of power. Waltz (1979: 131) tries to overcome the contestations by shifting the focus 
from power to capabilities. He suggests that capabilities can be ranked according to their 
strength in the following areas: “size of population and territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.” The difficulty 
here is that resource strength does not always lead to military victory. For example, in the 
1967 Six Day War between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, the distribution of 
resources clearly favoured the Arab coalition and yet the supposedly weaker side 
annihilated its enemies’ forces and seized their territory. The definition of power as 
capabilities is even less successful at explaining the relative economic success of Japan 
over China pre 1945 (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). A more sophisticated understanding of 
power would focus on the ability of a state to control or influence its environment in 
situations that are not necessarily conflictual. 
A weakness of the realist treatment of power concerns its exclusive focus upon state 
power. For realists, states are the only actors that really ‘count’. Transnational 
corporations, international organizations, and ideologically driven terrorist networks, 
such as Al Qaeda, rise and fall but the state is the one permanent feature in the landscape 
of modern global politics. Yet many today question the adequacy of the state-centric 
assumption of realism. 
3.4.2. Survival 
The primary objective of all states is survival; this is the supreme national 
interest to which all political leaders must adhere (Waltz, 1979) 
The important principle that unites realists is the assertion that, in international politics, 
the pre-eminent goal is survival. Although there is ambiguity in the works of the realists 
as to whether the accumulation of power is an end in itself, one would think that there is 
no dissenting from the argument that the ultimate concern of states is security 
(Mearsheimer, 2006). Survival is held to be a precondition for attaining all other goals, 
whether these involve conquest or merely independence. According to Waltz (1979: 91), 
“beyond the survival motive, the aims of states may be endlessly varied.” Yet, as we 
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mentioned earlier, a recent controversy among structural realists has arisen over the 
question of whether states are in fact principally security or power maximisers. Defensive 
realists such as Waltz argue that states have security as their principal interest and 
therefore seek only the requisite amount of power to ensure their own survival. 
According to this view, states are profoundly defensive actors and will not seek to gain 
greater amounts of power if that means jeopardising their own security. Offensive realists 
such as Mearsheimer argue that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemonic 
position in the international system. States, according to this view, always desire more 
power and are willing, if the opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution of power 
even if such an action may jeopardise their own security. In terms of survival, defensive 
realists hold that the existence of status quo powers lessens the competition for power, 
while offensive realists argue that the competition is always keen because revisionist 
states and aspiring hegemons are always willing to take risks with the aim of improving 
their position in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2010). 
Niccolò Machiavelli tried to make a ‘science’ out of his reflections on the art of survival. 
His short and engaging book, The Prince, was written with the explicit intention of 
codifying a set of maxims that would enable leaders to maintain their hold on power 
(Mearsheimer, 2006). In important respects, we find two related Machiavellian themes 
recurring in the writings of modern realists, both of which derive from the idea that the 
realm of international politics requires different moral and political rules from those that 
apply in domestic politics. The task of understanding the real nature of international 
politics, and the need to protect the state at all costs (even if this may mean the sacrifice 
of one’s own citizens), places a heavy burden on the shoulders of state leaders. In the 
words of Henry Kissinger (1977: 204) cited in Dunne and Schmidt (2004), “a nation’s 
survival is its first and ultimate responsibility; it cannot be compromised or put to risk.” 
Their guide must be an ethic of responsibility: the careful weighing up of consequences; 
the realisation that individual acts of an immoral kind might have to be performed for the 
greater good. By way of an example, think of the ways in which governments frequently 
suspend the legal and political rights of ‘suspected terrorists’ in view of the threat they 
pose to national security. The principal difficulty with the realist formulation of an ‘ethics 
of responsibility’ is that, while instructing leaders to consider the consequences of their 
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actions, it does not provide a guide as to how state leaders should weigh the 
consequences (Smith 1986: 51). 
Not only does realism provide an alternative moral code for state leaders; it suggests a 
wider objection to the whole enterprise of bringing ethics into international politics. 
Starting from the assumption that each state has its own particular values and beliefs, 
realists argue that the state is the supreme good and there can be no community beyond 
borders. This moral relativism has generated a substantial body of criticism, particularly 
from liberal theorists who endorse the notion of universal human rights.  
3.4.3. Self help 
No other state or institution can be relied upon to guarantee your survival. 
Self-help is not an inevitable consequence of the absence of a world 
government it is a logic that states have selected (Dunne and Schmidt, 
2004). 
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979) brought to the realist tradition some 
deeper understandings of the international system within which states coexist. Unlike 
many other realists, Waltz argued that international politics was not unique because of the 
regularity of war and conflict, since this was also familiar in domestic politics. The key 
difference between domestic and international orders lies in their structure. In the 
domestic polity, citizens do not have to defend themselves. In the international system, 
there is no higher authority to prevent and counter the use of force. Security can therefore 
only be realized through self-help. In an anarchic structure, ‘self-help is necessarily the 
principle of action’ (Waltz 1979: 111). But in the course of providing for one’s own 
security, the state in question will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states. 
The term given to this spiral of insecurity is the security dilemma. According to Wheeler 
and Booth(2007), security dilemmas exist ‘when the military preparations of one state 
create an unresolvable uncertainty in the mind of another as to whether those preparations 
are for “defensive’’ purposes only (to enhance its security in an uncertain world) or 
whether they are for offensive purposes (to change the status quo to its advantage).” This 
scenario suggests that one state’s quest for security is often another state’s source of 
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insecurity. States find it very difficult to trust one another and often view the intentions of 
others in a negative light. Thus the military preparations of one state are likely to be 
matched by those of neighbouring states (Mearsheimer, 2006: 82). The irony is that, at 
the end of the day, states often feel no more secure than before they undertook measures 
to enhance their own security. 
In a self-help system, structural realists argue that the balance of power will emerge even 
in the absence of a conscious policy to maintain the balance (that is prudent statecraft). 
Waltz cited in Mearsheimer (2006) argues that balances of power result irrespective of 
the intentions of any particular state (Mearsheimer, 2006: 75). In an anarchic system 
populated by states that seek to perpetuate themselves, alliances will be formed that seek 
to check and balance the power against threatening states. Traditional realists, however, 
are more likely to emphasise the crucial role that state leaders and diplomats play in 
maintaining the balance of power. In other words, the balance of power is not natural or 
inevitable; it must be constructed. 
There is a lively debate among realists concerning the stability of the balance of power 
system. This is especially the case today, in that many argue that the balance of power 
has been replaced by unipolarity, while others insist that multipolarity and interpolarity 
have become the order of the day. For unipolarity advocates, it is questionable whether 
other countries will actively attempt to balance against the USA, as structural realism 
would predict. But the multipolar crusaders are adamant that Russia and China have 
already counter balanced the US. Whether it is the contrived balance of the Concert of 
Europe in the early nineteenth century, or the more fortuitous balance of the cold war, 
balances of power are broken—either through war or through peaceful change—and new 
balances emerge (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). What the perennial collapsing of the 
balance of power demonstrates is that states are at best able to mitigate the worst 
consequences of the security dilemma but are not able to escape it. The reason for this 
terminal condition is the absence of trust in international relations (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
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3.5. The bearing of realists theory: combined discourse 
The unifying theme around which all realists thinking converges is that 
states find themselves in the shadow of anarchy such that their security 
cannot be taken for granted (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004) 
Realism is uniquely important to this study of the UN and Africa’s reform calculation 
since it is the dominant theory of International Relations. Why? Because it provides the 
most powerful explanation for the state of power, security, and war that is the regular 
condition of life in the international system. Despite important differences, such as 
emplaced emphasis on either states’ power as the end in itself or survival as the end in 
itself, particularly between classical and structural realism respectively, it is possible to 
identify a shared core set of assumptions and ideas like ‘self-help, statism, and survival.’ 
Essentially, realism is relevant and pertinently apt for explaining or understanding the 
dynamics of globalisation of world politics on the Security Council reform, for example 
the structural realist accentuates survival and traditional reveres power in trade for global 
political merchandise. 
 
The realists theory (structural and traditional), approach in this study is significant in a 
number of respects. For example, they appreciates the role of power, underscore the 
degree to which human beings were rational, and have different set of interests that 
motivate for guided actions such as exclusion, anti-reform, and war. Indeed, realism 
offers something of a ‘manual’ for maximising the interests of the state in a hostile 
environment which explains in part why it remains the dominant tradition in the study of 
world politics, which the reform game in the Security Council depicts. 
The insights, realists such as Thucydides (c. 460–406 BC), Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–
1527), Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78) (Dunne and 
Schmidt, 2004) offered into the way in which state leaders should conduct themselves in 
the realm of international politics which are often grouped under the doctrine of Friedrich 
Meinecke’s raison d’état, or reason of state provides a set of maxims to leaders (whether 
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the P5 nations or the African Group) on how to conduct their foreign affairs so as to 
ensure the security of their relevant states (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
Realist theory (traditional), as discussed, underpins the notion of human nature and moral 
standards that play and affect the conditions of international politics. This often make it 
necessary for state leaders whether pro or anti reformers of the Security Council to act in 
a manner (for example, cheating, lying) that would be entirely unacceptable for the 
individual. It is important to add that proponents of raison d’état argue that the state itself 
represents a moral force, for it is the existence of the state that creates the possibility for 
an ethical political community to exist domestically.  
While in principle, there exist variations of the realist paradigm, it is fair to say that there 
is a significant degree of continuity between traditional realism and structural realism 
with structural realism’s attendant modern variants. Indeed, the three core elements that 
we identify with realism— statism, survival, and self-help—are present in the work of a 
Traditional realist such as Thucydides, and Morgenthau and structural realists such as 
Kenneth Waltz. This is why, when Thucydides and Machiavelli were writing, the basic 
unit was the polis or city state, but since the Peace of Westphalia (1648) realists consider 
the sovereign state as the principal actor in international politics (Mearsheimer, 2006). 
The legitimacy of the state is what enables it to exercise authority within its domestic 
borders. It is also the instrument responsible for exercise of authority outside its border as 
witnessed in the UN. Yet outside the boundaries of the state, realists argue that a 
condition of anarchy exists. This configuration is clearly pointed out by the structural 
realist in the analysis of the United Nations Security Council. 
A prominent explanation that realists provide for the difference in behaviour in global 
politics (for instance within the Security Council) relates to the different organisational 
structure of domestic and international politics. Realists fittingly noted that the basic 
structure of international politics is one of anarchy in that each of the independent 
sovereign states considers itself to be its own highest authority as oppose to domestic 
politics that is ordered in hierarchical structure. The ordering principles, whether in 
international or national politics is partly explained in light of the power differentials of 
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states. Intuitively, structural realist apprises that states with more power stand a better 
chance of surviving than states with less power. Power is therefore, crucial to the realist 
lexicon. Yet, irrespective of how much power a state may possess, structural realists are 
insistent that the core national interest of all states must be survival. Like the pursuit of 
power for traditional realist, the promotion of the national interest is, according to two 
realists, an iron law of necessity (Dunne and Schmidt, 2004). 
Consistent with the principle of self-help, realism reveals that if a state feels threatened, it 
should seek to augment its own power capabilities by engaging, for example, in a military 
munitions build up. Nevertheless, this may prove to be insufficient for a number of 
smaller states (supposedly African nations) who feel threatened by a much larger state. 
This brings us to one of the crucial mechanisms that realists throughout the ages have 
considered to be essential to preserving the liberty of states—the balance of power. 
Although various meanings have been attributed to the concept of the balance of power, 
the most common definition holds that if the survival of a state or a number of weaker 
states is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of stronger states, they should join 
forces, establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their own independence by 
checking the power of the opposing side, hence the call for the United Nations Security 
Council reform. 
3.6. Behaviourism (the Scientific School)  
3.6.1 What assumptions do behaviourists make? 
Formally founded by John B. Watson in 1913, behaviourism is about the observation and 
recording of people’s behaviour (Danley, et al, 2012). Behaviourists such as Ivan Pavlov 
(founder of classical conditioning) claim that unconditioned stimulus causes 
unconditioned response. B.F. Skinner who is credited with the notion of radical 
behaviourism (Operant Response) also argues that all action is determined and that 
human behaviour controls the rate at which specific consequences occur. This study 
found the activities within the Security Council as equally that of control by the P5 and 
consequences for the African nations of the UN. According to Danley et al (2012), 
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Behaviourists regard all behaviour as a response to a stimulus. They assume that what 
humans do is determined by the environment they are in, which provides stimuli to 
which they respond, and the environments they have been in, in the past, which caused 
them to learn to respond to stimuli in particular ways. The opponents of African inclusion 
have regularly argued that Africa is poor which makes difficult for it to serve in the 
Council. This account as espoused by some P5 nations as noted in Chapter Two has 
underpinnings that seek to keep Africa thinking that it is poor and possess less of its 
abilities.  
Behaviourists are unique in believing that it is unnecessary to speculate about internal 
mental processes when explaining behaviour: it is enough to know which stimuli elicit 
which responses. These behaviourists named above also believe that people are born with 
only a handful of innate reflexes (stimulus-response units that do not need to be learned) 
and that all of a person’s complex behaviours are the result of learning through 
interaction with the environment. They also assume that the processes of learning are 
common to all species and so humans learn in the same way as other animals. 
3.6.2. How do behaviourists explain human behaviour? 
Behaviourists explain behaviour in terms of (1) the stimuli that elicit it and (2) the events 
that caused the person to learn to respond to the stimulus that way. Behaviourists use two 
processes to explain how people learn: classical conditioning and operant conditioning. In 
classical conditioning, people learn to associate two stimuli when they occur together, 
such that the response originally elicited by one stimulus is transferred to another. The 
person learns to produce an existing response to a new stimulus. For example, Watson & 
Rayner (1920) conditioned a young boy (‘Little Albert’) to respond with anxiety to the 
stimulus of a white rat. Africa is anxious and shows anxiety. They achieved this by 
pairing the rat with a loud noise that already made Albert anxious. The anxiety response 
was transferred to the rat because it was presented together with the noise. The response 
also generalized to other stimuli that resembled the rat, including a rabbit and a fur coat. 




In operant conditioning, people learn to perform new behaviours through the 
consequences of the things they do. If a behaviour they produce is followed by 
reinforcement then the likelihood of that behaviour being repeated increases in future (the 
behaviour is strengthened). A consequence can be reinforcing in two ways: either the 
person gets something good (positive reinforcement) or they avoid something bad 
(negative reinforcement). Conversely, if behaviour is followed by a punishment then the 
likelihood of that behaviour being repeated in future decreases (the behaviouris 
weakened). Whereas classical conditioning only allows the person to produce existing 
responses to new stimuli, operant conditioning allows them to learn new responses. 
3.6.3.  Evaluation of the behaviourist approach 
The main strengths of the behaviourist approach come from the methods it uses. The 
insistence on objectivity, control over variables and precise measurement means that the 
studies carried out by behaviourists tend to be very reliable, and the behaviourists can be 
credited with introducing the scientific method into psychology. The drawback of these 
methods, however, is that behaviour may be studied under very artificial conditions than 
do not reflect real-world contexts very well (although this criticism clearly does not apply 
to all behaviourist studies). The widespread use of animals is a source of criticism. Whilst 
conditioning can be observed in most species, there are genetic influences on what 
different species can and cannot learn which reflect their different evolutionary histories 
(e.g. rats can be conditioned to respond to tastes but not smells). This means that 
generalizations between species must be made with more caution than many 
behaviourists apply. 
A more fundamental criticism of   behaviourism is that it ignores the influences of mental 
processes on learning. In behaviourist theory people can only learn as a result of their 
own experiences. However, experience and many studies (e.g. by social learning theorists 
like Bandura) show that people are quite capable of observing and learning from the 
behaviour and experiences of others. Furthermore, studies of a wide range of human 
behaviours (principally language learning and use) have shown that classical and operant 
conditioning cannot adequately explain how people are able to solve problems without 
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the lengthy period of trial and error that behaviourism would say is necessary. These 
findings imply that mental processes must play a part in explaining much human 
behaviour. 
Nonetheless, behaviourism has supplied practical solutions to many human problems. 
Operant conditioning has proven an effective way of modifying behaviour amongst 
people who may be difficult to teach in other ways (e.g. autistic children) and many 
people with problems like phobia have benefitted significantly from behaviour therapies 
including systematic desensitization. 
3.6.4. The behaviourist approach and key debates 
The behaviorist approach is deterministic: people’s behaviour is assumed to be entirely 
controlled by their environment and their prior learning, so they do not play any part in 
choosing their own actions. The approach takes the nurture side of the nature-nurture 
debate, believing that apart from a few innate reflexes and the capacity for learning, all 
complex behaviour is learned from the environment. Their insistence that all learning can 
be accounted for in terms of law-governed processes like classical and operant 
conditioning, reflects a nomological approach to studying human behaviour (although 
behaviourists never ignore individual differences, since every person’s history of learning 
is unique). The behaviourists’ view that all behaviour, no matter how complex, can be 
broken down into the fundamental processes of conditioning makes it a highly 
reductionist approach to psychology. 
According to Skinner (1977) Behaviourim is a theory of psychology of human relations. 
He holds that the principal pillar upon which behaviourism is anchored is manipulation. 
Through manipulation, one controls the behaviour of the other, either by offering rewards 
or by meting out punishment. Skinner (1977) asserts that human behaviour is determined 
by human endowment which lends itself to what happens to us, and those we happen. In 
his view, we have control over ourselves and the good and evil things we do. We have 
control over evil activities (including, usurping of state resources, political exclusion and 
economic marginalisation, resource wars and (un)healthy interventions). This is possible 
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by manipulating ourselves the same way we manipulate others. As human animals we are 
being shaped by the things that happen to us and in our environment through 
reinforcement. 
3.6.5. Relating theory to the Security Council reform 
Both classical and operant conditionings have specific implications to what happens in 
the UNSC chamber. According to the Elinor  Ostrom (1998), a behavioural commitment 
to theory grounded in empirical inquiry is essential if we are to understand such basic 
questions as why face-to-face communication so consistently enhances cooperation in 
social dilemmas or how structural variables facilitate or impede effective collective 
action (Ostrom, 1998: 1). The behaviourist authors advocated the use of observable facts 
and precise calculations to provide empirical explanations of political behaviour that 
determines why people — the P5 and African Group — behave  politically (uses power, 
creates international government) which in turn cultivates the political system. Also, in 
social dilemmas with many structural variables, as well as in theories that predict either, 
zero or 100% cooperation in one-shot or finitely repeated dilemmas, structural variables 
do not upset levels of cooperation and may not dilute the strength of the Security Council.  
 
A coherent explanation of the relationship among structural variables (such as the 
representative character of the Council) and the likelihood of individuals solving social 
dilemmas (such as deprivation and marginalisation) depend on developing a behavioral 
theory of rational choice (Ostrom, 1998: 1). Behavioural theory, while it allows scholars 
who stress structural explanations of human behavior and those who stress individual 
choice to find common ground, rather than continue the futile debate over whether 
structural variables or individual attributes are the most important, this theory is pertinent 
to the structural issues within the Council organ and the P5 and African group actors. 
According to Isaiah Berlin (1960) who appraises political theories, underscores that those 
theorists who are called fanatical because their faith in a given pattern is not overcome by 
their sense of reality implies that behaviourism is central to identifying the scientific 
character and instrument that are capable of generating analyses of events with rigorous 
generalisations rooted deeply, in empirical evidence (Berlin, 1960). While this may be 
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part of the efforts to curtail the porosity within the Idealist School, the behaviourists 
emerged with emplaced emphasis on human conduct to determine the ‘why’ of certain 
human political behaviour (Riker, 1995). Deductively, the P5’s resistance to the United 
Nations Security Council reform is a calculated and intentional act, and the African 
Group’s call for inclusion is equally intentional. Even though, a growing number of 
scholars of international relations, security and strategy observe that idealism as a tool for 
unpacking international actors conduct in global politics is limited in interpreting the 
realpolitik (power politics) which, for example, makes the powerful nations exclude the 
weaker states in global affairs, it is always on some specific-felt human needs for power 
control. Actually, this is part of the cases with the current configuration of the Council. 
Behaviourists, settle that both pro and anti-reform crusaders are aware of their actions 
and inactions. 
 
Relating the United Nations Security Council reform account to behaviourism, mindful of 
the exclusive character and configuration of the organ, it can be outlined that Britain, 
China, France, Russia, and especially, the United States, rejection of reform proposals 
and for example, the US’s attendant suggestion of the Four Policemen are acts that lend 
credence to Africa’s claim that the US likewise other permanent members in this 
instance, do not want Africa’s development and progress but dependency. In the case of 
the United Nations Security Council reform, and the P5 resistance, the behaviourist 
would hold that African States insistence, following its 70% number of conflict cases, 
annually, is observable and is a sufficient reason to insist on reform actions in order to 
become part of the solution to its 70% conflict records (Eulau, 1963: 24). The 
behaviourist perspective is pertinent in unpacking the ideology that guides even the 
reform debates from all parties. This is true since it actually assists us in measuring and 





3.7. Society of State Approach 
Although, advocates of the society of states approach acknowledge the existence of 
international anarchy, they maintain that various kinds of bonds — such as the UN 
Charter, the Rome Statute — and institutions (the United Nations, the African Union, the 
European Union) bind many individual states (Mitchell, 1991; Doty, 1993; Gill, 1996). 
These states regulate their relations through array of practices such as diplomacy and 
trade. The entire system (such as the United Nations) is sustained through a balance of 
power mechanism whose operation is aimed not at preventing war but rather to safeguard 
state sovereignty and independence (Deudney, 1995; Gordenker and Weiss1996; Golberg 
and Don2001). Proponents of the approach insist that members of the society of state 
understand that they may use force only for a specific purpose such as self-defence or to 
uphold the basic principles and characteristics of international state system (the United 
Nations) as well as its norms and laws which in turn, is sustained by virtue, “a mixture of 
self-restraint and norms of compromise, and by a skilled knowledge of procedures and 
mechanisms, both of which were objects of extensive educational effort” (United 
Nations,1983; Deudney, 1995: 214). In this approach, there exist operating rules aimed at 
establishing the proper conduct which shall govern the state behaviour. As such, states 
that refuse, substantially, to accept the guiding rules of the game are denied membership 
in the club. For example, China, Iraq, South Africa, have been ostracised and isolated — 
more or less — as punishment for bad behaviour and poor conduct (Holsti, 1995: 7; Hay 
and David, 2000). In essence, the society of states model — much like realism — regards 
state as the focal point of international politics. The principal problems faced by states 
revolve around the quest for security, order, and peace. This approach is critical to 
understanding the reform agitation within the Council, since the Charter is mindful of 
security of nations and Africa is in search for one. 
 
The importance of security and respect to law validates the relevance of this approach as 
it pertains to both the African Group seeking inclusion on the permanent seat with a view 
to attain independence from the dictates of the P5 in managing global conflicts. And also, 
the P5’s reference to the amendment of the Charter as a starting point for reform, tallies 
with, and confirms the School’s observation of the various kinds of bonds especially the 
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Charter, the Rome Statute in terms of the Council reform. The relevance of this approach 
to this study is that, it provides grounds for the African states to agitate for inclusion and 
can equally argue that the entire African states is ostracised from the Security Council 
permanent seat — the unit where the global decision on security and peace are 
determined and most importantly without any offence. 
3.7.1. Strengths of Society of State Approach 
The society of state is specifically important to this study since it recognises roles of 
states in building international community. It equally pays respect to the instruments of 
law that should preserve the order upon which the community of nations must operate. 
Even though the African exclusion does not necessarily contravene the Charter, the 
Approach provides reasons to reform as reform according to Article 108 is part of the 
guiding rules and regulations of the Organisation. As such failing to reform or resisting 
such effort, in view of the Society of State violates the procedure since reform ultimately 
requires the blessings of the P5 as outlined in Article 23 of the Charter. In this way, the 
notion of society of state becomes relevant since it characteristically, questions African 
exclusion, viewing it as ostracise without any offence or provocation. And most 
importantly, it encourages the P5 to show respect to the Charter (bond) upon which the 
unity and assembly of the UN member states is built. This call is founded on the account 
that without the P5’s consent, no change can occur. The society of State becomes 
important approach here, as it provides basis and ground upon which the P5 can reform, 
by accentuating the importance of the bond in a community of nations. 
3.7.2. Weakness of the Society of States Approach 
This approach, while it pointed to the constitution as essential element in maintaining 
order and peace in international organisation. It did not particularly address how powerful 
violators of its stipulations should be treated by the weaker states. The imposition of 
sanctions and ostracise is possible when US is against Burundi and not the other way 
round. This in part, exposes the faulty formulations of the article of the Charter which 
makes the P5 judges in their own case which in turn makes difficult to determine how the 
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P5 can be treated as their refusal to reform cripples every other attempt on reform. So, in 
order words, it provides for the perpetuation of stronger nations to determine the terms of 
relationship and interactions when dealing with weaker nations. This specifically shows 
that the inability to reform is a matter of stronger nation against weaker nations and as a 
result, does not necessarily speak to African inclusion but explained that expansion of the 
Council did not happen principally because it is a community of the strong against the 
weak.  
3.8. Dependency Theory Approach  
Dependency theory is the notion that resources flow from a ‘periphery’ of poor and 
underdeveloped states to a ‘core’ of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of 
the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are 
impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the world 
system. The theory arose as a reaction to modernisation theory — an earlier theory of 
development which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, 
that today’s underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's 
developed areas at some time in the past, and that therefore the task in helping the 
underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common 
path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and 
closer integration into the world market (Hay and Daniel, 1998; Held and Anthony, 1998; 
Hopgood, 2000; Alvin, 2011). Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that 
underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but 
has unique features and structures of their own; and, importantly, is in the situation of 
being the weaker members in a world market economy and that of global politics. 
In principle, the idea of interdependence implies symbiosis between the mutually 
supporting parts of the whole (Keohane, 1988; Lipschutz, 1992; Keohane, 1995; Hopf, 
1998; Keohane, 1998; Johnston, 2001). In order words, it suggests the existence of 
equality and symmetry in the relationships between units or actors (Mastanduno, 1989; 
Martin, and Beth1998; Malone, 2000). However, in many countries of the Global South 
(developing countries), there are no records of reciprocal dependence between 
developing countries and industrialised countries (Schweller, 2004). Instead of 
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interdependence, some actors from the Global South offer an alternative explanation to 
the underdevelopment of unindustrialised countries. Beginning in the 1960s, the 
dependency theory, which argued that despite the ‘modern’ attributes, the fundamental 
character of dependency outlook is hierarchical and unequal in which one develops at the 
expense of other.  Snyder (1980) specifically recalled that “all states cannot develop 
simultaneously by definition, since the system [such as the United Nations Security 
Council] functions by virtue of having unequal core and peripheral regions” (Snyder, 
1980: 753). It goes without saying that the European conquest of the Africa, Americas, 
and Asia was not done for the benefit of the local populations (Matunhu, 2011). In other 
words, why else were the commercial agents and slavers so important to the European 
imperial system? To be sure, they argue, the conquests were done for commercial profit 
through robbery, slavery, and monopolies (Snyder, 1980).  
 
Surely, the conquest depends fundamentally on a highly unequal distribution of the 
benefits of power. The UN Security Council reproduces existing classes within the organ 
and presumes the continuing exploitation and marginalisation of the participants (Africa 
and Latin America) at the periphery. Various authors of dependency theory such as 
Snyder (1980) and Matunhu (2011) see a stratified international system in which some 
countries — the core (P5 members) — achieve autonomous self-sustaining growth while 
others — the periphery (African and Latin America Groups) — are so dependent on the 
growth of the core. These authors opine that security and development only reflects the 
state of economic activities at the core. From Snyder’s point of view, the Council actually 
comprises core states and semi peripheral and peripheral areas, each of which fulfils a 
different role in the system (Snyder, 1980: 752). In essence, development, growth and 
security in periphery countries lack its own dynamic. Dependency Theorists such as 
Celso Furtado, Andre Gunder Frank, T. Dos Santos, F.H. Cardoso and Szentes cited in 
Heraldo Muñoz (1978) present a multi-pronged argument in this regard. They contend 
that the developing countries were incorporated deliberately into the capitalist-led UN 
system by the West under an imposed structure that only serves to facilitate the 
exploitation of those peripheral countries. This provides for the account that colonial 
administrative system was purposeful in shaping the important features of the colonial 
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states such as: the direction of economic development, their cultural development 
including language; national boundaries to better shape the framework of national 
economy; and their social and political institutions (Snyder, 1980). The theorists also 
claim that economic activities (trade relations) were thus, effectively skewed to reflect 
the demand and supply imperatives of the metropolitan countries. The system has been so 
effective that in the post-colonial era, international trade has been sufficient in 
maintaining the old order. 
 
Also, the core-imposed structural constraints and prevent autonomous or self-sustaining 
economic growth patterns within the periphery. Beyond that, the capitalist international 
division of  labour  (which keeps the peripheral states at bay) and the changes within it 
distorted all of social, political and economic structure in the periphery in a way that 
concentrates power in the hands of small minority whose outward orientation serves to 
further entrench the countries in a dependent quagmire (Snyder, 1980). In political sense, 
this is also the real issue with the Security Council structure. Dependency outlook was 
deliberately facilitated by the P5 through exclusivist veto power which impresses the P5’s 
overwhelming dominance and virulence to suppress or stifle African Group seeking to 
engage in global security activities. In the place, of such hostile marginalisation of Africa 
and Latin America, the P5 oversaw the establishment of permanent seat and veto power 
as appendages of Global North interest. A characteristic feature of the Council’s 
arrangement is that the P5 nations have made the states at the periphery virtual dependent 
on the P5 to resolving the smallest of dependants’ own state and human security 
problems (Anne Orford, 2011: 3). This is why so many developing countries are 
perpetually de-capitalised and are always in persistent conflicts. Dependency also 
explains why African nations’ economies and actually their lives are dependent on policy 
decisions made in the metropolitan centres of the Global North through the agency of the 
United Nations Security Council permanent members. 
 
The Council’s governance and exploitation of the peripheral states is now held together 
in the form of assorted paternalistic leverages such as foreign aid, military grants and 
training, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding missions in Africa. The shared-common 
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denominator for these factors is that they are direct and indirect forms of control and 
influence over the target. The synergy between the Dependency theory and the Security 
Council reform in this fashion is anchored on the fact that the P5 which controls every 
decision of war and peace in the Security Council are actors of Global North. As implied 
by Snyder (1988), the subjugation of African countries at the table of global security has 
been the mode of relationship and activities in the Council. For its part, the dependency 
model views the world by examining the mechanisms of exploitation. The agitation for 
reform was informed by the notion that the Global North is in direct exploitation of the 
Global South (Africa being one of them) on global security matters. This approach proves 
useful in exploring the dilemmas of continued under development of Africa. Dependency 
theorists summarily argue that underdevelopment is a function of a nation-state’s 
international predicament, especially, its position in the global division of power.  
3.8.1. Strengths of Dependency Theory 
Not only do dependency theorists present a conceptual framework for analysing Third 
World politics, they also suggest several "solutions" for the central problem of inequality. 
They argue that Third World countries can take steps to improve their situation. Bearing 
this in mind, it can be argued that the formation of common agenda which includes 
political and economic interests to overcome adversaries will put the Third World on a 
better footing. The idea is that Third World countries share many common economic, 
trading and indeed political problems in their relations with the industrialised core P5 
nations. By joining together and presenting a common front to the core such as a 
representative P5 from the underdeveloped nation, the marginalised (Africa) will gain 
leverage, and be able to secure greater advantages from their interactions with world core 
countries. By forming groups or cartels the periphery nations will have more power than 
any individual Third World country has in its relations with the core.  
 
Dependency theory provides the mindset for the leaders of marginalised group to think 
towards redemption. The need for acting in tandem with the ideas of this Dependency 
School by the dependent nations is predicated on the fact that the dependent nations are 
actually colonised. The dependency theory should not be of any significant importance if 
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the dependent nations decolonised because there is no common enemy to oppose. This is 
how it calls on African leaders in the United Nations to confront their country's condition 
of exclusion and dependency in the UN, and take voluntary steps to alter it. Thus leaders 
and elites in the UN l might be convinced to use some of their political power — wealth 
to invest in regional security projects or permanent seat programs, rather than importing 
luxury automobiles and standing divided in times of needed-unity. The goal is for the 
elites to suspend their selfish habits of conspicuous consumption, and to use their wealth 
for national development. The elites would be encouraged to invest in their home 
countries, rather than abroad.  
 
Apart from Hans Singer and Raúl Prebisch who related Dependency theory through the 
lenses of imbalance terms of trade, the Guyanese Marxist historian, and a seemingly  
radical dependency theorists Walter Rodney, in his book ‘How Europe Underdeveloped 
Africa’claims that Africa had been consciously exploited by European imperialists, 
leading directly to the modern underdevelopment of most of the continent. His proffered 
solution, inherently calls for revolutionary elucidations. Rodney among others argues that 
it is unrealistic to expect those currently in positions of power to take voluntary actions 
which would be personally disadvantageous. Altruistic solutions are nice in the abstract, 
but are unlikely to be implemented in reality. The only realistic solution is revolutionary 
action to rid the country of those leaders who have betrayed it, and to institute sweeping 
revolutionary change to end inequality. It should be noted in conclusion that the 
dependency position is fundamentally anti-status quo. Dependency theorists argue that 
existing national and international economic and political systems are the cause of their 
unjust situations. They call for systemic change to solve the problems.  
3.8.2. Weaknesses of Dependency Theory 
Actually, Dependency Theory does not adequately account for the roles of the 
subservient African leaders who may side with the P5 to perpetuate exclusion. It may be 
argued that docile African leaders explain why African states to date have not presented a 
particular candidate to the United Nations Security Council as African candidate. The 
adverse effect of comprador bourgeoisie (subservient African leaders serving Western 
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interest) among African leaders goes to the extent that little attention is paid to the 
development of Africa but dependency seems to have covered all African states under 
one blanket as under developed and in-need of freedom. Essentially, no African state is 
rated as developed but not every African state is interested in the Security Council 
reform. But dependency would assume that all of them would be interested in the 
inclusion that can beget development and growth. Further, and most importantly, other 
weakness of some segments of the Dependency School as reflected is the assumption that 
the periphery is passive in its subordination. 
 
3.9. Justification for the choice of theories  
Realist Theory: Within the Realist tradition, three arguments are central. First, the 
international system is dominated by sovereign nation-states, each beholden to no higher 
authority than itself (Mastanduno, Lake, and Ikenberry, 1989). It is, in other words, 
anarchic. Second, the relations between nation-states are fundamentally competitive, 
although this does not preclude the possibility of cooperation in the pursuit of national 
interests. Finally, with a system so constituted, nation-states behave purposively in the 
pursuit of power and material well-being.  
 
While all of these arguments have connection with the position of the P5 in this study in 
one way or another, this study engages the Realist position specifically to highlight the 
functioning of the P5 and how they have preferred the preservation of their national 
interest to the reform of the global body of the Security Council. In this study, realism 
densely fleshes out the central argument that underpins the lack of reform and clearly 
placed the problem on the individual nations that constitute the P5 – Britain, China, 
France, Russia, and the United States and the non-permanent members.  
 
Realism was also utilised in this study since the study is international in character and 
realism arguably a prominent International relations theory that attempts to provide a 
conceptual framework upon which international actors behave and can be analysed. This 
is in part, crucial, since reflecting on the underlying strength of realism, it is safe to say, 
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that it is a theory, essentially about power and security, and the UN Security Council 
reform is one of such. The bottom line is that there is variegated interest that causes the 
absence of natural harmony of interest in the world which is why realism would 
impliedly insist that the P5 activities and refusal to reform the Council is calculated and 
intentional, aimed at disadvantaging the weaker nations at the periphery – Africa.  
 
While realist paradigm is critically essential in this study, it has one major disadvantage, 
especially with the issue of reform to expand the Council and include an Africa state. 
Under realism the state represents domestic constituencies at the international level and 
this, may be said of potential African representation at the UNSC. This is one of the 
principal reasons why additional three theories (Bahaviourism, Society of State, 
Dependency Theory), are discussed to clearly address the specific issue-areas and 
specific-felt needs of the study. 
 
Behaviourism: the Behaviorism makes a remarkable contribution to the framework of 
the study. Its suitability of usage in this theoretical unpacking of the Council attitude lay 
in the argument that enabled our understanding that the Security Council’s inability to 
reform since 1945 is a human machination aimed at conditioning and controlling the 
behavior of those who receive (the peripheral actors). Behaviourism, notes that the 
seeming impossible reform of the Council is a mere manipulation of the global 
community by the operant P5 nations who refused reform based on the expectation to 
meet their considered outcomes, that is, how the excluded African nations must behave 
when the P5 act in certain way in the world.  Given, that the P5 also make references to 
the common Charter of the UN as an element disturbing the reform, Behaviourism alone 
cannot account for the instrument and the utility of the Charter, hence, other approaches 
such as the society of state that concerns itself with matters of the national and 
international rules for international engagements.  
 
Society of State approach:  the Society of State Approach has a specific importance in 
the study since it highlighted the significance of the UN Charter in the overall reform 
effort. Society of State Approach stands out of the other theories in this study following 
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the commanding reference it makes to the bonds, the statutes, the constitutions, and 
indeed, the United Nations Charter. Understanding the role of the Charter in this study is 
prime and there is no other theory that is closest to its understanding than does the 
Society of state.  Another salient justification for the utility of the Society of state 
approach to this study is that, it views all parties as non-bias actors but harbingers of law 
to maintain security and order.  In this regard, the P5 and African Group are viewed as 
neutral actors, not biased, willing to respect the Charter and through their obedient to the 
Charter can work together to preserve the state and reform the Council. This theory is 
truly essential as it does not only give the benefit of doubt to the P5—that has been 
accused of interest protecting by the realist and the African Group that can be tagged 
overzealous. Extended usefulness of the Society of State to this study is its appreciation 
that the reform of the Council is within the law and that the two parties are encouraged to 
pursuing it through the invocation of the relevant provisions of the Charter to establish 
common ground for reform failing which, the offender of the law should be punished or 
ostracised. But, while the Society of State has seen both actors (the P5 and African 
Group) as neutral actors and believe that lack of reform was based on inadequate 
attention to the Charter, this theory shows more light on  explain the seeming Global 
North-Global South divide, the dependency theorist claims is the issue reproduced in the 
Security Council. 
 
Dependency Theory: Dependency theory campaigns for the Third World countries and 
calls for African states inclusion in the Security Council on the basis that neither 
developed (the P5) nor the Third World (African Group can exist in isolation. The theory 
reveals that the P5 and African Group can only be understood in the context of the world 
economic and political system. Political events in Africa are directly related to events in 
the P5 countries within the Council. However, relations between the P5 and Africans 
currently exist in the Security Council are asymmetrical. Dependency theory is critical to 
this study since it argues that the flow of power and control is from the First World 
(center or core or the P5) to the Third World (periphery or Africa). Through the lenses of 
Dependency theory, it is understood that political and economic (security and 
development) events in the First World have a huge impact on the politics and economics 
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of Third World countries, but Third World political and economic events usually have 
little impact on the First World. The exclusive Security Council is exemplary in this 
respect. 
 
Within the world political and economic system dependency theory asserts that there is a 
tremendous amount of interaction among core countries and peoples, and between the 
core and the periphery. There is very little interaction or influence just among periphery 
countries. The consequences of this are great, resulting in an isolated and weak periphery 
country having an unequal relationship with the united and strong core – the P5. Suffice 
to say that politics and economics are related especially as being practiced in the Security 
Council where political decisions are made for economic reasons. As such they cannot be 
understood apart from each other. Dependency theory clearly fleshed out the P5 effort to 
maintain the status quo. It underpins that economic and political ties and relationships 
between core and periphery countries are particularly important. These are advantageous 
for the core, and disadvantageous for the periphery. Core-periphery trading patterns result 
in continuous growth of political and economic power for the core at the expense of the 
periphery. Core-periphery orientation and continued operation causes a widening of the 
gap between developed and developing countries, rather than a narrowing it, in this way 
makes difficult for instance for the Council reform to occur. Historically, dependency 
maintains that lower priced raw materials have been exchanged for higher priced finished 
goods and this condition is replicated in the Security Council. 
 
Also, it necessarily follows from dependency theory argument that Africa’s 
underdevelopment is not a natural state, but rather a condition that is caused by core 
political actors, the P5. The fact is that in the asymmetrical relations, the developed 
nations are actively under developing Third World countries as a result of the systems of 
interactions between them, through the agency of the United Nations Security Council 
exclusive politics. Put another way, the insecurity paradigm in Africa and its 
underdevelopment is directly related to, and makes possible, the development of the 




Premised on the outlook of Dependency theory and the real imbalance, status quo, and 
above all the Global North and Global South divide as currently obtained in the Security 
Council, this study adopted this framework as it fleshes out the real reasons for the 
Security Council. This theory actually highlighted pertinent issues such as the Global 
North at the centre/core maintaining the strangle hold on those of African countries at the 
periphery. This outlook shows us that the inability to reform the Council is because the 
P5 at the centre do not want the African Group at the periphery to join the class at the 
centre. In this regard, dependency theory records that the relationship between the North 
and South reproduces unequal relations and that the functioning of the UN reproduces 
inequalities between Global North and Global South. In our case, the P5 represents the 
Global North and Africa represents the global South. 
3.10. Conclusion  
Reflecting on these theories and models engaged above, this researcher understands and 
concluded at once that international politics of the UN Security Council reform does not 
holistically fit one specific model following its hydra-headed and variegated dimensions. 
While some approaches such as behaviourism and society of states are closely 
interpretative and explanatory enough to make them truly useful in unpacking the reform 
saga, others such as realism are good because they touched chord in deep ways on sort of 
systems theory through which international politics can be understood. Since states are 
organisations that participate in both international and domestic political arenas, it is not 
unforeseen that the pursuit of goals in one arena influence actions in the other. Surely, the 
P5 nations may both respond to international events through domestic motivations and 
attempt to solve domestic problems through international actions; this is the principle of 
realism.  
 
The alternative frameworks to realism presented in this paper attempts to move beyond 
existing Realist theories. In assortment of ways society of state specifically places the 
state at the centre of the analysis and develops a range of strategies, across domestic and 
international arenas, available to state officials in pursuit of their objectives (for the 
African Group, it is inclusion and for the P5, it is exclusion of the African Group) both 
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laying claims to the Charter. By taking into account both the domestic and international 
constraints on the state, and by articulating both the domestic and international choices 
available to both P5 and the African Group, we are able to provide a more 
comprehensive, integrated approach to the analysis of state behaviour through the 
instrument of behaviourism.   
 
Specifically, on the basis of choice of theory, the Realist Theory of International 
Relations frameworks is used to exactly underpin and critically analyse and gauge the 
fundamental divergent interests of the P5 actors in the Council reform which shape the 
African Group actions and options. This chapter is equally fleshed out through the 
apparatus of   behaviourism. Behavioursim alongside realism summarise the overall 
effort in this chapter, to link lack of reform to power politics and actors’ behaviours. 
More, the realists’ integrated approach offers a versatile tool through which the 
examination of the multiple interests and behaviours of all actors in the Security Council 
reform saga, and how these have influenced the dialectics of the reform over the years are 
politically appraised. Assuredly, the African Group who competes for inclusion into the 
permanent category of the Council does so to protect its collective interest. It is also for 
the African Group a call meant for its survival in the anarchic international system. 
However, the P5’s resistance is anchored on desired ability to lord it over Africa for as 
long as power can sustain. The important thing to bear in mind therefore is that this 
model and approach explain international political process and are valid instruments and 
clean lenses through which we have evaluated global political phenomena in the United 
Nations Security Council reform. From here, the study moves to Chapter four in which 
we respond to Question 1 (Q1), Objective 1 (O1), of the study. The discussion in chapter 
four is carried out under the main heading ‘The African exclusion from the Council’s veto 
power: weighing the nexus.’ It looks at various reasons for African exclusion from the 
UN permanent seat, mirroring the remote and immediate reasons of the seeming political 







The African exclusion from the Council’s veto power: weighing the 
nexus 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a descriptive presentation of the responses to the interview 
questions which were administered in the field. It focuses on the two major actors—the 
African Group and the United Nations Security Council Group. Whereas a number of top 
career diplomats of both the African Union origin and the United Nations decent are 
targeted for this interview, it was only possible to access some senior level representative 
of the AU whose interviews were held on 23 May 2015. The AU was represented by a 
very senior official in Ethiopia whose office is located in Addis Ababa. However, this 
interview was held on 23 May 2015 at the event of Africa Day Expo in South Africa. A 
renowned professor of International relations and conflict resolution from Bradford 
University was also interviewed on 25 May 2015 while the interview of a High-Ranking 
Nigerian official working for the United Nations was on 28 May 2015 and another of 
South African representative in the AU was on 30 May 2015. Also, we solicited the 
views of high-ranking UPEACE official who equally advised us on pertinent issues areas 
of this study. The response was received on September 2015. 
 
This Chapter is developed and concluded from the feedbacks from the officials contacted 
in this study and corroborative literature evidence that interrogate the remote and 
immediate causes of African exclusion from the permanent seat of the United Nations 
Security Council permanent chamber. The presentation is made in terms of the themes 
covered in the interviews. The officials’ acuities are presented not only from their own 
perspectives, but also from the collaborative perspective of the UN and AU official 
documents on the subject under study. The discussion then assesses the actors’ interests 
and roles in the reform debates, juxtaposing these interests with those of other opposing 
actors. To further validate the findings of the interviews, the researcher employs the 
official and position papers on African inclusion and exclusion debates. To be sure, it is 
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very difficult to secure an appointment with the UN and AU officials. However, with a 
view to have reasonably balanced account on the pertinent exclusion saga within the 
Council, the researcher conducted further interviews with senior officers of the: United 
Nations mandated University for Peace (UPEACE), and the University professors with 
expert knowledge on the topic of UN Security Council reform debate. These senior 
directors assuredly, house some vast knowledge of African insecurities and the theatrics 
of global political affairs. For the purpose of presentation of the data all the respondents 
were grouped according to the questions they addressed. The AU/UN respondents and 
the non-AU/UN respondents were merged as the same set of questions was used in their 
separate interactions. This allowed for informed opinion of the possible causes of African 
exclusion from the permanent Chamber of the UN from 1945 to 2015. In this fashion, the 
roles of the P5 actors in shaping and sustaining the structurally imbalanced Council 
become clearer.  
4.2 Respondents’ perceptions on African exclusion 
In a nutshell, this chapter presents the views and assessment of the AU official, Professor, 
UN Official, and UPEACE official on Africa’s exclusion from the United Nations, 
Security Council (immediate and remote causes/reason). By extension, this chapter 
investigates Africa’s interests in the Security Council reform and reasons why Africa has 
not been included in the permanent category of the Council since most African states 
joined the organisation in early 1960s.  
4.2.1. Understanding African Exclusion from the permanent seat 
Africa in the first place was excluded from the permanent Council due to the following 
reasons: (1) “in 1945 when the United Nations was born, no African country was free of 
colonial rule and dominance. The not-colonised Ethiopia and (Liberia) that can claim 
freedom from Western domination was on its knees at advent of both WWI and WWII 
begging for survival from drought and hunger, as such was not a global player; (2) Africa 
did not have significant interest in directing global hegemon  and could not be a stake 
holder at that time, but has interest now following its efforts to control the array of the 
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natural deposit within its borders; (3) The concert of Europe and the League of Nations 
that were before the UN was not of any meaningful impact towards global peace and 
security and it was safe to assume that the UN could be a repetition of the League”4 
 
The Officials identified Africa’s interests in the permanent seat as aimed at continent’s 
development and providing essential skills and ensuring internal security to help stabilise 
African states which has emerged from colonialism and been in conflict with itself and 
loggerhead with the Western powers that excluded it from holding a veto. These 
respondents specifically added that the West through the UN agency suspends Africa at 
the periphery while the West stays at the core for as long that is possible. The “drive for 
Africa’s permanent seat interests in the Council, which is includes Africa’s political and 
economic securities and the campaign for its inclusion in the Security Council is genuine. 
In my view the behaviour of trying to repeat the West through some catch-up activities 
with the West by of African leaders is a problem. African actors must be aware that the 
some members of the P5 is furthering virtually every conflict the P5 has intervened either 
through direct military engagement or through the adoption of resolutions”5. However, 
the usefulness of the catch-up games in the context of Council reform, for Africans the 
basis of the reform is to enable the continent control its own territory, conflicts, and 
resources by having hold on the permanent seat and veto power – the most relevant 
power leverages of the Council — through which the continent was relegated to the 
periphery for perpetual dependence on the powers at the core—the P5 in the current 
international system. “The dependency channels and the assortments of its adverse 
impacts on the dependent nations as discussed in Chapter three, actually fashioned by 
some of the powerful P5 nations through their behaviour and conditioning of the African 
Group. In the most important areas of global relevance, the political will and economic 
                                                          
4 The idea that African exclusion was processed through the colonial manicure of decoration of the seeming 
importance for the beauty of the project at hand, were advanced by the AU Official and the UPEACE 
official who responded to our question on African exclusion respectively. It is imperative to note here that 
the common denominator, in terms of thematic analysis of the causes of exclusion among the respondents 
is included in quotation marks. Interview with the AU Official occurred at Protea Hotel, Johannesburg 
South Africa - 23 May 2015.  
5 In an interview with the AU Official, the African exclusion in some instances was blamed on Africa’s 
catch-up-game approach to reform the current status quo of the United Nations. The respondent is 
convinced that Africa can be included only when it charts its own way through the Council or dictates the 
modus of its involvement, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 23 May 2015. 
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options service only the spirit of dependency paradigm which originally was created by 
the Europeans emperors long before the dismantlement of African Land and Nations, 
cemented through the artificial construction of 1872 colonial Africa in a Berlin 
conference of 1884 – 1885”6. “Africa has been on a mission to regain itself from the 
shock of dependency on colonial masters; the dependency syndrome currently stretched 
beyond African leaders’ control, especially over its regional security affairs”7. In pursuit 
of these security protections of human and natural endowments and development 
strategies, the AU has challenged the status quo and will sure continue to do so until the 
reform is met either in a short or long term designs. If none works there are also options 
for extremes such as becoming defiant and withdrawing support towards the UN 
activities.8The respondent continues press that Africa’s aim towards the Council reforms 
also has focus on supporting regional efforts to find a practical solution to resolving 
conflicts in the continent without external intervention and assisting the stabilisation of 
Africa. This includes security support through the African Union and especially the veto 
mechanism of the United Nations Security Council.  
4.3 In 1945 Africa was still under colonial rule 
Ethiopia is one African state that was neither defeated in war nor colonised by imperial 
powers.9 Of course, every other African state was at one point or the other under the 
colonial rule. However, the non-colonised Ethiopia by 1945 was plagued by poverty and 
hunger, such that the country has no influence whatsoever at the time to demand a 
permanent seat from the Council. It also was not a player in the World Wars I and II 
neither is any other African states who gained political independence in the 1960s.10 The 
history of reform efforts geared towards making the Security Council more reflective of 
growing UN membership and of changing world politics since the organisation’s 
                                                          
6 The United Nations Official I, this respondent linked Africa’s exclusion to the asymmetrical encounter the 
continent had with Europe since the event of scramble for Africa at the programme of Berlin conference, 
Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 25 May 2015. 
7 Interview with the African Union Official, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 23 May 2015. 
8 Interview with the African Union Official, Protea Hotel Johannesburg, South Africa - 23 May 2015 
9 Interview with Professor of International Relations 23 May 2015, at Saro-Maria Hotel, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia. The professor as well as the UPEACE official, note that Africa has no meaningful role in the 
world during the years 1940s as most part of the continent were still under colonial rule. 
10 Interview with the UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015. [E-interview]. 
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establishment conveys the slim prospects for meaningful change(Weiss, 2003: 148). The 
UN founders deliberately divided member rights and roles by establishing a universal 
General Assembly with the most general functions and a restricted Security Council with 
executing authority for maintaining the peace — unanimity among the great powers was 
a prerequisite for action. This arrangement was designed to contrast with the Council of 
the League of Nations, in the areas of general executive committee of the organisation 
that failed miserably in its security operations. It failed because it required agreement 
from all states with the right to veto decisions of substance, an essential component of the 
original 1945 deal. In the original agenda of the institution of the UN was the chronicled 
sustenance of colonial empire and legacy. 
  
According to Fanon (1963: 33), the colonial world is a compartmentalised world. It is 
obviously as superfluous to recall the existence of ‘native’ towns and European towns, of 
schools for ‘natives’ and schools for Europeans, as it is to recall apartheid in South Africa 
Fanon, 1963: 33). Yet, if we penetrate inside this compartmentalisation we shall at least 
bring to light some of its key aspects. By penetrating its geographical configuration and 
classification we shall be able to delineate the backbone on which the decolonised society 
is reorganised and will remain secluded from international political and economic 
engagements for years. This is why the Concert of Europe following upon the defeat of 
Napoleon in 1815 was probably the first attempt at setting up a practical international 
organisation to foster peace by means of Congresses among the European powers to 
secure the vested strategic interests in global environment (Fanon, 1963: 33). The 
membership of the Concert was strictly confined to the large Powers, and that any 
attempt to change the status quo by the secession of any ethnic group within the 
boundaries of the larger Powers should be vigorously resisted. This is the case with the 
United Nations. 
 
Further, (Barkawi and Mark1999; Cammack, 2002; Verwij and Thompson, 2009)  note 
that the heavy casualties caused by the World War I, seemed appropriate that men like 
Smuts and Woodrow Wilson, inspired by motives of lofty idealism of entrenching 
European superiority in all spheres of international endeavour, considered setting up an 
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international organisation, its double purpose was the maintenance of peace by means of 
collective action of all the members against a likely aggressor in any part of the world, 
and the prevention by peaceful means of another major struggle. The lessons of history 
hold that Africa was not part of this gathering. The mere threat of collective action was 
usually sufficient to deter small states from pursuing an aggressive policy or even more, 
trying to be exertive. The League of Nations can thus be said to have come into existence 
as a remedy against international anarchy. At the event of Versailles, Africa was not 
there. The League was established under the Treaty of Versailles, the peace treaty that 
formally ended World War I (Duffy, 1950: 168). The Treaty of Versailles was signed on 
28 June 1919. Part I of the Versailles Treaty, that is, the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, was the constitutional document of the League. According to this constitution, 
the League’s purpose was “to promote international co-operation and to achieve 
international peace and security.”  Africa is part of the international community but was 
not part of Versailles convention even though Africa was bounded by the resolutions of 
the 1919 treaty, yet it had no contributions whatsoever towards the design and outlay of 
the League.  
 
Likewise, at the San Francisco conference where the UN was formed and Charter drafted, 
delegates who were dissatisfied with a revival of a kind of nineteenth-century Concert of 
Europe—with more powerful states given special roles—but also did not wish to impede 
the effective creation of the new world body expected that a review conference for all UN 
member states would be convened relatively quickly to discuss changes in the Charter 
and organisational structures. Although the Charter Article 109 reserved the possibility of 
a General Conference for the purposes of “reviewing the present Charter,” the P5 
preferred setting the bar high for any changes (Carpenter, 1997; Weiss, 2003: 149; Cox, 
and Harold2005).  They not only resisted efforts to convene such a conference but also 
clearly communicated their intention to safeguard their veto rights. The increasing 
polarisation of UN member countries during the Cold War in the 1950s prevented such a 
gathering then, and none has been convened since making it impossible for discussions 
and debate on such reform architecture let alone the low priority African inclusion 




Between the UN’s establishment in 1945 and the end of the first wave of decolonisation 
in 1963, the number of UN member states swelled from 51 to 114. Only six countries 
from Africa and Asia were UN members originally (Weiss, 2003) while two decades 
later, more than half of the UN’s membership were from these two developing 
continents. As a result, these newly decolonised countries demanded a better reflection of 
their numbers and priorities in the Security Council and throughout the UN system. The 
chief agitation from the African wing has been the inclusion in the permanent hall of the 
Security Council. 
 
Assuredly, no progress has been made on these numerical or procedural changes because 
absolutely no consensus exists about the exact shape of the Security Council or the 
riddance of the veto.11 Surely, every P5 member knows what Africa wants, they also 
know that the Council does not reflect the actual distribution of twenty-first-century 
power, yet reform proposals have been dented by never addressing the true imbalance 
between seats at the table and actual military capacity outside of the Security Council 
chamber. The P5 specifically have sought to address, instead, the imbalance between the 
total number of countries in the world and Security Council membership as well as to 
guard the absolute veto right held by five countries. So, Africa will continue to work on 
long term prosperity of the continent. This is important since the current power-play in 
the UN does not favour Africa a lot. 
 
To be sure, the only significant reform of the Security Council came to pass in 1965, after 
two-thirds of all UN member states ratified and all five permanent members of the 
Security Council approved Resolution 1990 (adopted by the General Assembly in 
December 1963) which proposed enlarging the Security Council from 11 to 15 members 
and the required majority from 7 to 9 votes (Weiss, 2010: 149).  The veto power 
exclusively reserved for the P5 was left intact. The question of whether the Security 
Council should reflect the growing membership of the UN, let alone the lofty language of 
the UN Charter’s Article 2, emphasising the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
                                                          
11 Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, at Protea Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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Members, resurfaced in the 1990s, paradoxically, as a by-product of the initial successes 
of the Security Council in the early post—Cold War era (Doty, 1997; Weiss, 2003). The 
P5 countries, progressively on the same wavelength, reached unanimity privately on 
Security Council as a whole on a range of issues especially on inclusion of another 
partner to the veto power. 
 
So the exclusion did not start in San Francisco. It actually was part if the Versailles 
congress and duplicated in 1945. Post San Francisco conference, a series of decisions 
about beefed-up and improved global security in areas that had formerly paralysed the 
council, including several flash points of former East-West tensions seemed to usher in 
the philosophy that guided exclusion and inclusion of states as actors. Excluded 
continents especially, African and Latin American countries wanted a part of the action, 
to defend their own viewpoints from the risk of being ignored by a new sort of P5 
condominium but this did not happen because neither of the two, was a part of the 
conquerors of WWII. In essence, the inclusion and exclusion strategies were equally 
based on the decision of the winners of WWII.12 
4.4 Africa’s pre-independence and post-1945 conditions and interests 
In 1945, Africa was not the master of its own destiny. Africans are not leaders in Africa, 
Africans are not in command of their natural resources, Africa did not control import and 
export trading agreement, Africans did not have a say in who will lead them, Africans are 
just people with life under the control of others—Britain, France, and Portugal.13  
However, since the wave of democracy in early 1960s, the African states and leaders 
have shown continued growth and became important global actors in both economic and 
political spheres. Currently, in terms of natural resources, Africa is the world’s richest 
continent.  It has “50% of the world’s gold, most of the world’s diamonds and chromium, 
90% of the cobalt, 40% of the world’s potential hydroelectric power, 65% of the 
manganese, millions of acres of untilled farmland, as well as other natural resources.”  
Africa has natural resources which include: crude oil, hydroelectric power, diamonds, 
                                                          
12 Interview with African Union Official, 23 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa. 
13 Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg South, Africa. 
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uranium, gold, cobalt, 70% of the world’s Coltan and 34% of its cassiterite.  Coltan and 
cassiterite are strategic in the production of cell phones, laptops, and other portable 
electronic products. Above all, Africa currently has 54 independent states and over 900 
million people; “it is the second largest region at the United Nations, after a 55 Asian-
Pacific region”.14 And these 54 states of Africa, account for over 70 percent of the annual 
conflicts treated by the Security Council. Mindful of this record, we believe that if the 
UN Security Council aims for genuine maintenance of global peace and security, it truly 
requires Africa’s cooperation and support to achieve that goal. 
 
So the AU makes no pretences concerning its interests in securing a permanent seat with 
veto power in the Council. This is important because, “Whatever is happening there [at 
the Security Council], has a clear and direct impact here [in Africa]”15. The AU defines 
its interests in terms of national security, recounting the wars and conflicts in the region 
that has attracted either the Security Council’s direct military intervention or adoption of 
the Security Council resolution since 1960s from the DRC to Libya in 2011. The un-
ending conflict in DRC that was soaked in the UN intervention since the 1960s and 
attendant assassination of Patrice Emery Lumumba (whom the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, Dag Hammarskjöld, told the Security Council of the United Nations that 
the UN did not know where Lumumba was at the time when he was taken prisoner by 
Mobutu’s troops, so they could not help him),  the removal of Laurent Gbagbo through 
the UNSC agencies, the trial of Liberian Charles Taylor that was orchestrated by the 
UNSC ambers, the dethronement of Muammar Gaddafi and extermination of his life 
through the UNSC Resolution 1973 in 2011, truly touches chord on some of the reasons 
why Africa has had increased interest in the quest for inclusion.16 
 
For more than 50 years, there have been heinous deaths of prominent African leaders. 
These deaths from Thomas Sankara to Muammar Gaddafi may have linkages to the 
                                                          
14Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa 
15Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa 
16Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. Johannesburg, South Africa. The respondent is of 
the view that even though an African representative may not represent the interest of all African states at all 
times, it is securely better than Europeans standing in for Africans. The AU has methods of dealing with 
defiants and can apply one on African representative when act defiantly. 
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UNSC presence in Africa (Thomassankara.net, 2010). And, the UNSC presence and 
interventions have contributed to weakness and dysfunctionality in African states where 
the Council has mediated in conflict. This explains why the, AU defines its quest for 
permanent seat and veto power in the Council as partly motivated by the need to bring 
Africa back to real political independence in the continent and globally. While the remote 
causes of African exclusion may be located on the three major issues identified above, 
some of the immediate reasons for African exclusion lay in the maintenance of old 
order.17 The AU is nervy of the status quo and works towards a Security Council that will 
be interest-free-intervention, friendly and open to address Africa’s and other region’s 
security concerns through a proportional inclusion and representation of members and 
interests especially at the permanent category.18 Africa has supported the transformation 
of the periphery-core that characterised the dependency agenda being perpetuated the P5 
since the 1945. Another immediate reason for the sustained exclusivity in the Council is 
that the African inclusion is likely to cause the removal of irredentist conflict and the 
escalation of intra-continent conflicts within Africa. This will wane the visibility of the 
Council in African conflicts and may as well diminish the relevance of the Council in as 
the most important organ of the UN. In this way, the record book of the Council that 
registers 70% of conflicts annually in Africa may have nothing to address in Africa and 
would have to scavenge for conflict elsewhere in order to write up her annual report.19 
 
Further, the University Professor, while expressing doubts on the possibility of reform, 
corroborates the AU official that currently Africa has interest at stake in the Council 
which must be guarded. Professor20 sees that besides the abundance of human and 
material resources which Africa has now as opposed to 1945, that its role in the Council 
is inevitable. He states that at least, African inclusion will speak to some extent to protect 
the African states from those cheap onslaughts of the West especially when Africa found 
unity and desires to oppose Western interventions, motivated by greed, as witnessed in 
                                                          
17 Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015 at Saro-Maria Hotel, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia; and, Interview with UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015, [E-interview). 
18Interview with African Union Official I, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
19Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa 
20Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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Libya.21 He believes that an African presence in the Council would undercut the negative 
excesses the P5 would intend for Africa in a bid to achieve some economic gains or 
political advantages. Further, he claims that Africa is becoming a hot spot for terrorist 
group which is another platform to keep western presence in the continent until another 
insecurity architecture in manufactured to keep the interested P5 on African soil, and 
belonging to the permanent seat of the Council will allow for African voice in how to 
best address the security issues and also engender real commitment to fighting the 
insurgences such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabab.22 
4.5 The League and the UN: failures and successes 
Bearing in mind that some African states that were independent at the dawn of the UN, 
having seen the League crumbled settled that there may be no need to fight for permanent 
seat, as the UN will eventually collapse as did the League. This idea forms part of the 
remote reasons why the call for reform seems to have gathered more momentum now 
than in late 1940s. The League of Nations was formed after the World War I (WWI), 
specifically on the occasion of 10 January 1920 through a Paris Peace conference that 
ended the WWI. Surely, it was the first international organisation that sought to maintain 
global peace and security through collective security and disarmaments. It has its own 
security goals contained in the Covenant. Even though, it was conceived on laudable 
objectives, the League was weak and unable to resolve conflicts quick enough if at all. 
The inability is due to the differences among the League leaders and the difficulty 
involved in managing a global organisation with independent nations with independent 
national interests even in war zones. Thus, as indicated earlier, at the dawn of the UN, 
those problems the League encountered which led to its eventual collapse, was some 
reasonable grounds for Africa not to fight for post in the UN as it was anticipated that it 
will die a natural death as did the League. But “the for the United Nations, the Security 
Council organ eventually, unlike the League of Nations became attractive, its 
                                                          
21Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At this 
instance, the professor argues that the 2011 Libyan intervention was not a democracy intervention but a 
hegemonic intervention through the veto mechanism. 
22Interview with the Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
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deliberations were more than talk, and resolutions were more than wishes”.23 Actually, 
Colum Gavan Duffy (1950) who corroborated the AU Official noted that diplomatic 
intrigue and rivalry behind the scenes of the League led to the abandonment of many 
global peace agendas that gradually became couched in such weak and vacillating terms 
that the League achieved nothing in practice (Duffy, 1950: 168; Murphy, 2000; Murphy, 
2002; Moravcsik, 2004).  To be sure, the League was nearly a care-free hall of actors 
where every actor is not bound by regulations to act in certain manner. For example, 
Duffy, (1950) relayed that Japan, Italy and Germany, as soon as they were criticised for 
committing acts of aggression against smaller states, immediately gave notice that they 
intended to withdraw from the League, in order to prevent the machinery of the Covenant 
from functioning effectively against them. 
 
In light of that, many of the smaller states, who were not members, were deterred from 
joining an international body which did not really protect small countries from aggression 
by larger ones, and this was how the dream of a genuinely universal League gradually 
faded away (Duffy, 1950; Oneal,  et al, 1996; Newman, 2001; Naraghi-Anderlin and El-
Bushra, 2004). Indeed, under Article 3, the Assembly of the League was empowered to 
deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of 
the world. In theory it was open to any member of the League to have inserted on the 
agenda of the Assembly any matter which the Secretary-General considered to come 
within the terms of this Article, but in practice the wide scope of the Assembly was 
subject to the unofficial approval of the Council, which could arrange to defer discussion 
of any awkward matter. The Council, under Article 4, consisted, like the Security Council 
today, of both permanent and non-permanent members; its terms of reference were 
identical with those of the Assembly, but it had power to act when the Assembly was not 
in session, and also to summon the Assembly for special extraordinary Sessions, if the 
need arose (Duffy, 1950). But in the case of the UN, the organisation was prepared to act 
apart when the collective international and individual interests of the P5 states are at 
stake. As such the P5 members do not allow international institutions to limit actions that 
they deem necessary for either collective international or that of their national security. 
                                                          
23Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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The protection of the national security of the P5 states is the principal plank upon which 
the survival and hegemonic relevance of the Council is anchored. The protection of the 
national interests of the P5 by whatever means serves part of the reasons why the organ 
cannot adhere to any reform that democratises or legitimises the organisation especially 
through a geographic representativity24 
4.6 Perspectives on African exclusion from the Council 
A professor of International Relations interviewed on the reasons of African exclusion, 
argued that “one important immediate reason why Africa is currently excluded from the 
permanent membership of the Security Council is because African states are still 
members of the United Nations”.25 He maintains that Africa’s united movement either 
towards the UN or outward the UN will earn Africa a landmark voice in the organisation. 
To be sure, he declared that “the day the 54 African members of the UN pull out of the 
UN is the hour their voice is heard in every corner of the world”.26 So, he opines that the 
AU should mark as a primary task towards an independent and relevant Africa in the 
world, to unite the continent and move as one.  Disunity and the old colonial tactics of 
divide and rule are some of the current forces that have utterly undermined the AU’s 
ability to return to global power and have kept the AU floating aimlessly in the UN for 
about 70 years of its membership in the organisation. 
 
Professor’s argument followed on the resoles of Frantz Fanon’s in his ‘The Wretched of 
the Earth’. Actually, Fanon (1963) remotely notes that independence from colonial 
masters [which includes Africa’s current struggle for freedom from P5 imposition] and 
such activities as national reawakening, restoration of the nation to the people or 
Commonwealth, whatever the name used, whatever the latest expression, decolonisation, 
is always an event of sustained passion (Fanon, 1963: 1). The underpinning is that Africa 
                                                          
24 Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015 
25Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015 
26Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Here, he says he is a realist and prefers the position of realist. In his view, power 
cannot be ceded on the altar of request. In his words, if Africa wants the seat, they must be ready for war. 
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could go on to portray the rise of a new Africa, the establishment of new strengths and 
resources, the recognition of its diplomatic relations and its economic and political 
importance and orientation in the world. But instead, the AU that would lead this 
reawakening has never formed a common font since the African inclusion debates.27 
 
In actual fact, steps towards success in the current debate for reform stay in the amount of 
pressure the AU was able to garner from its 54 members. The disunity conundrum will 
continue to make the AU not recognise its success as failure turned inside-out. The AU 
Official who responded to questions on this issue spotted that the Council reform is 
extraordinarily important because “it is desired, clamored for, and demanded by the 
majority of the legitimate members of the UN”.28 Further, professor29 continued that the 
need for the Council reform and reasons why it is not happening exists in an underdone 
state of affairs in the economic and political conditions and lives of the colonised and 
marginalised African leaders, youth, women and children. While the professor locates the 
immediate reasons for Africa’s exclusion as part of the ongoing neo-colonial tactics, 
Fanon (1963: 2) fundamentally narrates that decolonisation, independence, freedom as 
the case may be, therefore, implies the urgent need to thoroughly challenge the current 
colonial situation 
4.7 The African Group and the P5 Group as they see each other 
This unit reports on the responses of the actors regarding their perceptions of each other’s 
interests and roles in the UNSC. The aim is to depict divergences and conceivable 
caginess between and among these actors with a view to understanding the conflicting 
interests within the Council and factors driving resistance, and the roles that sustains 
African exclusion from the permanent seat since 1945.  
                                                          
27Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015. 
28 Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015. 
29 Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015. 
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4.7.1. The United States of America 
According to a former US president Mr. Jimmy Carter, the “sole purpose for the US 
membership of the United Nations is for the UN to contribute to the making of the US the 
super power it can ever be in the world despite the possible destructions that may follow 
in the quest of America’s superiority” (Jimmy Carter, 2015).  The two interviewees, a 
Professor30 and the AU Official31 who actually corroborated Mr. Carter informed this 
researcher that “the US’ interest in the Council is further anchored on safeguarding its 
national security and the security of its citizens against global terrorism and to 
permanently alleviate poverty among its population”. While professor, for one, argues 
that “US’s current resistance towards reform is part of its broader global agenda to keep 
Africa forever dependent and at the periphery, part of its strategies being to keep the 
African states out of permanent position in global leadership and global security activism 
so as to maintain the culture of America’s supremacy in Africa”. In this regard the US is 
also believed to be currently interested in African exclusion specifically to eliminate 
African threats from the global sphere of politics and engenders sustained insecurity in 
the region, as this would reduce the opportunity for Africa’s ability to unite let alone 
oppose whatever order the US wanted for Africa, whether against or for, through the 
agency of the Council. A Professor maintains that the relevance of the Council is within 
its rights to maintain global peace, as such, “where over 70% of the Council’s peace 
mission and activities occur is Africa, the continent in turn adds value to the Council and 
African inclusion will challenge not only the US powers on Africa but also US’ unholy 
practices in African wars as the economic gains she made from the DRC wars”.32 “In as 
much as I would agree that the US has been giving aid to African poor states, the US has 
been instrumental to initiating those conflicts that they give aid to their victims”.33 This 
view is supported by other literature evidence which argue that, the US supplied 
munitions and enabled the cycles of violence and economic problems plaguing the 
                                                          
30Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015 
31Interview with African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
32Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015 
33Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015 
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continent of Africa throughout the Cold War (1950-1989). Specifically, Mentan (2007) 
underscores that “the US delivered over $1.5 billion worth of weaponry to Africa. Many 
of the top US arms clients – Liberia, Somalia, the Sudan, and DRC have turned out to be 
the top basket cases of the 1990s and 2000s in terms of violence, instability, and 
economic collapse (Mentan, 2007: 89). To be sure, the Professor assert that “the US was 
part of the UN team that intervened in these countries; and as long as it [US] is part of the 
whole, these African nations will not recover fully from the conflict or to be safe, they 
may not know peace until the US arms trade is removed. Termination of trading in 
weaponry by the US is a major source of solution to most conflicts in Africa and 
elsewhere since weaponry sustained some major conflicts in Africa over the years”.34 
 
For his part, former President Jimmy Carter (2015) feels that the US is protecting its 
economic and political interest by shoving Africa out of the Council.  He contends that 
the interest of the United States is far from the interests of African states. In his view, 
“Africa is one of US’ biggest business partners and African representative’s physical 
presence in the permanent Council will serve a disturbance to the US. According to 
Carter (2015), US-Africa partnership may collapse following tensions that the permanent 
membership of an African state may pose to the US leading role in its relations with 
Africa. Further, while he admits that African inclusion is not good for the US, he asserts 
that it is problematic to assume that African inclusion will better the living standards of 
Africans; neither will it remove from Africa, the internal squabbles among African actors. 
The view of Carter (2015) was supported by Kofi Annan (2015) who however, added that 
while, African inclusion may not necessarily change the world, it, will indeed, provide 
buffer for Africans in trying decision making and taking times. Specifically, Annan 
(2015) is convinced that “Nigeria, South Africa [from Africa] and Brazil [from Latin 
America] are emerging powers that cannot be left out of the Council” (Annan, 2015).  
 
While admitting that the AU has not been as forceful to assert the necessary pressure to 
compel reform in the Council, Annan (2015) utters that the AU is doing the most 
                                                          
34Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University United Kingdom, at 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015 
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important, that is, raising the debate, bearing in mind that power is not relinquished on a 
platter of gold and mere wishes and desires. It may either take political might or 
economic might and based on these parameters, Africa is on the right track to become 
part of the permanent Council, “after all, Nigeria is potentially a global power in the 
continent, can fight wars and has natural resource, it is for the existing powers such as the 
US to facilitate the inclusion amicably” (Annan, 2015). A UN staff who responded to 
question in this regard, argues that the US will continue to fight against African inclusion 
in the Council since the US is currently testing the “African solutions to the US problems 
of terrorism”.35 To count, the UN Official maintains that US is interested in Al Shabbab, 
Boko Haram, and Islamic States of Iraq and Iran (ISIS) to mention a few. These three 
terror groups have stations in Africa: Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and 
Somalia. The UN Official further stated that while these terrorist wars are in the best 
interest of the US, “the US will continue to confront terrorism in Africa using Africans 
and never US personnel for all the odd jobs of fighting terrorism. The wider angle is that 
African inclusion could result in issues of fighting terrorist group in Africa receiving the 
decision of the Council to which Africa may have an opposing view with the US”.36 So, 
the bottom line is that the US sees a lot of potential in Africa and would not allow for the 
possibility of African challenge especially from the Security Council. 
 
4.7.2. Russian Federation and permanent seat with veto 
This UN Official37 who discussed African exclusion and why Russia has not in recent 
years vote for African inclusion states that that Russia is a major actor in the Council. 
According to the UN Official, Russia’s status in the Council and overall conflict 
resolution amounts to global security significance. However, Russia’s interest in global 
security is motivated by the efforts to sustain its ideological reasoning, which includes the 
                                                          
35 Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa. 
36Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa. The respondent believes 
that the terrorist presence in Africa has the backing of the US as oppose the notion of the US confrontation 
of the same. While the respondent cautioned that he is not seen as blaming the US alone, he is convinced 
that the US is involved in breeding terrorist groups, by equipping them as forces against the state. 
37.Interview with the United Nations Official, 28 May 2015. Pretoria, South Africa 
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“respect for the principle of sovereignty in international affairs, maintaining a 
geostrategic balance and international security, cultivating a favourable international 
image and status as a responsible member of the international community, and promoting 
its economic and political interests” (Paul, 1999:  218; Ferdinand, 2013: 15).  It too 
prioritises dialogue over force to solve international conflicts (although it has shown itself 
more willing to pursue a muscular foreign policy). Russia too believes that UN 
peacekeeping operations should only be authorised when the consent of the host 
government has been obtained. It too places economic stability and development over 
respect for human rights. It too believes in the principle of upholding and strengthening 
the rule of law in international relations. 
However, there is a key problem that Russia has with Council reform including African 
inclusion. Russia’s particular attachment to its membership in the UNSC stems from the 
trajectory of variation in Russia’s place in the world, Russia inherited its P5 seat from the 
Former Soviet Union (FSU), when it was accustomed to be treated as the superpower 
with net rivalry to the US (Ferdiand, 2013). Russia’s skepticism about reform stems from 
two principal factors: “its needs to first rise from the seemingly declining Russia’s status 
in the world, (even though this was also partly caused by the collapse of the Russian 
economy), and lack of trusted allies within the circle. Surely, most African states are 
colonised by Britain and France who also are permanent members and not the best 
friends of Russia, for Russia, if African state is included in the Council and the state allies 
with the West and US, Russia will suffer at the prime of democracy deficit within the 
Council and may become an overlooked power.38 One of the prime concerns of Russia 
has been to restore its prestige and clout globally, and African inclusion may not 
necessarily mark the box for Russia. In this time of self-building, being a permanent 
member of the UNSC is a key element in that self-image. According to Orlov cited in 
Ferdinand (2013: 13) “for Russia today no world order is acceptable unless it can 
influence Russia’s taking of strategic decisions within the Council.” This particularly 
means that Russia is afraid that the entry of new veto-holding permanent member of the 
UNSC may tip the balance in the Council against Russia. 
                                                          




So the P5 status remains tremendously valued by Russia because it embodies that wider 
vision the country should follow to achieve ends in the global politics. According to the 
UN Official, Russia requires every power it can muster to display global activism since 
Russia’s capacity to influence the whole range of global issues is now diminished by 
comparison with the Soviet era. Russian economic resurgence does at least provide them 
with greater capacity to make a difference in selected parts of the world. And the current 
priority is to thicken Russia’s relations with Asian states, especially China. So 
cooperation with China in the Security Council contributes both to the image and the 
substance of Russia as a global power. Russia’s inability to determine where Africa’s 
allegiance may fall in the Council is one reason why it will take another long period for 
Russia to endorse Africa’s candidature to the permanent seat, let alone Nigeria that is in 
seeming good standing with the US.39 
 
So far, China is the only reliable ally of Russia and the country has made many enemies 
from the European axis and somewhat has only the trust of its citizens, nuclear might and 
the veto power to rely on at the international gallery of politics. As such Russia, will not 
want any alteration or confusion within the established Council permanent order as it 
fears that additional member may side with the West. Behind Russia’s resistance is the 
fear of depletion of its own power base. Russia, in this year [2015] banned 89 European 
Union (EU) politicians from entering the country which the European parliament 
president, Martin Schulz termed unacceptable, but Russia, sees same as a sign of its 
intention not to compromise its extra territorial power [veto power inclusive] without a 
suitable measure of war (Ferdinand, 2013).  
4.7.3. The China and permanent seat with veto 
Since 1945, China laid down that it should adopt a low profile in international affairs 
(Ferdinand, 2013: 17). Actually, China’s strategy has been ‘coldly observe, secure their 
own positions, cope calmly, conceal their positions and bide their time, keep a low 
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profile, never take the lead, and make a contribution only when necessary (Ferdinand, 
2013). China focuses exclusively upon its economic objectives and the veto power is an 
instrument for protecting it. One interpretation of the practice of Chinese attitude and 
diplomacy as the country gradually sought to integrate itself into international 
organisations was that its representatives observed cautiously the ways in which these 
organisations operated so that they could better fit in. Rather than challenge the existing 
international order, they sought to learn how to work in it and how to make it work for 
them (Ferdiand, 2013). They have been more concerned to reassure governments around 
the world that China’s ‘rise’ is peaceful, and not a threat to anyone. This explains why 
Yang cited in Ferdinand (2013) has analysed Chinese diplomacy in the Security Council 
on issues concerning Iraq between 1991 and 2003 as friendly. This was opposed to the 
US invasion of Iraq in 2003. She showed that throughout the preceding decade the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) increasingly practised multilateralism and balance of 
power, accommodating and hedging conflicts from potential allies (Ferdinand, 2013: 12). 
As she puts it, on balance, China did not tend to opt for obstructive behaviour in the 
Security Council.  
 
Actually, observers have argued that China kept half a step behind and half inside the 
Council and letting Russia take the lead. According to Ferdinand (2013) Chinese officials 
were more nervous than Russians about antagonising the US within the Security Council 
system and around its reform debates. This forms part of the reasons why at the 
beginning of the decade-long confrontation between the West and the Saddam Hussein 
regime in Iraq, China was itself the target of Western sanctions in the aftermath of the 
massacres of protesters around Tiananmen Square in 1989. It might have been expected 
that China’s leaders, who felt both threatened by and resentment about this isolation, 
might have responded with greater opposition to Western diplomacy, but this did not 
happen. Ferdinand (2013: 12) settles that in its decade-long involvement in “international 





Thus, Ferdinand (2013: 12) notes that the main priorities of Chinese engagement at the 
UN have four main objectives:  
• protecting sovereignty, autonomy and its independence of decision-making there;  
• maintaining geostrategic balance and national security;  
• cultivating a favourable international image and status as a responsible member of 
the international community and a great power;  
• Promoting China’s economic and political interests.  
In the above regard, a steadfast adherence to absolute sovereignty and the prioritisation of 
dialogue over the use of force to resolve conflicts, as the UN Charter, Chapter VII 
provides must reviewed to have the consent of governments against whom they are 
directed. Alternatively, except where UN agencies can show clear evidence of breaches 
of UN rules. China favours support for government efforts to promote social and 
economic development, with stability prioritised over human rights, and the upholding 
and strengthening of the rule of law in international relations are matter of interest to the 
Chinese as well. 
 
Professor40 and UN Official41  have noted that there is a paradox about a recent emerging 
trend in China’s attitude towards dealing with the challenges to international peace and 
security that constitute the criterion for Security Council intervention under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter. In their views, China does wish to see the role of the Security Council 
enhanced. Yet, Ferdinand (2013) opines that at the same time the Chinese government 
has edged towards involving regional organisations such as the African Union in 
decisions as to whether a particular situation really does represent a threat to international 
peace and security, or at least in legitimising them but not ceding the veto power to 
Africa (Ferdinand, 2015). For China, without a permanent seat and that corroboration, it 
is more reluctant to grant the Security Council powers to act except in circumstances 
where the threats are most blatant.  
 
                                                          
40 Interview with Professor of International Relations from the Bradford University, United Kingdom, at the 
Saro-Maria Hotel, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 23 May 2015. 
41 Interview with UN Official I, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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In other words, it has shown itself reluctant to concede sole adjudication of power to the 
Security Council, when the majority of the P5 members are still Western and developed, 
rather than from the developing world where most peace-keeping activity takes place. It 
implicitly accepts that assessments of what constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security may vary from one region of the world to another. Above the Security Council 
politics, China is developing itself using resources found in China, elsewhere and Africa. 
An African inclusion in the permanent seat means African empowerment. According to 
the AU Official42 and the UN Official43the common denominator in their responses is 
that “China is not necessarily pushing for anti-African inclusion, if China had not been a 
permanent member since inception; it would have been difficult for China to manage its 
economic successes”. In this view, the AU Official for one, registers that the account is 
true, because the US that does not want any competitor, would have drummed up support 
from UK and France to preach democracy in China and possibly instigate violence in that 
country. “If China has been infested with conflicts even in 1990s, it would have been like 
the Democratic Republic of Congo – a country of abundance or wealth and war.”44 
Conflict of any sort cripples economic and political capabilities to organise oneself and 
move to the next advanced level. Incessant conflicts are why Africa is still crippled. 
4.7.4. The France and permanent seat with veto 
France is one of the five permanent members of the Council. According to the UN 
Official45, French interest and reason why it will stand in the way of African inclusion is 
the fear of its own space in the Council room. France is not as powerful as it were when 
the WWII ended and if it leads the march for African inclusion, two things might happen 
to France. One, the US and Britain will sideline it in the permanent seat and it may not 
have any good marriage with Russia and China for their difference in policy and 
ideology. Two, US, UK, Russia and China may agree to open the debate on reform and 
vote to replace France with any emerging African state such as Nigeria, South Africa and 
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others. For this reason, France would not campaign vigorously for reform for it fears it 
might become the victim of the reform.46 Its global power parity has waned since the end 
of WWII. The UN Official II47 recalled that when the French Government encouraged the 
African region to stand up for its right to inclusion at the 566 extraordinary meeting of 
the AU at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, it was aimed at liberating the region. Former French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy said that “it was time for the world to make a place for Africa 
on the global stage to discuss international crises and reform, calling for the United 
Nations to be reformed and Africa to have a permanent member of the Security Council” 
(Reuters Africa, 2010: 1).   At that instance, the US and Britain went behind the door 
saying that France is not deserving of a seat in the permanent chamber of the Council.48 
Equally so, authors such as Yehuda Z. Blum (2005: 637) had already indicated that critics 
are raising doubts as to whether Britain and France especially the latter had really 
qualified for ‘Great Power’ status in the Council in the first place, even in 1945. Blum 
(2005) asserts that after all, France having surrendered to Nazi Germany in 1940 was not 
among the participants in the Dumbarton Oaks Conference of September 1944. He 
asserts that France was not one of the sponsoring powers of the San Francisco 
Conference of April-June 1945, which adopted the Charter and established the United 
Nations. In his view, France’s inclusion in the P5 was apparently prompted by the 
nostalgia of Western statesmen more than by considerations of realpolitik. This 
sentiment, though, did not necessarily extend toward Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the 
‘Free French’ during the war. But the 1960s critics quickly abandoned these arguments, 
realising that any prospect for constitutional change in the composition of the Council 
and the powers of its permanent members was out of the question, since it required the 
consent of those very members. The apex therefore, is that France is not certain of its 
permanent post should there be an agreement to reform the Council. 
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4.7.5. United Kingdom and permanent seat with veto 
To be sure, Britain was a colonial power. According to the AU Official49 and the 
professor50 who have consensus on the underpinning interest of Britain in the permanent 
seat and having Africa outside the chamber of permanency in the Council, the two 
respondents’ agreed that Britain as a colonial master would not want to see its colonies at 
an equilibrium of power. The political reason for supporting African exclusion is to allow 
for the Britain to maintain the chauvinist view that lorded Britain over Anglophone 
African states including Nigeria. This goes without saying that Britain will not 
voluntarily cede power to Nigeria or South Africa or Zimbabwe, for the simple reason 
that they want these states to remain in perpetual dependent on the colonial master 
[Britain].51So, for Britain it is about dominating the colonised as the master in politics 
and economics. The two respondents see Britain as a master who wants to see African 
states serve as a messenger and not a mate of the UK for whatever reasons globally. 
Professor52 for one argues that Anglophone African states are being used by the UK to 
accomplish its economic goals and will lose that edge when it becomes equal with a 
‘stubborn’ African nation such as Nigeria that can challenge status quo and say “go away 
with your rotten aid.”53 In line with the above, the AU and the UPEACE officials54 who 
corroborated professor added that besides lording itself over its colonies, another key 
reason why Britain will stand against Africa’s inclusion as long as possible is to 
participate in maintaining the original Africa, Britain has created. “That is Africa without 
a global impact, controlled by outsiders.”55 He concluded that since early 1960s when 
most African states obtained political independence from Britain, that, Britain has been 
present in Africa pushing its own agenda through the divide and rule tactics that 
destroyed Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, to name a few.  
                                                          
49Interview with AU Official, 25 May, 2015, Pretoria South Africa. 
50Interview with Professor, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
51Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
52Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 
53 Interview with Professor of International Relations, 23 May 2015, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
54 Interviews with the AU Official and the UPEACE official resonate with the Professor’s assertion that a 
stubborn African state will challenge the colonial Britain if granted a permanent seat with veto. 
55Interviews with the AU Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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4.8. Sustaining the Status Quo: similar perspectives and examples 
In spite of widespread complaints that the council’s composition is unrepresentative and 
in spite of the seemingly endless maneuvering among member states on its reform, 
membership in the council is seen at the UN in the late 1990s as more of a prize than ever 
especially in the Latin American axis of the UN world. This view owes much to the 
increasingly active Council agenda since the end of the Cold War (Malone, 2000: 1).  
Many reasons have been advanced for why the Latin American Group was excluded from 
the Council as was African region.  To start with, the UN was a product of WWII which 
the Latin American Group did not influence in any political and or economic way 
discernible (Lenin, 2005).  As such, the sharing of the spoils of WWII took into account 
only important actors at the time. Currently, the P5 are dived over inclusion and reform 
because each actor has its own peculiar circumstances and environment that produce its 
survival strategy. Further, the motivation for reform and inclusion of the previously 
excluded and marginalised among the P5 members are variegated. Some are easily 
evident, while others are secreted. Bearing this in mind, the reason/s for the Latin 
American Group exclusion can consist of any of the following: (1) Opportunism by the 
executive core; (2) International dependency philosophy; (3) Realist ideology of might is 
right and the weak must suffer what they ought. 
4.8.1. Opportunism by the executive core 
An external state actor’s involvement in internal conflict on the side of an insurgent 
group fighting a state is often an expression of aggression but an independent state 
begging to be seen and addressed as such is deprivation. While the reasons for why some 
P5 members are willing to spend billions of US dollar in sustaining violence in the 
Caribbean is for the simple reason of the push and pull effect of dependency and 
independency. The executive core, in the case of Latin America, especially Brazil, is 
often motivated by a number of factors including:  the desire for the readily able P5 to 
intervene and overthrow any unfriendly government in the Latin America and Caribbean 
axis without the questioning of the tenacious Brazil; the US concerns around regional 
policy disputations and disagreements as it affects the US; and an opportunity to play one 
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state against the other in obtaining economic advantages with sheer impunity by the P5 
member states.56 
4.8.2. Entrenching the Dependency cleavages 
What is the economic implication of “antagonism against the Security Council reform” in 
the 21st century world? The answer to this question has been partly provided in the Basle 
Manifesto. That “the resistant and wars are being fought by all the Great Powers for the 
purpose of plunder, carving up the world, acquiring markets, and enslaving nations” the 
entire Latin American population inclusive (Lenin, 2005). To the P5 it brings higher 
profits; to a calculated crust of marginalisation and aristocracy, and also to the best 
interests of the victors of World War II which impedes the global security assurances and 
economic developments, it promises at the inception in 1945 (Lenin, 2005). The 
economic basis of “political-chauvinism” (this term being more precise than the term 
political-patriotism, as the latter embellishes the and adores) and of opportunism of the 
P5 is the same, namely, an alliance between very few number of the UN member states at 
the permanent category of the Security Council, directed against the majority of the 
member nations, directed against the class that is marginalised by the P5. Political-
chauvinism is a consummated opportunism and the P5 are adamant that the Latin 
American members of the UN will remain without permanent signature, in the global 
arena of governance. 
 
Political-chauvinism and opportunism are the same in their partisan essence; the P5 
collaborations (usually the Britain, France and US on one hand against the China and 
Russia on the other hand) avow dictatorship and rejection of transformative action, 
obeisance to the principles and spirit of the Charter. The legal and ethical poise of the 
Charter which prayed for greater freedom for all nations of the earth has lost confidence 
in the bourgeoisie-led Council. The exclusion of Latin American states is propelled by 
the circumstance that political ideas of the P5 who currently occupy the permanent seat 
are identical, and so is the political content of their exclusivist political tactics.  
                                                          




Political-chauvinism of Britain and US is a consummated opportunism in the Council. To 
be sure, the alliance of the duo is ideological and secret. What is public now, is that, none 
of the P5 members in essence wants South American Group in the permanent Chamber. 
While the US may want to remain unchallenged by South American states, it will remove 
every instrument that will bring South American powers to equal the North American 
state of US. The P5 draws its Latin American exclusion strength from nowhere else but 
the need to distance the two American continents apart with north as superior to the south 
in the global political radar (Lenin, 2005). This calculated resistance by the North 
America’s state of US against the South Americans explains why it is a falsehood for any 
P5 member to say that the Latin American and Caribbean is not ripe for global power 
politics of veto power.  The Latin Americans were never part of the P5 plan despite the 
roles of Brazil and Argentina’s agitations especially in the 1990s towards the reformation 
of the Council (Padelford, 1960).   
 
Having been seeking permanent position alongside Africa, Australasia for nearly seventy 
years without success in conditions of violence and peace, the P5 have matured in their 
exclusivist politics. The current P5 proved an open ally of the ‘bourgeoisie’. Unity with 
opportunism means unity between the proletariat and its national bourgeoisie that is, 
submission to the latter, a split in the international revolutionary working class. We do 
not say that an immediate split with the opportunists in all countries is desirable, or even 
possible at present; we do say that such a split has come to a head, that it has become 
inevitable, is progressive in nature, and necessary to the revolutionary struggle of the 
proletariat, and that history, having turned away from “peaceful” capitalism towards 
imperialism, has thereby turned towards such a split. Volentem ducunt fata, nolentem 
trahunt (faith lead the willing, but faith drag the unwilling). 
 
The three principal powers haggled long and hard over the inclusion of additional 
permanent members. The United States lobbied hard for China and, initially, for Brazil, 
while France owes its place to the efforts of Britain. The Soviets were leery about the 
addition of any other powers. The United States believed Brazil belonged on the Security 
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Council due to its size, resources, and its contribution of troops to World War I combat. 
However, the British and Soviets pushed back on the idea (Cox, 2009). The United States 
did not press the issue for two reasons: First, a driving reason for Brazil’s inclusion was 
equitable geographic representation, and the United States, after pushing so hard for the 
‘Four Policemen’ idea, did not want to reopen the question of regionalism in general. 
Second, Brazil was simply far below the rank of ‘Great Power’ economically, politically, 
and militarily. 
4.8.3. The realists turn in the Latin Americas 
When seen in bold relief against the histories of other times and places, the story 
Thucydides tells us would help us better understand the sustained exclusion of the Latin 
American states through the realists lenses. According to Lenin (2015: 2) international 
politics is primarily about choices, not constraints; that self-interest is but one motivation 
among many, and not always the strongest; that people take their moral commitments 
seriously and sometimes act upon them, even when this conflicts with their self-interest 
narrowly understood; that state behaviour in crisis and war is at least as powerfully 
shaped by passion as by reason; and that national interests are constructed in historically 
contingent, seemingly arbitrary ways, not given by the structure of the system. I think we 
would come to see more clearly that, whether that interests and identities are negotiated 
and transformed through interaction; that anarchy is indeed ‘what states make of it’; and 
that states have some choice as to what they do make of it.” Claims have long been 
advanced by Brazil that the Latin American area should have a permanent seat on the 
Council and that Brazil's size and position entitle it to such a privilege. 
4.9. Conclusion 
Indeed, this Chapter has explicitly and implicitly explained the reasons behind Africa’s 
exclusion from the permanent seat. Principally, the remote reasons were partly due to 
colonial rule that had many African state under colony, the Chapter further explains that 
the fall of the League of Nations, was relied upon to settle for the assumption that the UN 
will equally fall. This makes for lack of motivation to compete for permanent seat at the 
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birth of the organisation, at least from the very few independent African states that were 
equally among the founding nations of the UN. The third important discourse in this 
Chapter was that the immediate reason why Africa is still excluded was for the P5 nations 
to have their own interest protected and Africa’s interested not unprotected. The Chapter 
shows, that Africa with permanent seat will rival current status quo and this is not good 
for the P5 nations in varied degrees.  
A growing number of major actors in the international community have rightly felt and 
have given the Council reform increasingly vocal expression that the current standing of 
the United Nations in general, and the Security Council in particular, does actually 
exacerbate the exclusion conundrum within the organisation. The Chapter underscores 
that African nations calling for reform points to their worsening security conditions 
which is evidenced in the 70% of the cases treated by the Council annually, being 
Africans. In the event of remote causes for African exclusion, it was understood that 
majority of African nations were not part of the UN in 1945. It was explained also that 
Africa was not a stakeholder at the time of the UN formation, the thoughts that the 
League was not a success story and that the UN may be a repeat does serve as a pillar a 
problem with African actors in the exclusion saga. However, the contemplations of 
continued exclusion, post 1960s, that is the immediate causes for African marginalisation 
hinges mainly on the United States of America’s intentions to locka vulnerable Africa 
where the US can achieve maximum pecuniary profits. In short, the exclusion has 
processed both political and economic dislocations in Africa.The next chapter, Chapter 
Five, considers the capabilities of African states to serve in the Council using various 









Africa: the construal of regional and global peace and security 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion 
from the permanent seat which in part frames the epistemic contours of this study. It was 
noted that African exclusion was due to colonial perfidy and protection of contemporary 
interests of the privileged P5 members. The reasons for the formation of the Council 
capture the dialectics of realpolitik and prescribe mechanisms for sustaining the status 
quo – attributes that underscore Security Council’s relevance to the world.  
This chapter presents an overview conflicts and African actors presence in Africa. The 
Chapter locates the contemporary propensities in conflict and armed violence in Africa 
and elsewhere. It is noted that, it is a complex enterprise, especially, as it prevails on the 
United Nations Security Council profligacy. It however, excavated the economic, 
technological, military and political underpinnings that play roles to either encourage or 
inhibit global actors. As a measure to determine capabilities, it weighs top five African 
states securitisation competences and underscores that, while it is independently, 
daunting to gauge Africa’s suitability to occupy a permanent seat, it is fashionable to 
include Africa in the permanent range.57 Official documents such as the Human Security 
Report (HSR) (2013) was utilised to highlights that number of conflicts within states. 
As agreed to in chapter two, this chapter recognises: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, 
and South Africa as the Big Five in African affairs. The analysis draws from the views of 
United Nations Official’s response to our interview questions, the African Union 
representative’s response to our interview questions, and various data providers – the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), the reports from the Global Burden of Armed 
Violence (GBAV), the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, the Political Instability Task 
                                                          
57Interviews with the UN Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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Force (PITF), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) and the 
National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START ). 
Based on this premise, this chapter highlights the centrality of conflicts, wars, and 
capability to manage them. Specifically, it discusses the implications of Africa’s conflict 
in Africa and the consequent rise of terrorist groups. The tortuousness of the war and 
conflicts in Africa derived from various sources are considered thinking whether the 
result would have been same if African state is a permanent member. Finally, using 
specific interventions, as example, this chapter, in its explication of the conflicts in Africa 
weighs Africa’s fitness to take a leading role in providing security for Africa. In order to 
conceretise debate, sections 5.7, 5.7.1, 5.7.2, and 5.7.3 were used as specific sample of an 
African state’s roles. 
5.2. Violence and death in Africa: the implications of Security Council 
Permanent seat 
As noted earlier, the Africa is plagued with serious conflict pathologies despite its being 
naturally endowed. According to Cillier (2014: 2), in at least 58 countries that exhibit 
violent death rates above 10.0 per 100 000, Africa, accounts for almost two-thirds of all 
violent deaths – or 285 000 individuals killed annually. About five years ago, particularly 
since 2009 and 2010, Africa has experienced increased in armed conflict within the 
continent. This is a period jaggedly overlapping with the prodigious global recession and 
the later years of the War on Terror, during which armed conflict has, in particular, 
spread to Africa. According to the UN Official58 “the waning heights of interstate war 
and the fact that most armed conflicts today are fought within, rather than between states 
is a major cause of the declining levels of fatalities and causalities of war in the 
continent”. This signaled that civil wars in Africa are seemingly sure to stay. The wars 
will in turn tear apart the affected population as did Libya since 2011. And the issue of 
security importance here is why there are no civil wars in the P5 states, and Africa is 
                                                          
58Interviews with the UN Official which focusses on Africa’s regional and global security roles, was 
conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. This respondent strongly recommended the works of 
Jackie Cilliers in the field area as relevant document to understanding the roles and/or intended roles which 
this researcher adhered to and utilised. 
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regularly at war with self. In order to verify this point, an interviewee raised the question: 
“why is it that civil conflict continues in Africa while other parts of the world are 
relatively peaceful?”59 Questions such as this foreground the role of some of the P5 
nations in the Africa’s civil conflicts. 
However, one of the interviewees60 “underscores that the customary mode of 
governments’ leadership and combating insurrectionaries has given way to a multifarious 
tapestry within which rebel movements rise and fight against the state. In stressing the 
point, it was said that the government in Africa may be weak in combating insurrections 
and terrorism but no permanent voice in the Security Council is partly responsible for 
it.”61 One way to determine this trend is to turn to the measurement of the number of 
armed groupings involved in conflicts, or so-called ‘conflict dyads’ as casted by Jakkie 
Cilliers of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS). In her work, Africa’s Conflict Burden 
in a Global Context combining data from two Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
datasets, and plotting the number of dyads against the number of armed conflicts globally 
and in Africa, she found that the number of dyads slowly outpaces the number of 
conflicts over time despite the restrictive UCDP requirement that one of the two 
conflicting parties must be the government of a state. To be sure, Somalia and South 
Sudan, for example, have substantial proportion of conflict actors with local, regional and 
opportunistic goals that may fall into the neighboring borders. 
 
According to the AU Official62 and Cilliers (2014) the number of armed conflicts 
experienced in Africa in 1960s when African population was about 285 million compared 
to 1,1 billion in 2013, was on the increase because Africa currently does not have a 
permanent security actor. Cilliers (2014) argues that the increase and its complexion have 
direct bearings to some of the P5 members. Impliedly, she counted that more recently; 
external involvement in Africa’s internal conflicts by the P5 members is evidenced by 
                                                          
59Interviews with the UN Official which focusses on Africa’s regional and global security roles, was 
conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. 
60Interviews with the UN Official which focusses on Africa’s regional and global security roles, was 
conducted on 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. 
61Interviews with the UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015 [E-interview]. 
62Interview with the AU Official on Africa’s regional and global security roles, was conducted on 25 May 
2015, JHB, South Africa. 
149 
 
events in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and the Central African Republic, during which French 
forces intervened (Cilliers, 2014: 8 – 9). This account can be married to that of combined 
efforts of Britain, France and US in Libya in 2011 through which Gaddafi can never be 
resurrected again (Ekwealor, 2013). 
 
As was in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, Africa’s fatality levels from different types of armed 
conflicts including that of the later phase of Congo War, also known as the Great War of 
Africa, which began in 1998, directly involved nine African countries and at least 20 
armed groups (Cilliers, 2015). Fatality statistics vary greatly between sources, but by 
2008, the war and its aftermath had resulted in between 2.4 and 5.4 million deaths, 
mostly from disease and starvation.  Further, the veteran Ugandan scholar, Professor Dan 
Wadada Nabudere famously described the Congo war as “Africa’s First World War” 
(Ekwealor, 2013: 42). Baregu (2002:33) opines that the war was all “about high 
international politics as opposed to low domestic politics (democratisation, human rights, 
ethnicity, etc.)”. He adds that it was first and foremost, an imperialist war and like all 
imperialist wars in modern history, it was about the distribution of wealth and power.  
 
Both Amuwo (2009) and Baregu (2002) note that the United States of America, a 
permanent member of the Security Council is the main beneficiary of the conflict in the 
Congo based on the fact that its armaments industry was a foremost supplier to the 
country and warring factions including the militias involved in the war. While this 
account endorses the position of the UN Official that the P5 in its current form is not a 
safe net for Africa and that the reform is urgent to halt conflict in Africa, Baregu (2002:3) 
further observes that behind the pro-democracy pro-growth grandiloquence of the P5 
states, the less publicised role of the US in Africa has been its steady supply of arms, 
ammunitions and military training – all stoking the fires of armed conflicts in the Congo 
and elsewhere on the continent. See table 5.1 below as adapted from Heidelberg Institute 
for International Conflict Research (HIICR) at the Department of Political Science, 






Table 5.1 - Overview: UN Missions led or supported by Department of Peace 
Keeping Operations (DPKO) from 1948 till 2008 
Mission Acronym Name of Mission   Start  Country 
Europe     
UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia    1993 Georgia 
UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus   1964 Cyprus 
UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 1999 Serbia 
Sub-Saharan Africa    
BINUB UN Integrated Office in Burundi 2007 Burundi 
MONUC UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1999 Congo (Kinshasa) 
UNMIS UN Mission in the Sudan     2005 Sudan 
UNAMIS AU/UN  Hybrid operation in Darfur 2007 Sudan 
UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea 2000 Ethiopia, Eritrea 
UNOCI UN Operation in Cote d’Ivoire 2004 Cote d’Ivoire  
 MINURCAT UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad 2007 Chad 
 UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia 2003 Liberia 
UNIOSIL UN Mission Integrated Office in Sierra Leone 2006 Sierra Leone 
 UNIPSIL UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone 2008 Sierra Leone 
 AMISOM African  Union Mission to Somalia 2007 Somalia 
The Americas    
MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 2004 Haiti 
Asia and Oceania    
UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 1949 India, Pakistan 
UNMIT UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste 2006 Timor-Leste 
Middle East & Maghreb    
UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon 1978 Lebanon 
 UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 2002 Afghanistan 
 MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 1991 Morocco 
 UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization 1948 Israel 
UNDOF UN Disengagement Observer Force 1974 Syria, Israel 
Source: Adapted from the United Nations Intervention log book (http://www.un.org). 
 
Having seen that twenty-two UN peace mission led or supported by the DPKO globally is 
enormous, twelve of those (that is, more than half) are on the soil of Africa (HIICR, 
2008: 10). This observation also features prominently in narratives on the Africa’s 
conflict dyad. For example, several chapters in Cilliers’ (2014) compendium illustrate the 
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fact that each (PKO) had its own interest(s) or agenda(s) besides those advanced publicly 
or in official briefings. Thus, it is important therefore to note that the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda, which recorded about 500 000 deaths, and the 1996 DRC conflict are instances 
of UN Security Council P5’s business of interest. While the AU Official63 corroborates 
Cilliers account, that, the sharp peaks in Africa in battle-related fatalities in 1989/1990 
and again 1999/2000 are largely the result of the Ethiopian civil war, the AU Official is 
adamant that those wars are indicators of lack of ‘real’ authority — UN Security Council 
Permanent seat — in  the continent. The AU Official confirms Cilliers account that the 
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea over the town of Badme was a war against dissident 
and armed opposition groups against each other which actually broadened the scale of 
human deaths as part of a proxy war within the axis of the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia is 
currently on upward step towards a status of important regional actor. And equipping 
Eritrea with munitions by the manufacturer of munitions from the P5 will make that 
journey very far and unyielding. Veto power to an African state can serve a deterrent to 
such trading arrangements that stoke conflict in Africa. This assertion is mindful of the 
possibility of an African state aligning itself with either Western or Eastern members of 
P5. But what is certain, is that whoever gets its alliance must lobby for it. Currently, no 
one lobbies for Africa’s per se, Africa is told what actions to take. 
 
Other peaks in battle-related deaths still on African soil is in Angola, the war between the 
People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (1993) and the actions of the Cobra militias in the DRC in 1997, 
on top of sustained conflict in Sudan as the war between the government in Khartoum 
and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army escalated. This brawl saw the 
division of Sudan after the signing of the Naivasha peace agreement in 2005, followed by 
the secession referendum in South Sudan in 2011 and South Sudan’s independence, only 
for war in South Sudan to resume in 2014 among externally funded opposing factions in 
the ruling party that both broke and dislocated the political compass of the South Sudan 
political determination. 
                                                          
63 The view of the African Union Official in this interview is that Africa as a region, needs to present the 
world with one candidate for the permanent seat, and “when this is done, Africa will determine the tone of 
whatever debate that may follow” 25 May 2015, JHB South Africa. 
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5.2.1. The scale and nature of conflicts in Africa 
An important characteristic of armed conflict in Africa, which distinguishes it from other 
regions globally, is the consistent high levels of so-called non-state conflict and its 
associated fatalities (Cilliers, 2014). Reading and interpreting the works of Virgil 
Hawkins’ Measuring United Nations Security Action and Inaction in the 1990s: Lessons 
for Africa, it is evident from the intensity of conflicts in Africa especially, from 1991 to 
1993 and from 1998 to 2004 as also implied by Cilliers (2014) that Africa as a car needs 
mudguard for global conflict — the permanent seat with veto. While Cilliers holds that 
the most likely explanation for this particularly African phenomenon is the absence of 
effective state control over national territory, Hawkins (2003) and AU Official64were of 
the convictions that the political jockeying within the Council strata is the major 
militating force against Africa’s peace and security.  
 
The UN65 and UPEACE66 Officials and Cilliers (2014) argue that African exclusion from 
the Council per se, does not stop the region from the proprietorship of own and global 
securitisation scopes, the duo separately lay emphasis on weak governance and 
ineffective security agencies in Africa that are unable to ensure stability across the 
continent. Cilliers (2014) specifically, maintains that poor infrastructure and difficult 
politico cum economic terrains are the most likely explanations for Africa’s invisible 
security roles regionally or globally. Also, the African leaders’ inability to untie the 
colonial demarcated boundaries that do not necessarily correspond with forms of loyalties 
on the ground since independence is a significant factor driving Africa’s muted security 
roles. When boundaries and loyalties are properly harnessed, the AU Official judged that 
“Nigeria for example, will be able to lead the Economic Community of West African 
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) into most at-risk-of-death African states such as 
                                                          
64Interview with the AU Official on Africa’s regional and global security roles, 25 May 2015, JHB, South 
Africa. 
65Interview with the UN Official on Africa’s regional and global security roles, 25 May 2015, JHB, South 
Africa. 




Somalia, South Sudan and the DRC.”67 The AU Official is convinced that “Nigeria’s 
experiences and success stories in Liberia and Sierra Leone respectively coupled with 
new Ethiopian enthusiasm in regional and global security operations with the backing of 
other African states can combat and defeat any insurgency and douse uprisings in the 
region through military might.”68 
 
5.2.2. The emergence and rise of terrorism in Africa: the next burden 
Meanings of terrorism have continuously stayed contentious, particularly in Africa, 
where certain so-called terrorist movements later became anti-captivity crusaders. Africa 
has not had a hold on confiscating terrorist programmes and agenda in the continent 
neither has the global community. But the United Nations Security Council has ignored 
developing modalities on how to deal with terrorism in Africa as opposed to other 
terrorist attacked nations. According to the Russia Today (RT), terrorists such as the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in November/December 2015 attacked countries 
such as France, Lebanon, United Sates of America, Syria, Nigeria, to mention a few. But 
the Security Council convened to discuss only the Paris attack. Those that occurred in 
Nigeria and Lebanon did not receive any attention per se. 
However, global interest as well as African entrapment within the fight against terrorism 
cannot be contained without halting the importation of military hardware. The halt in the 
sales of arms to terrorist groups is a statement that a permanent member can make. 
Africa’s current mode of addressing the terrorist group such as the Boko Haram in 
founded in what the AU Official called “African solution to non-African problems.”69 In 
the view of the AU respondent, terrorism became global as well as African problems 
since it was rekindled by the 9/11 attacks in the US and the subsequent development of 
                                                          
67Interview with the AU Official on Africa’s regional and global security, is African exclusion from the 
permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally?  25 May 
2015, JHB, South Africa. 
68Interview with the AU Official, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. 
69Interview with the AU Official on Africa’s regional and global security, is African exclusion from the 
permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally?  25 May 
2015, JHB, South Africa. 
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what some consider a global jihadist movement composed of groups affiliated with or 
inspired by al-Qaeda (Cilliers, 2015). The AU Official recorded with concern that the 
current insurgency around the globe whether Al Shabaab or Boko Haram, sprang as the 
aftermath of the provocative combined invasion of Iraq by US and Britain. The 
respondent maintains that these terror groups have fixed interest as a common 
denominator. The respondent is adamant that even ISIS are to some extent, the byproduct 
of the undue incursion into Iraq. “They are spillover effect of undermining national 
governments and lack of respect to the will of others by the US and allies”70 
 
According to Cilliers (2014) data, at the 11th Conference of the Committee of 
Intelligence and Security Services of Africa in Kenya, which brought together African 
heads of intelligence and security services from 51 countries, the special representative of 
the chairperson of the African Union Commission for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, 
Francisco Madeira, quoted in Cilliers, advises the politicians to create jobs, give counter 
narratives to these groups, share intelligence in time, create laws that can help and 
allocate enough resources to address the menace. Madeira noted that although al-Shabaab 
represented the greatest threat in East Africa and Boko Haram in West Africa, the entire 
continent was threatened by the increasing influence of al-Qaeda and other radical groups 
in Iraq and Syria.  The challenge is that the War on Terror is exploited by governing 
elites and their security apparatuses to strengthen their coercive abilities, and that 
governments crack down on legitimate opposition by labelling them ‘terrorists’ (Cilliers, 
2014: 12). It is important to note that accounts which do not represent act or terrorism are 
also labeled so by the P5 states to allow intervention and simultaneous exploitation of the 
invaded land. Libya was invaded in 2011 through the UN Security Council Resolution 
1973, today, the North African economic and political power house, is a haven for all 
sorts of terrorist activities and as a state, it is very close to being declared a failed one. 
This account, indeed explains the claims that Africa’s exclusion from the P5 has 
neutralise its ability to keep peace and order regionally and globally. The AU had a 
                                                          
70Interview with the AU Official on Africa’s regional and global security, is African exclusion from the 
permanent seat and veto power impeding its ability to command peace regionally and globally?  25 May 
2015, JHB, South Africa. 
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collaborative plan on Libya, the only instrument that would have allowed its plan was a 
veto power. 
 
Despite the 2011 Libya reality, the incidents of armed conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, the 
ongoing conflicts in Central African Republic, the South Sudan, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, suggests that armed conflict in Africa follows the general pattern of voiceless 
African states and ‘voiceful’ P5 states on African soils. This is so, because in all of these 
conflicts, at least a permanent member is interested in the conflict, thereby sustaining it 
traditionally against the government and in favour of the ‘opposition’ or the rebel. The 
impact of the Cold War, to which Africa was no active role player,  for example 
continued to disrupt peace pattern in the continent, leading to higher levels of armed 
violence than would have been expected from the 1970s and 1980s (Cilliers, 2014). 
Recent trends of politics of exclusion and inclusion point to another increase in armed 
violence from around 2010, potentially indicating that, conflict in Africa rose much faster 
than the global average prior to 1989. According to the AU Official, “the issue with 
African equipment with veto strength is that the levels of armed conflict in Africa are 
quite sensitive to global developments.”71 Cilliers who corroborated this view added that, 
this is possibly because of the marginal position that Africa occupies politically and 
economically globally, and also the possible multiplier effect that limited governance has 
in many African countries (Cilliers, 2014: 15). 
 
When the UN Official was drawn to specifically untangle the disjuncture that exists in 
global conflict burden, the note is that “unlike other regions, Africa is burdened with a 
high level of so-called non-state conflict.”72 This type of conflict involves armed groups 
and factions that are fighting one another and not the state. Assuredly, Cilliers (2015) 
underscores that this is almost certainly due to weak, unconsolidated governance 
characteristic of many African countries. She continued that for several years, the War on 
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Terror enabled the impression that international terrorism, largely aimed at the US and its 
allies, but mostly affecting Muslim societies, presented a threat to all countries, despite 
the limited nature of the attacks and generally small number of fatalities suffered.  
 
There is a general view that the Middle East, and not Africa, is the region experiencing 
the fastest growth in terrorism. Cilliers informed that whether terrorism, intra-state war, 
or inter-state war, all precipitate conflict. Surely, once the dominant elite have established 
control in a given territory, and others recognise their legal right to rule, there are 
generally reduced levels of large-scale violence – although not always resulting in 
improvements in the livelihoods of the population is the view of Cilliers. However, in 
these variations, it becomes imperative to note, that the importance of African 
empowerment to combat own and global terrorism and other definitive conflicts is a step 
forward to genuinely addressing matters of international security. To be safe, the League 
of Nations and later the United Nations were established with a primary focus on 
reduction of wars between nations, the dominant type of instability at the time. The 
dominant trend of instability in Africa currently is an Africa with conflicts but does not 
play any significant role in ending conflicts within her own borders. 
 
Since the formation of the UN in 1945, the nature of conflicts have both gradually and 
drastically changed and internal armed conflicts now dominate both pie and component 
bar chats of global conflicts. And Africa is actually at the centre. As noted by Cilliers 
(2014), since interstate war – characterised by high-intensity battles between formally 
organised armed forces – is generally more deadly than civil war, the decline in war 
between countries since the middle of the 20th century has also led to a sharp decline in 
so-called battle deaths.  Today, armed political violence is still widespread, however. 
This manifests itself in various forms – from terrorism to efforts at violent secession and 






Increased competition for water, food, energy and land among Africa’s rapidly increasing 
population will increase local conflict over livelihoods. Again, this trend will be 
accentuated and may escalate into more widespread interstate conflicts in the near future 
starting with countries such as Libya, South Africa that do not have sufficient naturally 
engineered water within their own borders (BBC News, 2015). What is clearer is that, 
when the conflicts erupt, the affected local communities might not be able to 
compartmentalise the insecurity, thereby, requiring the support of the international 
communities, especially the Security Council. This is another fundamental reason why 
Africa’s exclusion from the Council is still a big thorn on Africa’s blood system. In this 
forecasted time of trial, Africa needs a veto power to manage the anticipated undue 
incursion by the current P5 states during trying time. The question however, is who will 
stand in the permanent position for Africa? To this end, we will engage the views of UN 
Officials, the AU Officials, and the global data sets on Africa’s top five actors as listed in 
chapter two.73 
5.3. Top Five African states 
In a milieu in which Africa both aspires and is expected to take on more responsibilities 
for expansion, peace and security on the continent and globally, the question of who will 
bail the cat is at the heart of post-colonial Africa. Save to say, Africa has been peripheral 
in all things and pusillanimity to international relations that have tended to focus on P5 or 
the other influential western states that spin the agenda wheel in the circle of global 
governance. While the AU Official is adamant that “Africa is reclaiming its rightful 
podium at the global altar of governance”,74 Cilliers et al (2015) can only agree that the 
more recent popular ‘Africa rising’ narrative is superficial, and so far only South Africa 
and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria and Egypt have attracted the attention of scholars and 
analysts as potential middle or emerging powers.  
 
                                                          
73 The idea here is to determine whether any of the states listed is eligible to stand in for Africa. The 
analysis is not aimed at comparing African states with a view to single out the best. 
74Interview with the AU Official, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. 
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The UN Official who narrates that Nigeria’s stability can change Africa’s course 
globally, hinted that, “withholding of permanent seat from Africa, will continue to 
exacerbate the instability in the region, Africa’s potential trajectory, provides that a 
colonial legacies, post-independence politics and foreign interference that have combined 
to render the region perennially tempestuous will be regularly challenged.”75 Concurring 
with the UN representative, Cilliers et al (2015) affirm that “changes in the global 
distribution of power [especially within the Council], however, will influence Africa’s 
ability to project power, and its capacity for informal and formal alliance building – both 
continentally and globally” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 1-2). They continued that the Big Five 
powerhouses of Africa – Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa (in 
alphabetical order) will unavoidably contour the future of the continent because of their 
demographic, economic and military size, as well as their historical role as regional 
leaderships. Jointly, these states account for “40% of Africa’s population, 60% of the 
African economy and 58% of Africa’s military expenditure” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 2).  
5.3.1. Perceptions of clout among Africa’s Big Five 
Forecasting the distribution of relative national power across time requires a platform that 
formally represents variables from a wide range of key development systems and 
interactions. Despite the fact that a fundamental variable in comprehending nation’s 
comportment, gauging its power, and determining its current state and future potentials 
are hugely contested, there are perceptions among scholars of economics and politics that 
Africa’s Ethiopia and Nigeria are on the regional and global power rise. The contestations 
among academics and analysts concerns the components that should be used when 
calculating power capabilities and how those components can be totaled into a single 
measure of power (Cilliers et al, 2015). After World War II, the UN Official notes that 
the focus on determining global power parity was generally on quantifying the balance of 
power held among the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the US and various 
European states. More recently the focus has been the ongoing transition of power 
                                                          
75Interview with the UN Official on Africa’s [Nigeria’s] candidacy to the United Nations Security Council 
permanent seat, 25 May 2015, JHB, South Africa. 
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between the US and China. Africa has in both regards, been at the margins of such 
debates. 
However, early measures of self-styled ‘hard power’ notions which are near absent on the 
African soil tended to emphasise only three principal components of power capability, 
that is, economic, demographic and military forte (Cilliers et al, 2015). Many other 
components of power have, however, subsequently been considered in an effort to refine 
the original broad measures. These include measures of wealth, trade, aid and investment 
flows, measures of technological capabilities, government capacity and human capital. 
Efforts to measure and forecast state power rely on indicators of the general strength and 
ability of a country to exert influence rather than on any particular outcome of state 
action. Therefore, measures of power focus on potential, which is tied to a generalised 
understanding of outcomes. Using the Hillebrand-Herman-Moyer Index (HHMI), a 
modification and expansion of the Hillebrand-Herman Index (HHI), which was created 
by Evan Hillebrand and Paul Herman with support from Barry Hughes at the University 
of Denver, Cilliers et al (2015) weighed the top five African states.  
 
Cilliers et al (2015) who conducted the study takes international flairs and diplomatic 
networks, and military spending into the analysis. In this fashion, the study relies 
extensively on the Base Case forecast in the International Futures forecasting system 
(IFs) to set out expected future developments with a time horizon of 2040 with a view to 
providing grounds for suggesting that, these top five African states is fit to become a 
permanent member of the Council with veto. IFs is a large-scale, long-term highly 
integrated modelling software system housed at the Frederick S Pardee Center for 
International Futures at the University of Denver. The measures referred to above is 
actually contextualised for Africa. On the continent, state formation and consolidation are 
ongoing processes. Many capabilities are inwardly focused and national processes for 
converting capabilities into power projection are constrained. This process of 
consolidating state capacity may be one helpful way to understand why African states’ 
ability to express power externally may be limited by domestic instability and other 
governance deficits (Cilliers et al, 2015: 3). 
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5.3.2. The economy of Africa’s top five 
Accounts available on Africa’s economic rooting as presented by Cilliers et al (2015) 
hold that in 2014 only six African countries had economies with a GDP larger than $100 
billion (in real market exchange rates): 
1. Nigeria ($536 billion) 
2. South Africa ($454 billion) 
3. Egypt ($263 billion) 
4. Algeria ($233 billion) 
5. Angola ($126 billion) 
6. Morocco ($116 billion) 
Even though, Ethiopia is among Africa’s top five powers, it was the 11th largest 
economy in Africa, with a GDP of $43 billion. But, although Ethiopia’s GDP was 12 
times smaller than that of Nigeria in 2014, at the end of the forecast period in question it 
is estimated that Ethiopia will be the sixth largest economy in Africa and only eight times 
smaller than that of Nigeria. This reflects faster rates of convergence (Cilliers, et al, 
2015). 
 
Economic growth in Africa is driven by long-term investments in health, education, 
reductions in foreign-debt burdens, access to information-communication technology and 
improvements in governance. Although there have been general improvements in these 
variables and associated trends for the past 15 years, each of the Big Five has a unique 
economic-production profile. 
 
According to the IFs Base Case forecasts for the period 2015 to 2040 Ethiopia is 
expected to achieve the highest average growth rate of the Big Five – on average, almost 
2% faster than the 8.3% of Nigeria. Whereas Algeria, Egypt and South Africa are 
expected to grow below the African average rate of 6.3%, and roughly in line with the 
global average, Nigeria and Ethiopia are both expected to grow much faster. Nigeria, 
already the largest economy in Africa, and representing over 1.5% of the global 
economy, is forecast to represent nearly 3% of the global economy by 2040, close to the 
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economic output of Germany and greater than that of France in 2013 (Cilliers et al, 2015: 
14). 
5.3.3. International flairs and diplomatic engagements 
Some of the ways to determine states international relevance and presence is through the 
arrays of its diplomatic interactions. Such indicators are: the number of embassies a 
country has in the world; the number of memberships of international organisations, 
weighted by importance of these organisations; and, the number of treaties held by the 
UN secretary-general signed or ratified by a country, weighted by treaty importance. In 
this regard, Egypt has traditionally dominated this category of foreign-policy power 
projection, followed more recently by South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, and Ethiopia 
(Cilliers et al, 2015). The increase in the level of South Africa’s diplomatic engagement 
after the end of apartheid clearly illustrated the country’s successful reintegration into 
international affairs over the last 20 years. In brief, Egypt is the African country with the 
most embassies abroad with 125 embassies in foreign countries in 2014. While we have 
underscored in chapter two that Egypt’s strategic location, and its important role in Arab 
and African nationalism have ensured that this country is deeply connected 
internationally, it is not surprising that Egypt is therefore the African country with the 
most foreign embassies – and has remained so even after the surge in interest and 
activism by South Africa since the end of apartheid in 1994.  
5.3.4. Military spending 
The size and quality of a country’s military force is a traditional indicator for measuring 
national power. The Big Five’s military capabilities since 1960 as a percentage of total 
military expenditure in Africa and shows the forecast through to 2040. Bearing in mind 
that the UN Security Council’s P5 are states with big spending on military projects it 
becomes imperative to weigh military expenditure among Africa’s top five. While the 
study does not compare Africa against the P5 states, absolute military expenditures for 
Algeria and Nigeria have increased modestly in recent years, whereas for Egypt, Ethiopia 
and South Africa have remained relatively flat. Algeria and Egypt have had to contend 
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with the fallout of the Arab Spring in North Africa, which culminated in the overthrow of 
the dictatorial regime of Mubarak and the Muslim fundamentalist rule of Mohamed 
Morsy – only for the military to later reassert its influence with El-Sisi’s appointment as 
president. After NATO’s intervention in Libya and the death of Gaddafi in October 2011, 
the arms that flowed in and out of Libya have fuelled regional instability. North Africa 
has thus far only seen a stable, if tenuous, transition in one country – Tunisia – and 
instability affects Algeria’s security along its eastern, southern and western borders. 
 
At the same time that global oil and gas prices have fallen sharply, reducing its revenues, 
Nigeria has been caught in an intensifying five-year insurgency with Boko Haram in its 
north-east, which, by the end of 2014, had displaced 1.5 million and resulted in the deaths 
of more than 10 000 people in 2014 alone (Mark, 2015).  Part of a regional challenge, 
Boko Haram is also active in Chad, Niger and Cameroon and has recently pledged 
allegiance to the Islamic State. For its part, and beyond its various internal challenges, 
Ethiopia has a frozen conflict with Eritrea, insurgency in Somalia and war in 
neighbouring Sudan/South Sudan to contend with in the region. Since the end of 
apartheid, South Africa is the only country in the group at peace with its region, which is 
reflected in the dramatic decline in defence expenditure since 1994. In 2013, the latest 
year for which the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute published data, 
Algeria accounted for 17% of Africa’s total military expenditure and has, since 2008, had 
the largest military expenditure in Africa (Cilliers et al, 2015). Algeria’s military 
expenditure has grown at 11% per annum since 1988.  
 
In 2014 Nigeria’s military budget increased substantially with an additional $1 billion 
allocated to the military in response to the growing threat of Boko Haram. This has 
pushed Nigeria into the same league as Egypt in terms of its annual military budget but it 
is still significantly below that of Algeria or Angola. Aside the account that suggests that 
an African top five, Nigeria, can saddle with the veto power of the Council for Africa, an 
ISS policy paper in South African Defence Review (Cilliers, 2014b) commented on the 
mismatch between ambition and capacity among Africa’s top five, and noted that Africa 
remains reliant on European and US force enablers, such as strategic and tactical airlift to 
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function. In that study, the potential locomotives of Africa’s development and stability – 
countries such as Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria, and Egypt – do not have commensurate 
military capacity, to match their foreign-policy ambitions. The study relates that the need 
for France, the UK, and to a lesser extent the US (and the UN) to militarily intervene in 
Africa reflects the constrained conflict-management capacity available on the continent. 
However, despite this record, the AU Official76 is adamant that “Africa has been able to 
return peace in certain trouble spots in Africa; and that the continent does not necessarily 
need out-of-ordinary military expenditure to resolve conflicts in the region.” The 
respondent related that “Nigeria almost single-handedly returned Liberia and Sierra 
Leone to peace even without big military expenditure; holding that Africa needs 
commitments to any course including fighting against externally dominated 
interventions.”77 
5.4. The power panel of Africa’s five states 
Indeed, Nigeria is the country with the largest economic and power potential on the 
continent. However, it faces different challenges like the other countries of the Big Five – 
although it shares a common history with Ethiopia, Egypt and Algeria, having 
experienced 33 years of military rule since independence in 1960. According to the AU 
Official78 and Cilliers et al (2015) the Nigerian economy is dominated by its hydrocarbon 
sector, which suppresses the development of other economic sectors, manufacturing in 
particular, by increasing the relative value of its currency, the naira. Despite the recent 
diversification of the economy, with new sectors contributing to the country’s GDP, 90% 
of Nigeria’s export revenue still comes from oil (Financial Times, 2014).  To a large 
extent, the increase in Africa’s role globally will be driven by the future weight of 
Nigeria. Politics in Nigeria are particularly complex with many ethnic, religious and 
social fault lines across society. Also, a deeply entrenched low level of government 
efficiency equally pulls Nigeria backwards against its bid to quickly emerge as a global 
power. Even when it ranked the happiest nation on earth in 2011, Transparency 
                                                          
76 Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
77Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
78Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
164 
 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranked Nigeria lowest of the Big Five, at 
136 out of 175 countries in the survey (Cilliers et al, 2015). 
 
However, despite the shortcomings Cilliers et al (2015: 7) assert that “in terms of 
economic potential, no African country can compete with Nigeria.” Further the 
interpretation of the International Futures (IFs) data and model in forecasting countries 
future powers, Nigeria’s GDP is forecast to grow from slightly “over $525 billion in 2014 
to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 7). By 2040 the IFs Base Case 
forecast is that Nigeria will constitute slightly less than 2% of the global economy, up 
from 0.7% in 2014. To this end, the authors advised that “to a large extent, the increase in 
Africa’s role globally will therefore be driven by the future weight of Nigeria – a country 
that by 2040 will have the fourth largest population in the world after India, China and 
the US” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 7). Despite these positive samplings, change in Nigeria’s 
political culture of violence which former President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan has 
terminated by accepting defeat as an incumbent president in the 2015 presidential 
election in Nigeria must continue to influence political decision in Nigeria. This is a 
country that has been enmeshed in continual internal wars – the most recent against Boko 
Haram in the north-east. The change in political culture of Nigeria is necessary to 
effectively align and nurture its foreign policy, stand its preeminence in role it plays in 
West Africa, and more specifically ECOWAS, and that of the African Union and the 
United Nations. 
 
Having seen that Nigeria is shortlisted to manifestly top the Big Five African states by 
2040, it becomes important to warn Nigeria to embark on overall good governance. The 
UN Official79 holds that Africa’s overall success is tied to the success of Nigeria as a 
nation. In fact, a commissioned study by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2013 
found that when Nigeria is liberated from colonial dependency Africa shall become an 
independent continent. The study also notes that Africa and the Middle East are likely to 
retain their unenviable position as the two regions with the highest conflict burden 
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globally for the foreseeable future. This does not only points to the continued need for 
Africa to wake from slumber but also to invest in conflict prevention, security-sector 
reform, the rule of law and regional forces, by not only striving towards becoming a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council but also ensuring good governance in 
Nigeria. As noted in chapter two, currently, nine of the sixteen global peacekeeping 
operations are sited in Africa and it is reasonable to expect that the continent will remain 
the largest domain for international peace operations in both long and medium terms 
unless Africa says no, that, enough is enough (Cilliers et al, 2015). Traditionally, under 
the current configuration of the UN Security Council, Africa’s interest is not protected, 
and it can only be catered for when it is able to seat as a veto power and negotiate bends 
with that power.  
5.5. Africa in the world: the cries or the actions? 
The state-based configuration of the global arrangement has always been in fluidity with 
countries – and regions – gaining and losing power over time. Since the 1940s especially 
from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War on December 8, 1991, the world experienced a 
bipolar distribution of state power between two P5 states (Russia and US). The end of the 
Cold War brought about an ostensible unipolar moment that was devoid of Africa which 
may now be changing towards another bipolar moment because of the shifting power 
between West and East, and more specifically the importance of the US and China 
(Cilliers et al, 2015). As for Africa in the world, some scholars have focused only on the 
rise of China, whereas others have emphasised that the world is moving towards a greater 
degree of multipolarity before the mid-century, with potentially four great powers, China, 
India, the European Union and the US, and to a lesser extent Africa (with a combined 
resources) (Cilliers et al 2015). 
 
The US National Intelligence Council’s report ‘Global trends 2030: Alternative worlds’ 
notes that one of the four most important megatrends globally is the diffusion of power, 
which is happening both across states (from West to East, in particular), and from states 
to networks, non-state actors and other international regimes the United Nations being 
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one of them (Cilliers et al, 2015). The UN Official80 indicated that global realignment of 
power is based on necessary might – political, economic and social. For example, China 
has risen and its economy was recently re-estimated to be larger than that of the US in 
purchasing-parity terms. In this regard, China is today a global power and is not missing 
in the global power mix. Nigeria is expected to rise, but it is not currently doing it greatly, 
the respondent observed. 
 
Against this backdrop, and within this broader mix of global power redistribution, Africa 
remains fundamentally at the sidelines. Following a study conducted by Cilliers et al 
(2015), “the total size of the African economy is expected to increase by 29% from $5.3 
trillion to $18 trillion, but by 2040 its share of the global economy will only increase 
from 5.1% to 7.2%” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 3). On the other hand, the study further shows 
that Africa’s demographic share is growing rapidly. The authors continued that in 2014 
the total African population was estimated at 1.1 billion people, or 15.6% of the global 
population. However, “by 2040 Africa is expected to have a population of 2.0 billion 
people, constituting 21.8% of the global population. To put this figure into perspective, 
by 2040 Africa’s population will have increased by 820 million people” (Cilliers et al, 
2015: 4). This is more than the total current population of the European Union (over 500 
million people – a figure that will remain largely unchanged to 2040). In the absence of 
an agricultural revolution that could exploit the massive potential of the associated 
workforce, Africa will remain largely dependent on food imports to feed its developing 
population. While this view is untainted, there are other studies that actually suggest that 
Africa will also grow economically to support its growing population. For instance, the 
study conducted by the World Bank and appropriated by the Eritrean Economist, Africa, 
especially the Sub-Saharan African region will increase productivity with 4.5% in 2015, 
just below Asia and Australasia that has 5.7% and will be better than any other continent 
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Figure 5.1 - Forecast of Global Economic increase by 2015 - 2017 
 
 
Source: Eritrea’s 2015 – 2017 Economic Outlook, According to the World Bank data 
 
Using military strength, economic abilities, and political and technological muscles, 
Cilliers et al, who have a different study on the Africa’s possible power underscore that 
the global measure of power in 2015, particularly the combined power of Africa 
represents close to 9% of global power (Cilliers et al, 2015). This percentage compares 
with about 5% in 1962, when the process of decolonisation was in full swing (and many 
African states bath themselves in the pool of independence from colonial strangle-hold). 
To be sure, it is not very clear how the US will exceed its current mark in 2040, but 
China and Africa might continue to diversify and increase. Currently, China and the US 
represent about 12% and 18% of global power, respectively. Cilliers et al note that in 
2015, the combined relative power of Africa is larger than that of Japan, Russia or India 
but less than that of the US, China or the European Union (EU). As for the future, the 
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total relative power of Africa is likely to surpass that of the declining EU and US by 2040 
(Cilliers at al, 2015: 4). This is important indicator for developing modalities that will 
ensure and secure Africa’s security features to be able to maintain the progress that could 
be achieved in 2040.  
 
Although the combined capabilities of Africa’s 54 countries total about 9% of global 
power today and are forecast to rise to over 11% by 2040, Africa is obviously neither a 
sovereign country (but composed of 54 sovereign countries) nor a union of states with 
any kind of supranational provisions as obtained within the EU political orbit. And even 
with a great expansion of regional and continental integration, the AU Official81 relayed 
that “the expression of a unified African foreign policy is experimented to be highly 
unlikely, but major and key integrations can occur.” This in part explains why Cilliers et 
al recorded in their study that, “with the potential exception of Nigeria, African countries 
will remain what have been termed ‘minor powers’ and this has implications on how 
Africa will influence issues of global governance, including the Security Council reform 
agenda” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 6). 
 
Despite the findings by Cilliers et al, the UN Official82 argues that African states will 
nevertheless continue to gain greater agency in terms of shaping their own future in a 
complex and interconnected world. Like other commentators in the field, the respondent 
notes that there exist mechanical limitations on African governments’ bargaining power. 
The respondent argues that “it is pertinent that African countries in their individual and 
collective capacities become increasingly active, assertive and confident players on the 
world stage, influencing international negotiations in areas ranging from multilateral 
trade to climate change not only in the Security Council reform.”83 
 
While there are suggestions and implied cases for strong economic and political 
integration complemented by much more rapid and sustained economic growth in Africa 
to offset its limited role in shaping global governance, Africa must harness its resources 
                                                          
81Interview with the AU Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
82Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
83Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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and secure its borders in order to be able to reap any of the forecasted projections. Surely, 
Africa is the next regional emerging market after India, and manufacturing and services 
are expected to expand rapidly in the continent – although much of this growth will 
initially be at the lower end of the value-add curve (albeit higher than the current value 
derived from commodity exports) (Cilliers et al, 2015). Manufacturing growth will 
continue to gravitate towards the free-trade region that has the lowest cost of labour and 
greatest domestic stability in the continent. This will however, increasingly include sub-
Saharan Africa. The AU Official84 believes that “one potentially major determinant of 
higher future growth rates will be the political and economic integration of current 
markets – the creation of regional economic communities with common currencies, 
freedom of movement of labour and capital across borders, and common import and 
export tariffs on African goods and services within Africa.” 
 
As noted in Chapter two, one of the strengths of Nigeria is the population evolution that 
could also act as an important driver of economic growth. Also, the works of Cilliers et al 
(2011) on African Futures 2050 – the next forty years, documented some demographic 
growth in West and East Africa, where population sizes will expand more rapidly than in 
northern and southern Africa. According to the Cilliers et al (2011) account, Central 
Africa will also experience large increases in population, but from a much lower base. It 
is expected that the populations of northern and southern Africa will have income levels 
that are three to four times higher per person than in East and central Africa over the 
forecast horizon, and that West Africa will slowly catch up with the two richer regions 
(Cilliers et al, 2011). 
 
According to these authors (Cilliers et al 2015) who have been mapping Africa’s progress 
through current and future possibilities, the HHMI reflects the shifting balance of power 
in Africa since the end of the Cold War, with “West Africa consolidating its position as 
the most powerful region in Africa (largely due to the presence of heavyweight Nigeria), 
followed, as from 2021, by East Africa and a fairly stagnant southern Africa” (Cilliers, 
2015: 6). The relative decline of North Africa from its position as second most powerful 
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region in Africa until 2019 to last but one (ahead of Central Africa) by 2040 follows 
changes in relative population size and indeed, economic growth prospects, among 
others. In these estimations, and according to Global Economic Outlook (2015), Africa’s 
Nigeria is identified to perform better than the US, UK, Germany, Iran, Russia, 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Japan and will be on or almost par with China and India that will 
be above 6% on economic performances respectively. Applicable to note that all four 
permanent members including France that is not among the state graphed are dwindling, 
with exception to China that is billed above 6%. See figure 5.3 for details. 
 
Figure 5.2 – Global Gross Domestic Product of Top Eleven Countries from five 
continents of the World.  
 
Source: 2015 Global Economic Outlook, Data provided by the International Monetary 
Fund, Graphic by Bloomberg BusinessWeek. 
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5.6. The African Union Peace and Security Council: Measuring the 
fitness 
The UN Official, who responded to our questions, was of the opinion that “Nigeria and 
South Africa are two African states that need to put their acts together to make important 
comments in the current global politics. Their importance is woven into the facts that 
even the powerful nations – the US and EU — need the collaboration of [Nigeria and 
South Africa] to gain inroad and be able to operate efficiently in the region.”85 
 
This view in part provided for Cilliers et al (2015) account that two potential ways of 
assessing influence in the foreign-policy domain in the African context may be, firstly, to 
look at a country’s commitment to peacekeeping missions, and, secondly, its relevance 
and membership in the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) in particular and Africa 
in general. Given the heavy conflict burden Africa is facing and resolving, which in fact 
serve a sufficient ground for qualifying African states for claims of share of global 
security prowess. The numerous interventions in Africa by African states equally shows 
individual country’s commitment to contributing to peace and security as a regional or 
international public good as an important indicator of its leadership qualities, ambitions 
and influence.  
 
Actually, the personnel contribution of the Big Five to UN peacekeeping operations over 
a period of 10 years on average, accounted for about 19% of the total number of UN 
peacekeepers in 2012, considerably more than in early 2007, when they only contributed 
8% of total UN peacekeepers (Cilliers et al, 2015). Over the years, Nigeria was the 
leading contributor of troops to the UN peacekeeping mission but has been surpassed by 
Ethiopia since 2011 presumably following the Boko Haram terror in Nigeria. 
 
Algeria, despite being the country with the largest military expenditure in Africa by a 
considerable margin, has never contributed more than 20 military observers per month 
and on average around six. At the end of 2011 when Ethiopia became the largest African 
contributor to UN missions after overtaking Nigeria, three years later, Ethiopia was 
                                                          
85Interview with the UN Official 25 May 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. 
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contributing on average more than 7 800 troops, observers and police officers to UN 
missions – more than the combined total of the other four members of the Big Five 
(Cilliers et al, 2015). In December 2014, Ethiopia was not only the largest African 
contributor to UN missions but also the fourth largest globally, while Nigeria fell to 
occupy rank eight. 
 
With the exception of Algeria, which has always played a very limited role in UN 
peacekeeping, all the other Big Five countries rank above South Africa, which 
nevertheless is a consistent contributor to peacekeeping efforts. Egypt’s contribution to 
peacekeeping took two significant dips from July 2011 onwards when it was providing 5 
632 troops to UN missions. By August 2011 the number of Egyptian troops had fallen to 
4 126, thereafter continuing its decline to 2 585 in October 2014 (Cilliers et al, 2015). In 
December 2014, Egypt was the 10th largest contributor to UN peacekeeping globally and 
the sixth largest in Africa as domestic security concerns appeared to take priority. 
 
Further, in recent times, Nigeria has also witnessed a substantial decline in the number of 
troops deployed: from a high of 6 020 in August 2009 to 2 930 in December 2014. The 
quality of Nigeria’s contribution to international peacekeeping efforts has always been 
linked to when Nigeria played an active role in managing two civil conflicts in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone. However, Adebayo cited in Cilliers et al (2015: 22) notes that since 
then, “the quality of [Nigeria’s] soldiers has been questioned; its military and police 
contingents have often not been equipped to UN standards; and many of the country’s 
Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) have broken down in mission areas.” This has 
resulted in frequent complaints from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
damaging the country’s impressive peacekeeping record painstakingly built up over five 
decades. 
 
According to the AU Official86 the PSC was established at the heart of the AU’s African 
Peace and Security Architecture. In this fashion, countries are voted onto the PSC for two 
or three year terms based on broad-based criteria. The original intention was that more 
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powerful countries would be re-elected on the three-year ticket, effectively remaining 
indefinitely on the council. One of the reasons advanced in the ISS report of 2015 for 
Nigeria’s candidature to the UN Security Council is that, Nigeria has consistently served 
on the PSC since 2004 on behalf of Africa’s most powerful region – West Africa – an 
indicator of the country’s significant sub-regional and regional influence (Cilliers et al, 
2015). In all other regions, members of the Big Five have rotated the baton of AU safe-
keeping in the PSC in favour of regional contenders – itself a stimulating indicator of 
how the Big Five are each perceived in their respective regions within the parameters of 
security adventure. With its long history of destabilisation in the region, South Africa has 
therefore not served on the PSC in a similar consistent manner, whereas representation on 
behalf of North Africa, for example, has been shared among Algeria, Egypt and Libya. 
 
Further, using the HHMI, the power of Nigeria as well as other nations of the Big Five, 
the states will gradually improve by 2040. In Cillier et al (2015), “the African country 
with the greatest capabilities is by far Nigeria, which accounts for 0.9% of global power 
today, forecast to rise to 1.6% of global power by 2040” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 10). 
According to the data set presented by the authors, Nigeria is followed by Egypt, South 
Africa, Algeria and Ethiopia, which all remain below 0.7% of global power over the time 
horizon. In the same study, the authors note that if one looks at the relative distribution of 
power only in Africa, where the combined power of the continent’s 54 states comes to 
100%, “then by 2040 Nigeria is forecast to account for nearly one-fifth of the continent’s 
total capabilities followed by Angola with close to 10% (a country that is not among the 
top five)” (Cilliers et al, 2015: 13). In 2040, frontrunners Nigeria and Angola are 
followed by Egypt, South Africa and Algeria, which each represent around 6% of total 
African power. Ethiopia steadily increases its share from 3% in 2014 to 5% in 2040. 
Morocco, another outsider, catches up, reaching over 3% by 2040. 
 
In all of these, some scholars of strategy such as Yang Li, Sun Guohui and Martin J. 
Eppler (2008) refer to the ‘inevitability of instability’ in Nigeria as a pull-back factor. 
The AU Official87 noted with niceties that there is lack of strategic vision, including in 
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the foreign-policy domain, recently aggravated by the growing threat the Boko Haram. 
The Official88 indicated that as long as Boko Haram operates in Nigeria, progress may 
remain in peace meal. In his view, without a solid native base, it is tough for Nigeria to 
formulate a coherent foreign policy and project power in the region or elsewhere. 
Therefore, while the evidence abound that Nigeria is a role player in Africa, it is at least 
debatable whether Nigerian leadership can keep up with the country’s development in 
terms of capabilities to translate raw mass into power projection and shape African, and 
even global, governance (Cilliers et al, 2015: 24). 
 
5.7. African state’s demonstrated abilities to maintain domestic peace 
and order 
According to Kirk-Greene (1975: 1), Nigeria has Africa’s first civil war (the Biafra War). 
Although, the war was located in a variety of different sources and levels, and may be 
explained in terms of political competition of inter-regional economic rivalry of elitist in-
fighting. More arguably, it is of class and religious struggle, of military anomie and 
ambition; of personal, ethnic and regional conflict. In terms of social malaise and 
disenchantment with the golden age never materialised in the aftermath of colonialism; or 
of colonialism itself with the fifty years of British divide and rule. Apart from its internal 
conflicts and attendant security and peace initiatives, Titilope Ajayi (2011: 3-4) notes 
that, while Nigeria has not been immune to the conflicts, having itself brawled a 
devastating civil war, suffered bad and oppressive governance under successive military 
regimes for most of its post-independence history and fought civil war, battled with the 
Niger Delta insurgence in 2002, [and currently the Boko Haram insurgency], it has not 
wavered in its commitment to conflict prevention, resolution and management in Africa. 
A key factor to note is that through the war, Nigeria developed a self-correcting 
mechanism to resolving and transforming conflicts and ensuring peace both within and 
outside Nigeria (Ebegbulem, 2012: 19). Nigeria has been involved in global bilateral 
special training and security missions in the world since 1960s. In West African 
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countries, such as, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, and especially, in Liberia, and Sierra Leone, 
Nigeria invested enormous amount of human-military and financial-material resources 
that restored peace in those countries of ECOWAS origin.  
 
When ECOWAS was formed on 28 May 1975 by the signing of treaty of Lagos with a 
primary mandate to improve regional economic integration in West Africa, the onset of 
civil war in Liberia and Sierra Leone tested Nigeria’s aptitude to regional peace and 
security. According to Egbubelem (2012) Nigeria’s commitment to ECOWAS ensured 
the political stability that led to successful economic integration that emplaced priority on 
economic to political urgencies as well as peace and security primacies. According to 
Ajayi (2011: 3) “Nigeria led both in military and economic might, the ECOWAS-
deployed Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), (a 
Ceasefire Monitoring Group), in Liberia (1990-1998, 2003- 2006), Sierra Leone (1997-
2000), Guinea Bissau (1999), Côte d’Ivoire (2003, 2011), and Mali (2012 - 2013).” The 
ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone occurred without prior UN authorisation 
due to strained relations between ECOWAS and the UN at the time. The UN Security 
Council held several informal consultations, some in response to ECOWAS’ requests for 
assistance, but took no immediate action until Nigeria took the first step (Ajayi, 2011). 
The UN sent military observer missions to Liberia in 1993 (UNOMIL) and Sierra Leone 
in 1998 (UNOMSIL) as shown in figure 5.1 above to help the ECOWAS-inspired 
ECOMOG implement its mandates under the respective peace agreements (Ajayi, 2011; 
Egbubelem, 2013).  
5.7.1. Regional peacebuilding for global harmony 
Nigeria’s effort at peacebuilding has been predicated principally on the pursuit of 
domestic security through the promotion of peaceful relations between itself and 
neighbours, and between neighbours themselves (Tope, 2011). Nigeria has been 
consistent with striving to put its neighbours at ease and attempts to stave off problems 
that could arise especially over inherited colonial boundaries by establishing bilateral 
agreements as the case of relations with Equatorial Guinea since 1988 demonstrate 
(Muhammad Juma Kuna, 2005).  According to the AU Official, some of the “Nigeria’s 
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leading roles include the mediation of the crises between Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
Burkina Faso and Mali, and Togo and Ghana, and these are some of the clearest 
indications of Nigeria’s peacebuilding machinations in the region.”89 
 
The chief exertion to date however could effortlessly be seen in the case of the struggle 
with Cameroon over the Bakasi Peninsula (Cilliers and Hilding-Norberg, 2000).  The 
extreme restraint that Nigeria has demonstrated and its acceptance of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling which ceded the oil-rich Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon is a 
supreme example of its pursuit for regional and global harmony.90 This vow to the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts was one of the major catalysts for securing its overall 
objectives of regional economic integration through which, Nigeria-led ECOWAS 
maximally reduce the reliance of other West African countries on Western foreign 
powers for economic and military assistance which in turn marks the region as Africa’s 
most powerful (Kuna, 2005). This is not to say that there have not remained problems, 
such as lingering Boko Haram terrorism and other border disputes, Cameroon, and Chad 
being two of them. But Nigeria’s preference remains the peaceful resolution of such 
disputes (Barna, 2014).   
5.7.2. Conflict Resolution for a peaceful world 
As in peacebuilding, the role of Nigeria in the resolution of actual conflicts has been 
vigorous especially when supported with appropriate instruments (Kuna, 2005). In the 
specificities of conflict resolution, Nigeria inspired various protocols endorsed by Heads 
of State and Government which provided for an effective institutional framework for the 
resolution of disputes in the region and continent alike (Kuna, 2005). To be specific, in 
the early 1990s, Liberia slided into anarchy, with the refusal of the United Nations, the 
United States and the rest of the International Community to quickly intervene, it was left 
to “ECOWAS at the instance of Nigeria to quickly act to stem the threat to law and order 
not only in Liberia, but also throughout the Mano River Union, and possibly across West 
Africa” (Kuna, 2005: 7). Monetarily, “Nigeria contributed in excess of ten US$10 
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billionin preserving its troops in Liberia and Sierra Leone alone and had 13,000 troops in 
the country which conducted both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations” 
(Kuna, 2005: 7). Nigeria’s approach occasioned the 1999 Lome, Togo, pact to end the 
crises, thus paving the way in 2000 for United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL). 
5.7.3. Peacekeeping mission for regional and global peace 
The history of Nigeria’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations dates back to 1960 
in the Congo just few days after her independence in an account in which Nigeria 
contributed troops and also commanded the UNOC operation (Kuna, 2005; Omotere, 
2011; Sule, 2013: 16;). Since then, as recorded by Kuna (2005: 8) and Omotere (2011: 24 
-25), Nigeria has been involved in many peace initiatives in several parts of the world 
some of which are:  
 
Congo (ONUC) 1960-1964, Battalion operations; New Guinea (UNSF) 1962-1963, 
Military Observers; Tanzania (Bilateral agreement) 1964, Battalion operations; India- 
Pakistan (UNIPOM) 1965-1966, Military Observers; Lebanon (UNIFIL) 1978-1983, 
Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Chad (Harmony I, bilateral agreement) 1981-
1982, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Chad (Harmony II, OAU) 1982- 1983, 
Brigade operations; Iran-Iraq (UNIIMOG) 1988-1991, Military Observers; Liberia 
(ECOMOG) 1990- Division (-) 25 operations; Iraq-Kuwait (UNIKOM) 1991, Military 
Observers; Angola (UNAVEM II) 1991-1992, Military Observers; Sierra Leone 
(NATAG) 1991, Training Team; Angola (UNAVEM III) 1992-1995, Detachment; 
Namibia (UNTAG) 1989-1990, Military Observers; Western Sahara (MINURSO) 1991, 
Military Observers; Cambodia (UNTAC) 1992- 1993, Military Observers; Somalia 
(UNOSOM) 1992-1994, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) 1992, Battalion operations and Staff Officers; Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) 1992 Military Observers; Rwanda (UNAMIR) 1993, Battalion operations; 
Gambia (NATAG) 1993, Training Team; Aouzo Strip (UNASOG) 1994, Military 
Observers; Israel (UNTSO) 1995, Military Observers; Liberia – ECOMOG; Sierra Leone 
– UNMIL; and Dafur peace initiative (Tope, 2011: 24 -25). “Bosnia Herzegovina, Iraq, 
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Kuwait, Western Sahara, Rwanda, Somalia, Mozambique, Cambodia, Lebanon, Angola, 
Beirut, India and Pakistan” (Kuna, 2005: 7). Nigerian troops are still serving in many UN 
missions in places like Kuwait, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone. By 
December 2000, Nigeria had 3404 troops serving under the UN; making her the second 
largest contributor to UN Peacekeeping missions in the world after Bangladesh with a 
total contribution of 6040.91 
 
Nigeria’s leadership both as Chair of the Security Council at various times, and member 
as well as in other areas in the UN System has given it the opportunity not only to build 
peace, but also to push for positions favourable to Africa. This long history of 
participation in peacebuilding, conflict resolution and peacekeeping operations has given 
Nigeria sufficient exposure and experience that is valuable not only to the country and the 
continent but also to the world community. This can be said of Egypt and South Africa 
that have concerned themselves with global peace through regional securities. 
 
5.8. The Challenges and prospects for African inclusion 
There appears to have been something of a consensus that in the impending 
reorganisation of the UN, at least one permanent seat will be reserved for Africa in the 
expanded Security Council. Again, very consistently Egypt and South Africa have been 
touted as countries that may challenge Nigeria for the seat. To be sure, whether in terms 
of geopolitics, regional international politics and issues of stability and conflict, or size of 
population and culture, Egypt remains an important Arab and African state. It also shares 
with Iran, Israel and Turkey for many of the same reasons, the characterisation of being 
one of the four most important countries in the entire Middle East including North Africa. 
Egypt until 1991 was the key hegemonic state in the international relations of the Middle 
East. It is the self-identified chief peace-maker, and on occasions, chief war maker in the 
region as well. It was Egypt, for example, Cantori (2002) noted, crafted the 
unprecedented Arab alliance against Iraq in 1991. It is also militarily powerful in terms of 
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size (300,000) and quality of armed forces as well as the size of its population, which at 
about 85 million contains practically one-half of all Arabs (Cantori, 2002: 229). It should 
also be mentioned that Egypt had a strong voice in the GAU (AU). It was Egypt, for 
example, that influenced the diplomatic isolation of Israel in Africa, following the 1973 
Arab-Israel war (Adeniji, 2005: 7). So Egypt is an important force. 
 
Further, South Africa’s credentials are also quite impressive. First, it is undoubtedly the 
regional hegemonic power in the Southern African sub-region; and secondly, it has had 
an incredible economic performance relative to other African nations. It is only African 
state member of the G20 and that of BRICS. If the African permanent seat would not 
rotate and is given to one state exclusively, it is palpable that the other contending states 
would not sincerely support the expansion. Moreover, this enlargement neglects the 
Arab/Muslim world (Venter, 2003: 30).  
 
In spite of the undoubtedly impressive records of Egypt and South Africa, supporters of 
the Nigerian bid also submitted that Nigeria’s bid is unassailable. Without bearing any 
comparison among the three African states (Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa), the three 
nations under consideration can represent Africa at the Security Council, if not on the 
basis of capabilities, at least on the basis of interestedness to serve. It is true that, for 
example, Nigeria is currently the largest economy in Africa and indeed, the most 
representative of the black race (African race). But both South Africa and Egypt are also 
fending for Africa and attract non-African through the mix in their relevant countries. 
Nigeria has a breed unsullied black population of over 170 million people, “it gives 
Nigeria an advantage to be treated as the African people country, because, for every four 
black persons anywhere in the world, one of them is mathematically a Nigerian” 
(Adeniji, 2005: 8). While this statistics is very important in measuring the black race 
representation in the multi-racial global body it is worthy to note that Africa was not 
marginalised in the Security Council purely on the basis of race (Ikhariale, 2002:35).  
 
Some of the concerns registered by some scholars against Africa’s push for 
representation in the Council is laced with the type of candidates they support. For some, 
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although Egypt is on the African continent, it is more ideologically identified with the 
Arab World than with Africa they aver. And as for South Africa, it is contended that the 
country is not racially a pure African society since it is composed of blacks, white, 
Indians, and coloured - the so-called rainbow nation (Adiniji, 2005: 8). These critics 
noted also that, Nigeria is too corrupt to be trusted, even though it is deemed to have 
more experience in peace operations, following that it has been fully tested in the 
responsibility and effective discharge of international obligations in the key areas of 
peace-keeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding and peace-enforcement - the critical areas in 
which the Security Council had been very active, still it is dull in transparency and good 
governance. On the score of peace operations, even the UN records confirm that Nigeria 
has acquitted itself very well but it has more political and economic problems needing 
attention for the well-being of its population (Gambari, 1997: 9; Ikhariale, 2002: 36).). 
 
Finally, it can be reasoned that if the UN Security Council is in search of candidate/s 
from Africa, the said three nations are available and willing to stand in for Africa. 
Whether Nigeria is considered the ideal African candidate for a permanent seat at the 
Security Council, by some scholars or South Africa or Egypt is considered suitable, our 
point is that at one juncture or the other, there are valid reasons why they were considered 
eligible. Save to say that the US and France do not possess the same amount of both 
economic and military powers let alone political powers. In addition to the points already 
highlighted, the three African countries are in respective ways strategically located in 
areas that will enhance their effectiveness in service to the continent. Yes, it was 
observed that Nigeria is almost at the middle of Africa; Egypt is too northerly, while 
South Africa too southerly, it is in our interest to note that it is also developed even if it is 
too southerly. From this abundantly strategic perspective therefore, all of these countries 
is considered to enjoy the near equidistance to the four corners of the African continent 
which Nigeria does (Ikhariale, 2002: 36). 
 
Further, the enormous contributions of Nigeria to regional and sub-regional resolution of 
conflicts in Africa which cost the country billions of dollars and gallant men and women 
of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF) who paid the supreme sacrifice in the cause of 
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peace cannot be over emphasised. South Africa is also involved in DRC and Burundi 
working for peace and security as does Egypt in the Arab world. Within the West African 
sub-region, for example, Nigeria has made the promotion of peace and security its 
primary consideration under the framework of the ECOWAS. South Africa is doing same 
under the umbrella of SADC all in a run for Relative peace and democracy. Recorded 
presently in countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, to mention a few 
examples, would not have been possible without the determined fight put up by Nigerian 
peacemakers at huge human and material costs under the framework of AU and 
ECOMOG (Starr, 1992; Adeniji, 2005: 7). 
5.9. Conclusion 
This chapter, devoted to the explication of conflicts in Africa and its capabilities has 
examined pertinent aspects of top five African countries capabilities in the context of the 
connections amidst security, politics and economy. In doing so, the chapter presented its 
discussion in three stages: conflict and war, Africa’s top five, and some intervention 
records. This among others includes elaboration on the profiles of selected top five 
African states. As discussed, Africa’s security and the United Nations Security Council 
exclusion featured prominently through the discussion. The chapter sought to determine 
whether permanent seat to Africa will tilt the balance of insecurity in the region and help 
contain terrorism.  The documentations which investigated UN behaviour in terrorist 
attacked member found that the Council can be biased. In order for African states to have 
decreased conflicts and increase economic advancements it shall by virtue of 
commitment to global peace, strive to occupy a permanent seat with veto power.  
 
The chapter demonstrated that there exist some substantial pressure to complicate plan 
through conflict by the P5, aimed at maintaining existing status quo, but a united Africa 
can wrestle permanent seat out of the current P5. In order to unpack the P5 behaviour in 
terms of its ambivalent manifestations, the chapter, maintains that lack of the permanent 
seat sometimes causes the P5 to withdrawn security support in conflict time and also 
makes African interveners powerless. ECOWAS led, and UN supported successful 
interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone endorsed that African inclusion in the security 
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affairs of the world through a permanent seat with veto is more likely to reduce insecurity 
in Africa and help keep the world at larger peace. 
 
Actually, Hawkins measurement of the UN behavior in Africa endorsed that the high 
level of conflict in Africa compared to other regions of the world is built into voiceless 
Africa in the permanent seat. Exclusion from the permanent seat has also sustained the 
creeping and rise of terrorism in Africa. Africa’s entrapment within the fight against 
terrorism — Al Shabbab and Boko Haram — which the AU Official called “African 
solution to non-African problem”92 will pick relevance only when Africa has the political 
power to veto intervention decisions of the P5 nations. The US and UK invasion of Iraq 
contributed to the existing terrorism in the Middle East, including the present day ISIS 
and cousin terrorist groupings in Africa. 
 
Surely, Africa has been the peripheral continent in the world. However, the analysis of 
Africa’s top five nations shows that at least in one category or the other, all of the top five 
states of Africa are fit to serve as a permanent member of the Council. This bears in mind 
that the current P5 nations do not possess equal powers. Actually, in 2040, Nigeria will 
surpass France, tangibly in economic output and overcome US in population. The African 
nations have been underperforming since they were caught up in catch-up games with the 
current global powers. Africa can only find its feet in global politics by defying those 
global orders that keeps Africa woven in the net of dependency, conflicts, 
underdevelopment and especially insecurity paradigm. Following Africa’s high-ranking 
status in the troop contribution graph, it is evident that Africa wants to play part in 
providing not only regional but also global security. And one sure way to achieve this end 
is for the 54 African states to endorse one candidate for the permanent seat, failing which 
to be accepted by the UN the 54 states as one will excuse themselves simultaneously 
from the UN until they are accorded a place of action at the permanent category of the 
Council. The question that merits attention is how does the researcher measures the 
Security Council’s activities in Africa to determine the lessons for Africa? Chapter Six 
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addresses this question by discussing the Security Council’s actions and inactions 



























The United Nations Security Council’s deeds: lessons for Africa 
6.1 Introduction 
The United Nations was created in an atmosphere of major power cooperation. Its 
architecture assumed that the leading global actors in world affairs in the period of 1940s 
will permanently be at the helms of world affairs, and with the introduction of veto 
power, they were even encouraged to believe so and act in tandem with their believe. 
However, from the very beginning of its practical operation in 1946, the Council came to 
operate in an entirely different atmosphere necessitated by the continued changes in the 
world. The slow but seemingly irrevocable drift into cold war went against the dictum of 
the Council, as such, had a paralysing effect on the organ. Further, major changes within 
the international systems such as liberation wars, decolonisation, and the increasing 
North-South divides may not have damaged the complexion of the Council but had 
indeed, impacted on the Council ability to stay true to its original mission. Since 
decolonisation (violent or peaceful), African states have registered presence in the global 
politics whether as a spectator or an actor, fact is, Africa has become part of the whole at 
the place of global politicking. Although Africa’s narrative was laced to being the host to 
the vast majority (and the most deadly) of conflicts in the world, Hawkins (2003) noted 
that that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs shown by the UN 
Security Council and its key members. This chapter shows the variegated scales of 
Council’s activities particularly in conflict areas in Africa and the world and takes note of 
the stack lack of seriousness of the Council in dealing with conflicts in Africa as well as 
states of non-permanent status. In the presentations, the results show that Africa has been 




6.2. The Council as an arena of Power Politics 
The beginning of the end of the international security system had actually come slightly 
earlier, on September 12, 2002, when the former US President George W. Bush, to the 
surprise of many, brought his case against Iraq to the General Assembly and challenged 
the UN body to take action against Baghdad for failing to disarm. The US government 
under Bush declared that the US will work with the UN Security Council to generate the 
necessary resolutions that will tame Iraq, failing which, Bush continued that he would act 
alone if the UN failed to cooperate (Glennon, 2003). US’ threat was reaffirmed a month 
later by Congress, when it gave Bush the authority to use force against Iraq without 
getting approval from the UN first. The American message seemed clearer and reassuring 
when the Bush’s administration undersigned that, the US does not need the Security 
Council. Two weeks later, on October 25, the United States formally proposed a 
resolution that would have implicitly authorised war against Iraq. But according to the 
AU Official “the UN encouraged US to stay away from Iraq.”93 Nevertheless, President 
Bush again cautioned that he would not be deterred if the Security Council rejected the 
measure. In his words, Bush asserts that “if the United Nations does not have the will or 
the courage to disarm Saddam Hussein and if Saddam Hussein will not disarm, the 
United States will lead a coalition to disarm [him]” (Glennon, 2003). Following the US 
determination to beat up one of the smaller states, intensive behind-the-scenes haggling 
started among the Council group to save Iraq from US’ wrath. Indeed, the Council 
responded to Bush’s challenge on November 7 by unanimously adopting Resolution 
1441, which found Iraq in material breach of prior resolutions, including “Resolution 687 
(1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors 
and the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], and to complete the actions 
required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of Resolution 687 (1991)” (S/RES/1441, 2002). Thus, 
the Council set up a new inspections regime, and warned once again of serious 
consequences if Iraq again failed to disarm. The resolution did not explicitly authorise 
force, however, and US pledged to return to the Council for another discussion before 
resorting to arms. In a community of independent states, of what importance is the 
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unproven Iraq’s nuclear armament for the US has been the question among member 
nations? 
 
Actually, the vote for Resolution 1441 was a huge personal victory for the then US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell, who had spent much political capital urging his 
government to go the UN route in the first place and had fought hard diplomatically to 
win international backing. Nonetheless, when doubts emerged concerning the 
effectiveness of the new inspections regime and the extent of Iraq’s cooperation, on 
January 21, 2003, Powell himself declared that the inspections will not work, returned to 
the UN on February 5 and made the case that Iraqi was still hiding its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD).  France and Germany who responded by pressing for more time only 
activated tensions between the allies that were already high and divisions deepened when 
18 European countries signed letters in support of the American position. In all of these, 
the UN Official,94 is convinced that the EU was only playing the usual solidarity card, not 
because they were half sure that Iraq possessed any nuclear substance. Still in effort to 
satisfy the US, on February 14, the inspectors returned to the Security Council to report 
that, after weeks of investigation in Iraq, they had discovered no evidence of WMD. Ten 
days later on February 24, the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain introduced a 
resolution that would have had the Council simply declare, under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter,95 that Iraq has botched the final opportunity afforded to it in Resolution 1441 
(Glennon, 2003). In response to the US; France, Germany and Russia once more 
proposed giving Iraq still more time.  
 
Further, “on February 28, the US announced that the American goal was no longer 
simply Iraq’s disarmament but also regime change. Then, on March 5, France and Russia 
announced they would block any subsequent resolution authorising the use of force 
against Saddam” (Glennon, 2003: 25). These political macho by France, Russia and US, 
in the view of the UN Official96 “is the dangerous tower in the Council”. Accordingly, 
the next day, China declared that it was taking the same position with Russia and France 
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making it impossible for the US to secure the Security Council blessings to attack Iraq. 
Still, the United Kingdom floated a compromise proposal, but the Council’s five 
permanent members did not agree. In the face of a serious disagreement among the P5 the 
Security Council fatally deadlocked. 
 
Under the deadlock, on September 2002, the United States announced in its national 
security document that it would no longer be bound by the Charter’s rules governing the 
use of force. According to the UN Official,97 at the time of deadlock, the Charter and its 
provisions ceased to bear meaningful terms to the US as applied to the use of force. The 
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, who corroborated the UN Official,98 declared on 
October 20, that the US has the authority to intervene in Iraq … just as in Kosovo 
(Glennon, 2003). The claim was that there was no Security Council authorisation for the 
use of force by NATO against Yugoslavia. That action blatantly violated the UN Charter, 
which does not permit humanitarian intervention any more than it does preventive war. 
As such, the US claims to have all the authority needed to attack Iraq not because the 
Security Council authorised it, but because there was no international law forbidding it. 
Under such circumstance, it was therefore impossible to act unlawfully. 
 
As surely as there are series of contested terrains regarding the Charter ranging from 
equality to freedom, oppression to expression, the legality of invasion of smaller states by 
bigger states as did the US in Iraq is a lesson of international importance, especially, 
under the watchful eyes of the Charter, the resolutions and veto mechanism. In a nutshell, 
the US invasion of Iraq, probes the legitimacy of the collective authority of the seemingly 
bias-hoisted Security Council.  
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6.3. The collective authority of the Security Council and the rules 
Theories such as the Society of the States analytical focus and broader explication is on 
the utility and implementation rules while engaging in any rule-governing activities. With 
the end of the Cold War, the most apparent ideological distinctions between East and 
West, political and economic, ended. As the ‘First and Second’ worlds merged, the Iraqi 
incursion into Kuwait swept the world up in an endeavor that breathed new life into a 
United Nations was hobbled by the East-West conflict (Caron, 1993). The difficulty in 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the strict application of the rules of the UN Charter. The 
Security Council acted in utterly unprecedented ways, collectively, ordering economic 
sanctions and, ultimately authorising the use of force — as provided in Charter VII — by 
Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait so as to implement the 
resolutions of the Council and restore international peace and security in the area. 
According to the UN Official,99 “the vitality within the UN was activated by the 
imposition of economic sanctions against Libya, Serbia and, Haiti with a view to 
establishing the Council as that organ that can issue command and expect obedience”. 
Following from the US attitude towards the Council on the issue on Iraq, the international 
community had sought a functioning UN Security Council with legitimacy that stems 
from its collective authority. However, at the dais of disunity among the P5 and the 
attendant show of might by the US after Resolution 1441, in view of the central role of 
the Security Council, the US actions went against the Charter and gave rise to discord 
among the P5 and non-P5 states.  
Against this backdrop, Wallensten and Johansson, (2013) accounted that within the 
Council, in the years 1988 – 1990, there was a considerable peace-making activity 
showing that the US’ outlandish strategy was met with disapproval. In the view of 
Wallensten and Johansson, and the AU Official100 “cooperation among the P5 was 
lacking, even though cooperation was to be the norm on matters as varied as the conflicts 
between Iraq and Kuwait”. It was observed that despite the perceived disunity among the 
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P5 that hampers the Council’s collective output, the UN Official101 noted with disdain 
that “the relations between the most significant powers within the Council did not 
reinforce the UN’s Charter position on resolution of disputes”. The UN Official102  
asserts that “Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August 02, 1990, and the immediate Council 
reaction to undo that breach of international peace and security was according to the 
Charter”. 
 
In pressing further Council’s activities, during the Cold War some countries had managed 
to get away with occupation of neighbouring territories, as exemplified by Turkey 
(northern part of Cyprus), Indonesia (East Timor), and Israel (the West Bank, the Gaza 
Strip, and the Golan Heights), but none of these moves had been awarded international 
recognition (Wallensten and Johansson, 2013). Credibly, when Iraq, tried to annex 
Kuwait, it expected protection from at least on permanent member which did not actually 
happen and amounted to a monumental misreading of the global conditions. Since then, 
the conflicts and crises surrounding Iraq have continued to be a top priority on the 
Council’s agenda. Specifically, from 1990 to 2002, Wallensten and Johansson, (2013) 
underscore that matters relating to Iraq resulted in sixty-three Council resolutions, of 
which fifty-eight were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter. This was important 
because the Iraq’s conduct was variously interpreted by the P5 states leaving rooms for 
reasons to engage the situation or not, which in part has been the dominant insecurity 
paradigm facing Africa from the Council. 
6.4. Africa’s conflict record in 1990s 
Conflict in Africa was responsible for approximately 90% of the total number of war 
deaths in the 1990s. Nine of the 10 bloodiest conflicts of the decade were in Africa. 
Death tolls in some of these conflicts were literally one thousand times those of minor, 
yet high profile conflicts in Haiti, Kosovo and Israel (Hawkins, 2003). Assertions that the 
UN Security Council is seriously engaged in African affairs are often supported by 
claims that 70% of the Council’s work is devoted to African affairs. According to the UN 
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Official “70% of the Council’s work may indeed on Africa, the overall output, of the 
Council’s work in the 1990s exposes that, on the contrary, Africa was largely 
marginalised by the Council and its members”103 To realistically put a rest to this issue, 
Hawkins (2003) maintains that some means of measuring and assessing the Council’s 
response to conflict  (including the plotting of radar graphs based on these indicators), 
demonstrate that, despite the immense needs of Africa in terms of conflict resolution, it 
has been the subject of disproportionately little attention in the Council. It is sufficient to 
note here that the most prominent factor is the lack of political will of its influential 
members, to function according to the stipulations of the Charter. This study is further 
corroborated by the Uppsala conflict data record, which pitched conflict and human death 
in Africa from 1980s to 2000s on the high. See Figure 1.1 on global conflict below. 
 
Figure 6.1 – Global Armed Conflict – 1946 - 2014 
 
Adapted from the Uppsala Data Conflict Programme, accessed June 2015 
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Comparing levels of conflict and UNSC response in order to evaluate the performance of 
the Security Council in the 1990s, it is important to compare the level of conflict with the 
level of Council response. Ideally, the Council would respond to a threat to the peace, or 
conflict situation, in an escalatory modus. Bearing in mind the world’s numerous 
conflicts and the physical inability of the Council to deal appropriately with all of them, 
the Council would ideally prioritise, devoting greater attention to the most serious 
conflicts. Hawkins’ (2003) elementary examination of the Council’s response to conflicts 
across the globe in 1990s reveals massive imbalances between the level of conflict and 
the level of response. Actually, “situations, where it was doubtful whether a threat to the 
peace ever existed, were met with a high level of Council response, while the Council 
largely (and in some cases completely) ignored large-scale wars resulting in massive 
casualties” (Hawkins, 2003: 63). 
6.4.1. The resolutions and the actions: the response 
Assuming that the Council does indeed spend much of its time discussing African 
conflicts, then it can also be said that there is a considerable gap between the amount of 
discussion and the actual output of the Council. The relatively low number of presidential 
statements and resolutions that the Council produces based on such discussion does not 
reflect such an apparently high level of engagement. To be sure, in the 1990s, 32% of 
resolutions (and 25% of presidential statements) adopted by the Council dealt with 
African affairs, with 26% of resolutions pertaining to European conflicts, and 17% to 
conflict in the Middle East (Hawkins, 2003). According to the UN Official,104 examining 
the number of resolutions dealing with individual conflicts (excluding those conflicts that 
the Council failed to engage itself in), the responses of the Council appear 
disproportionate to the level of the various conflicts. For example, 19% of all the Council 
resolutions in the 1990s were adopted in response to a single conflict: 124 resolutions in 
relation to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. On the situation between Iraq and 
Kuwait, the Council adopted 52 resolutions. Angola was the subject of the most 
resolutions of any African conflict: 46, approximately half of which were essentially 
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mandate extensions for missions in that country. The number of resolutions for some 
other major African conflicts are as follows: Rwanda, 29, Liberia, 17, Somalia, 17, Sierra 
Leone, 10, DRC, 6, Burundi, 4, and Ethiopia–Eritrea, 3 (Hawkins, 2003: 64).  
 
The number of presidential statements and resolutions that the Council adopts in response 
to conflicts does provide, to some extent, an indication of how seriously the Council is 
engaged in dealing with a particular conflict. Such numbers, however, can be somewhat 
misleading. The Council sometimes abandons the Charter mandate to take necessary 
action.  Instead, it utilises adoption of presidential statements or resolutions, as action 
towards a threat. It was observed that those resolutions are employed to provide the 
appearance that it is interested and engaged in the conflict. It is noted that such activities 
were for the Council to cover its lack of willingness to really get involved in finding a 
solution. In other cases the final version of statements or resolutions may have been 
watered down as a result of a compromise. Furthermore, many resolutions are adopted 
for the sole purpose of extending previously created mandates for peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement missions, and do not necessarily demonstrate serious Council engagement. 
Here, Angola is a case in point. In short, the content and strength of resolutions are not 
equal. Resolutions can range from a call for parties to a conflict to refrain from violence 
to the authorisation of full scale enforcement action as the latter was the case in Libya 
2011.  
 
In view of the UN Official,105 the Council’s response to conflict cannot, however, be 
judged entirely by the number of resolutions it adopts, or by whether or not it was able to 
find the existence of threat to the peace. The respondent outlined that in order to 
understand the pattern of the Council’s response, it is necessary to examine, and compare, 
the overall level at which the Council dealt with individual conflicts throughout the 
1990s. Hawkins (2003) records that the Council responded at a high level to certain select 
situations that were unrelated to actual armed conflict—for example, situations concerned 
with the possible involvement of certain governments in single acts of terrorism. In the 
cases of Libya, the Sudan and Afghanistan, the Council applied sanctions on the 
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leadership for their failure to hand over those who were allegedly involved in acts of 
terrorism. The Council was also quite responsive in a number of cases in which there was 
armed conflict, but on a relatively minor scale. It responded at low level in response to 
minor conflicts in Haiti, Albania, the Central African Republic, Kosovo, and East Timor 
— all with death tolls less than 3,000 (Hawkins, 2003). 
 
On the other hand, all too often in the 1990s, the Council was unable — or unwilling —  
to respond to large-scale conflicts, and as a result, a large number of major conflicts, 
particularly those in Africa, were the object of a disproportionately low-level of 
engagement by the Council (Hawkins, 2003). One of the most glaring examples of this is 
the Council’s handling (or mishandling) of the conflict in the Sudan. In the Hawkins 
(2003) range between levels 0 to 10 (low to high) the Council’s response did not exceed 
level one, as attempts in procedural discussions to include the issue on the Council’s 
agenda failed. The Council also responded at either level zero or level one to a number of 
other large-scale conflicts in Africa in the 1990s, including Algeria, and Ethiopia. In 
effect, the Council did not even discuss these conflicts. In response to conflict in the 
Republic of the Congo, the Council adopted two presidential statements (level four). For 
the other major African conflicts of the 1990s, the Council was at least able to adopt 
resolutions. The war in the DRC — probably the bloodiest war of the 1990s—raged over 
an area the size of Western Europe, drawing in the direct military involvement of as 
many as eight other African countries, and resulting in well over one million deaths in its 
first year alone. The Council handled it at level six: adopting a number of presidential 
statements, and finally a resolution (eight months after the outbreak of hostilities) 
(Hawkins, 2003). The Council recognised the existence of a threat to peace and security, 
but the demands it made — for a ceasefire, and the withdrawal of foreign forces, were not 
made under Chapter VII of the Charter. With the exception of the adoption of a 
presidential statement in June 1999, the Council took no further action until a peace 
agreement was signed in August, one year after the outbreak of hostilities. Throughout 
the war, the Council made it clear that it would not become involved until after peace had 




In a similar vein, the UN Official106 notes that the Council’s first resolution on Burundi, 
which had cost more than 200,000 lives, was in 1995 — almost two years after the 
conflict began.  Hawkins (2003) continued that Council’s response to the conflict did not 
exceed level six. Similarly, in response to the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the 
Council adopted a total of three resolutions in the 1990s (none of which contained any 
measures under Chapter VII). The Council finally adopted a resolution, under Chapter 
VII, banning the sale or supply of arms to the two countries in May 2000, as the conflict 
was coming to a close. According to Hawkins (2003), even in conflicts in which the 
Council did eventually respond at a relatively high level, such as in Angola (level eight) 
and Rwanda (level nine), the timeliness of response and force level did not reflect any 
sense of urgency in their resolution, and actions were largely ineffective.  
6.4.2. The Haiti conflict theatrics 1991–1995 
Accounts available on the study conducted by Hawkins suggest that human deaths 
amount to 3,000; refugees (Internally Displaced Persons [IDPs]): 100,000 and another 
300,000 under Humanitarian aid. According to the study, while the humanitarian 
situation in Haiti was problematic, the risk of a humanitarian crisis was not great. 
However, the Council authorised the forcible removal from power of the military junta in 
Haiti and adopted its first resolution more than one and a half years after the coup that 
brought the junta to power. This study also learnt from Hawkins (2003) calculations that 
one year later the Council authorised military intervention even after the junta has 
departed peacefully. This was followed by the contingent of a strong peace enforcement 
force as the UN operations saw the creation of numerous peace building projects, 
including the professionalisation of the Haitian police force 
 
                                                          
106Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa. 
195 
 
6.4.3. The conflict in Yugoslavia and the NATO bombing campaign 
(Kosovo), 1997–1999 
Again, Hawkins (2003) reveals that 2,000 persons died in Kosovo conflict, 145, 000 
persons became refugees and 315,000 were under the IDPs and humanitarian support. 
Although homes and means of livelihood were destroyed, the humanitarian situation was 
relatively stable. The majority of refugees were spread out across Europe, with 
approximately 30,000 in neighbouring Albania and Macedonia. The Council response 
was at level 9. After NATO’s bombing operation the Council authorised a peace 
enforcement operation and a UN presence (S/RES/1244). The timeliness of Council 
intervention measured from the dawn of NATO’s bombing which began almost two years 
after the outbreak of low intensity conflict, NATO’s unilateral bombing, rather than a 
Council-sanctioned response was a strong peace enforcement operation. At the end, the 
UN created an interim administration and numerous peace-building programs in Kosovo. 
6.4.4. The Sudan conflict from 1983–2003 
Reading from the 1983 to 2003, the conflict in Sudan claimed 1,100,000 human lives, 
raised Refugees (IDPs): (10) 460,000 (4,000,000) (Hawkins, 2003). Humanitarian War-
induced famine has been responsible for a large proportion of the war dead. Chronic 
food/water shortages and disease are also widespread among the displaced population. 
The conflict contributed to border conflicts between Sudan and Uganda, Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. The Sudan conflict that saw over one million death, attracted no response from 
the Council. In fact, the Council was at the zero (0) levels in all spheres it intervention 
strategies. For example, the Council scored at level 1 on response because it discussed the 
situation in Sudan, but scored zeros on timeliness, use of force, the most critical 





6.4.5. Democratic Republic of the Congo conflict, 1998–2002 
The DRC conflict was dubbed the Second World War by some scholars of security and 
strategy such as Professor Nabudere. The DRC conflict saw to the deaths of over 
1,300,000, refugees (IDPs): 240,000 (960,000) (very conservative estimates). Conflict-
related starvation and disease contributed to the deaths of over one million people in the 
first year of the conflict (and in excess of three million after more than three years of 
conflict) (Hawkins, 2003). The UN Official107 relates that DRC conflict had drawn in as 
many as eight neighbouring countries that have directly participated in the conflict (for or 
against the government and against each other). However, the Council response was at 
level six, that is, the Council determined the existence of a threat to the peace 
(S/RES/1234), and established an observer mission (MONUC). In terms of timelines the 
Council did not adopt a resolution until approximately eight months after the outbreak of 
fighting. In 2000, MONUC was expanded into a peacekeeping operation (S/RES/1291), 
to be deployed in a post-conflict capacity as a force. The case of DRC should serve as a 
useful means of evaluating Council performance in the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security. This is pertinent bearing in mind that DRC is a resource 
rich African state. However, what we see from the DRC is a number of its citizens 
penciled down for, or under trial by the ICC for war crimes and its related. 
6.5. The International Criminal Court (ICC) indictees 
The approach of enforcing the Rome Statute fmanaged by the ICC and sometime 
facilitated by the Council, has not also been consistently applied. In exploring the 
thematic concern of the chapter premised on the idea that in order to understand the 
activities of the Council it is necessary to situate the roles of bonds and actors in context.  
Under the United Nations Charter, the UN Security Council bears the responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council can take 
decisions in this regard that are binding on all UN Member States. The Charter empowers 
the Security Council to decide on a broad range of measures, including sanctions and the 
use of force that may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
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The Council may take such decisions where it determines “the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” in accordance with Article 39.  The 
Security Council thus has a key role to play in responding to acts of aggression. The 
Rome Statute, as amended in 2010, takes account of this key role and preserves the 
primary role of the Security Council in determining an act of aggression. 
 
The ICC governed by Rome Statute is the first permanent treaty based the court 
established to end impunity for perpetrators of the most heinous crimes of international 
concern. ICC is supposedly, independent international organisation and it is not part of 
the United Nations per se but refers matters to the Security Council of the UN. After the 
end of Cold War the ICC was established on July 17 1998 and the Rome Statute (the 
pillars upon which the ICC is founded) entered into force in July 1, 2002 (ICC Official 
website). Since then, the institution started arraigning African leaders for various counts 
of crime against humanity. Below are the works of the ICC since inception. The question 
is since we learnt from the figure 6.1 that conflict and war obtain n various part of the 
world, why are the indictees all Africans? Please see, Appendix 9 for detailed list of the 
ICC indictees. 
6.6. International Relations and Leadership lessons from the world for 
Africa 
Discussion, academic or otherwise, on the performance of the UN Security Council, 
likewise global institution such as the ICC, a discourse on the P5, tends to focus solely on 
how effective it has been in what it sets out to accomplish, but ignores what it fails to 
attempt at all. In the 1990s, assessment of the Council appeared to be based largely on 
how effective it had been in handling conflicts in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda. The other 
major indicator used by those judging Council performance seemed to be its 
unwillingness to authorise the use of force in response to select minor conflicts (or non-
conflict situations) that complicated major power interest and/or saturated media 
coverage — Kosovo being the leading example in this instance. This has been seized 
upon more also over the issue of Iraq — a high profile yet non-conflict situation and 
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essentially an artificial crisis — as those P5 nations pushing for war found themselves 
unable to attract the necessary support for authorisation in the Council.  
 
Essentially, the Council’s lack of support for the use of force against Yugoslavia over 
Kosovo seems quite understandable. Solitarily, massive aerial bombardment was scarcely 
a balanced response to such a conflict. Likewise in Iraq, the case for the US-led full-scale 
invasion of that country (both in terms of its justification and its consequences) remains 
decidedly dubious at best. The UN Official108 is of the view that the Council did not 
approve the use of force in either case should not be interpreted as a sign of Council 
impotence or irrelevance, but rather as recognition, by the Council, that such massive 
force was inappropriate, and that diplomatic options remained available. The UN 
Official109 continued that the Council traditionally treated the use of force as a last resort. 
Surely, the Security Council faces irrelevance not in Iraq, but in Africa. This is a glaring 
reality that has been all but ignored during discussions on the performance of the 
Council.  
 
This notion of neglect provides part of the reasons why Hawkins (2003) records that the 
massive wars, resulting in the death of millions, rage unchecked, sometimes with little 
more than a mild expression of concern by the Council, and with next to no serious 
pressure by its members to bring a halt to the hostilities. In the few instances, he argues 
that where the Council did attempt intervention in the 1990s, the casualty tolerance of 
those contributing forces proved to be far too low for the operations to be seen through, 
and intervention in African conflicts was abandoned. In his study, there is a demonstrated 
awareness that the apparent resurgence of Council interest in Africa in the late 1990s — 
in Sierra Leone, the DRC and Ethiopia and Eritrea — is a sign of improvement. 
However, this can be seen, partly as a reaction to criticisms of ‘selective indignation’ 
following interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, and, more importantly, has been 
limited primarily to post-conflict peacekeeping.  The willingness of the Council to fulfil 
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its duty in the restoration of peace, rather than simply in the maintenance of peace, in 
Africa remains (and can be expected to remain) extremely low. 
 
The UN Official110 who agreed to Africa’s marginalisation in global politics notes that 
the key issues lie in convincing the P5 states to be neutral and altruistic in their 
interventions. The Official is convinced that this is indeed in their interests, and in 
ensuring that the process is not derailed and converted into a ‘usual-incapable-Africa’, 
thereby deflating away from the more pressing need for African inclusion in the 
permanent seat of the Security Council. In the Official’s111 view the only basic challenge 
Africa is facing from the world bodies is garnering the support of the members who 
would support, and/or take some form of responsibility for Africa’s failure when efforts 
to become free at once fails. In the final analysis, there is little doubt that the future of 
Africa’s global relevance will be left almost entirely in African hands and that little 
support from the UN Security Council, or its powerful members can be expected in the 
near future. While diplomatic power does not have the same clout as economic or 
military power, it is inexpensive and, if used skilfully, can be quite effective (Hawkins, 
2003). It is imperative that African leaders pool their diplomatic power together and 
shame the Council and its powerful members into lending more meaningful moves 
towards supporting the African efforts to democratise the Council.  
 
As shown in table 6 above, since the birth of the ICC in 2002, there have been conflicts in 
various parts of the world that threatened the foundations of global peace and security. 
Israel, Palestine, Iraq-US, and DRC have had conflicts that browbeat humanity. But in all 
of these real accounts, there is no single citizen of any other continent other than Africa, 
who has been indicted. In areas, it is not clear whether those African conflicts and the so-
called perpetrators of violence truly violated those codes of war they are accused of. For 
instance, Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir must be arrested and handed over to the 
ICC, but the former US President Bush has nothing to answer to The Hague following, 
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leading his country to invade Iraq. During the invasion, the UN Official112 argued that, it 
is not possible that there was no war crime, at least rape, committed.  
 
Further when the North Korean attacks on South Korea were formally brought to the 
Security Council’s attention, the council's resolution of July 7, 1950 adopted in the 
temporary absence of the Soviet Union called on member states to assist South Korea in 
resisting the North Korean aggression (Russett and Sutterlin, 1991).  It recommended that 
all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid 
Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified 
command under the United States. Thus, the Security Council requested one member 
state to lead a combined effort on behalf of the United Nations to resist aggression. 
Notwithstanding his designation as commander of UN forces in Korea, General Douglas 
MacArthur, the commander named by the United States, never reported directly to the 
Security Council (Routine, unclassified status reports were provided by the United 
States). Neither the Military Staff Committee a body composed of military 
representatives of the five permanent members intended to advise the council on military 
matters nor the Council itself, had any role in directing military operations of the unified 
command.  
 
All of these disadvantages were intensified in the Korean case by the bitter disagreements 
that prevailed at the time between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under 
conditions of harmony among the permanent members of the Security Council, these 
various disadvantages could have considerably less force. In the Persian Gulf crisis the 
Security Council authorised, albeit in oblique language, the use of force for enforcement 
in another interstate conflict (Russett and Sutterlin, 1991). Actually, after imposing a 
comprehensive laid down in the resolution relating to economic sanctions, in Resolution 
678 of November 29, 1990, the Security Council authorised member states cooperating 
with the government of Kuwait to use all necessary means to uphold and implement 
Security Council Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore 
international peace and security in the area.  
                                                          




All states were requested to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken. This 
action, with specific reference to Chapter VII of the charter, constituted a new approach 
to implementation of the collective security concept. As in the earlier enforcement action 
in Korea, when there was no reference to Chapter VII, a basis for the council to mobilize 
a UN force for military enforcement action did not exist. Therefore the council again 
turned to member states to act in its behalf through such measures as might be necessary. 
But this time no unified command was established, and the use of the UN flag was not 
authorised. 
 
According to the UN Official113 the gulf action became possible because the permanent 
members of the Security Council cooperated on a matter of peace and security in the way 
originally foreseen when the United Nations was founded. The Official is akin to the 
narrative that the UN Charter is suffering from the interpretative abilities of the P5 
nations. When drawn to comment on the Iraq-Kuwait, the UN114 and UPEACE115 
Officials indicated that the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union have 
repeatedly suggested that such [collective] action is an important element in a new world 
order; that is, a world in which nations will be secure because of the capacity of the 
United Nations to guarantee their security through collective measures. This fundamental 
goal of the United Nations is unquestionably brought closer through the sustained 
cooperation and a notably increased commonality of interests among the major powers, 
evident not only in the Gulf War but also in other conflicts such as Cambodia and 
Angola.  
 
In view of Russett and Sutterlin (1991) the credibility of UN action to repel aggression 
and restore international peace and security, as foreseen in the UN Charter, has been 
profoundly affected by the response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Security Council 
showed itself capable of taking decisive action. Its ability to impose comprehensive 
sanctions and see them enforced was clearly demonstrated, even though the ultimate 
                                                          
113Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa. 
114Interview with the UnitedNations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa. 
115Interview with the UPEACE Official, 10 September 2015, [E-interview]. 
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effectiveness of the sanctions was not adequately tested. By authorising the use of 
military force, Russett and Sutterlin (1991) believe that the Council gained compliance 
with all of its relevant resolutions. The duo continued that the Security Council had 
shown that it has the capacity to initiate collective measures essential for the maintenance 
of peace in a new world order. This development can enhance the United Nations ability 
not just to restore the status quo as it existed prior to a breach of the peace, but also to 
change the parameters of the global order to something more favorable than existed under 
the prior status quo. In this it may even go beyond the vision of the UN founders. 
Furthermore knowledge that the United Nations has such a capability will also enhance 
its ability to deter breaches of the peace, and so make actual enforcement or later 
peacekeeping less necessary. Collective security may suppress incipient acts of 
aggression as well as defeat or punish those that do emerge but a collective effort cannot 
be attained by only a part of the whole, where some continents that bring the conflicts are 
not party to its solution.116 
 
Similarly, the manner in which the gulf military action was executed by the United States 
and its coalition partners actually limited the willingness of Council members to follow a 
similar procedure in the future - a procedure that leaves Council members little control 
over the course of military operations and over the conclusion of hostilities. Neither the 
United States nor any other country will be ready to act under all circumstances to 
preserve or restore peace. Nor will other states always be ready to endorse unilateral 
actions anymore. Even though, a Security Council without African permanent seat means 
for Africans, a unilateral Council, some states may not wish to contribute to an operation, 
and the Council may not always wish to depend disproportionately on a particular state’s 
contribution following the excesses shown by the US in the regard under review. This is 
so, because there were instances of the breach of the UN Charter. 
                                                          
116Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Pretoria, South Africa. 
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6.7. Constitutional and Charter crisis within the Council 
Beginning with the Nuclear Tests cases, continuing through Nicaragua, and, most 
recently, in the jurisdictional phase of Nauru, the Court indicated that it was prepared to 
depart from the classical and strictly consensual basis for its operations and assert its 
jurisdiction over disputes on the basis of what would previously have been considered 
weak or even questionable grounds (Reisman, 1993). Common to these cases was a gross 
disparity in the power positions of the state parties, with the weaker party requesting 
judicial intervention. By this time, a generation of political leaders from the smaller states 
in the General Assembly had grown up operating in this changing environment (Hill, 
2004). As a result, the membership of a much larger General Assembly came to feel itself 
entitled to far greater competence than the subordinate role to which the Assembly is 
consigned by the 1945 Charter. Some states aspired, individually to admission to the 
most exclusive club in the world; others (of which deceased Muammar Gaddafi of Libya 
was a leader), to limit or abolish the veto entirely or tear down the structures that support 
‘some are more equal than the others.’117 Like a parliamentary matryoshka (doll), the 
Council contains ever-smaller mini-Councils, each meeting behind closed doors without 
keeping records, and each taking decisions secretly thereby, magnifying the disquiet that 
the fact that, as the Council has become more effective and powerful, it has become more 
secretive too (Reisman 1993). Apathy 
 
According to Reisman (1993) who corroborates the UN Official118 on the account of 
converting the Security Council Chamber into a secret Chamber, he notes that before the 
plenary Council meets in consultation, in a special room assigned to it near the Security 
Council, the P5 have met in consultation in a special room now assigned to them outside 
the Security Council; and before they meet, the P3, composed of the United States, the 
United Kingdom and France, have met in consultation in one of their missions in New 
York. The P2, consisting of China and Russia will also agree in secret. All of these 
meetings take place in camera and no common minutes are kept. After the fifteen 
                                                          
117Interview with the African Union Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg South Africa. The official 
recalled how Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was killed, saying that the struggle for freedom from colonial 
dispiritedness was part of the reasons for Gaddafi’s sponsored assassination.   
118Interview with the United Nations Official, 25 May 2015, Johannesburg South Africa. 
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members of the Council have consulted and reached their decision, they adjourn to the 
Council’s chamber, where they go through the formal motions of voting and announcing 
their decision. Decisions that appear to go further than at any time in the history of the 
United Nations are now ultimately being taken, it seems, by a small group of states 
separately meeting in secret. In areas it could be a matter on Africa but the African states 
has in fact, no say. 
 
Yes, Libya’s suit in the International Court against the United States and the United 
Kingdom for alleged violations of its rights under the 1971 Montreal Convention was 
widely viewed as the cynical ruse of a government implicated in state terrorism to evade 
condemnation and sanction by the Security Council. But claimants, no matter how 
despicable, sometimes raise important issues (Reisman 1993). In dealing with Libya’s 
request for interim measures and the jurisdictional boundary between the International 
Court and the Security Council, the Court collided with world constitutional issues that 
had been taking shape over the previous five years. Specifically, in Resolution 731 
(1992), the Council had asked Libya, in effect to surrender for trial, two Libyan officials 
who had been indicted in the United States and Scotland for causing the destruction of an 
American civilian airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland.  
 
Relying on the Montreal Convention to which all the relevant states are party, Libya 
insisted on its treaty and customary right aut dedere aut judicare and indicated that it 
would try the officials itself if its investigating magistrate who, it averred, had begun to 
review the evidence-found sufficient grounds. As the Libyan Government purported to 
see it, three permanent members of the Council – the United States, the United Kingdom 
and France — were exploiting their powers under the Charter to deprive Libya of its 
rights under conventional and customary international law (Reisman 1993). Because the 
Montreal Convention incorporates the International Court’s jurisdiction, Libya asked the 
Court to stop them. Though the Court’s decision responds to a request for interim 
measures and could be reconsidered at a hypothetical merits phase, the majority, 
concurring and dissenting opinions provide a remarkable window on the Court’s thinking 




To be sure, the nominal issue in Lockerbie was thus the sequencing, as between Council 
and Court, of the exercise of jurisdiction in part held concurrently by both of them. This 
is not an unusual phenomenon in advanced legal systems where different organs with 
different competences are created over time and often find  themselves seized of all or 
different parts of the same dispute. The solution lies in the development of various codes 
for allocating and sequencing competences. Behind this nominal issue, however, lay a 
more difficult constitutional question that fused an apparently technical interpretation of 
the Charter about the boundary between the competences of Council and Court with an 
increasingly acute struggle over the most fundamental allocations of power in the United 
Nations system. In a nutshell, the P3 coaxed the Council to force Libya. The issue of 
lesson therefore, is that the P3 would not have dared, if Libya were to be a permanent 
member. If it were, it could have either joined forces with the P2 or challenge the P3 




Chapter Six, drawing from the analysis in the preceding chapter, deals with the 
presentation and analysis of specific Council intervention data. This chapter presents 
discussion on the activities of the Council especially in resolution of disputes. Through 
the discussion of the P5 behaviours, lessons were drawn from the activities for Africa. 
The idea here is to explicate the accounts that exist in Council’s behaviour. Chapter Six 
does this by framing the activities of Council in adopting resolution and intervening in 
the conflicts in Haiti, Yugoslavia, DRC and Sudan. Based on the perspectives from the 
discussion it was noted that high profile conflicts in Africa were ignored while low 
profile conflicts elsewhere attract the maximum attention of the P5 states. This 
observation is foregrounds the call for African inclusion for better practices.  
 
Unavoidably, the Security Council, specifically, the permanent seat has become an arena 
of power politics, where might is right. More than anything else, however, it has been 
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still another under lying difference in attitude-over the need to comply with the UN’S 
rules on the use of force-that has proved most disabling to the UN system. Since 1945, so 
many states have used armed force on so many occasions, in flagrant violation of the 
charter that the regime can only be said to have collapsed. In framing the charter, the 
international community failed to anticipate accurately when force would be deemed 
unacceptable.  
 
Further, given that the UN system is a voluntary system that depends on compliance of 
state consent, the act of unilateral actions in areas where collective authority is required, 
is short-sighted and can be fatal to the progress of the global body. This conclusion can 
be expressed a number of other different ways under the adoption of resolutions by the 
US as a means of intervention in less-interested territories to the P5. Indeed, massive 
violation of a treaty by the P5 states over a prolonged period can be seen as casting that 
treaty into desuetude -- that is, reducing it to a paper rule that is no longer binding, as 
Libya was bullied by the US and Britain on the account of Lockerbie trial as opposed to 
the international convention. In a global community such as the UN, the US and Britain 
serve as the principal forces that dismasted the Security Council making other weaker 
member states to snap in the gale. This was the accounts of Haiti, Yugoslavi (Kosovo), 
Sudan and the DRC conflicts where the US exerted influence without the proper required 
consultations with the stakeholders. 
 
Granted, it was argued that Resolution 1441 and its acceptance by Iraq somehow 
represented a victory for the UN and a triumph of the rule of law. But it did not. Had the 
United States not threatened Iraq with the use of force, the Iraqis almost surely would 
have rejected the inspections regime. Yet such threats of force violate the Charter and 
seek to abrogate it by disuse.  Actually, the Security Council never authorised the United 
States to announce a policy of regime change in Iraq or to take military steps in that 
direction but the US did with impunity. 
 
It is a UN’s failure that rules which must flow from the way states actually behave, not 
how they ought to behave is contradictorily correct. As the world prays for peace, even 
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though they preach war the old violence vocabulary should be cleared away so that 
decision-makers can focus pragmatically on what is really at stake and how to best 
compartmentalize every demeanour. Such vocabularies justify the search to continuously 
indict African citizens since the ICC despite evidence of violations in other parts of the 
world. While the forceful capturing of African citizens to be sautéed by the ICC some of 
them receiving jail terms of 14 years, the lesson for Africa is that the victims are looser of 
war. 
 
In line with this study’s hypothesis and Society of State Approach, this chapter 
underscored the idea that lack of consistent application of the rules entrench double 
standards. It also emphasised the point that an examination of such factors, as opposed to 
simplistic or reductionist explanations, engenders a holistic understanding of Council’s 
behaviour. It is on this cautiously optimistic note that this chapter concludes its 
presentation and analysis of research findings on Council’s behaviour in African conflicts 




















Summary of findings, conclusion and recommendations 
7.1. Introduction and Overview 
This study is interdisciplinary in nature. This assertion is predicated on the accounts that 
its contextual elements straddled the linked and mutually reinforcing disciplines of 
international relations and conflict transformation and peace studies. The study 
interrogated the connections of powerful nations who are prominent actors of the UN 
Security Council – that is the P5. Its primary unit of analysis from actors’ perspectives is 
the P5 – powerful permanent states actors with veto power which Caron (1993) refers to 
as ‘Club’. Its focal point of analysis in the domain of conflict analysis is conflict 
transformation and peace studies. Broadly speaking, this study has examined the intricate 
relationship between the Security Council formation and global conflict. Specifically, it 
investigated the roles of P5 nations and African states in Africa’s conflict zones, 
measuring peace and security conundrums. In terms of methodology, the empirical nature 
of this study necessitated a combination of research methods and various approaches. 
Therefore, it adopted historical and qualitative approaches to the explication of the 
subject matter of the research. 
 
Chapter One was a primer, an introduction to the study. Its presentation of the 
background to the study foregrounded, essentially, the research problem. It also identified 
the research task and outlined the study’s hypothesis. The chapter presented the research 
objectives and corresponding research questions. Furthermore, Chapter One delineated 
the study’s scope and limitations. It highlighted the significance of the study, followed by 
a brief statement of the research methodology and research design. The chapter also 
noted that an empirical study of this nature is bound to grapple with certain 
methodological and practical limitations, which the chapter identified. A section of 
Chapter One was devoted to the brief clarification and description of the seven chapters 




Chapter Two – a review and comparison of relevant literature – interrogated the interface 
between permanent seat and veto power and conflict and insecurity. The analysis of the 
Security Council reform nexus was done with a view to advancing a nuanced 
understanding of the role of the P5 in conflicts paradigms. Furthermore, the discussion of 
the veto power link provided a context in which the connections between exclusion and 
marginalisation skirmishes could be located. Using the ‘reform’ thesis as the focal point 
of analysis, Chapter Two examined the debate about the interconnection between veto 
power and conflict. It was noted that although the literature contains narratives that either 
corroborate or disprove the ‘reform’ thesis, the relationship between security and peace is 
not linear and direct but complex and indirect. This is because lack of reform of the 
Council, per se, does not in itself engender war pathologies but may precipitate conflict. 
 
Through a review and comparison of germane literature, Chapter Two evidenced the 
intervening variables in the security-conflict-peace link. Crucially, the chapter showed 
that a number of intervening variables associated with African exclusion from the 
permanent seat and veto power enjoyed the combined support of economic and political 
interests of the P5. It presents account that veto power precipitates, exacerbates and 
perpetuates conflicts especially against the veto-less states such as African nations. In 
other words, these variables intertwine with security and peace of nations as relates to 
conflict dynamics from the onset through its duration and specific intensity and 
perpetuation. In its explication of these variables, Chapter Two emphasised the need for a 
nuanced understanding of the link between veto power and security of nations including 
shielding friendly states and attacking non-friendly states. This chapter also provided the 
framework that elucidates the discussion on legitimacy, working methods, the new 
threats, and the composition and structure of the Council. 
 
Chapter Three presented theoretical and analytical perspectives on the call for Security 
Council reform and why it has not happened, and is not happening. The chapter examined 
relevant paradigms (or schools of thought) and the theories and arguments (pertaining to 
the international politics of Security Council reform and the behaviour of the P5) 
associated with paradigmatic perspectives. The analysis of related sub-themes in the 
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chapter sought to provide a panoramic framework that lends itself to understanding of the 
P5 nations in the exclusive governance of the Security Council in general and conflict 
biases of conflict trends in Africa in particular. The chapter’s interrogation of Realist 
theory on reform saga foregrounded the contending views vis-à-vis the impacts of status 
quo activities in the Security Council, especially in the face of Africa’s agitation for 
inclusion. Realist views the activities within the Council as interest utilised in terms of 
power. It was noted that the structural and traditional schools advance different premises 
that lead to apparently incommensurate conclusions on the effect of real politik in the 
permanent category of the Council on the marginalised states. The traditional realists 
contend that power is an end in itself and therefore is important engine driving the P5’s 
prosperity in making and taking major decisions of global security. By contrast, the 
structural realists maintain that, power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is 
survival. However, the chapter noted that the performance of P5 towards global peace 
and security underscore aspects of both traditional and structural arguments where power 
utility is demonstrated in reform resistance and, intervention in conflict zones further 
lends credence to facets of the structural and traditional schools’ arguments. It therefore 
is evident that the two paradigms are not necessarily or inevitably incommensurate since 
neither provides a definitive world view. Rather, each represents an aspect of reality. 
 
An examination of the structural and traditional realist paradigms provided a useful 
backdrop for the analysis of how ‘interest’ and ‘power’ are used instrumentally to 
achieve the sole objectives of the P5nations within the Council. As the discussion 
highlighted, the performance of the P5 exemplify an aspect of dominance. It was 
observed that, though the protection of national interests could possibly plague any other 
state drafted unto the P5 category, respect for the three ‘Ss’119 has remained resilient on 
the analytical and practical planes. Importantly, the P5 continue to profess commitment to 
global security but reform, and this probes the elementary essence of security.  
 
Chapter Three combined lexicon of crucial other theories. This is not only dependent on 
the fact that realist paradigm does not address all concerns within the reform agenda, but 
                                                          
119 See Chapter Three. 
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also, that pertinent issues such as colonial and imperial standards processed through 
dependency paradigm could only be best unpacked through the dependency approach. 
Dependency theory as articulated in Chapter Three emphasised domination of one by 
another, and recognised the imbalance within the Council Structure and the operational 
modalities as asymmetry among the political actors. It argues that, in principle, the idea 
of interdependence implies symbiosis between the mutually supporting parts of the whole 
(Hopf, 1998). In order words, it suggests the existence of equality and symmetry in the 
relationships between units or actors of global security (Mastanduno, 1989). Chapter 
Three highlighted that there is unequal relations and asymmetrical interactions among the 
security actors of the Council. In essence, the utilisation of Dependency Theory in the 
study put into perspective the Global North – Global South divide that exist in the 
Security Council chambers serving as the compass that underscores that the developing 
countries were incorporated deliberately into the capitalist system (such as the UN) by 
the West under an imposed structure that only serves to facilitate the exploitation of those 
peripheral countries. 
 
Chapter Three further engaged the Behaviourist Theory and gauged the behaviour and the 
conduct of the P5 and that of the permanent-seat-needing African states. While P5 
behaviour shapes both reform debates within the global political arena and conflict 
dynamics in native countries, the P5 governance regime in native countries – among 
other factors – influences domestic government behaviour itself. In line with this 
realisation, Chapter Three analysed the dominance of the P5 governance regime and 
aligned the treatment of various actors by the P5 conduct to classical conditioning and 
operant bahaviours. The interrogation of thesesub-paradigms showed that the adoption of 
one or the other by a host government determines the extent to which P5 could be held 
accountable and/or responsible for their activities in the public sphere. It was noted that 
while the classical conditioning may explain how the African states were being 
conditioned to accept the status quo as the only option, a nuanced analysis of such 
observation indicated that ‘the P5 actors’ were accountable to no political stakeholders. 
And indeed, as highlighted, there is a twin phenomenon of ‘learning and doing’ within 
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the Behaviourist approach as presented between the classical conditioning and the 
operant behaviour. 
 
Operant Response was utilised by Chapter Three to address the actions of the P5 towards 
the non-permanent African nations and provided the basis for determination of the claims 
implicitly made in the study that human behaviour controls the rate at which specific 
consequences occur. Behaviourist regard African states quest for inclusion as a response 
to the exclusion stimulus which is fraught with practical implications for P5 decisions. 
On one hand, a manipulation (classical conditioning) of African states behaviours for an 
expected outcome was viewed as undermining the legitimate claims/concerns of African 
states for inclusion, especially when the P5 actors determines the conditions of the 
African Group. On the other hand (operant response) the P5 activated a global political 
structures that allows the African nations to react only to actions but do not take the lead 
in deciding the activity within the organ. 
 
Chapter Three further used Society of State Approach. This approach examined the 
theory of society of state. In the context of this study, Society of State recognise the 
importance the international treaties, rules, bonds, regulations in international political 
environment. It accentuates the usefulness of the United Nations Charter in resolving the 
reform debacle and calls on all parties to adhere to the rules of the Charter as concerns 
the Security Council reform. As noted, lack of heed to the rules of the Charter 
significantly influences the trajectory of conflicts that exist within the Council organ. 
 
Chapter Four provided the analysis on the African exclusion from the Council’s veto 
power while addressing the research O1 that necessarily follows from research Q1. 
Chapter Four provided the background and context for the examination of the interface of 
African exclusion from the permanent seat since 1945. In this chapter, the study 
undertook a detailed depiction of the reasons for exclusion, the AU’s security roles, 
interests, and the roles of the individual P5 nations in the reform saga. It was noted that 
certain tangible attributes or elements of power underscore the Africa’s mineral might has 
become an importance source of interest in global politics and a strategic relevance for 
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the region. These include its economy, strategic geographic location in the world and 
most importantly, immense natural resource endowment.  
This enormous mineral wealth earned the region the appellation of geographic 
importance. As noted in the chapter, what gives the region strategic significance, 
however, is not the sheer number (or staggering amount) of natural resources but Africa’s 
considerable hare of world’s reserves and the high quality of the minerals which in turn is 
an element of power. This realist theory as presented in Chapter Three aptly speaks to 
‘instruments’ as either means to an end or an end in itself. Struggle for mineral wealth in 
oil rich African states sometimes has been means an end in itself for some P5 nations, 
while war is means to that end. The discussion in Chapter Four showed that Africa 
(arguably occupies important political and economic space on earth in terms of natural 
resource endowment) possesses crucial tangible elements of power that potentially 
stimulate global socio economic development. Thus no phenomenon illustrates the 
African exclusion-inclusion discourse in the Security Council more profoundly than the 
imbrication of natural resources in the continent. Chapter Four emphasised that the 
variegated positions the P5 nations holds on African exclusion and since 1945 underlies 
economic incentives that they (the P5) obtains from Africa’s conflict minerals which 
provided little or no incentive for Africa’s inclusion which may signal the end of 
exploitation of Africa’s mineral resources and instigation of conflicts that ushers in 
Africa’s dependency on the P5 nations. In this way, Africa’s resources have been a 
formidable factor in perpetuating a Security Council with a veto-less African state. 
 
In Chapter Five, the study sought to respond to O2, Q2 of the thesis and provided broad 
explications of P5 and especially African Group roles in entrenching regional and global 
security roles. It examined the activities of African leaders and roles of some P5 nations 
in conflict environment and noted that some P5 states such as the US benefits from 
conflicts in Africa, and poor leadership among African leaders has allowed for the US 
incursions. The chapter presented the politics and profiles of conflicts that have binary 
indications to the incessancy of conflict in the regions (some pointing at the permanent 




The discussion in Chapter Five showed that state and non-state conflicts were facets of 
insecurity regime in the region. It revealed that African states have not been the sole 
owner of the conflicts within its borders. It tested the military might of top five African 
countries, their diplomatic clout to ascertain whether the agitation for inclusion is healthy, 
and confirms that, these African states can function well as the permanent member with 
veto in the Council. The chapter noted that lack of UN permanent seat with veto 
negatively affects Africa’s securitisation. However; it recognised that some African 
countries intervention activities as did South Africa in Burundi and DRC and Nigeria in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone are indicators of potential and actual peacebuilding capabilities. In 
addition, it highlighted the point that since some of these African nations has been 
successful in various interventions and resolution of conflicts in Africa, it argues the 
point that their inclusion into the permanent category of the Council is equally in order. 
Importantly, drawing from empirical and literature evidences, the chapter argues that 
insurgencies such as Boko Haram and Al-Shabbab are prominent insecurity threats to 
Africa, which in turn, roll back Africa’s regional security fronts and relegate 
peacebuilding in the region to an embryonic stage. This section combines the Society of 
State and Realist paradigm to sustain its argument. The Society of State highlights the 
importance of preserving the sovereign order of the nations through instruments of law 
which terrorism is tottering. As noted during the discussion, realism denotes capability 
which Nigeria demonstrated in the intervened states.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, research findings indicate the saliency of Africa’s inclusion 
agenda in the permanent seat of the Council. It was shown that inclusive permanent 
Council can achieve a peaceful and stable political environment. The chapter argued that 
although peace-enhancing initiatives by P5 (intervention in affected states) constitute a 
dimension of security obligations; they do not fall strictly within the purview of 
traditional notion of peacebuilding. In this sense, P5 peacebuilding is located in 
securitisation agenda.  
 
Crucially, Chapter Five analysed the operational contexts that underpinned the 
contradictions of economic development and political progress in Africa. The chapter 
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undertook this analysis in light of the study’s O2, Q2 and the hypothesis, which states 
that the interplay of Africa’s security roles and capabilities and the operational context 
(that is, the local, national and international environments) underpin the strategic 
behaviour of the P5. As discussed, contextual factors and interactive clusters of actors 
(which this study refers to as the P5 and the African Group) at three levels of analysis – 
national, regional and international – influenced P5’s activities in support of conflict or 
contribution towards positive transformative change. It was argued that understanding the 
context in which P5 operated was pivotal to unpacking African Group behaviour, 
especially in terms of its persistent call for reform. 
 
Chapter Six undertook a combined empirical and literature presentation and analysis of 
data on Security Council’s connections to conflicts and peacebuilding in Africa and some 
other selected non-African cases, locating the lessons for Africa. The chapter examined 
the specific roles of Security Council in the DRC’s conflicts and peacebuilding process, 
thereby illuminating the broad explication of intervention behaviour and strategy. This 
was done through the presentation and analysis of the data obtained during fieldwork 
interviews and sourced literature accounts. 
 
Discussions in Chapter Six typified Security Council’s actions and inactions in 
transforming conflicts in resource rich and resource poor African states, compared to 
non-African states. The findings included the reckless abandonment of conflicts in 
resource poor states (such as Rwanda) and wedging war in the neighbouring resource rich 
DRC aimed at illicit exploitation of minerals, trading in conflict minerals and providing 
financial and logistical support for belligerents. From respondents’ perspectives, these 
actions portrayed P5 as ‘selective interveners’ and elements stoking ongoing conflicts. 
Research findings as corroborated by Virgil Hawkins (2003) suggested that the 
involvement of some members of the P5 in the DRC’s conflicts exacerbated and 
prolonged the conflicts, thereby having a significant impact on conflict dynamics. For 
instance, it was noted that there is a distinct lack of genuine interest in African affairs 
shown by the UN Security Council and its key members (the P5) and some P5 actors 
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reaped from conflicts underpinned conflict perpetuation which provided little or no 
incentive for every actors to seek peace. 
 
Nonetheless, research findings indicated that Security Council was involved in activities 
that increased elements of conflict in selected cases where the organ had intervened in 
Africa. As noted in this study, the conflict behaviourism underscores provision of 
environment to maximise performance, either in achieving peace or degenerating into 
conflict through conditioning of the actor. In addition, it emphasises operational 
activities of the Council which included selective interventions as crucial act that 
undermines the integrity of the organ as a neutral arbiter. From the perspectives of 
interviewees and documented evidence, the involvement of any member of the P5 in 
activities aimed at halting conflict shown to have entrenched sustained conflict. 
 
The chapter drew inferences from research findings and discussed emerging issues, 
highlighting the lessons learnt from this study on Security Council behaviour. Key issues 
that have significance for the research hypothesis and research questions included the 
nexus between reform and peacebuilding, the roles of the P5 in conflict zones, and the 
African Group in ending violence and building peace. Other issues discussed were the 
lack of inclusion that sustained the regional political economy of natural resource 
exploitation and trafficking, and the role of international actors in maintaining the status 
quo. Chapter Six also emphasised the point that the involvement of Security Council 
actors in the DRC’s conflicts and their inability to implement a peacebuilding initiatives 
highlighted the dialectics of the P5 states behaviour. It was also noted that the complicity 
of P5s in conflicts undermined Africa’s peacebuilding. In view of this, Chapter Six 
undertook a prognostication of P5 behaviour in Africa’s DRC and Sudan, mapping out 
the lessons from the Council’s engagements. Based on research findings and the 
operational contexts of the P5, the chapter observed with deductions that exclusion 
conundrums were intentional. 
 
The chapter’s analytical projection of Security Council’s interventions and P5 resolution, 
drawing from historical and contemporary trends, suggested that a number of factors 
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potentially jeopardise P5 sdesire to intervene in African conflicts. It was pointed out that 
a conflicts in DRC, Sudan, Haiti and Yugoslavia offer considerable different faces of the 
Security Council. However, the chapter presented a caveat: the success of 
P5interventions and commitment towards security and peacebuilding in countries such as 
Haiti was aimed at facilitating reconstruction, peace and development in that state. It was 
observed however, that, generally, intervention depends largely on the extent to which 
the P5 address the substantive (that is, systemic and institutional) factors that potentially 
causes conflict and imperil effective post-conflict peacebuilding strategies. Drawing from 
the study’s findings as outlined in the chapter, some of the key logical conclusions, which 
may provide the bedrock for future research into the P5conflict resolution nexus and 
Security Council behaviours in conflict zones is the abandonment or utility of the 
instructions of the Charter. 
 
Predicated on the study’s main objectives, it investigates the nexus between the United 
Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa. In this effort, the study 
sought to address the following specific objectives: to determine the remote and 
immediate causes for African exclusion from the United Nations Security Council 
permanent seat; to determine whether Africa’s exclusion from the permanent membership 
of the United Nations Security Council inhibits Africa’s peace and security roles in the 
region and globally; and, to articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of 
the United Nations Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African 
peacebuilding and security issues. 
 
In light of that, the study was underpinned by a realist paradigm as propounded and 
guided by the Waltz,  1979, Morgenthau 1948: 5; Donnelly 2000, Keohane, 1986 and 
three other complementary theories/models, such as: the Behaviorism (Scientific 
Approach); Society of State Approach, and Dependency Theory. Realist paradigm 
enabled the use of qualitative approach which is centrally important in this study. The 
population of the study is not measured by the number of participants but by the category 
of respondents, namely the AU, UN and researchers and directors of peace and security 
institutes. Data for this study was collected through, semi-structured interviews and were 
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analysed using content analysis, tacitly combining it with thematic analysis. In areas 
where quantitative data were utilised, the study have employed the utility of data set from 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) which variously generated descriptive and 
inferential statistics for actualising the outlined objectives of the study.  
 
The study has seven chapters. The first chapter anchors, in essence the background, the 
hypothesis, the study objectives to mention a few. In Chapter Two, the United Nations 
real reform debates past and present, pro and anti-reform crusaders views were recorded 
as they pertain to global security and peace. At Chapter Three, the study demonstrated 
with models that reform is under sabotage due to percuniary and political interests. The 
research questions of the study (section 1.7) and the objective (section 1.6) are used as 
the organising framework for chapters four, five, and six, and Chapter Seven presents the 
originality of the study, contributions of the study and suggested areas for future research. 
7.2. Summary of findings 
The Security Council reform and Africa’s peacebuilding inhabit a distinctive posture in 
the discourse of worldwide safekeeping due to the weighty configurations they have set. 
The reform and the Africa’s insecurity, indeed, have endured for seven decades. In the 
course of this thesis, the following findings were made under various chapters, from 
Chapters:  Four, Five and Six. The findings under Chapter Four are discussed under 
article 7.2.1 to 7.2.3 with Q1 and O1 respectively. Chapter Five is discussed under article 
7.3 with code Q2 and O2. And Chapter Six is discussed under article 7.4 with Q3 and O3. 
Generally, Chapter Four was dedicated to addressing objective One of the study – 
determining the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from the Council, 
Chapter Five unpacked the Objective Two – determing whether African exclusion 
hinders Africa’s security roles, regionally and globally, and Chapter Six addressed the 
lessons that can be learnt from African exclusion and overall UN Security Council 




7.2.1. The remote and immediate causes of Africa’s exclusion 
In 1945 when the United Nations was born, not many African countries were free of 
colonial rule and dominance. The not-colonised Ethiopia that can claim freedom from 
Western domination was on its knees at the advent of both WWI and WWII begging for 
survival from drought and hunger, as such was not in any manner a global player. Thus, 
lack of freedom from colonialism was an important remote cause for Africa’s captivity in 
and exclusion from the permanent seat. And the neo-colonial tactics played out through 
avenues of MNCs, aid donations, especially, the constitution of international 
organisations such as the UN is still responsible for Africa’s immediate reasons for 
exclusion from the permanent seat of the Security Council. 
 
It was recorded from some of the interviewees that Africa did not have significant interest 
in directing global hegemon and could not be a stake holder at that time when the UN 
was formed, but has interest now following its efforts to control the array of the natural 
deposit within its borders. This actually foregrounds the position of realism in this study. 
The study learnt that interests of parties in organisations determine the disposition and 
contestation among the same. The African exclusion from the Council is laced into the 
protection of global interest of the P5 nations of the UN. Also, Africa’s persistent call for 
inclusion was born to defend her own interest within the global political system. So, 
while it appears, that the P5 states are heartless, both the P5 and African continent as well 
as the Latin American Group, know that it is a competition that requires one to force the 
other to accept the will of the stronger competitor for there to be a winner. The P5 may 
not in the near future carve out a permanent seat for Africa through dialogue. And the 
African nations may never become permanent members without agitation and 
competition. The UN is not the League. 
 
The concert of Europe and the League of Nations that were before the UN were not of 
any meaningful impact towards global peace and security and it was safe to assume that 
the UN could be a repetition of the League. While one of the issue areas assumed to have 
sparked some care-free attitude towards the Council was that it may die a natural death as 
did the League, it was seen that the UN have learnt from the mistakes of the League and 
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have a different political arrangements from the League. One key difference between the 
League and the UN is the P5 operational modalities. As shown in Chapter Four, the 
League lacked the commanding voice that the UN found in the P5. A major challenge to 
the UN is within its lack of best practices, lack of democratisation and the dictatorial 
enforcement strategies that have clearly made Africa feel itself a victim of the P5. 
 
The study found that resistance towards reform is not about African states not having the 
necessary ingredients required to serve in the Council’s permanent seat, instead, it is part 
of the broader global agenda to keep Africa dependent and at the periphery. Part of which 
is to keep the African states out of permanent position in global leadership and global 
security activism. The membership of South Africa and Brazil to the BRICS group bears 
testament to the account that where Russia and China operates, that an African and Latin 
American minds can comprehend and participate meaningfully in execution of Group’s 
purposes. Thus, the resistance is aimed at settling Africa at the periphery without powers 
to challenge decisions imposed on them, especially when the continent is being exploited. 
 
The study learnt that the AU is not fully assertive as a unit of force at international arena. 
However, the AU has been consistent, through its document doing the most important 
with the UN, which is, raising the reform debates as witnessed in Ezulwini Consensus. 
While the common position paper of the AU did translate into granting the region even 
half of the AU’s overall request, the study again found that the status quo remained 
because power, especially at international level of politics is not relinquished on mere 
wishes and desires or proficiency and articulation of position paper, but by hard politics 
of increase economic, military and political growth and might. This is the view of realism 
in this thesis. 
7.2.2. What about Africa’s regional and global securitisation? 
Further, in Chapter five, the study found that lack of ‘clout-leadership’ – which is likened 
to driving a car without steering – which indeed is, seeking control of African affairs by 
African leaders in an international political environment without even a permanent voice 
in the Security Council is problem within the continent. Discussion on lack of clout-
221 
 
leadership noted that Africa is aware of its deficiency and is now looking for more than 
Africa’s development as articulated in Agenda 2063; they are seeking a complete 
experience with permanent power and secured continent. The study’s Chapter Five 
specifically shows that the UN P5 simply does not have enough attractions from Africa. 
This observation was located in the interpretation of armed conflicts and loss of lives that 
have occurred in Africa. It was further deduced that Africa could not resolve conflicts 
within her region independently of the UN especially, when the P5 have stakes in the 
conflict. The AU is likely to increase its agitation for inclusion as a unit to the UN and it 
is not likely to stop calling for reform until at least a permanent seat is ceded to Africa.  
 
In Chapter Five, the thesis learnt that war was aimed to be an African affair in particular 
and an integral part of global politics in general. For example DPKO records 
demonstrated that Africa has more than half of the global conflict. Even though, the UN 
has presence in the conflict, it has been at the peacekeeping levels. Peacekeeping, indeed, 
occurs after the conflict has occurred. Recalling the AU Official’s narratives, numerous 
wars in Africa with external actors with vested interests, are indicators of lack of ‘real’ 
authority in the continent. Thus, the study found that while Africa has attracted more 
peacekeeping missions from the UN, it would not have had more wars if the African 
region is in control of conflicts within its territory. 
 
This is important since the study also finds that veto power to an African state can serve a 
deterrent to unpopular resolutions that targets Africa and even illegal activities of war 
such as trading in military weaponry that cause and actually stoke conflict in Africa. In 
Chapter Five, we learnt that trading in military hardware is a source of income to some 
nations of the P5 such as the US that was the highest beneficiary of the conflict in 
Africa’s DRC. So, any arrangements that will cut the US out of the selling of military 
hardware to the DRC and numerous African states with conflict will surely face the 
challenge of the US. So, DRC for instance, may continue to be in war since it is a source 
of revenue to a permanent state and it requires another permanent member to disentangle 
DRC from the strangle hold of the weapon dealers. That other permanent member must 
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be African as the P5 members do not step into one another’s business, as a matter of 
mutual respect. 
 
In Chapter Five, the study learnt that since the formation of the UN in 1945, the nature of 
conflicts have both gradually and drastically changed and internal armed conflicts now 
dominate both pie and component bar chats of global conflicts, and Africa is actually at 
the centre. It is understood that Africa is at the centre of world conflict and periphery of 
the world governance, so that development cannot take root. Further, in a milieu in which 
Africa both aspires and is expected to take on more responsibilities for expansion, peace 
and security on the continent and globally, the question of who will bail the cat is at the 
heart of post-colonial Africa. The question of who will bail the cat requires Africa to 
stand on as a candidate, push the candidate through to the permanent seat, and tasked the 
candidate with the duty of representing the continent. Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria 
have been found capable of representing the continent in the permanent chamber of the 
Council. 
 
The UN Official, who narrates that some African states is verily able to serve at the 
Council’s permanent seat noted for instance that Nigeria’s stability can change Africa’s 
course globally. The Official, however, hinted that, “withholding of permanent seat from 
the region, exacerbate the instability within its circles.” Following the insights from the 
UN Official, the study learnt that some African state’s inability to punch up to, or even 
beyond its weight in international political arena is a problem to the continent as a whole. 
The study specifically finds that peace, security, development in Nigeria as well as any of 
the big five African states will bring peace, security, and development to the entire 
continent. In this regard, the study under Chapter Five records that Nigeria needs capable 
leaders at all spheres of governance with coherent policies to get out of its current arena 
of under-performance that negatively affects the continent. 
 
In essence, it is an observation of the study that the Big Five powerhouses of Africa – 
Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa (in alphabetical order) will inevitably 
shape the future of the region for the reason that their demographic, economic and 
223 
 
military size, as well as their historical role as regional leaderships, and for the fact that 
they account for “40% of Africa’s population, 60% of the African economy and 58% of 
Africa’s military expenditure.” While the study finds that Nigeria holds a lot of prospects 
for a prosperous Africa, the top five African nations, including Angola and Morocco need 
to be conscious of their role in the region as a well harnessed power from these countries 
will engineer the sense of security for Africa’s people. 
 
Further, recalling the interpretation of the ISS study, it is this study’s judgment that 
economic growth in Africa is driven by long-term investments in education and indeed, 
reductions in foreign-debt burdens. Thus, it is our finding that lack of education and 
especially low or high foreign debts liability is a major factor silencing African leaders in 
the face of good governance to the African people.  
 
There is prospect for Africa’s growth and development. The study finds that Ethiopia is 
on the rise. According to the IFs Base Case forecasts for the period 2015 to 2040 Ethiopia 
is expected to achieve the highest average growth rate of the Big Five – on average, 
almost 2% faster than the 8.3% of Nigeria. Whereas Algeria, Egypt and South Africa are 
expected to grow below the African average rate of 6.3%, and roughly in line with the 
global average, Nigeria and Ethiopia are both expected to grow much faster. Nigeria, 
already the largest economy in Africa, and representing over 1.5% of the global 
economy, is forecast to represent nearly 3% of the global economy by 2040, close to the 
economic output of Germany and greater than that of France. Algeria accounted for 17% 
of Africa’s total military expenditure and has, since 2008, had the largest military 
expenditure in Africa (Cilliers et al, 2015). Algeria’s military expenditure has grown at 
11% per annum since 1988. 
 
When the forecast shows that Nigeria’s GDP is forecast to grow from slightly “over $525 
billion in 2014 to slightly over $4.2 trillion by 2040” the IFs Base Case forecast is that 
Nigeria will constitute slightly less than 2% of the global economy, up from 0.7% in 
2014. To this end, lesson is that “to a large extent, the increase in Africa’s role globally 
will therefore be driven by the future weight of Nigeria – a country that by 2040 will 
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have the fourth largest population in the world after India, China and the US. As 
indicated earlier, to a large extent, the increase in Africa’s role globally will be driven by 
the future weight of Nigeria. Nigeria’s current problem is dependency wrapped in bad-
leadership clothing, a liberated Nigeria from neo-colonial dependency shall lead the road 
for Africa’s independent and good name. 
 
The study finds that global realignment of power is necessary. And Africa must cooperate 
and function as a unit to become heavier. The combined political, economic and social 
might of Africa, found in its total unit is impressive. Specifically, the total size of the 
African economy is expected to increase by 29% from $5.3 trillion to $18 trillion, and its 
share of the global economy will increase from 5.1% to 7.2% by 2040. Through the IFs 
forecast, the study finds that by 2040 Africa is expected to have a population of 2.0 
billion people, constituting 21.8% of the global population. One other major determinant 
of higher future growth rates is the political and economic integration of current markets 
– the creation of regional economic communities with common currencies, freedom of 
movement of labour and capital across borders, and common import and export tariffs on 
African goods and services within Africa 
 
In this respect, the study finds that Nigeria and South Africa are two African states that 
need to put their acts together to make important comments in the current global politics. 
Their importance is woven into the facts that even the powerful nations – the US and EU 
— needs the collaboration of [Nigeria and South Africa] to gain inroad into Africa and be 
able to operate efficiently in the region. 
7.2.3. Summarising security and peace lessons for Africa 
Under the Chapter Six of this thesis, the study finds that the United Nations was created 
in an atmosphere of major power cooperation. This was made evident when it was 
established that the UN architecture assumed that the leading global actors in world 
affairs in the period of 1940s will permanently be at the helms of world affairs, and with 
the introduction of veto power, they were even encouraged to believe so and act in 
tandem with their believe. Hence, the continued resistance towards reform to 
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accommodate the democratic principle upon which every government in the current 
dispensation is encouraged to appreciate. The P5 states (especially, US, France and 
Britain) who have advanced reasons why the Council must not democratise, have invaded 
countries like Libya on the altar of lack democracy. So, it is not about democracy and 
balance, it is about the maintenance of the interests of the concerned P5.  
 
Africa is afraid to challenge the status quo and face the consequences. From the analysis 
of data in Chapter Six, it was observed that the only basic challenge Africa is facing from 
the world bodies is garnering the support of the members who would support, and/or take 
some form of responsibility for Africa’s failure when efforts to become free at once fails. 
A lack of solidarity and disunity may keep Africa dependent and begging. Lack of unity 
and solidarity is the upshot of Africa’s fear of the colonial powers. The study noted that 
Africa has the capacity but lacks the courage when dealing at the international gallery. 
Collective action can bring about collective security which may in turn suppress incipient 
acts of aggression from within the region and end imposition of external order on the 
region. Study finds that collective effort among African actors cannot be easily attained 
but it is very possible. As such it was observed that African region that owns the conflict 
does not participate in its solution and was further noted that the African continent that 
owns the conflicts should be part of the team, (the permanent members) that proffer 
solutions. 
 
Africa lost more people to death in conflicts and wars than any other continent under the 
presence of the UN Security Council command. The study learns that conflict in Africa 
was responsible for approximately 90% of the total number of war deaths in the 1990s. 
Nine of the 10 bloodiest conflicts of the decade were in Africa. Death tolls in some of 
these conflicts were literally one thousand times those of minor, yet high profile conflicts 
in Haiti, Kosovo and Israel. Assertions that the UN Security Council is seriously engaged 
in African affairs are often supported by claims that 70% of the Council’s work is 
devoted to African affairs. That 70% of the Council’s work may indeed be on Africa, the 
overall output, of the Council’s work in the 1990s exposes that, on the contrary Africa 
was largely marginalised by the Council and its members. 
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The study discovered that Council uses different ‘canes to different persons’ in that the 
responses of the Council appear disproportionate to the level of the various conflicts. This 
bears in mind that high profile or large scale conflicts in Africa (as was the DRC) 
received a very low response from the Security Council, while a supposedly low profile 
conflict outside Africa (as was in Haiti) received the full attention of the Council. In 
areas, it was found that the Council just adopts resolution or presidential statement on the 
matter without any determination to get practically involved in resolving the actual 
skirmish thereby stoking the conflicts. 
 
Further, the study under Q3, O3, learnt that the ICC is an independent institution of 
justice, but it works hand in hand with the Security Council in dealing with indictees who 
are outside the bracket of the ICC. The study found that since 2002 when the ICC 
relevant documents were ratified, the body had indicted 37 persons for various accounts 
of war crimes, crime against humanity and genocide (See Appendix 10). As a matter of 
fact, the 37 indictees are all citizens of Africa. Some were tried by the Court, found guilty 
and convicted by the Court while others were set free on the basis of lack of sufficient 
evidence and others awaiting hearing and trial. It was noted that the Council play roles in 
referring and people deemed to have violated the rules, to the ICC. 
7.3. Conclusions 
Save the UN works out the idea to reform the Council, it has to resign itself to the status 
quo. It was observed that status quo is a preference that is not particularly attractive when 
one considers the current United Nations Security Council structure and the future of 
world order. As a system – a framework of rules, based on checks and balances – meant 
to preserve the survival of the human race through, maintenance of global security and 
peace, needs to be supported by all actors. Co-operation and inclusion as the basis of 
genuine equality among all international actors in normative terms as contained in the 
UN Charter were noted. Also, it was suggested that, in practical terms, such actions as 
implementation of geographic representativity contained in several proposal at the 




The study has three principal questions and three pertinent objectives that stems 
necessarily from the three questions posed in the study. This study has at the Chapter 
Four responded to question one (Q1) and Objective one (O1) respectively. At the outset 
of Chapter Four the study made significant findings discussed under Summary of 
Findings and concludes that the remote and immediate causes of African exclusion from 
the United Nations Security Council permanent seat is in parts on one hand of African 
cause and on the other hand non-African cause. The exclusion, particularly on the remote 
cause, where it is claimed that African nations were not free of colonial rule may serves a 
genuine account that the exclusion is not a decision made by the African members.  
 
However, on the other hand, when the African nations variously joined the UN during the 
post-independence in the 1960s, and having been members of the UN for that long, 
Africa’s exclusion is not entirely the problem of the P5. Indeed, Africa was not free when 
the decision to create the UN to rule the world was made. Now that it is free, the pertinent 
question is what stops Africa from including itself unto the permanent category? The 
study draws from the data and document evidence that Africa contributes to its continued 
marginalisation by the UN Security Council through its own inactions. 
 
Further, discussion on reasons for sustained African exclusion from the permanent seat, 
Q1 and O1, shows that the thoughts that the UN may function and collapsed naturally as 
did the League show lack of commitment from the African side. This is because, the 
lessons and factors that informed the collapse of the League appears to have been 
wrongly applied in the context of the Security Council. So, there is a wrong estimation 
and assessment of the UN at its departure by leaders of African descent. 
 
The same argument applies to the account of Africa not being interested in the global 
body as it had no interest at stake at the period of 1945. One, it can be given that an 
Africa that is not free from colonial powers does not have the liberty of talking about 
permanent seat when it is not assured of non-permanent seat. Two, it is also important to 
note that an Africa that was under colonial oppression will be seeking ways only to get 
rid of colonial masters and may not have the vision for permanent seat. However, there is 
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a duty on Africans to have marked their attendance in the UN activities correctly. The 
continent recognised the time of entry but have no agenda of exit which left their 
bargaining power in powder —weak status.  
 
In addressing Q2 and O2 which seeks to understand whether the permanent membership 
of the United Nations Security Council inspired Africa’s conflict and inhibited Africa’s 
active peace and security roles in the region and globally, it is evident that lack of 
permanent seat to Africa contributes to Africa’s insecurity paradigm. Indeed, without any 
reform that includes Africa, the Security Council shall continue to relegate Africa to the 
periphery and may lose legitimacy among disgruntled African states. This is not only 
because other multilateral institutions such as BRICS may gain relevance in Africa and 
the Latin America that is also excluded from the permanent seat, to entrench dependency 
paradigm but also the decentralisation of international peace and security activities to all 
concerned touch base with the marginalised.  
 
Following from the interrogation of Q2, O2 under Chapter Five, and the attendant 
outcomes, it can be deduced from the accounts that armed conflicts, and wars in Africa 
(the DRC, the Libya for example) sometimes are paid for by the external powers. The 
aim of the external powers is to become an actor in that conflict, either as a peacekeeper 
or weapon dealer. The latter is the case of the US and DRC in which the US is the highest 
beneficiary of the DRC conflict. Also, there seems to be some concerted effort in 
maintaining the cult of violence in Africa with a view to making the African region an 
arena notorious for violence, instability and under-developed to aid the interested P5 
states in marking Africa as a continent in perpetual need of intervention and not one to 
offer help to itself or any other globally.    
 
There have been voices from commentators and authors such as Brian Cox, that a 
permanent seat and veto power will not change Africa’s political story in the world. 
However, there are compelling grounds to concede that one thing that will change 
Africa’s political story in the world is the permanent seat with veto. For example, if the 
Resolution 1973 that authorised the attack on Libya and terminated Gaddafi’s life was 
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matched with a veto vote from supposedly South Africa or Nigerian government, the 
once consolidated Libya that is in shambles today may have a different story. In fact, 
South Africa or Nigeria do not need to wait until veto stage, the mere public 
announcement that they will veto it would have at least changed the complexion of the 
intervention in that country, bearing in mind that the AU was still working out modalities 
for a process that when peacefully explored will ensure a stronger Libya. So, permanent 
seat with veto power would have been deterrence factor, and allow Africa some 
meaningful intervention in both regional and global security regimes. 
 
Even though, there are some other pertinent activities such as growing Africa’s 
economies that the continent can focus on to increase its relevance and abilities towards 
regional and global securities, it is imperative to underscore that these economies may not 
grow if the region is not equipped with permanent power. This is because, one of the 
destabilising factors of growth is the conflicts and some of the conflicts are stoked 
through the permanent voice. So Africa needs permanent seat and veto power in order to 
sustain any progress made in the direction of development and especially that of security 
and peace in the region. This is important since no meaningful economic development 
can be achieved in a conflict-ridden environment. Conflict is a crippling factor to Africa’s 
growth and permanent seat and veto power are ingredients necessary to sustained 
Africa’s growth in the current international system. 
 
Suffice to say that Africa’s dependency on external actors decision before engaging 
conflict is caused by its lack of political equipment of the veto and permanent seat, not 
the financial resources as have been suggested for decades. One of the major ways, 
Nigeria’s poor governance is affecting the continent is that when it was punching at its 
weight, it nearly single-handedly restored both Liberia and Sierra Leone to peace before 
the UN was welcomed to those countries. Yes, the nature of conflicts have changed 
drastically, but any rebel group without the backing of such states as the US in terms of 
munitions will beg any government for peace within days of encounter. Further the AU 
intervention in 2003 at the instance of luncheon of the AUPSC, which was later taken 
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over by the UN was not due to lack of financial resources as the AU was made to believe, 
this study understood that, it was due to lack of strategy and determination to succeed. 
 
More also, following from the political marginalisation that Africa has experienced in the 
hands of authors of the United Nations, it is inevitable that if the authors such as the US 
and Britain are true to the course of Africa’s security, there must be a global 
rearrangement of power. Especially to entrench democracy in the Council through the 
geographic representation standards, this will incorporate Africa and Latin America into 
the whole, and allow all continents the opportunity to respond to matters of domestic 
interest before external actors. This account borders on the fact that insecurity paradigm 
is a global phenomenon and the powerful that intervene in weaker states also experience 
other forms of security threats. The policy of global war on terrorism was after the United 
States was attacked in September 2011. 
 
While South Africa and Nigeria have dominantly been important actors in the region, the 
two must act properly and united in international activism with a view to keeping African 
states united. The Western countries destablise the continent of Africa through Nigeria 
and South Africa. The two nations are vehicles through which the external actors enter 
Africa. The two have not been acting in tandem with the supposedly African expectations 
due to hegemonic antagonism which led to the fate of Laurent Gbagbo and Muammar 
Gaddafi respectively. 
 
Furthermore, critically appraising the Q3, O3, it is instructive to conclude that the United 
Nations was first and foremost a political institution created by the global powers for the 
global powers. It is operated by the powerful for the weak. The P5 (especially, US, 
Britain and France) that are front runners for the democratisation of the world and every 
gathering within it blatantly throw away any reform proposal brought to make the UN 
more inclusive and democratic. This in full, shows that the principle of democracy should 
exist only where it services the needs and interests of such states as the US, Britain and 




The issue with Africa’s backwardness is linked to lack of courage and wealth of fear 
among African heads of states. This study concludes that in their individual capacities, 
African leaders cannot favourably compete against their oppressors, but as a united body 
of governors, the African actors will surely become an important force to reckon with in 
global political matters. The fear to challenge the status quo does not mean out of touch 
with what has to be done to, it all has to do with being on the bad books of US and other 
Western powers. The continent needs to unite in real terms bearing in mind that a well 
governed Nigeria will in 2040 supersedes the France and German governments 
respectively in terms of output. So, unity among the leaders will increase Africa’s 
chances of taking care of business in the region and globally. 
 
Yes, in 1990s Africa lost more men and women to wars and conflict than any other UN 
region in the world. This fact is chiefly due to the Council’s tactics of ignoring major 
conflicts in Africa but responding adequately to minor conflicts elsewhere. The Council’s 
attitude towards Africa was informed by the fact that, in areas where conflict exists, there 
also exist natural resources that are of interest to the interested Council interveners. So, 
the conflict receives band aid treatments which allow the interested interveners to 
continue tapping benefits from the conflicts, the DRC and Libya conflicts being some of 
them.  
 
Another important lesson is that, when the ICC started arraigning people and 
incarcerating them, those conflicts that attracted high level response outside Africa, on 
the altar that they are high profile crises did not warrant the ICC to arrest any of the 
participants of those wars as in Haiti or in Kosovo. The issue is, it could be that the UN 
stopped the war crimes through its necessary intervention and takes credit for those, or it 
has failed to make necessary intervention and precipitate the violence and attendant 
crimes. In the latter, the Council shall be drawn to answer to the cases of war crimes in 
African areas and elsewhere where it did not use proportionate method in dealing with 





The study has discussed the United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in 
Africa, reviewing the possibilities of African inclusion in the permanent seat. The 
recommendations presented below are based on the interpretations of each of the research 
questions, objectives and the pertinent findings that necessarily stems from them. 
Therefore, the recommendations are made in the areas of: Security Council reform, with 
specificities of African exclusion from the Security Council’s permanent membership; 
intervention roles, with emphasis on Africa’s ownership of interventions and peace 
missions; lessons for African states to unite and act as a unit force, with clear emphasis 
on integration and generating common denominator-factors among members. 
 
Africa must drown dependency on external actors and fund own missions: while the 
chase for the permanent seat and veto power has been daunting, relying on external actors 
to resolving African crises makes the region vulnerable and susceptible to external 
interveners. Dependency allows the P5 nations to dictate for Africa in both political and 
other areas of African affairs. It was noted that African leaders through the AU should 
embark on independent funding system to back up the willingness to provide desired 
security for the region.  
 
In view of the above, it is recommended that funding should be anchored firmly on good 
political and economic governance, with strong emphasis on Africa-led interventions. 
Good security and political governance consists of the promotion of independent ethos 
(including popular political participation). To be sure, respect for the rule of law and the 
sustenance of accountable, responsible and responsive effective national governments, 
and credible political leadership, all of which have been lacking in Africa. Good 
intervention strategy includes the implementation of credible and predictable transparent 
financial management, and effective anti-corruption mechanisms. These measures will 
curb corruption, which has contributed to the mismanagement of funds meant for 




The continent should work collectively to secure collective regional peace through shared 
responsibilities among the 54 states that currently constitute African region. As noted, it 
was learnt that the region depended on external actors which had resulted in failed 
missions. So, for some practical steps to address some of the immediate intervention 
problems noted in the study, the AU member states should encourage both monetary and 
military contributions as a mandatory peace project. Currently, the greater burden is 
shared among, the top five African states as alluded to earlier in this study.  
 
The Security Council should be made to reform through hard politics: during the study, 
we learnt that the Security Council is not reforming because of matters of power and not 
that of the will of the people. Since it is a subject of Realpolitik, the only amour the 
African axis of the UN has, which is truly effective is for the AU member nations to go 
through the hurdle of disunity, unite under and umbrella of the AU and exert influence 
within the parameters of a collective. Given, that the current status quo of the Council 
violates every spirit of democracy in the current era, the African group shall hold the US 
and allies (who are crusaders of democracy) to practice what they preach. This can be 
done in two practical ways: firstly, the African Group will stand together and present a 
candidate, who will represent Africa at the permanent chambers of the Council. In this 
vein, their resources and especially voice will be best heard. We have seen that Nigeria, 
South Africa and Egypt can serve efficiently in the Council, the African states will insists 
for example that they have voted that an African state must become a permanent actor in 
the UN Security Council activities failing which, they will withdraw their membership 
from the organ. If request is granted, then the second step is not necessary, but if not 
granted the second step must be taken. 
 
Secondly, the second step, the African group will practically and collectively withdraw 
their membership of the UN on the grounds of marginalisation and that it is not 
democratic, but very exclusive. When this step is taken, bearing in mind that the reform 
has not happened because the US and allies are against it, the African Group, will 
collectively increase relations with other emerging and contending institutions such as 
BRICS. This will not only make the UN, especially the P3 actors call for dialogue, but 
234 
 
will actually compel them to cede at least a permanent seat to Africa, at least to avert 
entrenching Africa’s relations with the competitors — the P2 — of  the P5. 
 
The African nations must aim at integration and peacebuilding, to attain unity: the 
integration of African states is more doable on paper than in practice. However, it is 
possible. Africa can integrate through ownership of common currency, open borders, 
common passports and become visa free routes to all Africans. In this regards, the first 
things that needs to be done is to create a common passport. This passport will have the 
AU logo and seal, other than any particular country but can be issued by the AU or any of 
the AU member states. When the common passport is introduced, any African holder of 
the AU-issued passport will move freely in the continent without visa within the 
countries of AU member states. In this regard, the border is open to members only while 
non-members are subjected to the due process of visa acquisition before entry into Africa, 
and should have visas for any of the member states to allow passage. When this is done, 
the AU should introduce a common currency. Or allows that South African Rand can be 
used to purchase items in Nigeria and Nigeria’s Naira can be used in South Africa and 
same to apply to all member states. The AU should have African Union Banks that 
functions in all member states, these banks will see to free utility of African members’ 
various currencies in all member states, through the members Principal Banks such as 
Reserve Bank for South Africa, Central Bank for Nigeria, etc. When this is done, the gap 
and stack reality that Africa is divided will be practically narrowed, and the continent 
strengthened through shared common denominators such as the AU passport, either 
common currency or recognised currency, AU Banks, etc. 
 
Another strategy on Africa’s integration is to use the AUPSC as a forum to create a 
unified ‘made in Africa’ intervention plan that can be pushed into and integrated with the 
national security projects of member states through the national constitution. This would 
give such African peace mission plan a considerable legitimacy among the member 
nations, and would make it difficult for the Council to invade territories as was witnessed 
in Libya, since such AUPSC intervention plan will not only prohibit external 
interventions but will propel the wing to act at the earliest. As we saw in Chapter Two, 
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that the AU Constitutive Act empowers the African states to take certain action under 
certain circumstances, this account was re-enforced in Chapter Five when the data reveals 
that armed conflicts are more within than between countries in the present time. The 
AUPSC integration of security arrangements into national constitutions of member states 
makes easy to regard such arrangement as national order and part of nation’s constitution 
and treated as such under international law. 
 
This will eliminate the challenge of having to regularly garner the support of the Council 
members who (as seen in Chapter Six) would take actions that suit the interveners and 
not the intervened. In the final analysis, there evidence from the data that the past African 
conflict resolution was left to Africans, and the future of Africa’s conflict resolution has 
been left almost entirely in African hands, and that little support from the UN Security 
Council, or its powerful members cannot be practically and genuinely expected in the 
near future. At this juncture, the AU should assert itself through developed modalities to 
lead Africa’s unity programme. 
 
The United Nations Security Council should encourage its own reform through the P5: 
The UN Security Council should turn on a self-correct mode within the Council to reform 
it through democratisation and inclusive principles. This will appreciate, value, and 
recognise the presence of all members in the Council. How it will work, the P5 should 
adopt a resolution that speaks to current configuration of the Council, in consonance with 
the Charter and reform proposals, and call for the reform of the Council. Firstly, the P5 
must advise that the Council is bias as currently configured – since it does not have the 
genuine representation of people from Africa and Latin America at the permanent level. 
Secondly, the Council must assert that geographic representativity tallies with the UN 
Charter that all are equal and must be treated equally. In this regard, the workings of the 
Council should be such that one permanent seat to one UN region or two permanent seats 
each to one UN region and equitably so. When this is done, the bias, the undemocratic, 





Alternatively, when Council refuses to reform, it will have more jobs trying to keep 
disgruntled members happy and make them remain members and lose relevance that 
would have been there if the P5 have bowed when the ovation was indeed high. While 
this study did not make any forecast on UN’s future, it is imperative to note that with the 
emergent of alternative voices such as the BRICS, chances are there that the UN fame 
might wane in areas, as South Africa may be committed more to BRICS than the UN. It 
may as well happen that the Official’s speculation that the UN may die naturally becomes 
true as the departure of the League was done through the emergence of the UN.  
7.5. Contribution and originality of the study 
Wassenaar (2006) cautioned that, for research to be of value, it should address issues that 
are important to a particular society or community within a society. The study through 
the interrogation of research questions and objectives as set out, has in fact, identified the 
gaps in the existing literature, extended the frontiers and horizons of existing knowledge 
within the UN Security Council, and the AU. Specifically, knowledge generated from the 
study are of significant value to the AU, the UN, policy-makers, researchers, scholars of 
security, conflict, and strategy, as a whole, and more particularly to those who are dealing 
with the UN Security Council reform and Africa’s peacebuilding. 
 
From a policy perspective: the findings have the potential to influence the policy 
formulation of African government towards relations within the continent as how to 
relate with one another for unity purposes and countries outside the region for regional 
unity too. Further, the findings discussed in the study provide policy direction to 
planners, policy makers towards the Council reform and implementation. 
 
Improved Practice: the study indeed, contributes to the domain body of knowledge and 
literature, especially in the context of United Nations Security Council reform and 
peacebuilding in Africa. It also, has suggested improved ways reform the Council. While 
there are other studies in the field UN reform strategies, this study is the first 
comprehensive of its kind to explore the nexus between the reform and the peacebuilding 
in Africa. The study also proposes a model for peace missions in resolving Africa’s 
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conflicts, which builds upon the weaknesses of the UN Security Council current practice 
of might, is right. 
 
Finding the missing links and gaps:  several studies made on the reform have agreed on 
reform for democratic principles and representativity, however, beyond the noted 
reasons, this thesis has pressed further the call based on weighed capabilities of African 
states. It further identified the politics of P3 against P2 as primary problems towards the 
reform. This determination was possible after interpreting the positions of both Razali 
Plan and the High Level Report which called for reform but did not get the support 
required for implementation due in part to the P3 – P2 divide.   
7.6. Suggested areas for future research 
The present study investigated the United Nations Security Council reform and 
peacebuilding in Africa. In this fashion, while the study took into account the reform 
strategies and Africa’s peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding records, it did not 
give an in-depth analysis of the case of Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa or any other 
states of Africa’s top five. Thus, the study was limited to top three out of five, and indeed 
out of 54 African states. Future research should be conducted in the specific abilities of 
the top five compared with the current P5 nations of the Council with a view to determine 
their relative strengths and how those can be translated into soft and hard power in 
addressing the Council reform plan. 
 
Furthermore, since the present study was aimed at understanding the nexus between the 
United Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa, minding the roles 
of the P5 in reforming the Council, future research could be conducted on the roles of the 
General Assembly of the UN to reconnoiter how a 194 states has been over powered by 
just five states among them since 1945 and to reposition the Assembly in a manner that 








Books and Primary Sources 
Adebajo, A and Ismail, R. (2004). West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in 
a Troubled Region, London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 
Adebajo, A. (2008). Mad dogs and Glory: Nigeria’s Interventions in Liberia and Sierra-
Leone cited in Gulliver‟s Troubles, Nigeria‟s foreign Policy after the Cold War 
(Adebajo and Mustapha (eds.)), Published by the University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Press, South. 
Adebayo, A. (ed.) (1999). Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts: The Search 
for Sustainable Peace and Good Governance. London: Zed Books. 
Adebo, S. (1988) Our International Years Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited. 
African Union (2005). The Common African Position on the proposed reform of the 
United Nations: the Ezulwini Consensus. African Union Website. 
African Union, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United 
Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”. Executive Council of the African Union, 7th 
Extraordinary Session, 7-8 March 2005, Addis Ababa. Ext/Ex/CI/2(VII). 
Ajayi, K. (1998). Nigeria’s Peace Keeping role in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in Kolawole 
(ed.) Issues in Nigerian government and Politics. Akure:  Steebal` Publishers. 
Akinterinwa, B. (2010). Nigerian Citizen Diplomacy: Theoretical Genesis and Empirical 
Exegesis. Ibadan, Bolytag International Publishers. 
Aluko O. (1977). The Determinant of the Foreign Policies of African States, (ed.) the 
Foreign Polices of African States (1977) P. London: Hodder and Stoughton.  
Aluko, O. (1981). Essays on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy. London, Allen and Unwin.  
239 
 
Anam-Ndu, E.A (1979). The Leadership Question in Nigeria: A perspective Exploration, 
Lagos: Geo-Ken Associates Limited. 
Annan, K. (1997) “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform” Report of 
the Secretary General New York: UN Department of Information. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, (2011). International Relations, Principal Theories, in: Wolfrum, 
R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Babangida, I. (1991) For Their Tomorrow, We Gave Our Today: Selected Speeches of 
IBB Vol. II Ibadan: Safari Books (Export) Limited. 
Bailey, S. D. and Daws, S. (1998). The Procedure of UN Security Council. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
Bailey, S.D. and Daws, S. (1995). The United Nations: A Concise Political Guide, 3rd 
Edition. London: Macmillan Press LTD. 
Barkin, J.S. (2003). Realist Constructivism. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
pp. 325-342 
Bhaskar, R. (2008).  A Realist theory of Science with a New Introduction. New York: 
Routledge.  
Blokker, N.M. and Schrijver, N. (eds) (2005). The Security Council and the Use of Force: 
Theory and Reality, a Need for a Need for Change. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. 
Booth, K. and Wheeler, N.J. (2007). The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust 
in World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bourantonis, D (2005). The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform. New 
York: Routledge.  
240 
 
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1999). Unvanquished: a US-UN Saga. New York: Random House Inc. 
Boyd, A. (1971). Fifteen Men on a Powder Keg: A History of the UN Security Council. 
London: Methuen & CO LTD. 
Brown, M. E., Coté Jr, O. R., Lynn-Jones, S. M., and Miller, S. E. (2004) (eds), Offense, 
Defense, and War. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Byers, M. (1999). Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Carr, E. H. (2001). The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Relations. London: Palgrave. 
Copeland, D. C. (2000). The Origins of Major War. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press. 
Crocker, C.A. (2001). Intervention, Toward Best Practices and Holistic View. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institutes of Peace Press. 
Denis J.D. Sandole (2010) Peacebuilding: Preventing Violent Conflict in a Complex 
World. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Dickinson, G. L. (1916). The European Anarchy. New York: Macmillan Company.  
Diehl, P.F. ed. 2001. The Politics of Global Governance: International Organizations in 
an Interdependent World, 2nd edition. London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Donelan, M. (1990). Elements of International Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Donnelly, J. (2005). “Realism”, in Burchill, S. et. al. (eds). Theories of International 
Relations. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
241 
 
Donnelly. J. (2000). Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Doyle, M.W. and Sambanis, N. (2006). War making and Peace Making: the United 
Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Dunne, T. and Schmidt B. (2004), ‘Realism’, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds), The 
Globalization of World Politics, 3rd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ebegbulem, J.C. (2012). Nigeria and Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Darfur 
Experience. Abakaliki:  Smile Printing Press. 
Ekwealor, C.T. (2015). The UN and Africa: Acrimony and Anarchy in Libya. 
Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic Publishing. 
Fafowora, O. (1997) “Nigeria and the Security Council Guardian” (Lagos) September 22. 
Falola, T. (1999). The History of Nigeria, Greenwood Press, 1999. pp. 41,47. 
Falola, T. (1999). The History of Nigeria. West-Port CT: Greenwood Press. 
Fassbender, B. (1998).  UN Security Council Reform and the Right of Veto: A 
Constitutional Perspective. Hague: Kluwer Law International. Page 7 - 18  
Fisher, S, (2000). Working with Conflict: Skills & Strategies for Action. London: Zed 
Books. 
Freyberg-Inan, A. (2004). What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International 
Relations and Its judgement of Human Nature. New York: State University of 
New York Press. 




Gambari, 1. (1997) “Reform of the United Nations and Nigeria's Quest for a Permanent 
Seat in the UN Security Council”, Lagos: NIIA Founder's Day Lecture, 
December. 
Gambari, I. (1992) “The Role of the United Nations in a Changing World Order” Lagos, 
NIIA Lecture Series No.73. 
Garba, J. (1997) International Peace and Security. The Nigerian Contribution. Lagos: 
Gabumo Publishing Company Limited. 
Ghali, B.B. (1992). An Agenda for Peace, United Nations, New York. 
Guzzini, S. (1998) Realism in International Relations and International Political 
Economy: The New International Relations Series. London: Routledge. 
Hart, C. 1988. Doing a Literature Review: Releasing the Social Science Research 
imagination. SAGE Publication Ltd 
Hassler, S. (2013) Reforming the UN Security Council Membership: The Illusion of 
Representativeness. New York: Routledge. Pages 9-207. 
Hay, C. (2002). Political Analysis. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Himes, J. S. (1980). Conflict and Conflict Management. Athens: The University of 
Georgia Press. 
Hobbes, T. (ed) Curley, E. (1994). Leviathan: With selected variants from the Latin 
edition of 1668. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 
Hoffmann, W. (1994). United Nations Security Council reform and restructuring. 
Michigan: Center for U.N. Reform Education. 
Hovet, T. (1960). Bloc Politics in the United Nations. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press. 
243 
 
Hugh Tinker, (1977). Race, Conflict and International Order: from empire to United 
Nations. London: Macmillan. 
Idang, G. (1973). Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, (1960-1966). Ibadan: 
University Press. 
Idisi, C. O. and Idise, G. E. (eds.), (1996). Dynamic Cases in International Relations. 
Lagos, Benin, Kaduna: Uto Publications. 
Kaldor, M. (2007). Human Security. Cambridge: Polity Press 
Kennedy, P. (2006). The Parliament of Man. The Past, Present, and Future of the United 
Nations, New York, Random House, pp. 51-52. 
Keohane, R and Nye, J. (2005). Power and Interdependence 3rd edition. New York: New 
York University Press. 
Keohane, R. (ed.) (1986). Neorealism and its Critics. New York: Columbia University 
Press. This collection of essays includes key chapters by Waltz, an interesting 
defence of realism by Robert Gilpin, and powerful critiques by Richard Ashley, 
Robert Cox, and J. G. Ruggie. 
Kranso, J.E. (2004). ‘To End the Scourge of War: The Story of UN Peacekeeping’, in 
Krasno, J.E. (ed.) Confronting the Challenges of a Global Society. London: Lynne 
Reinner Publishers. 
Learche, C and Said, A. (1979). Concepts of International Politics. 2nd ed. Englewood 
Cliffs. N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 
Lenther, H. (1974). Foreign Policy Analysis. Columbus: Oh Merrill Publishing.  
Lobell, S. E., Ripsman, N. M., and Taliaferro, J. W. (eds) (2009). Neoclassical Realism, 
the State, and Foreign Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
244 
 
Luck, E.C. (2004). Reforming the United Nations: Lessons from a History in Progress, 
ed. Krasno, J.E. in The United Nations: Confronting the Challenges of a Global 
Society. London: Lynne Reinner Publishers. 
Luck, E.C. (2006). UN Security Council: Practice and Promise. New York: Routledge. 
Machiavelli, N. Translated by William K. Marriot (2007).The Prince. Rockville: Manor 
Classics. 
Macridis, R. (1962). Foreign Policy in World Politics, Englewood Cliffs. N.J. Prentice-
Hall. 
Malone, D. (2004). The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century. 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc. 
Martin, A. and Edwards, J. (1955). The Changing Charter: A study in the Reform of The 
United Nations. London: Sylvan Press. 
Mays, T. (1998). Nigerian Foreign Policy and Its Participation in ECOMOG, in Karl P. 
Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan, eds., Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in 
Liberia. London: Macmillan. 
McCandless, E. (2011). Peace And Conflict Studies: Origins, Defining Issues, Current 
Status, in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader. Printed in 
Switzerland: University for Peace. 
McDermott, G. (1973). The Diplomacy and its Apparatus. London: Plume Press / Ward 
Lock Ltd. 




Meredith, M. (2011).  The Fate of Africa: A History of the Continent since Independence. 
New York: Public Affairs Publishers. 
Mingst, K. and Margaret, K. (2000). The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd 
edition Oxford: Westview. 
Morgenthau, H. (1958). Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 
Morgenthau, H. J. (1948). Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
Moya, P.M.L. eds (2000). Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of 
Postmodernism. Berkeley and California: University of Carlifornia Press.  
OECD, (2007). “Principles For Good International Engagement In Fragile States and 
Situations”. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 
2007 
OECD, (2008). ‘Evaluating Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities”, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,: Factsheet 2008’ 
Orford, A. (2011). International Authority and Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ougaard, M. and Richard, H. eds. (2002). Towards a Global Polity. London: Routledge. 
Patton, M.Q. (2002). Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods. California: Thousand 
Oaks Sage. 
Payne, G and Payne, J (2004) Key Concepts in Social Research. London: Sage 





Rupert, M. (2000). Ideologies of Globalisation. London: Routledge. 
Russett, B. (1993). Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War 
World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Salthe, S.N. (1985). Evolving Hierarchical Systems. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Sandole J. D. and Hugo Van der Merwe (eds), (1993). Conflict Resolution Theory and 
Practice; Integration and Application”. Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press. 
Sandole, J.D. (2010). Peacebuilding: War and Conflict in the Modern World. Cambridge: 
Polity Press. 
Schraeder, P. (1994). United States Foreign Policy toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis 
and Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Silverman, D. (ed.) (1997). Qualitative Research: Theory, Methods and Practice. London: 
SAGE Publications. 
Smith, M. J. (1986). Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger. Baton Rouge, LA: 
Louisiana State University Press. 
Snooks, G.D. (2003). The Collapse of Darwinism, Or, The Rise of a Realist Theory of 
Life. Maryland: Lexington Books. Page 303. 
Sutterlin, J. (2003). The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A 
Challenge to Be Met, 2nd edition. London: Praeger. 




Thomson, M. and Verwij, M. (eds), (2006). Clumsy Solutions for a complex world: 
Governance, Politics and plural perceptions. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
United Nations (1945). “Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice”. San Francisco. 
United Nations (2008). Everything You Always Wanted To Know About The United 
Nations. United Nations Department of Public Information. United Nations 
Publishing Section, New York, NY 10017. 
United Nations General Assembly, Outcome Document: Resolution Adopted by the 
General Assembly, 60/1. 2005 World Summit Outcome. Sixtieth Session Agenda 
46 and 120 (A/60/1). 
United Nations Member state, Growth in the United Nations membership, 1945-present 
(2014a). 
United Nations Security Council (2014) Special Research Report on Security Council 
Election, September 2014. 2014, No. 2 16 September 2014. Available at: 
securitycouncilreport.org. Date accessed: 14/1/2015. 
United Nations, (1997). “Report of the Open Ended - Working Group on the Question of 
Equitable Representation on an Increase in the Membership of the Security 
Council and other Matters Related to the Security Council. United Nations 
General Assembly Official Records. Fifty-First Session.  New York. 
Vasquez, J.A. (1998). The power of Power Politics: from Classical realism to 
neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
248 
 
Walt, S. M. (2002). ‘The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition’, in I. Katznelson 
and H. V. Milner (eds), Political Science: The State of the Discipline. New York: 
W. W. Norton. 
Waltz, K.N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Weiss, T. G. et al (eds) (2010). The United Nations and Changing world politics.  
Philadelphia: Westview Press. 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Wilkinson, R. and Steve H, eds. (2002). Global Governance: Critical Perspectives. 
London: 
Wouters, J. and Ruys, T. (2005). Security council reform: a new veto for a new century. 
Brussels: Academia Press. 
Yanow, D. (1996). How Does a Policy Mean? Interpreting Policy and Organizational 
Actions. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
Zakaria, F. (1998). From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World 









Journal Publications and Articles 
Addison, T. (2003). From Conflict to Recovery in Africa, (ed) From Conflict to Recovery 
in Africa, UNU/WIDER Studies in Development Economics (London, Oxford 
University Press, 2003), 3–16. 
Adedeji, A. G., and I. S. Zabadi. (2004). The Regional Dimension of Peace Operations in 
the 21st Century. Lagos, Planet Press Limited. 
Adeleke, A. (1995). “The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The 
ECOWAS Operation in Liberia”. Journal of Modern African Studies, Volume 
33/Issue 04/December 1995. 
Adeniji, A. (2004) “Foreign Aid as an Instrument of Foreign Policy: The Nigerian 
Experience”, OOUJournal of History and Diplomatic Studies Vol. 1. 
Adeniji, A. (2005). Power and Representation at the United Nations: A Critique of 
Nigeria’s Bid for Permanent Seat in the Security Council India Quarterly Journal, 
Vol. LXI, No.2; April-June, 2005, Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi 
Adler, E. (1997). “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics.” 
European Journal of International Relations 3(3): 319–363. 
Ajayi, T. (2008).  “The UN, the AU, and ECOWAS – A Triangle for Peace and Security 
in West Africa?” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Briefing Paper.   
Akande, D. (1997).  The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is There 
Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United 
Nations? The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 
1997), pp. 309-343 
250 
 
Akindele, RA. (1999) “The United Nations in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” in Hassan Saliu 
(ed) Selected Themes in Nigerian Foreign Policy and International Relations 
Horin, Nigeria. Sally and Associates. 
Akindele, RA. (1999) “The United Nations in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” in Hassan Saliu 
(ed) Selected Themes in Nigerian Foreign Policy and International Relations. 
Ilorin, Nigeria. Sally and Associates. 
Akindele, RA. and Akintererinwa, B.A (1995) “Reform of the United Nations: Towards 
Greater Effectiveness, Enhanced Legitimacy Profile and Equitable Regionally 
Balanced Membership in an Enlarged UN Security Council” in George Obiozor 
and Adekunle Ajala (eds) Africa and the -United Nations, Lagos: NIIA Press. 
Akinrinade, S. (1992) “From Hostitility to Accommodation: Nigeria’s West Africa 
Policy, 1984-1990”Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 18, No.1. 
Akpotor, A. S.  and Agbebaku, P. E.  (2010). “The United Nations Reforms and Nigeria’s 
Quest for a Permanent Seat”, Journal of Social Sciences, Vol. 24(1): 51-55. 
Akresh, R.et al. (2011).  War and stature: Growing Up during the Nigerian Civil War. 
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor. 
Discussion Paper Series No. 6194. 
Aladekomo, T.S. (2005). Nigeria’s Quest for UN Seat, in the Vanguard (Lagos) 
September 21, 2005, P. 33. 
Alden, C. and Soko, M. (2005). South Africa’s economic relations with Africa : 
hegemony and its discontents, The Journal of Modern African Studies / Volume 
43 / Issue 03 / September 2005, pp 367 - 392 
251 
 
Alli, W.O. (2012). The Role of Nigeria in Regional Security Policy. Friedrich- Ebert – 
Stiftung. Regional Office Abuja, Nigeria. Available at: www.fes-
westafrica.org/abuja.  Date accessed: 11/01/2014. 
Aning, E.K. (1994). “Managing Regional Security in West Africa: ECOWAS, ECOMOG 
and Liberia”. CDR Working Paper 94/2. Copenhagen Denmark; Center for 
Development Research. 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, (2011). International Relations, Principal Theories, in: Wolfrum, 
R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ashley, R.K. (1988). “Untying the Sovereign State: A Double Reading of the Anarchy 
Problematique.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 17(2): 227–262. 
Ayers, M. (1991). Substance: Prolegomena to a Realist Theory of Identity. The Journal 
of Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 2, pp. 69-90 
Ayoob, M. (2007). State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure, in Chester Crocker, 
Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aal (eds.), Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict 
Management in a Divided World. Washington, D.C., United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 2007.  
Baker, G. (2000). ‘‘Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society.’’ Political 
Studies 50(5): 928–943. 
Banfield, J., Haufler, V. and Lilly, D., 2003. Transnational Corporations in Conflict 




Barkawi, T, and Mark, L. (1999). “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and 
Globalisation.” European Journal of International Relations 5(4): 403–434. 
Barkin, S.J. (2003).  Realist Constructivism. International Studies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3, 
pp. 325-342 
Barna, J. (2014) In-depth Analysis, Insecurity in context: the rise of Boko Haram in 
Nigeria. Policy Department, European Parliament. DG 
EXPO/B/PolDep/Note/2014_13, pp 1-23. 
Bercovitch, J. et al (2008).  Introduction: the Nature of Conflict and Conflict Resolution. 
Available at: http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/24632_Bercovitch___Intro.pdf. 
Date accessed: 02/02/2014. 
Berlin, I. (1960). History and Theory: The Concept of Scientific History. History and 
Theory, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1960), pp. 1-31 
Blanchfield, L. (2007). United Nations Reform: U.S. Policy and International 
Perspectives. Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress. 
Boyd, A. (1971) Fifteen Men On A Powder Keg: A History Of The U.N. Security 
Council  222 (1971). 
Bull, H. (1966). “International Theory: the Case for a Classical Approach”. World 
Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3. Published by the John Hopkins University Press, USA. 
Byers, M. (1999). Custom, Power and the Power of Rules: International Relations and 
Customary International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Call, C.T. and Cook, S.E. (2003). Introduction: Postconflict Peacebuilding and 
Democratization, Global Governance, 9:2 (2003), 135–39 
253 
 
Cammack, P. (2002). “Attacking the Poor.” New Left Review 13: 125–134. 
Cantori, L. (2002) “Egypt: Moribund Between Past and Future” in Robert Freeman (ed) 
The Middle East Enters the Twenty-first Century Florida: University Press. 
Caron, D.D. (1993). “The Legitimacy of the Collective Authority of the Security 
Council”. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87(4) pp. 552-588. 
Carpenter, T. G. (1997). “The Mirage of Global Collective Security.” In Delusions of 
Grandeur: The United Nations and Global Intervention, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter. 
Washington: Cato Institute. 
Case of Gender Mainstreaming.” International Studies Quarterly 45(1): 27–57. 
Cato Institute, (2013). Dangerous World? Threat perception and U.S. National Security. 
Massachusetts Avenue, Washington, DC. 
Cilliers, J. and Hilding-Norberg, A. (2000) Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for 
the New Millennium. Monograph, No 46 February 2000, pp 1- 78 
Ciroma, A. (1995) “Western Media and the Nigeria Image” in LawaI Jafar Isa (ed) Not in 
Our Character,Kaduna: Kaduna State Government. 
Cox, B. (2009). “United Nations Security Council Reform: Collected Proposals and 
Possible Consequences”. South Carolina Journal of International Law and 
Business: Vol. 6(I). pp 89-128. 
Cox, R, and Harold, J. (2005). “The Framework for Inquiry.” In The Politics of Global 
Governance: International Organizations in an Interdependent World, ed. Paul F. 
Diehl. London and Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Cutts, M. (1999). The humanitarian operation in Bosnia, 1992-95: dilemmas of 
negotiating humanitarian access. New Issues in Refugee Research, Working 
254 
 
Paper No. 8, Policy Research Unit, UNHCR  CP 2500, CH-1211 Geneva  
Switzerland. 
Cyril I. O. (2010) Oil Extraction, Dispossession, Resistance, and Conflict in Nigeria's 
Oil-Rich Niger Delta, Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue 
canadienne d'études du développement, Vol.30:1-2, pp 219-236. 
Deudney, D.H. (1995). The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and 
Balance of Power in the American States-Union, Circa 1787-1861. International 
Organization, Vol. 49, No. 2, pp. 191-228. 
Dickinson, L.A. (2003). The Promise of Hybrid Courts. The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 97, No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 295-310 
Divers, J. (1999). A Genuine Realist Theory of Advanced Modalizing. Mind, Vol. 108, 
No. 430 (Apr., 1999), pp. 217-239--- Oxford University Press on behalf of the 
Mind Association  
Donelan, M. (1990). Elements of International Political Theory. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
Donnelly, J. (2005). “Realism”, in Burchill, S. et. al. (eds). Theories of International 
Relations. 3rd Edition. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Doty, R.L. (1993). “Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of 
U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines.” International Studies 
Quarterly 37(3): 297–320. 
255 
 
Doty, R.L. (1997). “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique 
in International Relations Theory.” European Journal of International Relations 
3(3): 365–392. 
Draman, R. and Carment, D. (2003). “Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: 
Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia”. Journal of Military and Strategic 
Studies, Vol. 6, Issue 2. 
Dunn, D.E. (1998). Liberias Internal Responses to ECOMOG’s Interventionist Efforts in 
Magyar and Conteh-Morgan, eds. Peacekeeping in Africa. 
Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. (2005). Realism in Baylis, J; Smith, S; Owens, P. (ed.), the 
Globalization of World Politics (Third Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eulau, H (1963). The Behavioral persuasion in politics. New York: Random House  
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About the United Nations(2008). United Nations 
Department of Public Information. New York, 2008  
Fafowora, O. (1997) “Nigeria and the Security Council Guardian” (Lagos) September 22. 
Falae, O. (1992) “Two Years of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria: Problems and 
Prospects” in SocialTransfonnation for Self-Reliance: Proceedings of a National 
Conference Ibadan: Fountain Publication. 
 Fawole, A. (2000) “Obasanjo’s Foreign Policy: Nigeria's Return to Global Reckoning?” 
Nigerian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 26, No.2. 
Fawole, W.A. (2003): Understanding Nigeria’s Foreign Policy since 1999, Institutions, 
Structures, Processes and Performance. Addis Ababa: OAU Press. 
Fernbach, A. (1945). The United Nations Security Council. Virginia Law Review, Vol. 
32(1), pp. 114-146 
256 
 
Fox, W.T.R. (1945). IV. Collective Enforcement of Peace and Security. The American 
Political Science Review. Vol. 39, No. 5 (Oct., 1945), pp. 970-981. 
Francis M. Deng, (2008). Introduction: Identity, Diversity, and Constitutionalism in 
AfricaWashington, D.C., United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008. 
Franck, T. M. (1992). “The Powers of Appreciation”: Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of 
UN Legality? The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 3 (Jul., 
1992), pp. 519-523. 
Franck, T.M. and Patel, P. (1991). UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old Order 
Changeth" 
Galtung, J. (1992). “The Way is the Goal: Gandhi Today”. Ahmedabad: Peace Research 
Centre, Gujarat Vidyapith.  
Galtung, J. (1996). “Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and 
Civilization, (Oslo and London, International Peace Research Institute and Sage 
Publications), 139–152. 
Gambari I.A (1997). “Reforms of the UN and Nigeria’s Quest for a Permanent Seat in the 
Security Council”. Lagos: NIIA Founder’s Day Lecture, 1997. 
Gambari, I. (1992) “The Role of the United Nations in a Changing World Order” Lagos, 
NIIA Lecture Series No.73. 
Gambari, I.A. (2008). ‘From Balewa to Obasanjo, the Theory and practice of Nigeria’s 
foreign policy’ cited in Gulliver’s Trouble Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold 
War. Pietermaritzburg: University of Kwazulu-Natal Press.  
Garba, J. (1997). International Peace and Security. The Nigerian Contribution, Lagos: 
Gabumo Publishing Company Limited. 
257 
 
Geeraerts, G., Zhimn, C. and Macaj, G. (2007). “China, the EU and the UN Security 
Council Reform”, Asia Paper, Vol. 2 (6) 1 November 2007. 
Gill, S. (1996). “Globalization, Democratization and the Politics of Indifference.” In 
Globalization: Critical Reflections, ed. James Mittleman. London and Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Glennon, M.J. (2003). Why the Security Council Failed. Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 3 
(May - Jun., 2003), pp. 16-35. 
Golberg, E. and Don, H. (2001). “The Security Council and the Protection of Civilians.” 
In Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace, 
ed. Robert McRae and Don Hubert. London: McGill-Queen’s University Press. 
Golwa, J. (2009). ‘ECOWAS and Conflict Resolution in Africa’ cited in ECOWAS: 
Milestones in Regional Integration, Ogwu and Alli (eds). 
Gordenker, L. and Weiss, T. (1996). “Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical 
Approaches and Dimensions.” In NGOs, the United Nations and Global 
Governance, eds. Thomas Weiss and Leon Gordenker. London: Lynne Rienner. 
Gowan, R. and Gordon, N. (2014). Pathways to Security Council Reform. A Report by 
the New York University Center on International Cooperation Commissioned by 
the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. 
Gowlland-Debbas, V. (1994). Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State 
Responsibility. The International and Comparative Law Quarterly. Vol. 43, No. 1 
(Jan., 1994), pp. 55-98. 
258 
 
Grieco, J.M. (1988a). Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the 
Newest Liberal Institutionalism. International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 
485-507 
Grieco,J.M. (1988b). Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation: 
Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model. The Journal of Politics, 
Vol. 50, No. 3 pp. 600-624 
Gross, L. (1951). Voting in the Security Council: Abstention from Voting and Absence 
from Meetings. The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 60, No. 2 (Feb., 1951), pp. 209-257. 
Gross, L. (1953). The Double Veto and the Four-Power Statement on Voting in the 
Security Council. Harvard Law Review. Vol. 67, No. 2 (Dec., 1953), pp. 251-280. 
Gross, L. (1968). Voting in the Security Council: Abstention in the Post-1965 
Amendment Phase and Its Impact on Article 25 of the Charter. The American 
Journal of International Law. Vol. 62, No. 2 (Apr., 1968), pp. 315-334. 
Guzzardi, E. and Mullenbach, M.J. (2008). The Politics of Seeking a Permanent Seat on 
the United Nations Security Council: An Analysis of the Case of Japan. Midsouth 
Political Science Review, 2007-2008, Vol. 9, Pp 35-73. 
Guzzardi, J.E. and Mullenbach, M. J. (2010). “The Politics of Seeking a Permanent Seat 
on the United Nations”. Midsouth Political Science Review. 2007-2008, Vol. 9 
Hadwen, J.G. and Kaufmann, J. (1960). How United Nations Decisions are Made. 
Leyden: A.W. Sythoff. 
Haftendorn, H. (1991).The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in 
International Security. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 
1991), pp. 3-17. 
259 
 
Hamil, J. and Spence, J.E. (1994) “South Africa’s Watershed Election.” The World 
Today, Vol. 50, No.7 July. 
Hansson, S.O (1994). Decision Theory a Brief Introduction. Department of Philosophy 
and History of Technology. Stockholm. Royal Institute of Technology. 
Hartzell, C. and Hoddie, M. (2003). Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-
Civil War Conflict Management. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, 
No. 2 (Apr., 2003), pp. 318-332 . 
Hawkins, V. (2003). “Measuring United Nations Security Action and Inaction in the 
1990s: Lessons for Africa,” Africa Security Review. Vol. 12, pp. 61-71. 
Hay, C. and Daniel, W. (1998). “Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism.” 
Political Studies 46(5): 951–957. 
Hay, C. and David, M. (2000). “Introduction: Demystifying Globalization.” In 
DemystifyingGlobalization, ed. Colin Hay, and David Marsh. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Held, D. and Anthony, M. (1998). “The End of the Old Order: Globalization and the 
Helen Leigh-Phippard (1994). Remaking the Security Council: The Options. The World 
Today, Vol. 50, No. 8/9 (Aug. - Sep., 1994), pp. 167-172. 
Hoffman, S. (2001). The debate about intervention in Crocker, Hampson and Aall. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institutes of Peace Press. 
Hopf, T. (1998).   The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.  
International Security, Vol. 23, No. , pp. 171-200. 
260 
 
Hopgood, S. (2000). “Reading the Small Print in Global Civil Society: The Inexorable 
Hegemony of the Liberal Self.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
29(1): 1–25.  
Howard, M. (1998). The United Nations: From War Fighting to Peace Planning, in The 
Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations 1944 – 1994. Ernest R. 
May and Angeliki E. Laiou (eds), Harvard: Harvard University Press  
Huntington, S.P. (1993). Why International Primacy Matters. International Security, Vol. 
17, No. 4, pp. 68-83 
Hurd, I. (2002). Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council.  
Global Governance, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Jan.–Mar. 2002), pp. 35-51 
Hurd, I. (2007). After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security 
Council. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Hutington, S.P. (1993). Why International Primacy Matters. International Security, Vol. 
17, No. 4, pp. 68-83. 
Ibijola, A.O. (2015). Nigeria’s Ambition for the United Nations Security Council within 
the Context of Historical Antecedents and Domestic Realities: Analysis of the 
Prospects and Challenges. Advances in Social Sciences Research Journal, 2(7) 95 
-107 
Ikenberry, G.J., Mastanduno, M. A., Lake, D.A. (1989). Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 457-474. 




Jacobs, L.R. and Shapiro, R.Y. (1999). Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: 
Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership. Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 29, 
No. 3 pp. 592-616 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Center for the Study of 
the Presidency and Congress 
Jashapara, A. (2007). Moving beyond tacit and explicit distinctions: a realist theory of 
organizational knowledge. School of Management, Royal Holloway, University 
of London, UK. 2007. 
Johnston, A. I. (2001). “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments.” 
International Studies Quarterly  Vol. 45(4): 487–515. 
Johnstone, I. (2008). Legislation and Adjudication in the Un Security Council: Bringing 
down the Deliberative Deficit. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
102, No. 2 (Apr., 2008), pp. 275-308. 
Kaldor, M. (2007). Human Security. Cambridge: Polity Press 
Kandiyoti, D. (2004). “Post-conflict Reconstruction, ‘Democratisation’ and Women’s 
Rights.” IDS Bulletin 35(4): 134–136. 
Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick (2010). “UN Security Council Enlargement 
and U.S. Interests”, Council Special Report No. 59, December 2010. Pp 7. (Pages 
1 – 60). 
Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick (2010). “UN Security Council Enlargement 
and U.S. Interests”, Council Special Report No. 59, December 2010. Pp 7. (Pages 
1 – 60). 
262 
 
Kearney, M. and Odusola, A. (2011), “Country Study: Assessing Development Strategies 
to Achieve the MDGs in the Republic of South Africa.” United Nations 
Department for Social and Economic Affairs March 2011. 
Keohane, R and Nye, J. (2005). Power and Interdependence 3rd edition. New York: New 
York University Press. 
Keohane, R. (1980). ‘The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International 
Economic Regimes’ in O. Holsti, and A. George, (eds.), Change in the 
International System, Westview: Westview Press: Boulder Co. 
Keohane, R. (1988). “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies 
Quarterly 32(4): 379–396. 
Keohane, R. (1995). “Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: 
Sovereignty in International Society.” In Whose World Order? Uneven 
Globalisation and the End of the Cold War, ed. Hans Henrik Hohn and Georg 
Sørensen. Oxford: Westview. 
Keohane, R. (1998). “International Institutions: Can Interdependence Work?” Foreign 
Policy 110: 82–96. 
Kirgis, Jr. F.L. (1995). The Security Council's First Fifty Years. The American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 506-539. 
Kirk-Greene (1975). The Genesis of Nigerian Civil War and the theory of Fear. Uppsala. 
The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. Research Report No. 27. 
Kochler, H. (2007).  “Security Council Reform:  A Requirement of International 
Democracy”. Center for the Study of Federalism. V3/25-VIII-2007 
263 
 
Köchler, H. (2007). Security Council Reform: A Requirement of International 
Democracy. Lecture delivered at the International Seminar on “Reforming the 
United Nations: Democracy, Justice and Security in the Age of Globalization”. 
organized by Centro Studi sul Federalismo / Center for the Study of  Federalism, 
Turin, Italy, 8 June 2007. 
Kristian S. Gleditsch, K.S. and Ward, M.D (1999). “A Revised List of Independent States 
since the Congress of Vienna.” International Interactions: Empirical and 
Theoretical Research in International Relations, Vol, 25:4, 393-413, 
Kumar, R (1996) Research Methodology: A Step by Step Guide for Beginners. London: 
Sage Publications. 
Kuna, M.K. (2006). “the Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, and 
Peace Keeping since 1960”.  Department of Sociology, Usman Danfodiyo 
University, Nigeria. 
Lalá, A. (2004) Demilitarisation and Human Security, in Peace, Conflict, and 
Development in Africa: A Reader. Printed in Switzerland: University for Peace. 
Pp 225. 
Lederach, J. P. (1997). Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. 
Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Legro, J.w and Maravcsik, A. (1999). Is anybody still a realist? International Security. 
Vol. 24, No. 2. Pp. 5–55. 
Liang, Y. (1950). Abstention and Absence of a Permanent Member in Relation to the 
Voting Procedure in the Security Council. The American Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 44, No. 4 (Oct., 1950), pp. 694-708. 
264 
 
Lipschutz, R. D. (1992). “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil 
Society.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 21(3): 389–420. 
Lobel and Ratner (1999). Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous Authorizations to 
Use Force, Cease-Fires and the Iraqi Inspection Regime. The American Journal of 
International Law. Vol. 93, No. 1 (Jan., 1999), pp. 124-154. 
Mack, A. (1975). “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric 
Conflict”. World Politics, Vol. 27(2) pp. 175-200. 
Maclaurin, J. (1951). The United Nations and Power Politics. London: George Allen & 
UNWIN LTD. 
Macqueen, B. (2010). “Muslim States and Reform of the United Nations Security 
Council”, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia) Vol. 4, No. 3, 
2010. 
Macqueen, B. (2010). “Muslim States and the Reform of the United Nations Security 
Council. School of Political and Social Inquiry, Monash University”. Journal of 
Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies. Vol. 4, No. 3. 
Malone, D. M. (2000). “The Security Council in the 1990s: Inconsistent, Improvisational, 
Indispensable?” In New Millennium, New Perspectives: The United Nations, 
Security and Governance, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Edward Newman. New York: 
UN University Press. 
Martin, L. and Beth, S. (1998). “Theoretical and Empirical Studies of International 
Institutions.” International Organization 52(4): 729–757. 
265 
 
Mashudu, G.R. (2011). “Post-cold War Military Intervention in Africa, Scientia Militaria, 
South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol.39, No.1, Faculty of Military 
Science, Stellenbosch University. 
Mastanduno, M. David, A. L., and Ikenberry, G.J. (1989). Toward a Realist Theory of 
State Action. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 
457-474. 
Mastanduno, M. Lake, D.A. and Ikenberry, J.G. (1989). Toward a Realist Theory of State 
Action. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4  pp. 457-474. 
Matunhu, J. (2011). A critique of modernization and dependency theories in Africa: 
Critical assessment. African Journal of History and Culture. 
May, R. and Cleaver, G. (1997) “African Peace Keeping: Still Dependent?” International 
Peace Keeeping Vol. 4 No.2 Summer. 
McCandless, E. and Karbo, T. (2011).  Peace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages, 
in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader. Printed in Switzerland: 
University for Peace. 
McCarthy, C. (1999). Regional Integration in sub-Saharan Africa: Past, Present, and 
Future, in Oyejide et al (eds.) Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in 
sub-Saharan Africa. London:  McMillan Press. 




Mearsheimer, J.J (2010). “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve 
Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp.77-94. 
Mearsheimer, J.J. (2011). Why Leaders Lie: The Truth About Lying in International 
Politics.New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mearsheinner, J.J. (2001). The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton 
Mitchell, T. (1991). The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their 
Critics. The American Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 
77-96. 
Moravcsik, A. (2004). “Is There a Democratic Deficit in World Politics? A Framework 
for Analysis.” Government and Opposition 39(2): 336–363. 
Mouton, J. (1996). Understanding Social Research. J. L. vanSchaik Publishers 
Muñoz, H. (1978). Cambio y continuidad en el Debate sobre la Dependencia y el 
Imperialismo. Estudios Internacionales, Año 11, No. 44 (octubre-diciembre 
1978), pp. 88-138. 
Murphy, C. (2000). “Global Governance: Poorly Done and Poorly Understood.” 
International Affairs 76(4): 789–803. 
Murphy, C. (2002). “Why Pay Attention to Global Governance?” In Global Governance: 




Murphy, S.D. (1996): Humanitarian Intervention, the United Nations in an Evolving 
World Order, in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political 
Dimensions cited in J. L. Holzgrefe & Roberto Keohane eds., 2003. 
Nader, L. and Grande, E. (2002) Current Illusions and Delusions about Conflict 
Management-In Africa and Elsewhere. Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp 
573-594. 
Naraghi-Anderlini, S. and El-Bushra, J. (2004). “The Conceptual Framework: Security, 
Peace, Accountability and Rights.” In Inclusive Security, Sustainable Peace: A 
Toolkit for Advocacy and Action. International Alert and Women Waging Peace. 
London: Hunt Alternatives. 
Nasu, H. (2009). International Law on Peacekeeping: A Study of Article 40 of the UN 
Charter. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV. 
Neil Cooper (2006). Peaceful Warriors and Warring Peacemakers, excerpted from 
Economics of Peace and Security Journal, Vol, 1(1), p 20–23. 
Newman, E. (2001). “Human Security and Constructivism.” International Studies 
Perspectives 2(3): 239–251. 
Nolan, M., McCarty, N.M. and Poole, K.T. (1995).  Veto Power and Legislation: An 
Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986. 
Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Oct., 1995), pp. 282-
312. 
Ogunbadejo, O. (1980). “Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Military Rule 1966-79 




Ogunsanwo, A. (1986). “Our Friends’ ‘Their Friends’: Nigeria’s External Relations 
(1960-1985)”. Alfa Communications, Yaba, Lagos 
Oguonu, C.O. (2006). Nigeria and the United Nations Reforms.  African Renaissance 
Vol. 3 No.3. pp104-109 
Okhovat, S. (2012).   The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its 
Reform. University of Sydney. Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies. CPACS 
Working Paper No. 15/1. 
Omotere, T. (2011). “Nigerian Peacekeeping Mission Under the Auspices of the UN 
Security Council From 1960 To 2010: A Study of Sierra Leone”, Published 
Online: EgoBooster Books.  
Oneal, J.R., Frances, H. Oneal, Z. M. and Bruce, R. (1996). “The Liberal Peace: 
Interdependence, Democracy and International Conflict 1950-85.” Journal of 
Peace Research 33(1): 11–28. 
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2014). Petroleum: An Engine for Global 
Development, 6th OPEC International Seminar, 3–4 June 2015 Hofburg Palace 
Vienna, Austria.  
Oren, I. (2009). The Unrealism of Contemporary Realism: The Tension between Realist 
Theory and Realists’ Practice. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 283-301 
Orford, A. (2011). International Authority and Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Ostrom, E. (1998). A behavioural Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of collective 
Action: Presidential Address, American Political association, 1997. The American 





Padelford, N.J. (1960). Politics and Change in the Security Council. International 
Organisation, Vol. 14, No. 3 pp. 381-401. 
Palan, R.P, and Blair, B.M. (1993). On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations. Review of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 385-
399,  Published by: Cambridge University Press 
Palan, R.P. and Blair, B.M. (1993). On the Idealist Origins of the Realist Theory of 
International Relations Author(s): Review of International Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4 
(Oct., 1993), pp. 385-399 Published by: Cambridge University Press. 
Paris, R. (2004). At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict. London: Cambridge 
University Press  1–10, 235–236 
Paris, R. and Timothy D. Sisk, T.D. (2007). Postwar Statebuilding, in ‘Managing 
Contradictions: The Inherent Dilemma of Postwar Statebuilding’, International 
Peace Academy, November 2007, 1–10 
Parpart, J. (1995). “Deconstructing the Development Expert.” In Feminism, 
Postmodernism, Development, ed. Marianne Marchand, and Jane Parpart. 
London: Routledge. 
Paterson, M. and Virk,K. (2013). “Africa, South Africa, and the United Nations’ Security 
Architecture”. Centre for Conflict Resolution. Policy Advisory Group Seminar 
Report. Erinvale Estate, Western Cape, South Africa.  
270 
 
Paul, D.E. (1999). “Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind Alley in 
International Relations.” Review of International Studies 25(2): 217–231. 
Personms, A. (1988) “From Southern Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, 1965-1988.” International 
Relations Vol. IX No.4 November. 
Peter Kagwanja (2008). Cry sovereignty: South Africa and the UN Security Council in a 
hegemonic   world, 2007–2008. International Journal of African Renaissance 
Studies Vol. 3 (1) 2008 pp.35-5 
Peter Middlebrook and Gordon Peake (2011). Right-Financing Security Sector Reform, 
in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader. Printed in Switzerland: 
University for Peace. Pp 257. 
Poorvi Chitalkar and David M. Malone, (2013). The UN Security Council and Iraq. 
United Nations University Working Paper Series, (1 November, 2013). 
Posner, E.A. (2008). Human Welfare, Not Human Rights. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 
108, No. 7 (Nov., 2008), pp. 1758-1801. 
Prospects for World Order.” Review of International Studies 24(5): 219–243. 
Randall L. Schweller (2004). Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of 
Underbalancing. International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall, 2004), pp. 159-201. 
Razali Reform Plan, (1997) (named after the UNGA president, Ambassador – Razali  
Ismail) is also known as the Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the 
Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the 




Reimann, K.D. (2006). “A View from the Top: International Politics, Norms and the 
Worldwide Growth of NGOs.” International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 45–68. 
Reisman, M.W. (1993). The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations. The American 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 1 (Jan., 1993), pp. 83-100. 
Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher. (2004). The United Nations and Global Security. 
New    York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Ricker, W. H. (1995). The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory. Political 
Psychology, Vol. 16, No. 1, Special Issue: Political Economy and Political 
Psychology (Mar., 1995), pp. 23-44. 
Rieth, L., and Zimmer, M., 2004. Transnational Corporations and Conflict Prevention: 
The Impact of Norms on Private Actors. Tübingen: University of Tübingen. 
Roach, J.R. (1952). Seven Decisions that Shaped History by Summer Welles. 
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 33, No 1.pp. 62-64 
Roberts, R.S. (2008). “Fit to Govern: The Native Intelligence of Thabo Mbeki”.  
Johannesburg: David Krut Publishing. 
Ronzitti, N. (2010). “The reform of the UN Security Council”.  Istituto Affari 
Internazionali DOCUMENTI IAI 10, Seminar Paper, IAI-University of Kiel. 
Rome. 
Rothwell, S. (2013). Security Council Reforms: Why it matters and why it’s not 
happening. Published on open Democracy.  
Rubenstein, R.E., (2001). “Basic Human Needs: The Next Steps in Theory 
development”. The International Journal of peace studies. 
272 
 
Ruddick, S., (1995). Maternal Thinking: Towards a politics of Peace. Boston 
Massachussetts: Beacon press.  
Rupiya, M.  (2004). An African Perspective of the Reform of the Security Sector since 
the 1990s, in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader. Printed in 
Switzerland: University for Peace. 
Russett, R. and Sutterlin, J.S. (1991). The U.N. in a New World Order. Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 70, No. 2 (Spring, 1991), pp. 69-83. 
Sahar Okhovat (2011) The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its 
Reform CPACS Working Paper No. 15/1 December 2011 
Sahar Okhovat (2011) The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its 
Reform CPACS Working Paper No. 15/1 December 2011 
Saliu, H.A. (1999) “Nigeria, UN and Contemporary Realities under Abacha” in (ed) 
Hassan Saliu Selected Themes in Nigeria Foreign Policy and International 
Relations Ilorin, Nigeria: Sally and Associates. 
Salthe, S.N. (1985). Evolving Hierarchical Systems. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Samuel Gbaydee Doe, ‘Indigenizing Postconflict State Reconstruction in Africa: A 
Conceptual Framework’, Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, 2:1 (June 2009), 
http://www.apcj.upeace.org/issues/APCJ_June2009_Vol2_Num1.pdf  
Sens, A.G. (2004). From Peace-keeping to Peace-building: the United Nations and the 
Challenge of Intrastate War, in United Nations and Global security (eds) Price, 
R.M, and Zacher, M.W. New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 
273 
 
Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M. (1954). A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power 
in a Committee System. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 48, No. 3 
(Sep., 1954), pp. 787-792 
Slaughter, A. (2010). International Relations, Principal Theories. Published in: Wolfrum, 
R. (Ed.) Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Smythies, J.R and Ramachandran, V. S. (1997) An empirical refutation of the direct 
realist theory of perception, Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 
40:4, 437-438, DOI: 
Snyder, F. G. (1980). Law and Development in the Light of Dependency Theory. Law & 
Society Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, Contemporary Issues in Law and Social Science 
(Spring, 1980), pp. 723-804. 
Starr, H. (1992). “Democracy and War: Choice, Learning and Security Communities.” 
Journal of Peace Research 29(2): 207–213. 
Steckel, R.H. (2008). Heights and Human Welfare: Recent Developments and New 
Directions. Nber Series Working Paper, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Studies 46(5): 951–957. 
The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 85, No. 1 (Jan., 1991), pp. 63-74 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 1 (Jan., 1996), pp. 150-
161. 
The Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution, and Peacekeeping since1960 
Muhammad Juma Kuna Department of Sociology Usmanu Danfodiyo University 
Sokoto Paper Presented at the Workshop on Nigeria and the Reform of the United 
274 
 
Nations, Organized by the Centre for Democratic Development, Research and 
Training, Hanwa, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Saturday, June 11th, 2005 
Morgenthau, H.J (2005). Politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and peace. 7th 
Edition. New York: McGraw Hill Higher Education. 
Thomson, M. and Verwij, M. (eds), (2006). Clumsy Solutions for a complex world: 
Governance, Politics and plural perceptions. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Tim Murithi, (2006). Towards A Symbiotic Partnership: The UN Peacebuilding 
Commission and the Evolving AU/NEPAD Post-Conflict Reconstruction 
Framework. Adekeye Adebajo and Helen Scanlon (eds.), A Dialogue of the Deaf: 
Essays on Africa and the United Nations (Johannesburg, Jacana, 2006), 243–60 
Tope, O. (2011). Nigeria Peacekeeping Mission under the auspices of the UN Security 
Council from 1960 to 2010: A study of Sierre Leaone. Ogun state, Nigeria: 
Egobooster Books. 
Transfonnation for Self-Reliance: Proceedings of a National Conference Ibadan: 
Fountain Publication. 
True, J. and Michael, M. (2001). “Transnational Networks and Policy Diffusion: The 
Tsang, E.W.K. and Kwan, K. (1999). Replication and Theory Development in 
Organizational Science: A Critical Realist Perspective. The Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 759-780 
Tukur, M. (N.D) Nigeria’s External Relations: The United Nations as a Forum and Policy 
Medium in the Conduct of Foreign Policy. October 1960-December 1965, Zaria: 
Institute of Administration, Ahmadu Bello University. 
275 
 
Udeh, C. (2005). Nigeria and the UN Security Council Permanent Seat, in the Vanguard 
(Lagos) September 5, 2005, P.3. 
Vasquez, J.A. (1998). The power of Power Politics: from Classical realism to 
neotraditionalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Venter, A. (2003).  Reform of The United Nations Security Council: A Comment on the 
South African Position. International Journal on World Peace, Vol. 20, No.4 
2003, pp. 29-47. 
Voeten, E. (2001). Outside Options and the Logic of Security Council Action. The 
American Political Science Review. Vol. 95, No. 4 (Dec., 2001), pp. 845-858 
Walker, R. B. J. (1990). “Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons 
of Contemporary Political Practice.” In Contending Sovereignties: Redefining 
Political Community, ed. R. B. J. Walker and S. H. Mendlowitz. London and 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Wallensten, P. and Johansson, P. (2013). Security Council Decision in Perspective. 
Walt, S.M. (1997). The Progressive Power of Realism. The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 931-935. 
Walt, S.M. (1997). The Progressive Power of Realism. The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, pp. 931-935 
Waltz, K.N (1979). Theory of International Politics. Long Groove, Illinois: Waveland 
Press Inc. 




Wayman, F.W.and Dieh, P.F. (1994). Reconstructing Realpolitik.  Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press. Pp 1 - 227  
Wedgwood, R. (2003). The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and 
Preemptive Self-Defense. The American Journal of International Law. Vol. 97, 
No. 3 (Jul., 2003), pp. 576-585. 
Weiss, T. (2003). The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Washington Quarterly. Vol.26, No.4, 
147–161. 
Weiss, T. G. et al (eds) (2010). The United Nations and Changing world politics.  
Philadelphia: Westview Press. 
Weiss, T.G. and Young, K. (2005). Compromise and Credibility: Security Council 
Reform? Security Dialogue vol. 36, no. 2, June 2005. 
Wendt, A. (1987). “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.” 
International Organization 41(3): 335–370. 
Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Weston, B.H. (1991). Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision 
Making: Precarious Legitimacy. The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 
85, No. 3 (Jul., 1991), pp. 516-535. 
Williams, J. (2003). “Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do Good 
Fences Still Make Good Neighbours?” Geopolitics 8(2): 25–46. 
277 
 
Wood, M.C. (1996).  Security Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent 
Developments 
Wouters, J. and Ruys, T. (2005). Security Council Reform: a new veto for a new 
century?, Veto Power in the Security Council at the Beginning of the 21st 
Century, Working Paper No 78 – June 2005 
Yang, L. Sun, G. and Martin, J.E. (2008). Making Strategy Work:A Literature Review on 
the Factors influencingStrategy Implementation,ICA Working Paper 2/2008, 
Institute of Corporate Communication,University of Lugano (USI),Via Buffi 13, 
6900 Lugano, Switzerland. 
 
Published and unpublished thesis and dissertations 
Ekwealor C.T. (2013). United Nations Security Council resolutions in Africa: the 
conundrum of state and human insecurity in Libya. Master of Arts dissertation, 





Online and Internet Sources 
Africanholocaust, (2012) African Leadership: the Roots of Failure in Africa. Available 
at: http://www.africanholocaust.net/news_ah/africanleadership.html.[Accessed: 
26 September, 2014]. 
278 
 
BBC News (2014). Nigeria becomes Africa’s biggest economy. 
http://bbc.cocuk/business-26913493 
Council Pursuant to their 1992 Summit Meeting.” Available at http://www.un.org/french/ 
Council.”S⁄PRST⁄(2000)⁄7.Availableat 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/Council.” S⁄PRST⁄(2004) ⁄ 40. Available 
at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/docs/cs/repertoire/89-
92/CHAPTER%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/Item%2028%20_SC%20respons%2
0in%20maint%20IPS_.pdf.[Accessed March 26, 2008]. 
Eso, H. (2003). “Nigeria: The saving of Liberia, The Impartial Observer”, Available at: 
http://www.kwenu.com/publication/hankeso/saving_liberia.html. [Date accessed: 
05/03/2014]. 
Hamad, Ahmad, Azem, (2005). “The Reconceptualization of Conflict Management: 
Peace, Conflict and Development”. An Interdisciplinary Journal, Vol. 7, July 
2005, available at: http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk.[Date accessed: 
05/03/2014]. 
Hill, T. (2004). “Three Generations of UN-Civil Society Relations: A Quick Sketch.” 
Global Policy Forum. Available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/ngo-




Marwa, Al-A’sar (2014). What are Egypt’s chances of gaining UNSC non-permanent 




permanent-seat/ [Accessed: 3 December 2014]. 
Personnel in Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Report of the Secretary-
General.”S⁄(2000)⁄101.Availableat: 
 http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/291/43/PDF/ 
Serrão, O. (2011). South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011-2012. Friedrich Ebert 
Stiftung.  UN Security Council in Focus. http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/iez/08166.pdf 
Rothwell, S. (2013). Security Council reform: why it matters and why it's not happening. 
Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net. [date accessed: 7 November 2013]. 
South Africa Department of Foreign Affairs (2009). South Africa in the United Nations 
Security Council (2007-2008), February 2009, Department of Foreign Affairs, 
Republic of South Africa. available at: www.dfa.gov.za. [Date accessed: 
3/12/2014]. 
State Information Services (2014). Your gateway to Egypt. Available at: 
http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?ArtID=312#.VH7
2tNKUenQ[Accessed: 3 December 2014. 
The Global Evolution of Digital Commerce and MENA eCommerce, (2013) 
http://www.visamiddleeast.com/me/common/include/uploads/ecommerce_apr201
3.pdf 
UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2006/507), 19 
July 2006, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/Notes/s-2006-507.pdf.  
280 
 
UN Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council (S/2006/507), 19 
July 2006, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/Notes/s-2006-507.pdf. 
United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, (2014). 
United Nations Regional Groups of Member States. Available at:  
http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml [Accessed: 15 
November, 2014] 
United Nations Department of Public Information (2013). News and Media Division. 
New York. 7 November, 2013. Available at: 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sgt2926.doc.htm.  Date accessed: 05/03/2014. 
United Nations Department of Public Information (2013). News and Media Division. 
New York. 8 November, Available at: 
www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2013/sgt2926.doc.htm.  Date accessed: 05/02/2014. 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (1992). “Statement by the President of the 
Securityhttp//www.un.org/doc.sc/unsc/340/73/PDF/N0034073.pdf? [Accessed 
March 26, 2008]. 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). (2000a). “Statement by the President of the 
Security. available at: 
http//www.un.org/doc.sc/unsc/340/73/PDF/N0034073.pdf?OpenElement. [Date accessed: 
March 26, 2008]. 
United Nations Security Council(UNSC). (2000b). “The Role of United Nations 
Peacekeeping. Available at:http//www.un.org/doc.sc/unsc/340/73/PDF.[Date 
Accessed: March 26, 2008] 
United Nations Security Council. (2004). “Statement by the President of the Security 
281 
 
United Nations. (2007). “UN Security Council: Background.” Available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_background.html. (Accessed March 26, 2008). 
United Nations. 1983. “Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Security Council.” S ⁄ 96 ⁄ 

























I, EKWEALOR Chinedu Thomas, of the University of KwaZulu Natal, kindly invite 
you to participate in the research project entitled The Nexus between the United 
Nations Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa. 
 
This research project is undertaken as part of the requirements of the PhD, which is 
carried out through the University of KwaZulu-Natal, School of Social sciences. The 
aim of this study is to engage in the United Nations Security Council reform and 
peacebuilding in Africa and determine whether African exclusion from the permanent 
seat without veto negatively impacts on Africa’s overall peacebuilding agendas. 
Participation in this research project is voluntary.  
 
You may refuse to participate or withdraw from the research project at any stage and 
for any reason without any form of disadvantage. There will be no monetary gain from 
participating in this research project. Confidentiality and anonymity of records 
identifying you as a participant will be maintained by the School of Social Sciences, at 
the University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about participating in this study, please feel free 
to contact myself, my supervisor, or the University Research Ethics office at the 
numbers indicated below. 
 
The interview should take you about 15 minutes to complete. 
Thank you for participating in this research project. 
 
---------------------- -------------------- 
Signature   Date 
 
I…………………………………………………………………………(full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the 





I hereby provide consent to:  









Name: ........................................... Date: ....................... Signature: ................................. 
 
Supervisor’s details 
Supervisor: Dr Khondlo Mtshali 
Institution: University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Telephone number: +27 (0) 33 260 5895,  
Email address: mtshalik@ukzn.ac.za 
 
Research Office details 
Contact: MsPhumeleleXimba 
Humanities and Social Science Research Ethics Office 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Telephone Number: +27312603587 
Email address: ximbap@ukzn.ac.za 
 
Student’s details 
Researcher: EKWEALOR Chinedu Thomas 
Institution; University of KwaZulu-Natal  
Telephone number: +27734099690 







I………………………………………………………………………… (full names of 
participant) hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the 
nature of the research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
 
 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. I understand the intention of the research. I hereby agree to participate. 
 







































Appendix 3: Letter of Request to the African Union 
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Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. 
Cell phone: + 27 (0) 849 893 972 
Email: 210556027@stu.ukzn.ac.za 
To Whom It May Concern: 
 
African Union Headquarters, 
P.O.Box 3243, 
Roosvelt Street, Old Airport Area, 
W21K19, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 
15 May 2015 
 
My name is EKWEALOR CHINEDU THOMAS (student number: 210556027). I am a PhD 
candidate studying Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal (UKZN), South Africa. The title of my thesis is: The Nexus between the United Nations 
Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa 
 
The objective of this study is to:  
1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a 
permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council; 
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa’s permanent 
representation; 
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations 
Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African peacebuilding and 
security issues. 
As part of the requirement for the award of PhD degree I am expected to undertake original 
research on the subject under study. The UKZN ethical compliance regulations require me to 
provide proof that the relevant authority where the research is to be undertaken has given 
approval. 
 
My supervisor is Dr Khondlo Mtshali of the School of Social Sciences, University of KwaZulu-
Natal, Pietermaritzburg Campus, South Africa. Available at: Mtshalik@ukzn.ac.zaTelephone: 
+27332605892. The Humanities and Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee contact details 
are as follows: Ms Phumelele Ximba, University of KwaZulu-Natal Research Office. Email: 
ximbap@ukzn.ac.za, Telephone: +27312603587. 
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05 May 2015 
 
My name is EKWEALOR CHINEDU THOMAS (student number: 210556027). I am a PhD 
candidate studying Conflict Transformation and Peace Studies at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal (UKZN), South Africa. The title of my thesis is: The Nexus between the United Nations 
Security Council reform and peacebuilding in Africa 
 
The objective of this study is to:  
 
1. To determine how has Africa contributed to its continued exclusion from obtaining a 
permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council; 
2. To determine how the United Nations Security Council inhibited Africa’s permanent 
representation; 
3. To articulate what lessons can be learnt from the composition of the United Nations 
Security Council permanent seat, in terms of how to deal with African peacebuilding and 
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As part of the requirement for the award of PhD degree I am expected to undertake original 
research on the subject under study. The UKZN ethical compliance regulations require me to 
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Questions on African exclusion from the permanent seat (Question 1 [Q1] – Objective 1 
[O1]); Q2 – O2; and Q3 – O3. 
 
1. As an independent observer, what do you think are the remote and immediate causes of African 






2. Do you think that the non-permanent seat to African states affects its peacebuilding roles in 













4. Do you think that Africa (particularly Nigeria) will make a successful bid to be included in the 




















Appendix 8: Interview Schedule for the African Union Officials  
 
Questions on causes of African exclusion and  Security Council reform – Africa’s interests 
(Question 1 [Q1] – Objective 1 [O1]); Q2 – O2; and Q3 – O3. 
 
1. What are the factors responsible for the AU exclusion from the permanent seat, and what 





2. The AU has been excluded from the permanent seat and veto power of the Security 
Council since UN formation in 1945, how is the AU working towards its inclusion into 




3. Why is the African members of the UN politically marginalised in the permanent 
category of the Council, has the AU identified a single candidate and supported same for 
















6. What would you recommend for the African members of the UN, with a view to 











Appendix 9: Interview Schedule for United Nations Officials  
 
Questions on United Nations Security Council reform (Question 1 [Q1] – Objective 1 [O1]); Q2 
– O2; and Q3 – O3. 
1. What would you say is the importance of the United Nations Security Council to the 



















5. Bearing in mind that the P5 has resisted any reform that will affect their permanent seat 




6. Do you think that the Council will be better equipped with veto powers decentralised 





7. What would you recommend as a best way forward towards reform and inclusion to 












Appendix 10 – The International Criminal Court Indictees (World 
Leaders) 
 
Name of the ICC Indictee   Continent Country Year and status of case 
Bahr Idriss Abu Garda Africa Sudan On 7 May 2009, Abu Garda was indicted and 
summoned to appear before the Court on 18 May 2009 
and on 23 April 2010 Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the 
Prosecutor’s application to appeal its decision, thus 
ending the proceedings in the case. 
Mohammed Ali Africa Kenya Mohammed Ali was indicted on 8 March 2011 and 
summoned to appear before the Court on 8 April 2011. 
Hearing was held from 21 September 2011 to 5 
October 2011. On 23 January 2012, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II decided not to confirm the charges against 
Ali, thus ending the proceedings against him. 
Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain Africa  Sudan Abdallah Banda was indicted on 27 August 2009 and 
the Court on 17 June 2010 confirmed charges and 
hearing was held on 8 December 2010. On 7 March 
2011 Pre-Trial Chamber I confirmed all the charges 
against him. And on 11 September 2014, Trial 
Chamber IV replaced the summons to appear with an 
arrest warrant and suspended the case until Banda 
appears in court. 
Walter Osapiri Barasa Africa Kenya Walter Barasa was indicted on 2 August 2013. The 
warrant of arrest against Barasa was unsealed on 2 
October 2013. Barasa is currently in Kenya, where the 
government initiated extraditions proceedings against 
him. In January 2014, the High Court of Kenya ruled 
that he can be extradited, but he is currently appealing 
the ruling. 
Omar al-Bashir Africa Sudan Omar al-Bashir was indicted on 4 March 2009. On 26 
March 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber II referred the Al-
Bashir to the Security Council. Since then, Al-Bashir 
has traveled to Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Nigeria, 
Malawi, and South Africa, without arrest. 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Africa Congo Jean-Pierre Bemba of the Congo was indicted on 23 
May 2008. On 10 June 2008, the arrest warrant was 
amended and Bemba was arrested in Belgium on 24 
May 2008, transferred to the Court's custody on 3 July 
2008. The confirmation of charges hearing was held 
from 12 to 15 January 2009, and on 15 June 2009 Pre-
Trial Chamber II partially confirmed the charges 
against Bemba. The trial against Bemba began on 22 
November 2010 and is ongoing. 
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Charles Blé Goudé Africa DRC Charles Blé Goudé was indicted on 21 December 2011 
and arrested on 17 January 2013 in Ghana, and 
extradited to Côte d'Ivoire. On 22 March 2014, the 
Ivorian government transferred him to the Court’s 
custody in The Hague on 23 March. The confirmation 
of charges hearing was held from 29 September to 2 
October 2014, and on 11 December 2014, the Pre-
Trial Chamber confirmed all the charges against him 
and committed him to trial. 
Muammar Gaddafi Africa  Libya Muammar Gaddafi (assassinated Libyan leader) was 
indicted on 27 June 2011. Gaddafi was killed in the 
Libyan city of Sirte on 20 October 2011 and the Court 
terminated proceedings against him on 22 November 
2011. 
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi   Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was indicted on 27 June 2011. 
In 2012, Libyan authorities stated their intention to try 
Gaddafi in Libya. However, on 10 December 2014 the 
Pre-Trial Chamber found Libya in non-compliance 
with several of its orders, including an order to 
transfer Gaddafi to its custody, and accordingly it 
referred Libya to the Security Council 
Laurent Gbagbo Africa Cote d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo was (the former president of Cote 
d’Ivoire) indicted on 23 November 2011. On 29 
November 2011, Gbagbo was transferred to the Court. 
On 5 December 2011 he made his first appearance 
before the Court and the confirmation of charges 
hearing took place from 19 to 28 February 2013 before 
the pre-trial chamber and on 12 June 2014 it 
confirmed all the charges against him. Trail is 
ongoing. 
Simone Gbagbo Africa Cote d’Ivoire Simone Gbagbo was indicted on 29 February 2012. 
On 22 November 2012 the warrant of arrest was 
unsealed. On 11 December 2014, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber dismissed Côte d'Ivoire's challenge to the 
admissibility of the case. However, the domestic 
prosecution of Simone Gbagbo continued and on 10 
March 2015 a court sentenced her to 20 years' 
imprisonment.  
Ahmad Muhammad Harun (Ahmad 
Harun) 
Africa Sudan Ahmad Muhammad Harun was indicted on 27 April 
2007. Since his indictment, Harun has continued to 
play an active role in the Sudanese government, which 
has refused to cooperate with the Court. He served as 
Sudan’s Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs 
until May 2009 when he was appointed Governor of 
South Kordofan. 
Abdel Rahim Muhammad Hussein Africa Sudan Abdel Rahim Hussein indicted on 1 March 2012. 
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Hussein continues to play an active role in the 
Sudanese government (which has refused to cooperate 
with the Court) and he is currently serving as Minister 
of Defense. 
Saleh Jerbo Africa Sudan Saleh Jerbo was indicted on 27 August 2009. Jerbo 
was summoned to appear before the Court on 17 June 
2010 and the confirmation of charges hearing was held 
on 8 December 2010. On 22 April 2013 Radio 
Dabanga reported that Jerbo had been killed on 19 
April. On 4 October 2013, the Court terminated the 
proceedings to resume upon prove that is alive. 
Germain Katanga Africa DRC Germain Katanga was indicted on 2 July 2007. After 
the Court issued a warrant for his arrest, Katanga was 
transferred to the Court on 17 October 2007. His trial 
began on 24 November 2009. The Trial Chamber 
delivered the judgment in the case on 7 March 2014 
finding Katanga guilty of four counts of war crimes 
and one count of crime against humanity. On 23 May 
2014, Katanga was sentenced to 12 years' 
imprisonment. He is currently at the Court's Detention 
Centre in The Hague pending transfer to a state where 
he will serve the remainder of his sentence 
Uhuru Kenyatta Africa Kenya Uhuru Kenyatta is the current President of the 
Republic of Kenya was indicted on 8 March 2011. 
Kenyatta was summoned to appear before the Court 
on 8 April 2011 and the confirmation of charges 
hearing was held from 21 September 2011 to 5 
October 2011. All the charges against Kenyatta were 
confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber II on 23 January 
2012. However, before the trial began, the Prosecutor 
announced on 3 December 2014 that she was 
withdrawing all of the charges. Accordingly, the Trial 
Chamber terminated the proceedings against Mr. 
Kenyatta on 13 March 2015 
Joseph Kony Africa Uganda Joseph Kony of Uganda was indicted on 8 July 2005. 
Kony is currently at large and his whereabouts are 
unknown, although he is suspected to be in either the 
Central African Republic or a neighboring country. 
Henry Kosgey Africa Kenya Henry Kosgey was indicted on 8 March 2011. Kosgey 
first appeared before the Court, voluntarily, on 7 April 
2011. On 23 January 2012, Pre-Trial Chamber II 
decided not to confirm the charges against Kosgey 
therefore ending his proceedings before the Court. 
Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman (Ali 
Kushayb) 
 
Africa Sudan Ali Kushayb was indicted on 27 April 2007. On 
October 2008 it was reported that Kushayb was 
arrested by Sudanese officials in connection to war 
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crimes allegedly committed in Darfur. Despite the 
arrest, no evidence of any further proceedings has 
emerged. It is also not clear if Kushayb is in detention 
and his whereabouts are not publicly known. 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Africa DRC Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was indicted on 10 February 
2006. Lubanga Dyilo was arrested on 19 March 2005 
by Congolese authorities and transferred to the Court’s 
custody on 16 March 2006. His trial began on 26 
January 2009 and ended with his conviction of all 
three counts on 14 March 2012. On 10 July 2012 he 
was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. 
Raska Lukwiya Africa Uganda Raska Lukwiya was indicted on 8 July 2005. On 12 
August 2006 the Ugandan military killed Lukwiya in a 
battle with LRA forces. Following the confirmation of 
his death, the Court terminated proceedings against 
Lukwiya on 11 July 2007. 
Callixte Mbarushimana Africa DRC Callixte Mbarushimana was indicted on 28 September 
2010. Mbarushimana was arrested in France on 11 
October 2010 and transferred to the Court on 25 
January 2011. On 16 December 2011, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I ruled to decline to confirm the charges 
against him and ordered his release. The Prosecutor's 
appeal against the decision was rejected, and on 23 
December 2011, Mbarushimana became the first 
person to be detained by the ICC and then set free; at 
his request, he was released in France.  
Sylvestre Mudacumura Africa DRC Sylvestre Mudacumura was indicted on 13 July 2012. 
Mudacumura continues to lead the FDLR in the 
eastern DRC and is at large as a fugitive. 
Francis Muthaura Africa Kenya Francis Muthaura was indicted on 8 March 2011. 
Muthaura was summoned to appear before the Court 
on 8 April 2011 and the confirmation of charges 
hearing was held from 21 September 2011 to 5 
October 2011. On 11 March 2013, the Prosecutor 
announced that her office would withdraw all charges 
against Muthaura, citing a lack of cooperation from 
the Kenyan government, the death and killing of 
witnesses, and the recantation of testimony by a key 
witness who was bribed by agents of the accused. On 
18 March 2013, the Trial Chamber granted the 
Prosecutor permission to withdraw the charges and 
terminated all proceedings against Muthaura 
Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui Africa DRC Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui was indicted on 6 July 2007. 
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After the Court issued an arrest warrant, Ngudjolo 
Chui was detained on 6 February 2008 by Congolese 
authorities, transferred to the Court the next day, and 
made he his first appeared before the Court on 11 
February 2008. The confirmation of charges hearing 
was held from 27 June 2008 to 18 July 2008 and on 26 
September 2008 the Pre-Trial Chamber confirms all 
but three charges against Ngudjolo Chui. His trial 
began on 24 November 2009 and on 18 December 
2012; Trial Chamber II delivered the judgment 
acquitting Ngudjolo Chui. The Prosecutor appealed 
the judgment, but the Appeals Chamber upheld the 
acquittal on 27 February 2015. 
Bosco Ntaganda Africa DRC Bosco Ntaganda was indicted on 22 August 2006. The 
Congolese government refused to arrest him and in 
2009 Ntaganda became a general in the armed forces 
in the city of Goma in North Kivu province. In April 
2012 he and his troops defected from the military and 
left Goma to form the March 23 Movement, an armed 
group that began attacking villages and towns around 
Goma. On 18 March 2013, following reports of 
clashes between factions of the March 23 Movement, 
Ntaganda fled to Rwanda and entered the Embassy of 
the United States in Kigali. He requested that the 
United States facilitate his surrender the Court. On 22 
March, the ICC took custody of Ntaganda and 
transferred him to The Hague. His first appearance 
before the Court took place on 26 March 2013. The 
confirmation of charges hearing occurred from 10 to 
14 February 2014 and on 9 June 2014 all the charges 
against Ntaganda were confirmed by the pre-trial 
chamber. 
Okot Odhiambo Africa Uganda Okot Odhiambo of Uganda was indicted on 8 July 
2005. In 2014, an LRA defector claimed that the 
Ugandan military wounded Odhiambo in October 
2013 during an ambush in the Central African 
Republic and that he later died from his injuries. In 
February 2015, Ugandan officials announced that they 
had exhumed a grave believed to contain Odhiambo's 
remains and are conducting DNA testing on the 
remains to verify if Odhiambo is deceased. However, 
since his death has not been confirmed, Odhiambo is 
still considered to be at large as a fugitive by the 
Court. 
Dominic Ongwen Africa Uganda Dominic Ongwen was indicted on 8 July 2005. 
Ongwen surrendered to United States military advisors 
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assisting Ugandan forces on 6 January 2014 in the 
Central African Republic. The Court took custody of 
Ongwen on 17 January 2015 and he was transferred to 
the Court's detention center on 21 January. He made 
his first appearance before the Court on 26 January. 
Vincent Otti Africa Uganda Vincent Otti was indicted on 8 July 2005. In 
December 2007, BBC News reported that on 2 
October 2007 Otti had been executed on orders from 
Joseph Kony, the commander-in-chief of the LRA. 
Kony later confirmed that Otti was dead to Riek 
Machar, a mediator between the Ugandan government 
and the LRA. Because Otti's death has not been 
independently verified, the Court still considers him to 
be at large as a fugitive and proceedings against him 
are ongoing. 
William Samoei Ruto  Africa Kenya William Ruto (the current Deputy President of the 
Republic of Kenya) was indicted on 8 March 2011. 
Ruto first appeared before the Court, voluntarily, on 7 
April 2011. All the charges against Ruto were 
confirmed by Pre-Trial Chamber II on 23 January; 
Ruto’s trial began on 10 September 2013, and is 
ongoing. 
Joshua Arap Sang Africa Kenya Joshua Sang was indicted on 8 March 2011. Sang first 
appeared before the Court, voluntarily, on 7 April 
2011 and through the confirmation of charges hearing, 
all the charges against Sang were confirmed by Pre-
Trial Chamber II on 23 January 2012 Sang’s trial 
began on 10 September 2013, and is ongoing. 
Abdullah Senussi Africa Libya Abdullah Senussi was indicted on 27 June 2011. 
Senussi was arrested on 17 March 2012 at Nouakchott 
International Airport in Mauritania after he arrived on 
a flight from Casablanca, Morocco with a fake Malian 
passport. On 5 September 2012 he was extradited to 
Libya. On 11 October 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled 
that the case against Senussi was inadmissible before 
the ICC because of ongoing proceedings against him 
in Libya. On 24 July 2014, the Appeals Chamber 
confirmed the decision. 
Aimé Kilolo Musamba Africa DRC Aimé Kilolo Musamba Current situation: Interim 
release. Arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 
November 2013, made public on 28 November 2013 
Transfer to the ICC on 25 November 2013. He made 
initial appearance on 27 November 2013 and 
confirmation of charges on 11 November 2014. 
Scheduled opening of the trial is 29 September 2015. 
Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo Africa DRC Jean-Jacques Mangenda Kabongo’s current situation is 
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interim release. Arrest warrant was issued under seal 
on 20 November 2013, made public on 28 November 
2013. He was transferred to the ICC on 4 December 
2013 and made initial appearance on 5 December 
2013. Decision on the Confirmation of charges was on 
11 November 2014. Scheduled opening of the trial is 
29 September 2015. 
Fidèle Babala Wandu Africa DRC Fidèle Babala Wandu’s current situation is interim 
release. His arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 
November 2013 and made public on 28 November 
2013. He was transferred to the ICC on 25 November 
2013 and his initial appearance was on 27 November 
2013. Decision on the Confirmation of charges was on 
11 November 2014 and scheduled opening of the trial 
is 29 September 2015. 
Narcisse Arido Africa CAR Narcisse Arido’s current situation is interim release. 
Arrest warrant was issued under seal on 20 November 
2013, made public on 28 November 2013 and he was 
transferred to the ICC on 18 March 2014. Initial 
appearance was on 20 March 2014. Decision on the 
confirmation of charges was on 11 November 2014. 
Scheduled opening of the trial is on 29 September 
2015. 
Bahar Idriss Abu Garda Africa Sudan Bahar Idriss Abu Garda’s summons to appear was 
issued under seal on 7 May 2009 and unseald on 17 
May 2009.  First appearance was on 18 May 2009. 
Confirmation Hearing was on 19-29 October 2009. On 
8 February 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I refused to 
confirm the charges against Mr Abu Garda. On 23 
April, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber I issued a decision 
rejecting the Prosecutor’s application to appeal the 
decision declining to confirm the charges.  
Source: Data worked out from the ICC official website, 2015 
 
 
 
